See v Transport for NSW
[2012] NSWADT 51
•23 March 2012
Administrative Decisions Tribunal
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: See v Transport for NSW [2012] NSWADT 51 Hearing dates: 13 March 2012 Decision date: 23 March 2012 Jurisdiction: General Division Before: C Huntsman, Judicial member Decision: The decision is affirmed.
Catchwords: Criminal charges; burglary; serious offence; suspension of taxi driver authority Legislation Cited: Sections 4, 33(3), 33F Passenger Transport Act 1990 Cases Cited: Chowdhury v Department of Transport and Infrastructure [2010] NSWADT 199
Saadieh v Director General, Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 68
Department of Transport and Infrastructure v Murray (GD) 2011 NSWADTAP
Director General, Department of Transport v Z (No.2) (GD) [2002] NSWADTAP 37 Nasour v Director-General, Transport NSW[2011] NSWADT 91
Director General, Transport NSW v AIC (GD) [2011] NSWADTAP 65Category: Principal judgment Parties: Christopher John See (Applicant)
Transport for New South Wales (Respondent)Representation: The Peoples Solicitors (Applicant)
Smythe Wozniak Solicitors (Respondent)
File Number(s): 123024
Judgment
Background
This was an application by Mr Christopher John See, the applicant, for review of a decision of the respondent, Transport for New South Wales, to suspend his taxi driver authority. The respondent issued a notice of suspension by letter dated 17 January 2012. The statement of reasons attached to the notice detail that the respondent, when conducting data matching with the New South Wales police, identified that the applicant had been charged with criminal offences. The police report received by the respondent, as detailed in the statement of reasons, indicated that goods were stolen to the value of $450,000.
The applicant applied to the tribunal for review of the decision to suspend his taxi driver authority, and also for a stay of the reviewable decision. The tribunal refused to stay the decision and made directions to progress the hearing of the matter.
The applicant has driven taxis since 1990. During this period he has also been in full-time employment in the Commonwealth Public Service.
The applicant's case
The applicant provided written evidence, by affidavit, and written submissions to the tribunal at the hearing. The applicant was not required for cross-examination. In the affidavit the applicant noted a number of matters about his personal circumstances, and the hardship which would be caused to him if the decision to suspend his driver authority was affirmed by the tribunal. He noted in his affidavit that as a taxi driver since 1990 he has never been subject of any complaint to the authority. He notes that on 19 December 2011 he was charged with the offence of burglary, and that he had entered a plea of not guilty to the offence and the matters are still to be heard. As a result of the charges he was suspended without pay from his employment in the Commonwealth Public Service in January 2012. He notes that his taxi driver authority has also been suspended because of the criminal charges. He states that the criminal charges do not relate to his employment as a taxi driver. He states that he has not been able to find other employment since his suspension. He is in financial hardship and notes that if he is unable to secure income there will be significant disruption to his two school-age children who may have to transfer schools due to an inability to pay school fees. He says he has never been subjected to allegations of misconduct in the workplace or any other allegations relating to violence or intimidation. He notes he is the primary carer for his 93-year-old mother and that he resides in the duplex next door to his mother.
The applicant also provided a number of references. A reference from Michael Bridle, Fleet manager, Legion Cabs addressed "to whom it may concern" dated 3 January 2012, notes that the network to date has had no customer complaints regarding the applicant and states that he is always been honest, friendly and pleasant to deal with. A second reference by Mr Bridle, of 9 February 2012, states that Mr Bridle is aware of the criminal charges, and the suspension of the authority, and states that if the authority is reinstated he is willing to provide further work to the applicant.
A statutory declaration by Mr Ankeshian states that the applicant has driven taxis for him since 1998. The reference states that the actions (criminal charges) are out of character and that the applicant has always worked well. A further reference by Wendy Gray, of 25 January 2012, states an awareness of the charges and that the applicant's taxi driver license is in issue. Ms Gray notes her own professional background and that she has known the applicant, as friend and sister-in-law, for 11 years. She notes the applicant's involvement in voluntary activities at the children's schools and that he is a valued and respected member of these communities. A reference by Father Scarf, Franciscan Friary, addressed to the tribunal, supports the applicant. He said he first came into contact with the applicant's family two years ago when he conducted the funeral for the applicant's father. He states that the applicant will carry out his obligations in a conscientious way. A statutory declaration by Esme See, mother of the applicant, details the support which he provides to her, to assist her, in her elderly age, maintaining independent living in her own home. A reference by Gregory See refers to the hardship which would be occasioned to the applicant and his family members if he was unable to earn an income. Gregory Sees states that the allegations against the applicant are contested, and that in the grant of bail, the existence of strong family ties was emphasised. A notice of the undertaking of bail was provided by the applicant which states that the criminal information relates to burglary. The bail conditions indicate that the applicant was granted bail on fairly strict conditions, including a surety of $350,000, daily reporting to police and other bail conditions.
