Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SJW (No 3)
[2025] VSC 441
•21 July 2025
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2020 0014
| SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY SAFETY | Applicant |
| v | |
| SJW | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | Gorton J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 21 July 2025 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 21 July 2025 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SJW (No 3) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSC 441 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Application for renewal of supervision order – Where respondent has been assessed as ‘moderate-high’ risk of committing serious violence offence – Where respondent is institutionalised – Where respondent has limited protective factors and pro-social relationships in the community – Where respondent has been engaging in treatment programs – Application not opposed – Supervision order renewed – Application for suppression order – Whether publication of respondent’s identity and location will disrupt rehabilitation – Suppression order granted – Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic) ss 14, 22, 24, 27, 279, 280.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Paul Holdenson KC | Russell Kennedy |
| For the Respondent | Tim Noonan | Victoria Legal Aid |
Contents
A. Introduction
B. Summary of the respondent’s offending
B.1 The murder
B.2 Other violent offending and contraventions of the supervision order
C. The respondent’s circumstances
D. The respondent’s progress while subjected to a supervision order
E. Consideration
F. Order restricting publication
G. Disposition
HIS HONOUR:
A. Introduction
The Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety, the applicant, has applied pursuant to s 22 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 for the renewal of a supervision order currently in force against SJW, the respondent, for a further period of three years. The supervision order was made by Tinney J on 13 August 2020 and confirmed by Tinney J on 24 August 2023, and is due to expire on 12 August 2025.
The respondent, through his counsel, indicated that he did not oppose the renewal of the supervision order.
B. Summary of the respondent’s offending
B.1 The murder
On 5 June 2001, the respondent in the company of two others[1] murdered a drug dealer. The respondent and the deceased were known to each other, with the respondent having irregularly purchased heroin from the deceased. A disagreement arose as to whether the respondent would pay money to the deceased or whether a further deal of heroin would occur, and the deceased made a derogatory remark about the respondent’s partner. The respondent then used a pinch bar repeatedly to strike the deceased, which caused his death.
[1]The co-offenders were convicted of lesser charges reflective of the roles they played in the deceased’s death and disposal of the deceased’s body.
The respondent with the assistance of a co-offender moved the deceased’s body to the respondent’s unit, and set about dismembering it. Parts of the deceased’s body were then disposed of in rubbish bins throughout the neighbourhood, and were later found at a rubbish tip, with the exception of the deceased’s head which was not recovered.
After murdering the deceased, the respondent and one of the co-offenders attended the deceased’s residence and stole some jewellery, a mobile phone, a video tape and a firearm, then set the deceased’s residence on fire.
The respondent had consumed alcohol and anxiety medication prior to murdering the deceased and, by the time he commenced dismembering the deceased’s body, he had also used heroin.
In February 2003, the respondent pleaded guilty to murder. He was sentenced to 18 years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 years.
The respondent later, it is said, told a clinician at the Forensic Intervention Service that he had carved the words ‘pig’ and ‘cunt’ into the deceased’s torso while he was dismembering the body, and that he had cooked and eaten the deceased’s liver with the co-offenders as part of a ‘pact’ to not disclose the offending. I note that the respondent was not sentenced on the basis of this supposed post-offence conduct and no findings to that effect were made, and I place no weight on these apparent admissions.
B.2 Other violent offending and contraventions of the supervision order
The respondent has a lengthy history of violent offending before and after the murder of the deceased, including convictions for:[2] in July 1986, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assault, resisting police and spitting; in June 1987, intentionally causing serious injury and robbery; in February 1993, unlawful assault, using threatening words in a public place, and wilful property damage; in December 1994, robbery, assault with intent to rob, unlawful assault and impersonating a police officer; in December 2001, resisting police; in July 2005, recklessly causing serious injury; and in March 2007, assault by kicking.
[2]This is a non-exhaustive list of the respondent’s convictions.
