Safety v RZT (a pseudonym)
[2025] VCC 1258
•10 September 2025
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE COMMON LAW DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
APPEALS AND POST SENTENCE APPLICATION LIST
| The Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety | Applicant |
| v | |
| RZT (a pseudonym) | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE OVER | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 19 August 2025 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 10 September 2025 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v RZT (a pseudonym) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VCC 1258 | |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
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Subject:SUPERVISION ORDER
Catchwords: Application for renewal of supervision order – Respondent assessed as “moderate-high” risk of committing serious sex offence and serious violence offence – Application for renewal not opposed save for certain conditions – Supervision order renewed – Determination of conditions including relating to curfew, period for review, and for electronic monitoring – Contest about whether to make a non-publication order –Non-publication order made
Legislation Cited: Serious Offenders Act 2018; Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009; Firearms Act 1996; Sentencing Act 1991; Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004
Cases Cited:Nigro v The Secretary to the Department of Justice (2013) 41 VR 359 Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SJW(No 2) [2023] VSC 506; Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SJW (No 3) [2025] VSC 441
Judgment: Supervision order renewed, and non-publication order made
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the applicant | Mr R Kornhauser | MinterEllison |
| For the respondent | Ms J Parker | Leanne Warren & Associates |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
1The Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety (“the Secretary”) applied to renew a supervision order in respect of the respondent pursuant to s22(1) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (“the Act”). The Court made an order on 4 September 2025 that renewed the supervision order, specified the conditions of the order and made a non-publication order. These are the reasons for that decision.
The parties’ positions
2The Secretary applied to renew the supervision order for a further four years. At the time of the hearing, the Secretary’s proposed supervision order was in the form of a draft order dated 20 August 2025, save that the parties agreed that clause 6.2, which required the respondent be at his residence between a period, should be amended. Where I refer to the proposed order, it is a reference to the draft order dated 20 August 2025 with the agreed amendment to clause 6.2.
3The respondent did not oppose the renewal of the supervision order or that the order be in the form of the proposed order except in the following respects:
(a) the Secretary sought that the respondent be subject to electronic alcohol monitoring and the respondent opposed this; and
(b) the Secretary proposed review of the supervision order within two years, and the respondent proposed review within 18 months.
4The respondent applied for a non-publication order in respect of his identity and his location pursuant to s279 of the Act. The Secretary opposed the making of a non-publication order in respect of the respondent’s identity, and neither consented to nor opposed an order regarding his location.
5The issues in the proceeding were thus:
(a) whether the supervision order should be renewed or revoked;
(b) if the supervision order was renewed, what conditions should it contain; and
(c) if the supervision order was renewed, whether there should be a non-publication order.
Summary of the respondent’s offending
6In February 2007,[1] the respondent was convicted in the County Court of Victoria of one charge of rape and one charge of intentionally causing serious injury. The offending happened in November 2003, when the respondent was about 39 years of age. He was in a relationship with the victim for about three years. In the lead up to the offending, the victim told the respondent that she wanted to separate and in November 2003 she obtained an intervention order against him.
[1]In accordance with the non-publication order made on 4 September 2025, this judgment avoids use of information that would or could be used to identify the respondent, for example, specific dates and references to decisions that identified the respondent by name.
7In November 2003, the respondent went to the victim’s house. According to the victim, he became violent when she said he would have to sleep in the spare bedroom if he was to stay the night. He attacked her repeatedly including pouring beer on her and demanding she drink beer. He told the victim it was “time to go to bed”, picked her up and put her on the bed. He then raped her.
8The respondent was sentenced to a total effective sentence of nine years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years (with 84 days declared served by way of pre-sentence detention).
9In March 2015, the respondent was convicted in the County Court of Victoria of one charge of aggravated rape.
10The offending happened in June 1988 when the respondent was 23 years-of-age. The victim was a 15-year-old female, who was not known to him. She was walking home from a sports centre at about 9pm, when he approached her from behind, grabbed her and threatened her with a knife, which he threatened to use. He walked her to a vacant block where he raped her including ejaculating inside her. He told her that he might look her up in a couple of years to see if she had a kid from his rape of her. The ordeal ended when by chance a car drove onto the block giving the victim the chance to flee. The respondent was said by the victim to smell of alcohol during the rape.
