Sealy and Lewis (Child support)

[2020] AATA 5969

Sealy and Lewis (Child support) [2020] AATA 5969 (17 December 2020)

DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division

REVIEW NUMBER:  2020/SC019936

APPLICANT:  Ms Sealy

OTHER PARTIES:  Child Support Registrar

Mr Lewis

TRIBUNAL:Member Y Webb

DECISION DATE:  17 December 2020

DECISION:

The decision under review is affirmed.

CATCHWORDS

CHILD SUPPORT – percentage of care – whether there was a change to the likely pattern of care – existing percentage of care determinations revoked and new determinations made - court orders not complied with – whether reasonable action taken by parent with reduced care – whether reasonable action taken by parent with increased care - decision under review affirmed

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

REASONS FOR DECISION

BACKGROUND

1. This review is about the percentages of care of Ms Sealy and Mr Lewis in relation to their son, who is 11 years old.  Ms Sealy and Mr Lewis have two children but this review relates only to their son (“the child”).

2. The child support case was registered with Services Australia (Child Support Agency) on 18 March 2020 and has been collectable by the Child Support Agency since that date.

3. There are Federal Circuit Court of Australia court orders dated 30 November 2016 in relation to the care of the child. In brief summary, these orders provided that the parents have equal shared parental responsibility and that during school terms Mr Lewis will have care of the child for six nights a fortnight and Ms Sealy eight nights a fortnight.  During school holidays the parents will each have 50% care.  On special occasions the care will alternate each year between the parents[1]. 

   [1] C1-pages 43-44

4. In March 2020 Ms Sealy contacted the Child Support Agency and made an application for a child support assessment.  She stated that she had 100% care of the child[2].

   [2] C1-page 25

5. On 9 April 2020 the Child Support Agency made a decision that Ms Sealy had 100% care of the child and Mr Lewis had 0% care with the child support assessment commencing from 18 March 2020[3]. 

   [3] C1 -page 29, 33-34

6. On 28 April 2020 Mr Lewis objected to that decision. Mr Lewis stated that the care of the child was being withheld by Ms Sealy from 13 February 2020.[4]  He stated that he was taking prompt and multiple steps to have his care restored.

   [4] C1-page 52

7. On 4 August 2020, an objections officer allowed Mr Lewis’s objection and set aside the original decision.    The objections officer decided that an interim care decision should be made and that the court-ordered care of 56% to Ms Sealy and 44% to Mr Lewis should apply for an interim period of 26 weeks from 13 March 2020 to 11 September 2020.  The objections officer found that Mr Lewis was taking reasonable action to restore his care and ensure that the court orders of 2016 were complied with but that Ms Sealy was not taking reasonable action to participate in family dispute resolution.

8. On 24 September 2020 Ms Sealy requested review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).

9. Ms Sealy and Mr Lewis attended the hearing on 17 December 2020 by way of a telephone conference and both gave evidence on affirmation.

10. The Tribunal was also provided with a bundle of relevant documentation (numbered pages 1 to 140 by the Child Support Agency and this was marked Exhibit C1. A smaller bundle numbered pages 141 to 158 from the Child Support Agency was marked Exhibit C2.  Ms Sealy also provided documents and these were marked as Exhibit A1 to A80.  Mr Lewis also provided documents and these were marked Exhibit B1 to B52.

ISSUES

1. The issues for the Tribunal to determine are:

   a)What were the care arrangements in relation to the care of the child in the relevant care period?

   b)Should a new determination of a percentage of care for the child be made? If so, what is the percentage of care and from when should it apply?

   c)Should an interim care determination be made in relation to the child and, if so, for what period should it apply?

CONSIDERATION

1. The legislation relevant to this review is contained in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Assessment Act) and the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act1988.

2. Percentage of care determinations are made under section 49 and/or section 50 of the Assessment Act. Section 49 of the Assessment Act provides authority to make a determination in circumstances where a parent has no care of the child. Section 50 of the Assessment Act provides authority to make a determination of a percentage of care in situations where a person has a pattern of care. Where the Child Support Registrar is satisfied that a responsible person has had, or is likely to have, a pattern of care for the child during the relevant care period, the Registrar must determine that person’s percentage of care for the child during the care period. Most usually, the percentage determined will be the percentage that corresponds with the actual care of the child that the Registrar is satisfied the responsible person has had, or is likely to have, during the relevant care period.