In written submissions, which were supplemented by oral submissions by the applicant's legal representative at the hearing, it is put that the tribunal would consider the following matters as relevant and in favour of the applicant retaining his taxi driver authority: the applicant's otherwise clean criminal record; his unremarkable driving record given his occupation; his reputation in the community; the fact that the charges are to be defended; the lack of a history of violence; the lack of complaints against the applicant as a taxi driver; and the hardship to the applicant of having his licence suspended whilst awaiting trial. It is said that the tribunal would reserve judgement as to the applicant's character and allow him to continue to earn a livelihood pending the outcome of the criminal charges. It is submitted that if subsequently convicted the licence could be cancelled at that time. It is stated that the applicant is otherwise of good repute and character on the evidence before the tribunal. The applicant submits that there is not a danger or risk to the community presented by the applicant being authorised to drive a taxi cab, at this time, on the evidence overall.
The respondent's case
The respondent provided their file in relation to the applicant. The respondent also made oral submissions to the tribunal at the hearing. The respondent's file contains a copy of the applicant's traffic record and also a copy of a warning letter to the applicant, of 10 January 2012, issued because the applicant had failed to disclose some speeding offences. The letter of warning states that the applicant is warned that Transport New South Wales will take into consideration any non-compliance, arrests, convictions, proven offences and traffic history which can result in variation, suspension or cancellation of driver authorisation. The warning is given in the context of the applicant's failure to disclose speeding and traffic offences.
The respondent's file also includes details of the criminal offences with which the applicant is charged. These are set out at folios 65 to 68 of the respondents file. The description of the offences is headed "Kennard storage burglary". The description of the offences suggests that the applicant and a co-accused were under surveillance by police. It is said that the applicant and the co-accused travelled to Melbourne from Sydney, and while in Melbourne hired a rental car vehicle. It is alleged that the applicant and a co-accused went to the storage facility and that while there the co-accused used an electric saw to cut through a timber access door, gaining entry into the security safety deposit room of the building. It is alleged that, after placing a screen over security surveillance cameras, the co-accused gained access to 36 security boxes, by grinding and damaging lock mechanisms to gain access. A number of items were stolen from the 36 security boxes including cash, jewellery and gold bullion. It is stated that a stocktake of the property stolen is still underway. It is said that from one security box, box number 36, $450,000 in cash was stolen (in $50 and $100 denominations). From another box, box 31, a collection of prize-winning coins and jewellery was stolen.
It is alleged by police that telephone intercept monitoring disclosed the applicant and the co-accused to be in the vicinity when the offences occurred. It is alleged that the applicant maintained a lookout, and assisted in removing property from the crime scene, while the co-accused broke into the security boxes. It is alleged that a substantial amount of cash and property was taken in the course of the burglary and that bleach product was used by the accused to clean the crime scene. Investigators observed the applicant and the co-accused returning by plane from Melbourne to Sydney and it is alleged that they carried luggage in which the property was secreted. On 15 December 2011 warrants for the arrest of the applicant and the co-accused were issued.
The respondent submits, having regard to applicable law and prior tribunal decisions, that the tribunal would not be satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be authorised to drive a public passenger vehicle/taxi. The respondent submits that the offences are subjectively very serious and that the public interest and public safety would dictate that the applicant not be authorised to drive a public passenger vehicle. The respondent submits it is relevant that the offences are relatively recent, unlike other factual situations in recent cases before the tribunal, which dealt with offences occurring some years previously. The respondent submits that the tribunal would not be satisfied on the facts in the present matter, according to the law and in accordance with guidance offered by recent tribunal decisions, that the applicant should be authorised to drive a public passenger vehicle. The respondent emphasised that the legislation requires the decision maker, and in this context the tribunal, to attest to the applicant's fitness and propriety to drive a public passenger vehicle and the respondent submits that the tribunal could not so attest.
Discussion of the law evidence and findings of the tribunal
The objects of the Act are set out in section 3:
4 Objects
The objects of this Act are:
(a) to require the accreditation or authorisation, by TfNSW, [Transport for NSW] of the operators of and drivers involved in public passenger services (other than ferry services), and .............