Since the imposition of the supervision order, the respondent has also been sentenced by Tinney J on five separate occasions for contravening a condition of the supervision order:[3]
(a)On 11 November 2020, the respondent was sentenced for three charges of contravening a condition of a supervision order and one charge of possessing a drug of dependence. Those contraventions relate to the respondent producing a positive urinalysis test showing the presence of cannabis on 22 September 2020, using two online betting accounts to place 223 bets at a total value of $968 between 13 August 2020 and 24 September 2020, and possessing one gram of cannabis on 25 September 2020;
(b)On 15 February 2021, the respondent was sentenced for three charges of contravening a condition of a supervision order and one charge of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail. The contraventions relate to the respondent producing two positive urinalysis tests showing the presence of cannabis on 11 January 2021 and 16 January 2021, and using an online betting account to place 293 bets at a total value of $705.57 between 9 September 2020 and 21 January 2021;
(c)On 24 August 2023, the respondent was sentenced for four charges of contravening a condition of a supervision order, two charges of using a drug of dependence and two charges of committing an indictable offence on bail. The contraventions relate to the respondent using two online betting accounts to place 514 bets at a total value of $7,891.41 between 6 July 2021 and 18 July 2021 and a depositing in excess of $4,000 into three betting accounts between 5 July 2022 and 11 September 2022, and producing two positive urinalysis tests showing the presence of methylamphetamine on 15 March 2023 and cannabis on 29 April 2023;
(d)On 15 December 2023, the respondent was sentenced for one charge of contravening a condition of a supervision order. The contravention relates to the respondent using four online betting accounts to place a total of 1,233 bets at a total value of $4,561.43 between 6 July 2023 and 18 October 2023; and
(e)On 22 October 2024, the respondent was sentenced for one charge of contravening a condition of a supervision order. The contravention relates to the respondent using methylamphetamine between 24 August 2024 and 27 August 2024.
[3]Contrary to s 169(1) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic).
Since that time, the respondent has also breached the conditions of the supervision order three times by the extent of his gambling, once by failing to attend for urinalysis testing and twice by failing to attend prearranged appointments. He has not been convicted of any offences in relation to those breaches, but does not dispute, at least for the purpose of the present application, that those breaches did occur.
C. The respondent’s circumstances
The respondent was raised by adoptive parents in Victoria. He left the family home at 15 years of age, following an incident where he assaulted his father. He moved to Sydney where he experienced homelessness, sleeping rough around Kings Cross. While he ceased to have contact with his parents, the respondent maintained a close relationship with his maternal grandmother. Through this relationship, it appears that the respondent was exposed to gambling as his grandmother frequently took him to the racecourse to watch horse racing. The respondent’s relationship with his sister was positive at times but has deteriorated in the last couple of years due (it seems) to financial tensions. He received a letter in February 2025 from his sister indicating that she wished to ‘cut ties’ with the respondent. Following this relationship breakdown, it seems that the respondent has little to no familial support or pro-social relationships.
D. The respondent’s progress while subjected to a supervision order
The following is a brief summary of the treatment that the respondent has engaged in in the lead up to and since the confirmation of the supervision order in August 2023:
(a)Between April and June 2023, the respondent resided at Rivergum, a residential treatment facility where he engaged in counselling for substance abuse and gambling and other offence-specific treatment programs. The respondent was assessed as having ‘gained a better understanding of his emotional and behavioural patterns’ that had contributed to his offending;
(b)After leaving Rivergum, the respondent continued to participate in gambling counselling through IPC Health until at least December 2024. The respondent’s engagement was ‘inconsistent’ throughout this period, with the respondent admitting to clinicians that he had been ‘withholding information in [counselling] sessions to avoid incriminating himself’ as he had been gambling outside the weekly limits set by the Post Sentence Authority in accordance with condition 4.10 of the supervision order. He also sought financial counselling, and attributed a reduction in ‘gambling urges to counselling sessions and structured financial planning’;
(c)From April 2023 until at least October 2024, the respondent participated in alcohol and other drugs treatment with Caraniche HiROADS. While the respondent missed some scheduled treatment sessions during this period, it appears that he otherwise engaged positively in treatment aimed at addressing ‘relapse prevention planning, values-based decision making and emotional regulation’; and
(d)From July 2023 until at least January 2025, the respondent participated in offence-specific treatment programs with the Forensic Intervention Service, with a particular focus on ‘stress management, interpersonal sensitivity, and strategies for maintaining emotional regulation’. Despite his missing some sessions, the Forensic Intervention Service considered that the respondent was ‘engaged’ with treatment and his clinician, and ‘continued to reflect on his behaviour and choices’.
E. Consideration
On hearing an application pursuant to s 22 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 for the renewal of a supervision order, s 24(1) provides that the court may renew the supervision order, revoke the supervision order, or ‘make no order’ following which it is intended, I infer, that the supervision order would lapse at its expiration unless a further application were made. In determining whether the supervision order should be renewed, the court may only do so if it determines that the respondent ‘poses… an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence or a serious violence offence or both if a supervision order is not made and the [respondent] is in the community’.[4] Although the fact that the respondent has ‘accepted’ that ‘an order should be made renewing the supervision order including the conditions sought’ by the applicant, such orders may not be made by consent, as it were.
[4]Ibid, ss 3, 8(1), sch 2. Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic) ss 14(1)(b), 24(3). There is also a requirement that the respondent be an ‘eligible offender’ within the meaning of s 8(1) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018. The respondent is an ‘eligible offender’ because he is over 18 years of age and has previously been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for murder, which is a ‘serious violence offence’ for the purposes of the Serious Offenders Act 2018.