3. The Assessment Act provides that the care percentage must be determined for a “care period” which is effectively defined as “…such period…as the Registrar considers to be appropriate having regard to all of the circumstances”. Usually (but not necessarily) the care period will be a 12-month period starting from the date the care of the child changed and reflecting the actual care that a person has, or is likely to have, during the care period.

4. The pattern can be established either according to a “care arrangement” (such as court orders) or the actual care that is taking place. Depending on whether a pattern has been established or not, the Tribunal can then proceed to determine the percentage of care applying the appropriate law (sections 49 and 50 of the Assessment Act).

5. Section 54A of the Assessment Act provides that the Registrar may assess the level of care on the number of nights that a parent has during a care period.

6. In this case, Ms Sealy and Mr Lewis did not contend that nights were an unsuitable measure of the care of the child and the Tribunal finds that nights are an appropriate method of ascertaining the care in this case.

7. For the purpose of determining whether a person “has had, or is likely to have, a pattern of care for the child”[5] the Tribunal takes into account evidence of the care the person has had, or the actual care, from the date that the child support assessment was registered and up to the time of the original determination by the Registrar and evidence of the pattern of care the person is, or was, likely to have at that point in time.

   [5] Paragraph 50(1)(a) of the Assessment Act

8. In this case, there were court orders in existence from 30 November 2016. There did not appear to be any dispute between the parents that up until 13 February 2020 the court orders were being followed. The Assessment Act refers to a “care arrangement”. Section 5 of the Assessment Act refers to the “Family Assistance Act” for its definition of a “care arrangement” and section 3 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 provides that a “care arrangement” includes a court order such as a parenting order within the meaning of section 64B of the Family Law Act 1975. Hence the Tribunal finds that the court order of 30 November 2016 is a “care arrangement” for the purposes of the Assessment Act and that it provides that during school terms Mr Lewis will have care of the child for six nights a fortnight and Ms Sealy eight nights a fortnight. During school holidays the parents will each have 50% care. On special occasions the care will alternate each year between the parents[6]. The Tribunal is satisfied that these orders mean that Ms Sealy had 56% care of the child and Mr Lewis 44% care under the court orders. (This was calculated on the basis that there are 40 weeks of school term (20 fortnights) with Ms Sealy having care eight nights a fortnight = 160 nights + half of the school holidays = 42 nights. This totals 202 nights and divided by 365 = 55.3%.) In accordance with section 54D of the Assessment Act the lower percentage of care is rounded down and the higher percentage rounded up. Hence the Tribunal finds that the court orders provided Ms Sealy with 56% care of the child and Mr Lewis with 44% care.

   [6] C1-pages 43-44

9. It is not disputed that when Ms Sealy contacted the Child Support Agency to apply for a child support assessment that she notified that the child was in her 100% care.  The Child Support Agency granted the application from 18 March 2020 with the care recorded as 100% to Ms Sealy and 0% to Mr Lewis from 13 March 2020. 

10. Before making new percentage of care determinations under sections 49 and 50 of the Assessment Act from 13 March 2020, the Tribunal must consider whether an interim period should apply pursuant to section 51 of the Assessment Act.

Did the parent with reduced care take reasonable action to ensure that the care arrangement was complied with?

1. Section 51 of the Assessment Act provides that a care determination may be made (called an “interim determination”) if a care arrangement, such as a court order, is not being complied with and the parent with reduced care is taking “reasonable action” to have the court order complied with. “Reasonable action” is not defined in the legislation. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill for the amending Act that introduced section 51, referring to “reasonable action” states: “...for example, a parent may be negotiating with the other parent to have the care arrangement complied with, or seeking advice and assistance from a family relationship centre, or taking action through other dispute resolution processes.”

2. In addition, government policy is reflected in the Child Support Guide (the Guide) which states  at 2.2.4 that reasonable action could include:

   ·     negotiating with the other party in a genuine attempt to ensure compliance with the care arrangement;

   ·     making and/or attending an appointment at a family relationships centre or other dispute resolution service with the aim of ensuring the care arrangement is adhered to;

   ·     seeking or obtaining legal advice regarding the making of a court order;

   ·     filing an application to the court to seek an order to be made or enforced; or

   ·     notifying the police that the child has been taken without consent.