11The respondent was sentenced to a total effective sentence of six years and six months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and six months. He was sentenced as a serious sex offender pursuant to section 6F of the Sentencing Act 1991. He was also declared a registrable offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (“SORA”) for a reporting period of life.
12The respondent has an additional extensive history of sexual and violent offending:
(a) in February 1989, the respondent was convicted in the County Court of Victoria of five charges of armed robbery and three charges of intentionally causing injury. The offending related to four armed robberies committed in the late 1980s. The respondent and his co-offender approached and attacked several people and stole their wallets. The respondent pleaded guilty to the offences and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years;
(b) in May 1993, the respondent was convicted in the Korumburra Magistrates' Court of one charge of intentionally or recklessly causing injury. The respondent was sentenced to four months' imprisonment, suspended for 12 months;
(c) in April 1994, the respondent was convicted in the Springvale Magistrates' Court of one charge of unlawful assault, three charges of assaulting police/person assisting police, one charge of using indecent language in a public place, and one charge of breaching the suspended sentence imposed in May 1993. The offending was committed in August 1993 against the respondent's then-partner in a domestic setting. The respondent had been drinking and became verbally aggressive. It escalated to him throwing mashed potato into the victim’s face and rubbing it into her hair. On being asked to leave, he threatened to hit the victim saying that she was making him do so. He held onto the victim's jumper and then lifted and slammed the victim's head about six times against the concrete driveway. Police were called and he assaulted the police officers and a person assisting a police officer. The respondent was sentenced to a community based order for 12 months and ordered to perform 50 hours of unpaid community work, to attend assessment and treatment as directed and to complete an anger management course. In relation to the breach of suspended sentence, the respondent's sentence was suspended for a further 12 months;
(d) in April 1996, the respondent was convicted in the County Court of Victoria of rape. The offence was committed in August 1995, when the respondent was about 31 years old. The victim was a 15-year-old female child who was not known to the respondent. The respondent offered the victim a ride on his motorbike. While riding on the bike, the victim asked the respondent to take her back to her friends and he stopped the motorbike in a secluded area near some bushes. He then put one of his hands over the victim's mouth and another arm around her neck. The respondent threatened violence to the victim if she was not quiet. The respondent raped her. He was sentenced to five and a half years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years;
(e) in June 2001, the respondent was convicted in the Moe Magistrates' Court of two charges of recklessly causing injury, one charge of unlawful assault, one charge of criminal damage (intent to damage/destroy), and one charge of assault with a weapon. The offending occurred at the respondent's home in November 2000 against his then-partner and two guests. The respondent and the victims were about to commence a meal when the respondent threw the dinner and table setting off the table. He assaulted his then-partner by punching her with two fists. A dinner guest tried to intervene, at which point the respondent picked up and threw a small pot belly stove towards his then partner and dinner guests, picked up a knife and threatened to kill two people, rugby tackled his partner as she attempted to leave, swung a kettle twice at two people, picked up a golf club and swung it people while threatening to knock his partner's knee caps out, and as his partner went to call the police, grabbed her by the throat and pushed her against a glass cabinet. In respect of one of the charges of recklessly causing injury and assault with a weapon, the respondent was sentenced to an aggregate period of four months' imprisonment to be served concurrently with the sentence he was then serving. The respondent's sentence was wholly suspended for two years. For the remaining charges, the respondent was sentenced to an aggregate period of eight months' imprisonment, to be served by way of an intensive correction order; and
(f) in July 2014, the respondent was convicted in the Geelong Magistrates' Court of one charge of unlawful assault, and he was sentenced to seven days' imprisonment to be served cumulatively with the sentence he was then serving. The offending occurred whilst he was in prison. While in the kitchen preparing food, he punched the victim to the one side of the head causing the victim pain and distress but no injury.
The previous supervision order
13The County Court of Victoria made a supervision order on 3 September 2021 that was to expire on 9 September 2025. The previous supervision order commenced upon the respondent’s release from prison. It was reviewed in November 2023 and continued.