In assessing whether the risk is an ‘unacceptable risk’, I am required to consider the ‘the degree of likelihood of offending and the seriousness of the consequences if the risk eventuates’.[5] Put another way:[6]
[T]he test requires an assessment of the risk and a consideration of the nature and gravity of the relevant offence and the magnitude of the harm that may result having regard to the manner in which the [respondent] had previously committed such an offence.
[5]Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2013) 41 VR 359, 363 [6].
[6]Ibid, 391 [117].
The court must have regard to any reports including assessment and progress reports filed and any evidence tendered in the application, and ‘any other matter the court considers appropriate’.[7] Perhaps surprisingly, the Court must not have regard to the ‘means of managing the risk’ or likely impact of a supervision order on the offender.[8] Before making or renewing a supervision order, the court must be satisfied to ‘a high degree of probability’ that the offender poses or will pose an unacceptable risk.[9] A risk my be unacceptable, even if the likelihood that the offender will commit a serious offence is less than more likely than not.[10]
[7]Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic) s 14(2).
[8]Ibid s 14(2)(b).
[9]Ibid s 14(3).
[10]Ibid s 14(4).
The applicant relies upon a report prepared and oral evidence given by a clinical and forensic psychologist, Dr Joel Godfredson. In preparing his report, Dr Godfredson met with the respondent on two occasions, and reviewed thousands of pages of material including files from the Office of Public Prosecutions, the Forensic Intervention Service and Community Correctional Services.
The respondent has diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder, paranoid and borderline personality traits, gambling disorder, opioid use disorder, major depressive disorder and psychopathic personality traits. He is reliant on medicinal cannabis to manage feelings of stress and anxiety and previously took antidepressant medications up until he was remanded in custody in October 2024, when he decided to self-cease this medication.
Dr Godfredson assessed the respondent as demonstrating ‘significant difficulties with impulse control, rule adherence, and disregard for social norms’, stating that ‘[t]here is strong evidence of aggressive tendencies, particularly in the form of physical aggression’ and that the respondent’s drug use is ’likely to be a key factor in his behavioural instability and overall risk profile’. Dr Godfredson considered that the respondent’s responses indicate that he is experiencing ‘clinically significant depressive symptoms’ and a strong ‘presence of significant ADHD symptoms’.
Dr Godfredson also assessed the respondent’s risk of violence, opining that if the respondent were in the community and not subjected to a supervision order, he poses a ‘moderate-high risk’ of committing a serious violence offence listed in Schedule 2 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018. This is a reduction from a previous assessment where the respondent was considered to be a ‘high’ risk of committing a serious violence offence. Dr Godfredson attributes the reduction in risk to the extended period of time that the respondent has spent in the community without committing acts of physical violence, but caveats that the respondent’s risk may increase if he experiences an unstable lifestyle, has violent ideations and continues to use drugs.
Dr Godfredson’s central conclusion, which I accept, is that:
[The respondent’s] psychological vulnerabilities underscore the importance of supporting him to establish and maintain protective factors, encompassing a stable, structured, and prosocial lifestyle in the community. In the absence of a Supervision Order, [the respondent] would be at risk of cascading negative outcomes, including financial instability, negative peer influence, substance misuse, and reduced engagement with support services. Each of these factors could ultimately contribute to an increased risk of violence (including the risk of a Schedule 2 violence offence).
He also stated:
Presently, [the services provided under the supervision order] are functioning as a surrogate personal support network, providing an antidote to loneliness while fostering prosocial community engagement.
Dr Godfredson confirmed these opinions in his oral evidence. He emphasised that the respondent’s progress is dependent on his capacity to build a support network of his own outside the supports and conditions imposed on or given to him by the supervision order, and that he faced difficulties with doing this due to his ‘institutionalisation’ associated with his having spent many years in prison.
The situation remains that the respondent has not developed relationships in the community or other structured activities outside those mandated by the supervision order, or significant interests, that could operate as protective factors. The respondent has no employment, has not developed any friendships, has ceased his relationship with his sister, has had altercations with his neighbours and, although he has talked about engaging in more social programs like the ‘men’s shed’ or seeking employment or performing volunteer work, he has not yet done so. He remains tempted by gambling and drug use, as reflected by his ongoing breaches of the conditions directed at curbing those activities. If unchecked, either could push the respondent towards the sort of dislocated lifestyle that resulted in his index offending and that might result in his committing another serious violence offence. I conclude that in the absence of the monitoring and supervision and participation in treatment programs that come with a supervision order, the prospect of this happening would be significantly enhanced.