3. In determining an application for review and in the interests of consistency of decision making, the Tribunal would ordinarily apply such policy providing it was not inconsistent with the Act.[7]

   [7] See Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] FCA 39

4. Mr Lewis contended that his care of the child was being withheld and that he was taking reasonable action to have his care restored.  He stated that on 13 February 2020 the child was not returned to his care.  He stated that on this day he received an SMS from Ms Sealy advising him that she had a medical certificate to say that the child should stay with her for the night and that they had an appointment with the same doctor the following week.  He stated that he was unaware that a mental health plan had been obtained by Ms Sealy on 23 January 2020 (this being a date when the child was in his care).  He stated that he ended up instructing his solicitor to contact the medical practice in writing to request a copy of the child’s mental health plan and any referral to a mental health service.  His solicitor did so on 14 February 2020.

5. Mr Lewis stated that he had contacted his solicitor numerous times in an effort to reinstate his care[8].

   [8] C1-page 53

6. On 19 February 2020 Mr Lewis emailed Ms Sealy seeking documentation regarding medical issues relating to the child and the lack of compliance with court orders in relation to the care of the child.  He flagged that he was considering lodging an urgent contravention order[9].

   [9] C1-page 70

7. On 18 March 2020 Mr Lewis emailed Ms Sealy with some suggestions as a way forward[10].

   [10] C-pages 71-72

8. On 19 March 2020 Mr Lewis emailed Ms Sealy suggesting that the issues can’t be resolved “without getting together some therapy and talking”.[11]

   [11] C1 -page 73

9. Mr Lewis’s solicitor also wrote to Ms Sealy on 25 March 2020 stating that without a reasonable excuse she had failed to comply with the court orders of 30 November 2016 by failing to make the child available to Mr Lewis and failing to encourage or facilitate the child having telephone contact with Mr Lewis[12]. 

   [12] C1-pages 67-69

10. On 26 March 2020 Mr Lewis emailed Ms Sealy advising that he would attempt to collect the child the following day and that if there was no compliance he had given instructions to his solicitor to file court proceedings.

11. Mr Lewis contended that he was taking practical steps to restore his care.  He provided a discharge transfer summary dated 3 April 2020 from a clinical psychologist [Mr A] at Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) who undertook an  assessment of the child.  [Dr B], a child and adolescent consultant psychiatrist was also involved in the assessment.  Corroboration was sought from both parents as well as the referring GP and the child’s previous therapist and most recent therapist.  Both parents also attended a parenting session (separately) where parent child attachment was discussed and other strategies for interacting with children. The report confirmed that the child was screened for a range of serious mental illnesses with negative results and no evidence of serious mental health risks.  The report confirmed that there was no evidence which indicated any child protection concerns.  The report concluded that the child did not meet criteria for CAMHS intervention.  The CAMHS team made some recommendations to assist the child to feel safe and comfortable in having a relationship with both parents. These recommendations included that the parents attend mediation with a skilled facilitator (and noted that the mediator would be able to see parents separately).  CAMHS also recommended that Ms Sealy encourage the child to have contact with his father and Mr Lewis was encouraged to continue with low pressure ways of seeking contact and making himself available[13].

    [13] C1-pages 62-63

12. On 3 April 2020 Mr Lewis emailed [Organisation 1] (one of the two recommended mediation/therapy organisations recommended by CAMHS) to request an appointment (with a copy to Ms Sealy).[14]

    [14] C1 -page 78

13. On 7 April 2020 Mr Lewis emailed Ms Sealy to advise that he had met with a therapist at [Organisation 1] and he requested that she make contact to book an appointment.[15]

    [15] C1-page 77

14. By email dated 20 April 2020 Mr Lewis emailed his solicitor in relation to the lodgement of court proceedings and the preparation of his affidavit[16].