14The respondent initially resided at a residential facility. In July 2023, the respondent transitioned into the community, where he resided with his sister and brother-in-law. However, during his time, there was reported tensions between the respondent and his sister, and both viewed his stay as temporary, with the long-term goal that the respondent would acquire independent accommodation.[2]
[2]Report of Dr Janelle Armstrong dated 12 April 2025, [103]-[106]
15In January 2024, the respondent was directed to return to a residential facility as there was an ongoing Victoria Police investigation involving the respondent and a further report needed to be completed to assess the suitability of the respondent residing with his sister and brother-in-law.[3] He stayed at the residential facility until May 2025, largely because he could not return to this sister and brother-in-law’s house.
[3]Ibid, [107]
16During the previous supervision order, the respondent was convicted of the following offending:
(a) in July 2024 he was convicted of one charge of contravening a condition of the order for using or possessing prohibited drugs. He was fined $750;
(b) one charge of possessing Buprenorphine, one charge of possessing Diazepam and one charge of possessing Alprazolam in July 2024. The charges were discharged following the respondent’s compliance with an imposed undertaking;
(c) in December 2024, one charge of contravening a condition of the order, being the requirement to attend drug and alcohol testing. He refused a direction to attend for saliva testing. He was fined $500; and
(d) one charge of failing to comply with his SORA reporting obligations because he failed to provide his telephone number to the Chief Commissioner of Police in October 2023. He was fined $500.
The evidence
17The Secretary relies upon an assessment report by Dr Janelle Armstrong, a forensic psychologist, and her oral evidence. In preparing her report dated 12 April 2025, Dr Armstrong relied on her interviews with the respondent, and significant additional material, including her previous assessment report dated 27 April 2021.
18Dr Armstrong opined that the respondent poses a moderate-high risk of committing a further serious sex offence, and is specifically considered to be at a moderate-high risk of rape by penile penetration of the vagina of either an ex-partner or a post-pubescent stranger female.[4] This risk assessment was unchanged since the previous review of the supervision order in November 2023.
[4]Ibid, [227]
19Dr Armstong opined that the respondent posed a moderate-high risk of committing a further serious violence offence, namely intentionally or recklessly causing serious injury to an intimate partner.[5] This risk is greater that her assessment of a moderate risk in November 2023.
[5]Ibid, [228]
20Dr Armstrong assessed the respondent as experiencing ongoing difficulties with ‘disorganised attachment, maladaptive schemas … and intimacy deficits” and opined that intervention in these behaviours through trauma-informed therapy should be prioritised above all other interventions, as this was the most likely to result in a reduction in risk.[6] She noted that a risk factor for the respondent was substance use problems, particularly alcohol and methamphetamine use. She said that alcohol abuse had impacted his mental health, and it appeared to be a cause of both his intimate partner and general violence.[7] Additionally, she recorded that methamphetamine withdrawal had precipitated his previous spousal sexual violence and general violence.[8]
[6]Ibid, [221]
[7]Ibid, [217]
[8]Ibid
21Dr Armstrong considered the respondent’s involvement in rehabilitation and treatment programs and opined that while some progress has been made, the respondent requires further intervention to enhance his insight development and address risk-relevant behaviours more effectively.[9]
[9]Ibid, [233]
22The respondent provided a signed but undated letter from his current employer. The letter states that the respondent is doing maintenance work at a rural town north of Melbourne. There is a need for him to start early, especially given the heat in summer. He must wear protective equipment including safety boots.
23At the hearing, the respondent’s counsel submitted that he was seeking treatment for issues relevant to his risk of further offending, including seeing a psychologist. I was not prepared to accept that submission without any supporting evidence and requested the parties confer to see whether there could be an agreed position about whether the respondent was seeing a psychologist. The respondent subsequently provided a letter dated 28 August 2025 from Northern Health. The letter stated that the respondent has been a client of the Northern Area Mental Health Service and has a treatment team of a consultant psychiatrist, a psychiatric registrar and a clinician. The letter states the service provides special mental health assessment, care and treatment, but does not specify what treatment has been provided to the respondent, his level of engagement with the service, how any treatment could impact on an assessment of his risk of committing a serious sex offence or a serious violence offence, and what plan there is for further treatment. The Secretary did not object to the letter but pointed out the shortcomings with the letter including that it does not support the claim made in submissions that the respondent is currently engaging in treatment with a psychologist.
