Secretary (Department of Communities and Justice) v Davies & Ors

CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER
CITATION:	Secretary (Department of Communities and Justice) v Davies & Ors [2023] NSWPIC 683
APPLICANT:	Secretary (Department of Communities and Justice)
FIRST RESPONDENT:	Ian Davies
SECOND RESPONDENT:	Caleb Hawkes Davies
THIRD RESPONDENT:	Michael Davies
FOURTH RESPONDENT:	Peter James Davies
SENIOR MEMBER:	Kerry Haddock
DATE OF DECISION:	19 December 2023
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; claim for interest on lump sum death benefit pursuant to section 109; consideration of Haidary v Wandella Pet Foods Pty Limited, Dynamix Pty Ltd and Burrangong Pet Foods Pty Ltd, Kaur v Thales Underwater Systems Pty Ltd, Kathryn Ann Kratz as executrix of the estate of the late Owen Beddall v Qantas Airways, Bennett v Jones, Beves v Patrick Stevedores No 2 Pty Ltd & Anor, McGrath v P.M, and Electric Pty Limited; claim was not duly made until statement of first respondent containing evidence of dependency served with Reply on 23 October 2023; Held – interest awarded at a rate that was 2% above the Reserve Bank Cash Rate, that is 6.1% per annum, from 23 October 2023 to 6 November 2023, when order for payment of lump sum death benefit was made.
DETERMINATIONS MADE:	The Commission determines: 1. The applicant is to pay interest on the lump sum death benefit, pursuant to s 109 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998, at the rate of 6.10% per annum from 23 October 2023 to 6 November 2023.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