    [16] C1-page 79

15. Ms Sealy contended that Mr Lewis failed to take reasonable action when he failed to take action to have the child assessed[17].  However, Mr Lewis took steps to obtain the details of the mental health plan from the GP and participated in the CAMHS assessment and followed up the recommendation from CAMHS for mediation.  While Mr Lewis expressed his dissatisfaction with the counsellor that Ms Sealy had earlier engaged in relation to the issues affecting the child, CAMHS suggested that the issue of a suitable counsellor could be discussed at mediation if it was otherwise difficult to resolve.[18]

    [17] C1 -page 107

    [18] C1-page 63

16. The Tribunal is satisfied that the actions taken by Mr Lewis were consistent with the examples of “reasonable action” given in the excerpt from 2.2.4 of the Guide.  Accordingly the Tribunal finds that Mr Lewis was taking all reasonable action to ensure that the care arrangement (that being the court order) was complied with.

17. The Tribunal therefore finds that section 51 of the Assessment Act applies and (subject to subsection 51(5) of the Assessment Act) the Tribunal may determine two percentages of care as provided for in subsection 51(2) through to subsection 51(4) of the Assessment Act which provide:

    2 percentages of care in relation to the responsible person

    (2)Subject to subsection (5), the Registrar must determine, under section 49 or 50, 2 percentages of care in relation to the responsible person.

    (3)The first percentage of care is to be a percentage that corresponds with the extent of care of the child that the responsible person should have had, or is to have, under the care arrangement during the care period (which may be nil).

    (4)The second percentage of care is to be:

    (a)for a determination under section 49 – 0%; or

    (b)for a determination under section 50 – a percentage that corresponds with the actual care of the child that the Registrar is satisfied that the responsible person would be likely to have during the care period if the action referred to in paragraph (1)(d) were not to succeed.

18. Hence the Tribunal finds that for Ms Sealy, the first percentage of care is 56% and the second percentage of care is 100% and for Mr Lewis the first percentage of care is 44% and the second percentage of care is 0%.

Special circumstances

1. However, subsection 51(5) of the Assessment Act provides that if “special circumstances” exist in relation to a child, a single percentage of care (which in this case would be 100% in respect of Ms Sealy and 0% for Mr Lewis) – rather than two percentages of care – may be determined based upon the actual care taking place. The meaning of “special circumstances” is not defined in the legislation but is described in the Child Support Agency’s policy at item 2.2.4 of the Guide. It relevantly states:

   …

   This discretion is only to be exercised in unusual cases, for example, where there is evidence of violence or other inappropriate behaviour by the person who has reduced care which led to the change in care.  This recognises that if a person’s own unreasonable or inappropriate actions are a significant cause fir the care arrangement not being complied with, the person should not benefit from an interim period, even if they are seeking the return of the child.

   The Registrar will consider the individual circumstances that led to the change in care to determine whether the circumstances are a significant cause of the change in care, and whether there was a substantial risk to the physical, emotional or psychological well-being of the child if the care arrangement had continued to be followed.  Examples of unreasonable or inappropriate behaviour of the parent include:

   ·         violence towards the child;

   ·         exposing the child to family violence (within the meaning of section 4AB of the FL Act);

   ·         violence towards the person with increased care;

   ·         directly involving the child in a criminal act;

   ·         exposing the child to alcohol, drugs or substance abuse;

   ·         substantially failing to comply with legal schooling requirements; and/or

   ·         neglecting the child’s basic needs, such as withholding essential medical care from the child or disregarding their daily needs for food, shelter, hygiene etc.

   The decision should take into account any information provided by the parent with less care as well as information from the person who gained care.  Decisions should be made on the basis of evidence that supports relevant findings of fact, particularly in situations where the facts are disputed. 

   …

2. In this case Ms Sealy stated that she did everything she could to encourage the child to attend care visits with his father but she said that the child refused to go to the father’s home on his allocated nights.  He also refused to FaceTime his father.  Ms Sealy stated that she was not withholding care; rather it is the child who was refusing  to have care with the father.

1. Ms Sealy stated that when the child was discharged by CAMHS, recommendations were attached to the discharge report.  She stated that the first recommendation was that the “parents move past “arguments, criticism and blame” within their relationship.  Ms Sealy claimed that she had “always maintained a neutral relationship with the father and had never exposed the children to his ongoing harassment.  She stated that the father continued to breach court orders by denigrating her within hearing of the children.