Should the supervision order be renewed?
24In hearing an application to renew a supervision order, a court has power to renew or revoke the order or “make no order”.[10] A court can only renew a supervision order if satisfied that a respondent “poses …an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence or a serious violence offence or both if a supervision order is not made and [he or she] is in the community”.[11] An applicant has the burden of proving that a respondent poses or will poses an unacceptable risk.[12] In determining whether there is a such risk, a court must have regard to specified matters and must not have any regard to the means of managing the risk or the likely impact of a supervision order on the respondent.[13] Further a court must be satisfied by acceptable, cogent evidence to a high degree of probability that the respondent poses or will pose an unacceptable risk.[14]
[10] The Act, ss24(1)
[11] Ibid, s14(1)
[12] Ibid, s14(5)
[13] Ibid, s14(2)(a)
[14] Ibid, s14(3)
25The term “unacceptable risk” is not defined in the Act. The Court of Appeal in Nigro v The Secretary to the Department of Justice[15] considered the use of the term “unacceptable risk” in the context of the making of supervision orders under the Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009, the predecessor of the Act, and held that that it requires an assessment of the risk and consideration of the nature and gravity of the offence and the harm that may result if the risk manifested.[16] The Court of Appeal’s interpretation has been applied to the use of the term “unacceptable risk” in the Act.[17]
[15](2013) 41 VR 359
[16] Ibid, [6] and [117]
[17]See, for example, Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SJW(No 2) [2023] VSC 506, [29] and [30]; Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SJW (No 3) [2025] VSC 441, [15].
26I had regard to Dr Armstrong’s reports dated 12 April 2025 and 27 April 2021, her oral evidence, the report from Northern Health dated 28 August 2025, and the undated letter from the respondent’s employer.
27I consider that Dr Armstrong’s opinion is acceptable, cogent evidence of a high degree of probability that the respondent poses an unacceptable risk. The report of Northern Health shows that the respondent has been seeking treatment since the assessment performed by Dr Armstrong but the lack of information about what the treatment is and what it is for does not undermine or weaken Dr Armstrong’s opinion or her assessing of risk.
28I accept that the respondent poses a moderate-high risk of committing a further serious sex offence and a further serious violence offence. Further, that if that risk eventuated it could lead to rape of an intimate partner or a post-pubescent female girl or violence against an intimate partner, which would or could cause them irreparable harm.
29I am satisfied that there should be renewal of the supervision order. Further, I am satisfied that order should be for four years given the respondent’s history of offending, that he currently represents an unacceptable risk, that he is relatively early in the process of reintegrating into the community and there will be a need to manage the risk posed by the respondent at least until the risk level materially reduces .
What conditions should the supervision order contain?
30A supervision order must contain the core conditions set out in s31 of the Act and may include discretionary conditions imposed under ss34 to 38 of the Act. The proposed supervision order was based on the existing supervision order, save to changes to the conditions relating to residence and to remove a prohibition from contravening the Firearms Act 1996.
31In considering whether to impose a discretionary condition on a renewed supervision order, consideration must be given to the following:
(a) the primary purpose of the conditions of an order is to reduce the risk of the offender re-offending by committing a serious sex offence and/or a serious violence offence or an offence referred to in Schedule 3 of the Act;
(b) the secondary purpose of the conditions of an order is to provide for the reasonable concerns of the victim or victims of the offender in relation to their own safety and welfare;
(c) in order to reduce the risk of the offender re-offending, the conditions may:
(i)promote the rehabilitation and treatment of the offender; and
(ii)address the types of behaviour that may increase the risk of the offender committing a serious sex offence and/or a serious violence offence or an offence referred to in Schedule 3, or engaging in any behaviour or conduct that threatens the safety of any person (including the offender); and
(d) the conditions must constitute the minimum interference with the offender's liberty, privacy or freedom of movement that is necessary in the circumstances to ensure the purposes of the condition and must reasonably relate to the gravity of the risk of the offender re-offending.[18]
[18] The Act, s27
32The parties agreed about the conditions of the supervision order except for a limited contest about some conditions.