BACKGROUND

The worker, Faith Davies, died on 8 December 2022, as a result of injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident, arising out of or in the course of employment with the applicant, Secretary (Department of Communities and Justice).
The first respondent, Ian Davies (Mr Davies) is the worker’s widower. The second respondent, Caleb Hawkes Davies, is the worker’s son. The third respondent, Michael Davies, and the fourth respondent, Michael James Davies, are the worker’s stepsons. The only person who claims to have been dependent on the worker is the first respondent.
The first respondent made a claim pursuant to s 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) for the lump sum death benefit of $871,200; funeral expenses, pursuant to
s 26 of the 1987 Act; and interest on the lump sum, pursuant to s 109 (1) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act).
By letter dated 22 December 2022, to the applicant’s insurer, QBE Workers Compensation (NSW) Limited (QBE), the first respondent’s solicitors requested that QBE forward to them the original Death Benefit Claim and any other relevant documentation relating to the motor vehicle accident on 8 December 2022, “and all other documents relating to this Death Benefit Claim”.
By letter dated 23 December 2022, the solicitors for the applicant advised the first respondent’s solicitors that no claim for death benefits had been received, and that further evidence was required to determine liability in respect of the worker’s death. They requested information and particulars of the claim, including details of any other potential dependents.
By letter dated 16 January 2023 to QBE, the first respondent’s solicitors stated that they had not received a response to their letter dated 22 December 2022. They provided various documents, including, among other evidence, a copy of the first respondent’s and the worker’s marriage certificate; a copy of the first respondent’s and the worker’s birth certificates; a copy of the worker’s death certificate; and statutory declarations from the second, third, and fourth respondents, and other potential claimants.
The first respondent’s solicitors stated that they had not been provided with any documentation “including the original Death Benefit Claim” and asked that the applicant advise its further requirements “forthwith”.
The first respondent’s solicitors advised that, unless they received a response within seven days, they would lodge a complaint with IRO (Independent Review Office).
By letter dated 2 February 2023 to the applicant’s solicitors, the first respondent’s solicitors referred to letters dated 23 December 2022 and 31 January 2023, which the applicant’s solicitors “allege[d]” they had sent to a firm called “Penny Walters Armstrong Legal” (emphasis in original), which was not the name of the firm. They asserted that they had not received any correspondence from the applicant’s solicitors.
The first respondent’s solicitors enclosed copies of the letters and documents they had sent to QBE dated 22 December 2022 and 16 January 2023. They requested an “amended” request for particulars.
By letter dated 6 February 2023, the applicant’s solicitors advised the first respondent’s solicitors that they had sent their letters dated 23 December 2022 and 31 January 2023 to the correct email address. They again requested particulars of the claim.
The first respondent’s solicitors provided some particulars of the claim by letter dated
8 February 2023. They advised that instructions were currently being obtained as to the first respondent’s dependency, wholly or in part, as the legal spouse of the worker.
By letter dated 9 February 2023, the applicant’s solicitors advised the first respondent’s solicitors that they had not provided the NSWPF GIPA (New South Police Force Government Information (Public Access)) authority which had previously been requested. They also requested contact details for other potential dependants.
By letter dated 1 March 2023, the first respondent’s solicitors requested that the solicitors for the applicant indicate when a decision on liability would be made.
By letter dated 3 March 2023, the solicitors for the applicant advised that they were awaiting further evidence, including the police report and Coroner’s report, and contact details of the worker’s parents and siblings.
By letter dated 6 March 2023, the first respondent’s solicitors provided the applicant’s solicitors with the contact details of potential claimants of the lump sum.
By letter dated 21 March 2023, the applicant’s solicitors responded to an email dated
20 March 2023 from the first respondent’s solicitors that is not in evidence. They advised that their GIPA request of the police had been denied as the information related to the judicial function of the Coroner’s Court, and a request had to be made to the Court.
The applicant’s solicitors advised that the request to the Coroners Court had been made, the report may take several months, and they were unable to advise when their client would determine liability.
By letter dated 1 June 2023, the first respondent’s solicitors requested an update, and advised the applicant’s solicitors that the first respondent would be making a claim for interest, pursuant to s 109 of the 1998 Act, “from the date he made his claim to date and continuing”.
By letter dated 2 June 2023, the applicant’s solicitors advised the first respondent’s solicitors that they were still awaiting the Coronial documents, without which liability could not be determined. They advised that s 109 of the 1998 Act provides that interest cannot be ordered before a claim for compensation was duly made. (Emphasis in original).
The applicant’s solicitors referred to case law that addresses the issue of “duly made”. They stated that the claim had not been fully particularised, which related to all claims for dependency, not just that of the first respondent; and therefore a claim had not been duly made for the purpose of s 109. (Emphasis in original).
The applicant’s solicitors wrote to various potential claimants on 2 June 2023, advising them of their right to make a claim should they be able to establish dependency on the worker.
By letter dated 8 June 2023, the applicant’s solicitors advised the first respondent’s solicitors that the Coroner’s Court had advised it was awaiting the final post mortem report, which could take up to 12 months.
Liability for the claim was apparently accepted by the applicant on 19 September 2023, although the correspondence notifying that decision is not in evidence.
The applicant lodged an Application in Respect of Death of Worker (the Application) on
26 September 2023.
The first respondent lodged his Reply on 19 October 2023.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The parties agree that the following issue remains in dispute:
(a) whether the first respondent is entitled to payment of interest on the lump sum; and if so, the period during which, and the rate at which, interest is payable.

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION (the Commission)

The matter was listed for preliminary conference on 6 November 2023. Ms Dunkley appeared for the applicant; and Ms Waters appeared for the first respondent, who was present. The other respondents also attended.
I was satisfied on the evidence that the first respondent was dependent on the worker for support, and there were no other persons dependent on her for support.
Findings and orders with respect to payment of the lump sum and funeral expenses were therefore made on 6 November 2023.
The parties were unable to agree on the claim for interest.
The solicitor for the first respondent asserted that his statement, dated 24 April 2023, had been served on the applicant prior to the service of his Reply.
The applicant’s solicitor asserted that the statement had not been received.
After reviewing her file, the solicitor for the first respondent confirmed that the statement had not been served prior to the service of the Reply.
I offered to hear and record the parties’ submissions on interest. They advised that they wished to provide written submissions,
A timetable was set for the provision of written submissions, which have now been received. The parties were advised that, at the conclusion of the time allowed for submissions, the claim for interest would be determined “on the papers”.
I am satisfied that the parties to the dispute understand the nature of the application and the legal implications of any assertion made in the information supplied. I have used my best endeavours in attempting to bring the parties to the dispute to a settlement acceptable to all of them. I am satisfied that the parties have had sufficient opportunity to explore settlement and that they have been unable to reach an agreed resolution of the dispute.

EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence

The following documents were in evidence before the Commission and considered in making this determination:
(a) Application in Respect of Death of Worker and attached documents, and
(b) Reply by first respondent and attached documents.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

Evidence

In view of the previous consent orders and the narrow focus of the remaining issue, it is unnecessary that I discuss the evidence in detail.

Evidence of the first respondent, Ian Davies

Mr Davies’ statement is dated 24 April 2023.
He was then aged 61. He and the worker were married in 2007 and lived together to the date of her death.
To the best of his knowledge, he was the worker’s only dependant. All their children were adults and supported themselves. To the best of his knowledge the worker’s parents and two siblings supported themselves.
At the time of the worker’s death, he was “the stay at home spouse doing home duties with no income.” He had not been in paid employment for nine years.
The worker provided all their income from her employment. It paid for all expenses, including food, household needs, utility bills, rates, insurances, car registration, travel, holidays, medical expenses “and more”.
He was financially totally dependent on the worker. His contribution was to do as much as he could, with his disabilities, to look after the house and surrounds, cook, clean, and manage their finances. They shared responsibilities.
He and the worker shared two bank accounts, and they used the funds in those accounts to meet day to day expenses.

SUBMISSIONS

As written submissions have been provided, I will provide a brief summary.

First respondent

The first respondent submitted that his interest claim arose on 8 February 2023, the date on which his claim was duly made. The establishment of his claim to be the only dependant did not require him to establish the degree of dependency to have a duly made claim, as there was no apportionment.
The first respondent submitted that he had assisted in obtaining and forwarding statutory declarations from all potential dependants. As at 8 February 2023, he had provided all particulars requested by the applicant, other than the degree of dependency. Dependency is a matter of fact – Aafjes v Kearney[1] and New Monckton Collieries Ltd v Keeling.[2]
[1] (1976) 180 CLR 199.
[2] [1911] AC 648.
The first respondent submitted that there was no dispute regarding his dependency at and after 8 February 2023. He submitted that on 7 September 2023, in response to a request from IRO/ILARS (Independent Legal Assistance and Review Service) Legal Solutions Team, QBE confirmed that no information was required from him.
The submissions refer to the annexure of this and other documents, which were not attached, and were attached to the submissions in reply. Most were in evidence, but the document referred to above was not.
The first respondent submitted that on 19 September 2023, the applicant admitted liability without awaiting the Coroner’s report.
The first respondent submitted that the Application contained an “admission” that he had made a claim for the lump sum death benefit on the basis that he was the only dependant of the worker. No date for the making of the claim was provided.
The first respondent submitted that interest was payable from 8 February 2023, or such other date as determined, to the date of payment of the lump sum, as determined by the findings and orders dated 6 November 2023.
The first respondent referred to Haidary Wandella Petfoods Pty Ltd[3] [sic: Haidary v Wandella Pet Foods Pty Limited, Dynamix Pty Ltd and Burrangong Pet Foods Pty Ltd] as authority that an appropriate source to determine that the interest rate was the Supreme Court rate.
[3] [2005] NSWWCCPD 9 (Haidary).
The first respondent submitted that the Supreme Court rate currently referred only to post-judgment interest. He submitted the pre-judgment interest rate set by “the NSW District Court Practice Note Civil 15” was the appropriate rate. The rate “as at today’s date” was 8.10% and for the period from 9 February 2023 to 30 June 2023 was 7.10%.
The first respondent submitted that the final calculation of interest could not be ascertained until the date on which he received the lump sum.
In reply to the applicant, the first respondent submitted that the Commission should exercise its discretion to award interest. He referred again to the New South Wales District Court indexed interest rates.