(e) to encourage public passenger services that meet the reasonable expectations of the community for safe, reliable and efficient passenger transport services, and
(f) to encourage co-ordination of public transport services.
The decision under review in the current proceedings is a decision to suspend the applicant's authority to drive a taxi cab. Section 35F clearly provides that having regard to the purpose of an authority the respondent may at any time suspend a taxi driver authority - when making such a decision therefore, regard must be had to the purpose of the authority. The purpose of an authorisation is set out in section 33 (3) of the Passenger Transport Act 1990. The purpose of an authority is to attest to the matters set out in s33(3)(a)(b) of the Act, namely, to attest that the authorised person is:
- Of good repute; and
- A fit and proper person (to be so authorised); and
- Considered to have sufficient aptitude and responsibility to drive a taxi in accordance with - law and custom; and in accordance with the conditions under which the taxi service is operated.
Section 63 of the Administrative Decision Tribunal Act 1997 ("the ADT Act") provides that in determining an application for review the Tribunal is to make the correct and preferable decision having regard to the material before it, and any applicable written or unwritten law. It is well established that in considering an application for review the Tribunal is not restricted to a consideration of the material that was before the respondent, but may have regard to any relevant material before it at the time of the review: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 179; (1979) 46 FLR 409.
A frequently used phrase is that, when conducting a review, the Tribunal 'stands in the shoes of the decision maker' and exercises the same functions and powers. The Tribunal is therefore constrained in its powers to those held by the decision maker.
Section 63(3) of the ADT Act provides that in determining an application for the review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:
(a) to affirm the reviewable decision, or
(b) to vary the reviewable decision, or
(c) to set aside the reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the reviewable decision it set aside, or
(d) to set aside the reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.
In deciding this matter the tribunal has also had regard to prior decisions of the Tribunal discussing the legislative requirements. A useful review of the authorities was provided in the case of Chowdhury v Department of Transport and Infrastructure [2010] NSWADT 199:
7........The purposes of a taxi drivers authority are set out is s 33(3).....
8.The meaning of "fit and proper" is dependent on the nature and purpose of the activities which the person will undertake. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321,Chief Justice Mason explained that, at 380:
'The question whether a person is fit and proper is one of value judgment. In that process the seriousness or otherwise of particular conduct is a matter for evaluation by the decision maker. So too is the weight, if any, to be given to matters favouring the person whose fitness and propriety are under consideration.'
9. The Tribunal and the Appeal Panel have frequently cited with approval the test posed by the equivalent ACT Tribunal dealing with an equivalent legislative scheme in Maythisathit and Registrar of Motor Vehicles [1996] ACT 165 per Curtis P:
'One must put oneself, so far as possible, in the position of a member of the public who might travel in a taxi driven by the Applicant and ask whether that member of the public, knowing of the Applicant's criminal record and what he has done ... to rehabilitate himself, would object to the Applicant as the driver of the taxi.' .......
12..In contrast to character, reputation as Waddell J explained in Re T and Anor and the Director of Youth and Community Services [1980] 1 NSWLR 392 at 389:
"...is to be found in the estimate of his moral character entertained by some specific group of people, such as by those who live in the neighbourhood of his residence, those who work with him, or those with whom he associates in his occupation or profession. The importance of a person's reputation is that it is an estimate of his character, or some aspect of his character, upon which the persons in such a group are generally, although not necessarily unanimously, agreed. It is this essential nature of reputation which makes it a reliable guide to a person's character. See, generally, Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., vol 5, p 486 et seq, pars 1615, 1616; p 479 et seq, par 1610. As is pointed out by Wigmore, a person might not have a general reputation in the neighbourhood where he lives, but may have established a reputation in another group of persons: p 472 etseq, par 1606. It is, I suppose, possible that a person might not have any reputation at all, simply because he does not participate in the activities of any group of people who have any necessity to form an estimate of his character.
.....
14.In Re T Waddell J (at 399) discussed how reputation is to be proved by evidence from those who know the person well, and who know how the person is generally regarded in the community in which he lives. At 401, his Honour said that:
...evidence of particular acts of conduct on the part of the person whose reputation is in issue is not admissible to prove the nature of that reputation."
In the case of Saadieh v Director General, Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 68 the Tribunal cited Waddell J in Re T and the Director of Youth and Community Services [1980] 1 NSWLR 392 at 393:
A person's reputation, in fact and in law, is to be found in the estimate of his moral character entertained by some specific group of people, such as those who live in the neighbourhood of his residence, those who work with him or those with whom he associates in his occupation or profession. . . Evidence of conviction for a criminal offence is, however, admissible as evidence, indeed, most cogent evidence of bad reputation.