33In respect of the uncontested conditions, I am satisfied they constitute the minimum interference with the respondent’s liberty that is necessary in the circumstances to ensure the primary and secondary purposes of conditions of a supervision order, and they are reasonably related to the gravity of the risk of the respondent reoffending. I turn now to conditions that were contested or had been contested.
Required time at residence
34The existing supervision order included a condition that required the respondent to be at his residence from 10pm to 6am, effectively a curfew. The parties agreed a curfew was still appropriate and by the time of the hearing had agreed that it should be shortened to 11pm to 5am. It was submitted that he needed to be able to leave his residence by 5am to attend employment. His current employer, a maintenance company, would like him to be able to be at a country location north of the city as early as 7am. He would sometimes have to leave home before 6am to get to work for 7am. It was submitted that allowing him to be away from his residence until 11pm would enable him to foster his relationship with his wife, who lived separately from him on the opposite side of the city.
35In circumstances where there was no evidence that the new proposed times would increase the respondent’s risk of offending, and a curfew of 11pm to 5am would aid protective factors that dimmish his risk of offending, such as his employment and establishing and maintaining intimate relationships, I was satisfied that the curfew period in clause 6.2 of the proposed order should be 11pm to 5am.
Alcohol monitoring
36The Secretary sought in clause 6.13(b) of the proposed order that the respondent must comply with electronic alcohol monitoring. The monitoring would require the respondent to wear an ankle bracelet 24 hours a day.
37The respondent opposed this condition, submitting it exceeded the minimum interference with his liberty, privacy and freedom of movement and that it was unnecessary in the circumstances given:
(a) separate from clause 6.13(b), the proposed supervision order has conditions about alcohol usage. The respondent is prohibited from consuming alcohol except in accordance with a written direction from the Post Sentencing Authority.[19] He must submit to testing for alcohol if a supervision officer or a police officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that he has consumed alcohol;[20]
(b) he has worn an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet since the supervision order was initially made on 10 September 2021. The bracelet has not detected him using alcohol for nearly five years. Relevantly, there is an example of alcohol being available to him at his residence, but he was not detected as having consumed alcohol consistent with him choosing not to consume it; and
(c) there is a stigma in wearing the bracelet. Further, it is inconvenient to do so especially given he needs to wear safety boots for work.
[19] Clause 6.5 of the proposed order dated 20 August 2025
[20] Clause 6.7 of the proposed order dated 20 August 2025
38I accept that requiring the respondent to wear an ankle bracelet monitoring alcohol usage will interfere with his liberty and privacy, and that it involves stigma and a degree of inconvenience to him. Nonetheless, I find that such a requirement is necessary and does not exceed minimum interference, for the following reasons.
39First, if the respondent consumes alcohol it will increase the risk of him offending. Dr Armstrong was of the opinion that alcohol abuse or dependence and substance abuse or dependence were factors that might increase the respondent’s identified risks,[21] whereas abstinence or responsible use of alcohol was a factor which might decrease his risk.[22] She also stated that an “increased understanding of the connection between his attachment issues and behaviours (such as substance use or interpersonal conflicts)”[23] was a factor which might decrease the respondent’s identified risks. She recorded that the respondent’s participation in alcohol and other drug intervention had a moderately positive effect and there was evidence of the respondent’s emerging insight into his substance use and associated risk factors. This was qualified by noting her clinical observations of the respondent, which highlighted ongoing minimisation, externalisation of blame, fixed persecutory ideation, and inconsistent use of coping strategies.
[21]Report of Dr Janelle Armstrong dated 12 April 2025, [234]
[22]Ibid, [235]
[23]Ibid
40Secondly, the respondent’s risk of offending concerns, at least, in part the potential for serious sexual and violence offences against an intimate partner, offences that would likely occur in a private place like a house. The other conditions relating to alcohol usage are likely to have limited potential to protect against this part of the risk. The requirement that the respondent submit to breath testing is contingent on a supervision officer or a police officer suspecting that he has used alcohol; this is unlikely to occur if the respondent was drinking alcohol at a house.