Applicant

The applicant provided a chronology of events, which I will not repeat.
The applicant’s solicitors requested of the first respondent’s solicitors by letter dated
23 November 2023 the annexures to which he had referred in his submissions, but which were not attached.
The applicant submitted that the Commission’s jurisdiction to award interest is discretionary – Haidary.
The applicant referred to the decisions in Kaur v Thales Underwater Systems Pty Ltd;[4] Kathryn Ann Kratz as executrix of the estate of the late Owen Beddall v Qantas Airways Limited;[5] and Leo Paul Mahoney trading as Cudgegon Security v McQuiggin & Ors[6] [sic: Leo Paul Mahoney trading as Cudgegong Security v McQuiggin & Ors].
[4] [2011] NSWWCCPD 6 (Kaur).
[5] [2020] NSWWCC 36 (Kratz).
[6] NSWWCC 198/20.
The applicant submitted that the Commission should not exercise its discretion to award interest. (Emphasis in original).
The applicant submitted that it acted promptly and pro-actively in investigating and accepting liability for the injury and the death benefit, even in the absence of evidence to determine the cause of the late Mrs Faith Davies’ death or a duly made claim being made by the applicant [sic: first respondent]. (Emphasis in original).
The applicant submitted that any purported delay from the claim being accepted on
19 September 2023 until 6 November 2023, when the matter was listed for teleconference [sic] was not occasioned by its actions or inactions. (Emphasis in original).
The applicant submitted that the date on which the dependants served specific information required to show an entitlement to the death benefit should be the characterisation of each date of a duly made claim, being the date on which the claim for “dependency” was fully particularised.
The applicant submitted that it requested evidence of the first respondent’s dependency when it had not been forthcoming by 6 February 2023. Therefore, even if the applicant had the responsibility to obtain particulars of dependency, which it rejected, it required further particulars.
The applicant submitted that the letter from the first respondent’s solicitors dated
8 February 2023 made it clear that they did not have instructions on his dependency. It had informed the first respondent on 2 June 2023 that the claim had not been duly made.
The applicant submitted that the first respondent did not particularise the dependency or provide evidence as to dependency prior to 23 October 2023. The Reply served on
23 October 2023 included documents that addressed his dependency, despite the evidence being dated in April 2023. The first respondent had confirmed that the document was not served prior to the Reply. Until those documents were provided, the claim could not be regarded as fully particularised.
The applicant submitted that, further, or in the alternative, neither the second, third nor fourth respondents filed Replies, and their previous statutory declarations were provided without the benefit of legal advice. It was only at the teleconference that they verbally confirmed they were not making a claim for dependency, and I accepted they were not dependent on the worker.
The applicant submitted that it was not until the teleconference on 6 November 2023 that the issue of dependency was fully particularised by all respondents. Any delay from
6 November 2023 to the death benefit being paid was due to the requirement for submissions regarding interest, in circumstances where the claim was not particularised by the first respondent.
The applicant submitted that it was not in a position to attend to payment of the death benefit until the Commission confirmed that the first respondent was the only dependant on
6 November 2023. (Emphasis in original).
The first respondent submitted it would not be appropriate to award interest in this case. (Emphasis in original).
In the alternative, the applicant submitted that should the Commission “prefer” to award interest, it should only be awarded from the period to which the claim was fully particularised, being from 6 November 2023 [sic], when it was determined that there were no other dependants of the worker.
The applicant submitted that it was not possible to pay the lump sum until the Commission had determined the persons dependent for support upon the worker and made the necessary orders with regard to payment. Therefore, the Commission should decline to order interest.
In the alternative, the applicant submits that the absolute earliest that the first respondent’s claim was duly made was when the first respondent served the Reply on the applicant’s solicitors on 23 October 2023. Until 23 October 2023, the applicant could not be aware as to the first respondent’s claims for dependency. (Emphasis in original).
The applicant submitted that the first respondent first provided full particulars of the claim for interest in his written submissions served on 17 November 2023.
The applicant submitted that the Commission is not bound to award interest at Supreme Court rates but may award interest at “such rate as the Commission thinks fit.” It submitted that, in accordance with the decision in Cameron v StateCover Mutual Limited,[7] interest should reflect the loss to the estate. There is no prescribed rate of interest, and the Commission does not have a standard applicable rate. The Commission must have regard to the rates of interest available on investments during the period awarded.
[7] [2015] NSWWCC 325.