A decision of the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal: Director General, Department of Transport v Z (No.2) (GD) [2002] NSWADTAP 37 also provides useful guidance:
38 Good Repute:The approach to be adopted in considering 'good repute' is well explained by Waddell J in Re T. The Appeal Panel also considers it in a forthcoming decision, Lo -v- Director-General, Department of Transport [2002] NSWADTAP 39. 'Good repute' refers to the way reasonably-minded people assess an individual's current reputation, with reasonably precise knowledge of those matters that put the person's reputation in doubt. The fact that the person produces evidence from witnesses who vouch in general terms for the person's reputation can not be conclusive. Equally, care must be taken, as we see it, not to use the 'good repute' requirement as a way of bringing into consideration stereotypes or assumptions which offend, for example, against human rights or anti-discrimination standards....
42 The question which the Director-General must ask, as we see it, is whether the travelling public would be prepared to place their trust in a driver with Z's background, and past and recent offence history, even if satisfied that there is no longer a significant risk of sexual reoffence?
43 In the past, the Tribunal and the Appeal Panel has cited with approval the test posed by the equivalent ACT Tribunal dealing with an equivalent legislative scheme in Maythisathit and Registrar of Motor Vehicles [1996] ACT 165 per Curtis P:
"One must put oneself, so far as possible, in the position of a member of the public who might travel in a taxi driven by the applicant and ask whether that member of the public, knowing of the applicant's criminal record and what he has done ... to rehabilitate himself, would object to the applicant as the driver of the taxi."'
The Appeal Panel of the Tribunal in a recent case considered the role of the "perception of the public" in decisions about whether an applicant is a "fit and proper person". The Appeal Panel of the Tribunal in the case of Department of Transport and Infrastructure v Murray (GD) 2011 NSWADTAP 16 reviewed relevant authorities and concluded:
When deciding whether a person is a 'fit and proper person', the question of whether the community would have confidence that any improper conduct will not re-occur is relevant: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; 94 ALR 11. Otherwise, the determination of fitness and propriety is a question of fact for the decision maker to determine objectively on the basis of the all evidence. That question is not to be determined through the eyes of a reasonable member of the travelling public. Nor is it correct, as was suggested in Farquharson, to take account of the likely perceptions of the travelling public as one of the relevant factors in deciding whether an applicant is a fit and proper person. The Tribunal decided that Mr Murray is a fit and proper person to be the driver of a hire car taking into account relevant factors. It did not err by failing to determine Mr Murray's fitness and propriety through the eyes of a reasonable member of the travelling public
In reaching this conclusion the Appeal Panel noted:
In the same case, Mason CJ stated at [63] that:
The question whether a person is fit and proper is one of value judgment. In that process the seriousness or otherwise of particular conduct is a matter for evaluation by the decision maker . So too is the weight, if any, to be given to matters favouring the person whose fitness and propriety are under consideration. (our emphasis)
While the seriousness of the conduct is a matter for evaluation by the decision maker, the question of whether it can be assumed that the conduct will not recur is a matter which is to be viewed through the eyes of the general community.
The Federal Court applied the decision in Bond in relation to the meaning of 'fit and proper person' when it upheld a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal relating to taxation agents: Toohey v Tax Agents' Board of Victoria (No 3) [2010] FCA 356 at [46-47]; Toohey and Tax Agents' Board [2008] AATA 262. Middleton J held at [37] that "determining whether a person is the prescribed fit and proper person involves an evaluation of character and reputation." At first instance the AAT decided that the public as a general body would not have confidence in the conduct not occurring again (at [156-160]). The Federal Court reiterated that the enquiry is directed not only to whether improper conduct has occurred, but whether it is likely to occur again, and whether the community will have confidence that it will not occur.
The Appeal Panel's decision in Department of Transport and Infrastructure v Murray [2011] NSWADTAP 16 (8 April 2011) ("Murrays case") was subject of comment by the President of the Tribunal, Judge K P O'Connor, in the case of Nasour v Director-General, Transport NSW[2011] NSWADT 91 (4 May 2011):
In that case [Farquarssen] I went on to look at the question of how then might the administrator go about forming a view as to 'repute and character'. The reasons referred to taking into account the views that might be formed by a reasonable member of the travelling public; and have been read as allowing the views of the travelling public to be used in the assessment of character. The Appeal Panel recently held in Department of Transport and Infrastructure v Murray [2011] NSWADTAP 16 (8 April 2011) that the views of the travelling public are not a relevant consideration when assessing character. What is involved in the assessment of character is an objective evaluation of the person's fitness to continue to undertake the regulated occupation having regard to the relevant material.