41Thirdly, while it is to the respondent’s credit that there is no evidence of him consuming alcohol while on the supervision order, regard must be had to the fact that he is relatively early in reintegrating into the community and that he is yet to demonstrate a sustained period of stability and avoiding maladaptive coping mechanisms. Previously, his maladaptive coping has been using drugs despite being prohibited from doing so. This is evident from his breaches of the supervision order and his comment in his interview with Dr Armstrong that while on the supervision order he had used methamphetamine and buprenorphine for about 1 and 1/2 months.[24]
[24] Ibid, [138]
42Fourthly, the overriding purpose of the supervision order is to put in place measures that reduce his risk of reoffending and harm to members of the community. A risk in this period which should be guarded against is that the respondent will cope with stressors by using maladaptive strategies such as using drugs or consuming alcohol. While to date his maladaptive coping strategy has been drugs and not alcohol, there is a concern that without constant monitoring he may consume alcohol. Dr Armstrong gave evidence that generally the use of an alcohol monitoring bracelet has a deterrent effect. While she had not discussed this directly with the respondent, she considered the deterrent effect is likely to assist in his decision making.[25] I accept that the alcohol monitoring bracelet likely does have a deterrent effect on the respondent and that if he were not to wear the bracelet there is a risk that drinking alcohol will become a means for coping with the challenges he faces.
[25] Transcript of hearing on 19 Augst 2025 (“T”) 32, lines (“L”) 11-23
43Fifthly, the supervision order will be reviewed within 2 years. This will provide an opportunity to review the condition of electronic alcohol monitoring in the context of information about whether the respondent has continued not to consume alcohol, whether he has been able to avoid maladaptive coping strategies and whether he has demonstrated a sustained period of stability.
Review period
44The supervision order must contain a date by which the Secretary must make an application for review of the supervision order under Part 8 of the Act. A supervision order must be reviewed, with an application for review to be made within three years of the making of the order or any earlier date specified in an order.[26]
[26] The Act, s99(1)
45The Secretary proposes a review take place within two years and the respondent proposes it take place within 18 months.
46The purpose of reviewing a supervision order is to determine whether the supervision order should remain in operation or be revoked, including whether it should be replaced with a different supervision or detention order.[27] The Secretary must commission a progress report in respect of the person subject of a review application. The court hearing the application must have regard to, amongst other things, the progress report.[28] It follows that a review should take place when sufficient time has passed to enable a chance for a change in the level of potential risk and an assessment to have been undertaken.
[27] Ibid, s104(a) and (b)
[28] Ibid, s105
47In this proceeding, Dr Armstrong gave evidence that the respondent had not yet demonstrated stable mental health in high risk situations and that he would need to demonstrate this over six to 12 months for there to be a reduction in the risk assessment. She considered it appropriate that a personal examination take place in about 18 months for the purpose of preparing an assessment report for review of the supervision order, and that generally she would prepare a report about six weeks after the examination. I accept her opinion, which means that a review is not likely to be useful within 18 months but is likely to be useful if held within 24 months.
48I ordered that the supervision order be reviewed in 24 months.
Should there be a non-publication order?
49The respondent applied for non-publication order of the respondent’s identity and location pursuant to s279 of the Act. In deciding whether to make a non-publication order I must consider whether I am satisfied that it is in the public interest to make such an order having regard to the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (e) of s280 of the Act.
50The Secretary opposes a non-publication order in respect of the respondent’s identity, and neither consents to nor opposes an order regarding his location. It points out that under s280(d) of the Act I must take account that the respondent breached his existing supervision order in April 2024 by possessing prohibited drugs and in December 2024 by refusing a direction to attend for saliva testing, although no submission was made about how I should take account of the breaches. Without seeking to downplay the seriousness of the breaches, the drug use shows his resort to maladaptive coping strategy by using drugs and the refusal to saliva test as an attempt to conceal drug use that he knew was impermissible. Dr Armstrong gave evidence that if the respondent’s identify and location were published this would affect his rehabilitation. It could worsen his concerns about safety and trust and increase his paranoia, and would increase the risk of him reoffending.[29] The overriding purpose of renewing the supervision order is safety and protection of the community and that purpose could be undermined with publication of the respondent’s identity and location.
[29] T26, L16-24
51I was satisfied it is in the public interest for a non-publication order to be made.
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