The applicant submitted that the Commission has developed the practice of awarding interest at a rate which is 2% per annum above the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) cash rate. It referred to my decision in Goulburn Flight Training Centre Pty Limited v Druck & Ors.[8]
[8] [2023] NSWPIC 35.
The applicant submitted that the interest the parties could have received had they received the benefit of the funds is reflected by a commercial retail interest rate, or investment rate, of the RBA.
The applicant submitted that the first respondent’s submissions on interest are of no assistance, as they do not address the correct test, relevant history and facts, or specify which of the rates identified, namely 8.10% or 7.10%, is being claimed. An order of either would be unduly punitive, unfair, and unjust and should not be permitted.
The applicant submitted that, should the Commission be minded to award interest, any award should not exceed a rate that is 2% above the RBA cash rate at the relevant date, from the date the first respondent duly made the claim to 6 November 2023. (Emphasis in original).

SUMMARY

Section 109 of the 1998 Act provides:

“109 Interest before order for payment

(cf former s 113)
(1) In any proceedings before the Commission, the Commission may order that there is to be included, in any sum to be paid, interest at such rate as the Commission thinks fit on the whole or any part of the sum for the whole or any part of the period before the sum is payable, subject to the limitations imposed by this section.
(2) Interest cannot be ordered under this section--
(a) on any compensation payable under Division 4 of Part 3 of the 1987 Act, or
(b) on any compensation payable under this Act for any period before a claim for the compensation was duly made, or
(c) on any compensation payable under this Act for any period during which proceedings before the Commission were adjourned on the application of the claimant for the compensation or pursuant to section 102.
(3) This section does not--
(a) authorise the giving of interest upon interest, or
(b) apply in relation to any debt upon which interest is payable as of right whether by virtue of any agreement or otherwise.”