It may be, as Dr Godfredson suggests, that the respondent is ‘resistant to making progress because he fears losing the support facilitated by the Supervision Order.’ Be that as it may, I am satisfied that, at the present time, there is an unacceptable risk, if the supervision order is not in place, of the respondent committing a serious violence offence. Accordingly, I will renew the supervision order.
As part of that renewal, I am able to vary, add or remove a condition of the supervision order.[11]
[11]Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic) s 24(4).
The applicant submits that conditions should be imposed in largely the same terms as the current supervision order, with the exception of amending condition 4.1 to reflect the respondent’s current residential address and removing condition 4.8.2 which presently requires the respondent to ‘comply with electronic alcohol monitoring’. The latter of these proposed changes is recommended by Dr Godfredson, who considers that it ‘may provide [the respondent] with an incentive for progress and an opportunity to demonstrate compliance with other conditions’. I will vary the order in those ways.
I raised with Dr Godfredson two issues: the duration of the supervision order, and whether it should continue to include electronic monitoring.
The application is for a supervision order that lasts for three years, but with the last day by which the applicant must apply for a review under Part 8 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 being 11 August 2027, that is, within approximately two years. Dr Godfredson was supportive of the supervision order being made for three years rather than for some lesser time. The substance of his evidence was that the difficulties that the respondent is experiencing in developing the support networks outside those provided by the supervision order, which are necessary if he is to be able to maintain a stable lifestyle in the absence of a supervision order and to reduce the risk of his committing a serious violence offence, would likely not appreciably lower over the next three years. I accept that evidence, and will make the supervision order for the duration sought.
The question of the electronic monitoring was not straightforward. Under s 27(4) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018, the court must ensure that any conditions constitute the minimum interference with liberty that is necessary in the circumstances to ensure the purposes of the conditions and are reasonably related to the gravity of the risk of re-offending. On one view, it might be thought that electronic monitoring is unnecessary because it has not, it seems, been necessary to identify any breaches or unsafe behaviour. But here, as Dr Godfredson explained, the electronic monitoring plays an important deterrent role. According to Dr Godfredson, the respondent has had for many years very real problems with impulse control and the fact that his case manager will or may know where he has been contributes to the respondent’s ability to comply with the conditions that limit his gambling, drinking, drug taking and associations. It was noted, for example, that on at least one occasion when the respondent gambled more than he was permitted to do so he blamed that, in part, on his gambling not being adequately monitored – it meant he felt he could ‘get away with it’. Dr Godfredson said that although the respondent is not by nature a liar, it could not be assumed that he would volunteer breaches in circumstances where breaching his conditions could conceivably lead to further periods of imprisonment. Counsel for the respondent did not argue to the contrary.
Based on Dr Godfredson’s evidence, I accept that creating an environment where the respondent does not feel that he can ‘get away with’ a breach of his conditions is, at this stage, necessary to ensure that he complies with those conditions and thus to reduce the risk of his re-offending by committing a serious violence offence or an offence referred to in Schedule 3 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018.
F. Order restricting publication
Under s 279 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 I may order that any information that might enable an offender or the offender’s location to be identified not be published. The respondent sought such an order. The applicant opposed the making of such an order insofar as it precluded publication of the respondent’s identity (but not location). The applicant pointed out that in deciding whether to make such an order I must have regard to, among other things, the fact that the respondent had breached his supervision order on a number of occasions,[12] and that the point had been arrived at when the public had a right to know the respondent’s identify so that they could arrange their own affairs accordingly.
[12]Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic) s 280(d).
The respondent relied on evidence given by Dr Godfredson that in circumstances where the respondent continues to experience a period of difficult transition into the community, the public interest is best served by orders that minimise the risk of disruption to his rehabilitation that publication of his identity or location may pose.
I accept Dr Godfredson’s evidence. Without trivialising the applicant’s submission, this is not a case where the respondent’s breaches have been associated with acts that have directly placed other persons in danger. Further, as did Tinney J when a similar submission was put to him on an earlier occasion, I do not see the respondent as someone who is deliberately disrespecting the law but rather as someone who is struggling, but at times failing, to comply with the supervision order.[13] I am satisfied that it remains in the public interest that the respondent’s potential rehabilitation not be compromised by the publication of his name and address or of anything that would reveal his name and address.
[13]Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SJW (No 2) [2023] VSC 506, [34].
G. Disposition
I will renew the Supervision Order with variations in accordance with the applicant’s application and proposed form of order.
I will include an order that no information be published that might enable the respondent’s identify or location to be identified until the next review is heard and determined, or the supervision order expires or is revoked, or until further order.
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