2. Ms Sealy stated that the second recommendation was that there needed to be agreement as to how to proceed to provide the child with appropriate care and support. She stated that mediation had been recommended and that the father had initiated it but she did not consider it would be appropriate to attend.

3. Ms Sealy stated that the third recommendation was that the child attend counselling.  Her preference was that the child continue with [Ms C] but Mr Lewis had obtained an injunction to prevent [Ms C] continuing to counsel the child.  CAMHS recommended that the issue of counselling be resolved at mediation.

4. While the Tribunal acknowledges that there are disputes and unresolved issues between the parents,  there is no evidence to suggest that the child’s safety was at risk while he was in the care of his father and the CAMHS report stated that it would be in the child’s best interests to feel safe and comfortable in having a relationship with both parents[19].  In addition, the counsellor later engaged for the child stated in her email to the parents that “I have not seen from any adults a genuine reason why (the child) should not be at his father’s house.  There seems to be no allegations of risk, abuse or any other concerns”.[20]

   [19] C1-page 62

   [20] B42

5. The Tribunal is satisfied that there are no special circumstances in relation to the child of the extreme nature described in the Guide above which would appropriately invoke subsection 51(5) in this case.

Two percentages of care

1. The Tribunal therefore finds that section 51 of the Assessment Act applies and that in accordance with subsection 51(2) it is appropriate to make two percentage of care determinations as follows:

   (a) the first percentage of care is the percentage of care that Ms Sealy and Mr Lewis should have had during the care period under the court order of 30 November 2016 which was 56% to Ms Sealy and 44% to Mr Lewis (subsection 51(3) of the Assessment Act). This percentage of care applies to each day that occurs in the interim period (section 54C of the Assessment Act); and

   (b) the second percentage of care is the actual care of the child which is determined under section 49 of the Assessment Act to be 0% to Mr Lewis and 100% to Ms Sealy (under section 50 of the Assessment Act).

Interim period

1. The next consideration for the Tribunal is to determine when the interim period begins. Paragraph 54C(2)(a) of the Assessment Act effectively provides that the interim period begins on the first day that the actual care of the child ceased to correspond with the care provided under the care arrangement (court orders). Section 54C of the Assessment Act states:

   Days to which the percentage of care applies if 2 percentages of care apply under section 51 in relation to the responsible person

   (1)   This section applies if:

   (a)A determination of a responsible person’s percentage of care for a child is made under section 49 or 50; and

   (b)2 percentages of care were determined for the purposes of subsection 51(2) in relation to the responsible person; and

   (c)The determination is not suspended under subsection 54F(2) or 54HA(2).

   (2)   Until the determination is revoked or suspended under Subdivision C of this Division:

   (a)The percentage of care referred to in subsection 51(3) applies to each day in a child support period that occurs in the interim period for the determination; and

   (b)The percentage of care referred to in subsections 51(4) applies to each day in a child support period that does not occur in the interim period for the determination.

2. Both Ms Sealy and Mr Lewis agreed that Ms Sealy’s care of the child was 100% from 12 February 2020.  However, the child support assessment did not commence until 18 March 2020 with the care being recorded from 13 March 2020.  Hence the Tribunal accepts the Child Support Agency’s determination that care was recorded, for child support purposes, from 13 March 2020.  Hence, the Tribunal determines that the change of care day was 13 March 2020.

3. Section 53A of the Assessment Act sets out the meaning of “interim period”. The length of the period depends on various factors, including whether the care arrangement is a court order. For court orders items 1 and 2 of the Table in section 53A are relevant. Section 53A and the effect of items 1 and 2 of the Table are summarised in the Guide at 2.2.4:

   For court orders, the maximum interim period that can apply is the later of:

   (a)   52 weeks starting from the day the care arrangement provided by the court takes effect; or

   (b)   26 weeks from the change of care day.

4. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia order took effect on 30 November 2016 and so 52 weeks from that date was 29 November 2017.  Alternatively, 26 weeks from the change of care day of 13 March 2020 was 11 September 2020.  Therefore, the later date was 11 September 2020.