The Appeal Panel's approach is similar to the one I expressed at para [29] of Farquharson , as extracted above. The preferable approach in dealing with the character question (often expressed in statutes as whether the person is a 'fit and proper' person to undertake the regulated activity), therefore, where one event is substantially relied upon - the laying of serious criminal charges - is to reserve judgment on intrinsic character until more is known.
However, 'repute' is a concept very much about what members of the public, and importantly the passenger community, might think (fairly or unfairly). The Act itself, not surprisingly, gives weight to passenger thinking. One of the objects of the Act is to 'encourage public passenger services that meet the reasonable expectations of the community for safe ... passenger transport services' (s 4(e)).
A person's reputation is a function of public perception. See for example Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 380 at [36] per Toohey and Gaudron JJ. The full passage appears in Murray at [16]. The same point is made in the Supreme Court and ACT Supreme Court decisions to which the Appeal Panel refers at [13].
A judgement as to the perception of reasonably-minded members of the travelling public remains, in my view, a relevant consideration for an administrator, when considering the 'repute' of a driver, or the driver's 'aptitude and responsibility'.
Guidance was also offered by the Tribunal in the case Saadieh v Director General, Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 68 as to assessing a person's fitness to be authorised to drive a taxi-cab. The Tribunal then observed:
17Taking into account the terms of the legislation and the case law interpreting similar provisions, there are a number of factors that need to be taken into account in determining a person's suitability and fitness to obtain a taxi authority. These factors include:
the nature, seriousness and frequency of any criminal offences for which the Applicant has been arrested or convicted;
the nature, seriousness and frequency of any complaints made against the Applicant;
the Applicant's driving record;
the Applicant's reputation in the community; and
the likelihood that the Applicant will re-offend, be the subject of further complaints or commit further traffic offences.
18. In assessing the last factor, several considerations are relevant. These include: the length of time since the offence/s were committed or the complaint/s made; the circumstances in which those offences or complaints occurred or are alleged to have occurred; whether the Applicant admits responsibility for the offences or complaints and shows genuine remorse; the efforts the Applicant has made to rehabilitate himself or herself during that time and; any change in the Applicant's circumstances such as increased support from friends, family or professional service providers.
A recent decision of the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal reviewed the authorities: Director General, Transport NSW v AIC (GD) [2011] NSWADTAP 65 (23 December 2011). The case dealt with a review of a decision to suspend a taxi driver authority where the driver had been charged with criminal offences, and focussed on considerations applicable to suspension decisions. The Appeal Panel stated:
12The first point to note is the use of the word 'attest'. The primary meaning of this word is 'to bear witness to; certify; declare to be correct, true or genuine; declare to the truth of, in words or writing: especially in an official capacity' ( Macquarie Dictionary , 4th ed. 2005). The Parliament, in using this word, seeks, we consider, to emphasise the idea that the conferral of an authority involves a declaration of public trust. While this is true of all licensing, the word gives special emphasis to it in the present context.
13As we see it paragraph (a) focuses on general characteristics of the driver relevant to the regulated function, paragraph (b) focuses on maturity and technical competence. The expression 'good repute and in all other respects a fit and proper person' is meant, we think, to be expansive in scope allowing for a broad range of personal attributes to be assessed, and for consideration to be given to the person's general standing in the community, especially among those who know the person well and are fully informed as to any matters of concern. It gives greatest weight to 'good repute'. For a recent discussion of the matters to which the terms 'good repute' and 'fit and proper' are addressed see Real Estate and Business Agents Supervisory Board v LJW [2011] WASCA 35 per Newnes JA (Pullin, Buss JJA agreeing). 'Fit and proper' goes to such matters of character as to whether the applicant is possessed of sufficient moral integrity and rectitude of character as to permit him or her to be safely accredited to the public without further inquiry (per Newnes JA at [27] citing with approval remarks of Walters J in Sobey v Commercial and Private Agents Board (1979) 22 SASR 70); and 'repute' goes to the public estimation of the person (at [28]-[29]).
14Different licensing schemes use variations on this language, for example 'good fame and character'; sometimes the term 'fit and proper' only is used. Sometimes there are specific references to such matters as 'honesty', 'integrity' and 'competence'.
