SDAH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SDAH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2003] FCAFC 49

MIGRATION ACT – s 474 – jurisdiction of Federal Court in respect of a “privative clause decision” – persecution by reason of religion – credibility findings – whether jurisdictional error.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s474
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s39B

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Naima Khawar & Ors (2002) 187 ALR 574 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 195 ALR 1 followed
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 195 ALR 24 followed

SDAH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 206 of 2002

MANSFIELD, WEINBERG AND SELWAY JJ
ADELAIDE
24 MARCH 2003

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 206 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SDAH
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

MANSFIELD, WEINBERG and SELWAY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

14 MARCH 2003

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent his costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 206 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SDAH
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

MANSFIELD, WEINBERG and SELWAY JJ

DATE:

24 MARCH 2003

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

  1. The appellant, his wife and two children arrived in Australia on 20 April 2001.  They were and are “unlawful non-citizens” for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). They were taken into detention.

  2. On 28 July 2001, the appellant lodged an application for a protection visa. In order to obtain such a visa the respondent had to be satisfied that the appellant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol: s 36(2) of the Act. In general terms the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Minister”) had to be satisfied that the appellant was a “refugee” as defined in the Convention being a person who:

    “…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

  3. On 13 September 2001, a delegate of the Minister…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 49
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SDAH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the Federal Court was presented with an appeal challenging the finality of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The applicant, SDAH, contested the Tribunal's determination that they did not qualify for a protection visa, arguing that the Tribunal had not genuinely exercised its power in reaching its decision. The primary point of contention was whether the decision was a bona fide attempt to exercise the power as required under s 474 of the Migration Act 1958.

The court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal's decision was indeed a bona fide attempt to exercise its power, particularly in light of the Tribunal's credibility findings. SDAH contended that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the merits of their case, focusing instead on credibility issues. The court meticulously reviewed the Tribunal's reasoning and concluded that the decision-making process was a genuine attempt to exercise the power granted by the Act. The focus on credibility, as per the court's understanding of the Act, did not invalidate the decision if it was a bona fide exercise of power.

Justice von Doussa, while acknowledging the broad restrictions on judicial review imposed by s 474, found that the Tribunal's decision was indeed a bona fide attempt to exercise its power. The court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the challenge to the decision did not succeed. The decision underscored the importance of the Tribunal's authority in making credibility findings and the limitations on judicial review in such matters.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent his costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent his costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD, WEINBERG AND SELWAY JJ
On the face of it, the decision of the Tribunal in this matter appears to be a “privative clause decision” for the purposes of s 474 of the Act. Section 474 of the Act provides:“474 Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision: (a) is final and conclusive; and (b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. (2) In this section:‘privative clause decision’ means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). (3) A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:(a)granting, making, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination;(b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa); (c)granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument.” Von Doussa J noted the limitations upon the jurisdiction of this Court to afford judicial review by reason of s 474 of the Act. However, his Honour did not have the benefit of the High Court decisions in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 195 ALR 1 (“S134”) and Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 195 ALR 24 (“S157”) where the High Court “read down” the otherwise broad terms of s 474. Instead his Honour proceeded on the basis that s 474 had a more significant effect upon the jurisdiction of this Court than is now realised:“It is common ground between the parties that s 474(1) is to be construed and applied according to the principles stated by Dixon J in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598. The section is to be understood as not having a validating effect upon a decision that might otherwise reflect error unless the impugned decision is ‘a bona fide attempt to exercise its power, that it relates to the subject matter of the legislation, and that it is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body’ (per Dixon J at 615).” Consequently the issue considered by von Doussa J was whether the Tribunal had made a “bona fide attempt to exercise the power.” The appellant’s argument that it had not was based entirely upon the credibility findings that the Tribunal had made. After careful consideration of the reasoning of the Tribunal, his Honour concluded:“I am not persuaded that the decision of the Tribunal was not a bona fide attempt to exercise power. In my opinion the challenge to the decision is not made out, and the application must be dismissed with costs.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD, WEINBERG AND SELWAY JJ