The power to award interest is discretionary and may apply to some or all of the compensation payable, for the entire period, from the date of the claim to the date of the order, or for a lesser period. The rate of interest is also a discretionary matter. However, while the discretion is wide, regard must be had to the facts of the case.
In Haidary, Deputy President Fleming said:
“The award of interest by the Commission, pursuant to section 109 of the 1998 Act, is discretionary. Mr Haidary will only be entitled to interest, if awarded, on those amounts of his weekly entitlement that were unpaid, and only from the date that his claim ‘was duly made’. The likely amount of interest that would be due on these sums is small, relative to the whole of his claim, but nonetheless they may form part of Mr Haidary’s entitlement. The purpose of ordering interest on an award is to compensate the worker for the loss of his or her income, not to penalise the employer (Virag v James N Kirby t/as Betts Electric Motors;[9] Healey v McPherson Binding Pty Ltd).”[10]
[9] [1990] NSWCC 1; (1990) 6 NSWCCR 86.
[10] (1989) 5 NSWCCR 139.
Section 109 (2)(b) of the 1998 Act provides that interest cannot be ordered for any period before a claim was duly made.
It follows that interest may be payable to some, but not all, claimants, for differing periods, and at differing rates, depending on when their claims were duly made. The applicant’s submissions regarding the particularisation of claims by the second, third and fourth respondents at the preliminary conference are misconceived.
President Keating said in Kaur at [139]-[140]:
“Section 109(2)(b) of the 1998 Act prohibits interest on any award of compensation payable under the Act for any period before a claim for compensation on behalf of the appellants was duly made. I accept the submission that the claim for compensation on behalf of the appellants was not duly made until the day of the arbitration. I therefore accept Thales’s submission that, as at the arbitration, the appellants could not be entitled to interest pursuant to s 109 of the 1998 Act.”
The phrase “duly made” has been held to mean “fully particularised”. It was applied in Kratz, in which Arbitrator Isaksen, as he then was, referred to the decision of Arbitrator Wynyard, as he then was, in Shanika Cooper v G & W Mudge Concreting Pty Ltd & others[11] and his own decision in Lavelle v David Paul Browne & others.[12]
[11] WCC 6411/18.
[12] WCC 533/19.
It is not relevant whether, as submitted by the applicant, it acted promptly and “pro-actively” in investigating and accepting liability.
In Bennett v Jones[13], President Moffitt said (at 367):
“A number of questions arise. Is the power to award interest such that it should be used punitively, so a plaintiff or defendant is penalised for delay or failure to observe court procedures; or is it entirely compensatory, so as to do no more than that which is fair in a pecuniary sense between the parties? Is the jurisdiction to be exercised, or not exercised, simply by inquiry whether the defendant ought to have paid money to the plaintiff at some earlier date; or is it to be awarded on some more neutral basis, as that, for some reason, the money has been outstanding for a period, in which the defendant had the benefit of not paying it and the plaintiff the detriment of not having it, and the delay and the conduct of a party is relevant only so far as by reason of it, there is, or may be, economic disadvantage to the opposing party by an award of interest being, or not being, made? For reasons I will indicate, in my view the approach last mentioned in each of the two foregoing queries is that which is in conformity with the statute.”
[13] (1977) 2 NSWLR 355 (Bennett).
His honour continued, at 370:
“I see no reason why the simple fact that a defendant does not have to pay money when his liability arises, and has the benefit of non-payment for a period, should not provide a basis for payment of interest for the whole period. One had the money, and the other not. If it is not a commercial setting, the gain and loss may not be measured by a commercial rate of interest.”
Arbitrator Sweeney, as he then was, said in Beves v Patrick Stevedores No 2 Pty Ltd & Anor,[14] that in a “death claim”, where the compensation has not been paid, the insurer/scheme agent has been in possession of the award moneys and the worker [sic] has been deprived of their use. He noted that the common law principles must be considered in the light of s 109 of the 1998 Act.
[14] [2014] NSWWCC 178 (Beves).
Arbitrator Sweeney pointed out that the course of events in Beves was beyond the insurer’s control. He said:
“Nevertheless, the insurer has had the compensation moneys throughout this period and presumably invested it to its advantage. To paraphrase Bennett, interest is not to be awarded simply on the basis that the respondent ought to have paid the money earlier, but on the more neutral basis that ‘the money has been outstanding for a period during which the defendant has had the benefit of not paying it, and plaintiff the detriment of not having it’.”
In this matter, I am persuaded that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to award interest on the lump sum.
I do not accept any of the first respondent’s submissions about when the claim was “duly made”.
The first respondent’s claim was not “fully particularised” until he provided the applicant with his statement dated 24 April 2023. Prior to that date, the chronology of events was as I have noted above in “Background”.
As late as 8 February 2023, the first respondent’s solicitors advised that they were obtaining instructions as to his dependency on the worker.
The first respondent’s solicitors attached to his submissions in reply a copy of an email from ILARS. The first respondent did not seek and was not granted leave to rely on further evidence, and it was inappropriate to attempt to rely on it in response to a direction to provide submissions. However, as the applicant has not objected, I have considered it.
The email does not assist the first respondent. The first respondent’s complaint was clearly directed to the determination of the claim. The question asked of QBE was whether any information from the dependent spouse was required to facilitate a determination. QBE responded that no information was required, but the balance of its response clearly identified that a determination of liability had not been made, and the first respondent was not required to provide any information that could assist in that determination.
The first respondent’s solicitor conceded at the preliminary conference that his statement was not served on the applicant until his Reply was served. The applicant has submitted that the Reply was served on 23 October 2023.
The first respondent did not provide any evidence in support of his claim to have been dependent on the worker until he served his Reply. His claim was not duly made until 23 October 2023. No interest may be awarded before that date.
As regards the rate at which interest is to be awarded, the approach of the Commission has been to award interest at a rate, consistent with the recent rates of interest, at 2% above the cash rate for the relevant period. In the matter of McGrath v P.M. Electric Pty Limited,[15] Acting Deputy President Parker confirmed a decision to award interest in accordance with that calculation.
[15] [2023] NSWPICPD 31.
The first respondent’s submission that interest should be awarded to the date of payment of the lump sum overlooks the provision in s 109 (1) of the 1998 Act that interest may be ordered pursuant to s 109 before the sum is payable.
The date on which the sum was payable was the date of the Certificate of Determination (COD), that is 6 November 2023. Any entitlement to interest between the date of the COD and the date of payment of the lump sum is governed by s 110 of the 1998 Act.
As I have determined that the first respondent’s claim was duly made on 23 October 2023, he is entitled to interest on the lump sum from 23 October 2023 to 6 November 2023. The RBA cash rate during that period was 4.10%. The rate at which interest is awarded is therefore 6.10% per annum.
The order is set out in the COD.

[2023] NSWPIC 683

19 December 2023