5. However, in certain circumstances a shorter interim period may apply (paragraph 53A(1)(b) of the Assessment Act) and items 1 and 2 of paragraph 53A(1)(b) of the Assessment Act. The circumstances can be summarised as follows:

   A shorter interim period may apply if the change of care occurs after the first 26 weeks from the day the court order takes effect, and the person with increased care takes reasonable action to participate in family dispute resolution.  The shorter interim period will end at the earlier of:

   (a)   14 weeks from the day the person with increased care started taking reasonable action to participate in family dispute resolution (but no earlier than 52 weeks starting from the day the court order took effect); or

   (b)   26 weeks from the change of care day.

6. Section 5 of the Assessment Act provides that “family dispute resolution” has the meaning given by section 10F of the Family Law Act 1975 which provides:

   Family dispute resolution is a process (other than a judicial process);

   (a)   In which a family dispute practitioner:

   (i)helps people affected, or likely to be affected, by separation or divorce to resolve some or all of their disputes with each other; or

   (ii)helps persons who may apply for a parenting order under section 65C to resolve some or all of their disputes with each other relating to the care of children; and

   (b)   in which the practitioner is independent of all of the parties involved in the process.

7. The Tribunal considered whether Ms Sealy as the parent with increased care was taking reasonable action to participate in family dispute resolution within a reasonable period of time (section 53A of the Assessment Act).

8. Ms Sealy admitted that the CAMHS discharge document of 3 April 2020 recommended that the parents participate in mediation and it recommended two mediation organisations[21].    She stated that “the father initiated mediation which I was unable to agree to attend as it is not appropriate to do so (pursuant to paragraph 601(8)(aa) of the Act) on the basis of the father’s ongoing violence and harassment, our unequal bargaining positions making free negotiation impossible, as well as other factors.”[22]

   [21] C1 -page 60

   [22] C1-page 108

9. Mr Lewis strongly disputed the allegations of Ms Sealy.  He stated that the process of the mediation was that the mediator spoke to him on the telephone as part of the induction process.  He understood that the mediator also spoke to Ms Sealy for a similar induction.  He stated that he had a further telephone call with the mediator where he was asked to put a proposal for consideration by Ms Sealy which he did.  He stated that at no time did the mediator make any suggestion that Ms Sealy had made claims of violence or harassment only that she was unwilling to move from her opening position that she wanted the child to see his former counsellor. 

10. On 19 May 2020 the mediator issued a certificate stating that “Mr Lewis did not attend family dispute resolution with me and the other party or parties to the proceedings but that person’s failure to do so was due to the refusal, or the failure of the other party or parties to the proceedings to attend.”[23]

    [23] B34

11. On 16 June 2020 the mediator issued a further certificate stating that “Mr Lewis and Ms Sealy did not attend family dispute resolution with me and the other party or parties to the proceedings because I consider having regard to the matters mentioned in subregulation 25(2), that it would not be appropriate to conduct the proposed family dispute resolution.”[24]

    [24] B35

12. Mr Lewis stated that he and Ms Sealy were never on the same phone line with the counsellor. He strongly denied the allegations of harassment or violence of any kind. He also referred to Ms Sealy’s affidavit to the court for the June 2020 hearing and stated that there was no statement or indication that she considered there was any harassment or violence on his part.

13. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is any persuasive evidence that Ms Sealy has taken reasonable action to participate in family dispute resolution. She did not initiate it and did not participate (at least beyond the initial induction discussion with the mediator). The certificates issued by the mediator do not confirm in any way that Ms Sealy took reasonable action to participate in family dispute resolution as section 53A requires. In her response to the objection process Ms Sealy advised that she had taken reasonable action to have the care arrangement complied with and that she did so by “initiating mental health plan and assessment by a mental health service and by attempting to negotiate with the father for the child to return to counselling”.[25] However, for a shorter interim period to apply section 53A is clear that a person who has increased care of a child must take reasonable action to participate in family dispute resolution. Hence, there is no scope to shorten the interim care period.

    [25] C1-page 108

14. In conclusion therefore the Tribunal agrees with the objections officer that an interim care period of 26 weeks applies from 13 March 2020 to 11 September 2020 during which time the care percentages were 56% to Ms Sealy and 44% to Mr Lewis and that thereafter the care was 100% to Ms Sealy and 0% to Mr Lewis (until a new care percentage determination was made).

DECISION

The decision under review is affirmed.