15As we see it, the purpose of threshold requirements cast in broad terms of these kinds is to give 'the widest scope for judgement and indeed for rejection' (see Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v NSW (No 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127 at 156). The various broad expressions invite the administrator to look broadly at the character and reputation of the individual and they have at the heart the conferral of public trust. The review tribunal is engaged in the determination of a question of fact. It has wide scope, therefore, for judgement, and its decision can not easily be set aside on error of law grounds.....
.... (AIG)36.The President, sitting at first instance, has suggested that public perception still has some role to play in relation to the matter of 'good repute' which is the primary part of formulation used in s 33F: see Nasour v Director-General, Transport NSW [2011] NSWADT 9 at [29]- [33]. Nasour was a suspension case. There the driver had been charged (not reported but discovered on data matching) with assault occasioning actual bodily harm; common assault, and use etc of an offensive weapon (a tyre lever) with intention to commit an indictable offence. (In addition there was a lengthy adverse disciplinary and traffic record.
37.The courts have emphasised the connection that assessment of repute, fitness and propriety have in a regulated context with public interest considerations. Repute, fitness and propriety involve concepts that should not be 'narrowly construed or confined' and may extend to 'any aspect of fitness and propriety that is relevant to the public interest' ( Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 (26 July 1990) at [64] per Mason CJ.
The tribunal must have regard to the objects of the Act and the public interest. The authorities set out above and in particular the case of Director General, Transport NSW v AIC (GD) [2011] NSWADTAP 65 indicate that where a suspension decision is made due to criminal charges the tribunal should consider a number of matters. One of the matters which the tribunal may consider is the tribunal's view of the appropriateness of the applicant holding a licence if the charges against him were proved. The tribunal accepts that the applicant had, prior to the criminal charges, been of good repute, there is no evidence to indicate otherwise. The tribunal should also consider the history of complaints - in the current matter the tribunal accepts that the applicant does not have a history of complaints being made against him about his conduct as a taxi driver. Whilst he has some traffic offences the tribunal does not consider that his traffic record is such that he would not be considered a fit and proper person to be authorised to drive a taxi.
The real issue in this case is the seriousness of the criminal charges. They are not a consequence of impulsive behaviour: the evidence about the charges and allegations indicated organised planning of a significant criminal enterprise. The charges involve dishonesty. As noted by the Appeal Panel in the case of Director General, Transport NSW v AIC (GD) [2011] NSWADTAP 65, in assessing repute the tribunal may take into account the views and expectations of the travelling public. The tribunal must also consider the public interest. The tribunal considers that given the seriousness of the criminal charges, involving a significant criminal enterprise and dishonesty, with significant planning, that the tribunal cannot attest that the applicant is of good repute and a fit and proper person to be authorised to drive a taxi.
In so finding the tribunal has considered all of the applicant's evidence, including the character references provided. Character references by friends and family are not conclusive as to reputation. As was stated by the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal in the case Director General, Department of Transport v Z (No 2) (GD) [2002]NSWADTAP 37:
We should observe at this point that the question of reputation is one that must always be assessed in an objective way by an administrator and the Tribunal, no doubt informed by information which is often quite subjective. The opinions of friends and co-workers are important but in our view would not be conclusive as to the way in which the objective task is carried out.
A number of the references are from friends and family members although one is from a church leader and two are from those who have engaged the applicant to drive their taxis. They are not conclusive as to repute given that the tribunal considers that the serious criminal charges would also bear on the applicant's repute. The tribunal does accept that, on the evidence, prior to the charges the applicant was of good repute. However, given the seriousness of the charges and the nature of the charges - for offences of dishonesty involving considerable criminal planning and execution - the tribunal is unable to attest to the applicant's repute and is also unable to attest that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be authorised to drive a taxi.
Whilst the tribunal has considered the issue of financial hardship to the applicant, in the context of a suspension decision, the objects of the Act indicate the importance of the public interest. The hardship to the applicant is not a consideration in the context of the purpose of an authority as set out in the Act. The purpose of an authority is to attest to the applicant's fitness and propriety, and the Act provides that a suspension decision is made having regard to the purpose of the authority. To set aside the suspension decision the tribunal would be required to be able to attest to the applicant's fitness and propriety and, on the evidence in this case, considering the seriousness of the criminal charges involving significant planning and premeditation, and significant dishonesty, the tribunal is not able to so attest.
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Decision last updated: 23 March 2012
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