Scott v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police

[2025] NSWCATAD 246

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Scott v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2025] NSWCATAD 246

Hearing dates:

28 August 2025

Date of orders:

02 October 2025

Decision date:

02 October 2025

Jurisdiction:

Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division

Before:

Emeritus Prof R Graycar, Senior Member

Decision:

(1) The decision under review is set aside and a decision substituted that the respondent restore the applicant’s firearms licence but with a condition pursuant to s 19(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) that the applicant not store any firearms at a property that is owned or occupied by Steven Scott or Matthew Scott.

(2) Pursuant to ss 64(1)(b) and 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order, the publication or reporting of the confidential part of the hearing of this application, including any confidential evidence given in the hearing, is prohibited.

(3) Pursuant to ss 64(1)(b) and 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order, the publication of any part of the reasons for decision dated 2 October 2025, that are marked as confidential, is prohibited.

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Firearms Act 1996, “contrary to the public interest”; overriding need to ensure public safety; “reasonable cause to believe”; confidential information;

Legislation Cited:

Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)

Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)

Firearm Regulation 2017

Cases Cited:

Adams v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 194

AML v Commissioner of Police [2013] NSWADT 5

Azzopardi v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2013] NSWADT 205

Bilanenko v Commissioner of Police [2022] NSWCATAD 76

Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9

Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force v Parish [2025] NSWCATAP 180

Constantin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADTAP 16

Conway v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2023] NSWCATAD 183

Cory v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2019] NSWCATAD 32

Cusumano v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWADT 50

Davos v Commissioner of Police [2013] NSWADT 7

Emery v Commissioner of Police [2022] NSWCATAD 122;

GQG v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 323

Grant v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAD 158

Hill v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2002] NSWADT 218

Joseph v Commissioner of Police [2017] NSWCA 31

Kocic v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (2014) 88 NSWLR 159; [2014] NSWCA 368

LY v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2004] NSWADT 115

M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68

Martin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 97

Meacham v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 107

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41

Plunkett v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWADT 104

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286

Smith v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 350

Snow v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 214;

Sullivan v Civil Aviation Authority (2014) 22 FCR 555; [2014] FCAFC 93

Ward v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 28 [2025] NSWCATAD 177

Texts Cited:

None cited

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Renee Frances Scott (Applicant)
Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (Respondent)

Representation:

Applicant (Self-Represented)
Crown Solicitor (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2025/00144509

Publication restriction:

(1) Pursuant to ss 64(1)(b) and 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order, the publication or reporting of the confidential part of the hearing of this application, including any confidential evidence given in the hearing, is prohibited.
(2) Pursuant to s 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order of this Tribunal, the publication of Confidential Exhibit R4 provided to the Tribunal on 28 August 2025 is prohibited, and all references to "Confidential Material" made in this matter are to be read as including Confidential Exhibit R4.
(3) Pursuant to ss 64(1)(b) and 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order, the publication of any part of the reasons for decision dated 2 October 2025, that are marked as confidential, is prohibited.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction

1. By an application made to the Tribunal on 14 April 2025, the applicant is seeking to have set aside a decision of the Commissioner of Police (the respondent) made on 20 January 2025 and affirmed on internal review on 25 March 2025 to revoke her Category AB firearms licence which she had held since 5 November 2013.

2. The respondent revoked the firearms licence because it determined pursuant to s 24(2)(a) and (d) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) (the Act) that it:

1. Had reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms because of her way of living or domestic circumstances (referring to s 11(4)(a) of the Act); and

2. It would not be in the public interest for the applicant to continue to hold a firearms licence (cf s 24(2)(d) of the Act and Clause 20 of the Firearm Regulation 2017 (the Regulation)).

3. The respondent acknowledges that the applicant has held a licence since November 2013 for the “genuine reason of recreational hunting/vermin control” and that matter is not in issue in this proceeding.

4. The applicant’s licence was suspended on 10 December 2024 following an incident that occurred at the applicant’s home address on 9 December 2024. The applicant and her husband live at a property that has been, until the suspension/cancellation of the applicant’s licence, the safe storage address for her firearms.

5. The applicant and her husband, Matthew Scott have three children. The applicant’s in-laws (her husband’s parents) are Sue Scott and Steven Scott. It appears to be common ground that the latter are separated and that Steven Scott is estranged from his family.

6. On 9 December 2024, Steven Scott returned from an overseas trip and came to the property which he owns (which was also the safe storage address). Steven Scott claims to have been assaulted by Marshall Darcy, an acquaintance of Matthew Scott, and another unknown man at the property and then subsequently in another incident on the same day in the local town. The assault was serious, according to police reports, and charges have been laid against Marshall Darcy in relation to the incident. In a witness statement, Steven Scott reported that both Marshall Darcy and the other unknown assailant were wearing “Hells Angels” shirts.

7. Steven Scott told police that he attended the home/safe storage address to “retrieve his motorbike and vehicles”. However, he could not gain access as the shed in which he stored those items was welded shut. Because the address was the applicant’s safe storage site, and because the door had been welded shut by Matthew Scott at the applicant’s request, it was determined by the respondent that the incident demonstrated that there was a risk of firearms being improperly accessed at that address and that the applicant had anticipated that risk by welding the shed door shut.

8. There are apparently two houses on the property, one of which is occupied by Ms Sue Scott and the other by the applicant, her husband and children. The safe storage address is apparently owned by Steven Scott though it is not apparently in dispute that he no longer lives there.

9. As noted above, the applicant’s licence was initially suspended shortly after the incident. It was formally revoked by a decision made on 20 January 2025. The applicant sought internal review and in her application, she noted that she had not ever endangered anyone. She also sought to move her safe storage address from the family property to a different address.

10. The respondent affirmed the decision on internal review. The main reason appeared to be a finding that, despite the applicant having no involvement in the incident of 9 December 2024 (she was not at the address when it occurred), the fact that the shed in which the firearms safe is contained was welded shut was an acknowledgment of the risk of her firearms being accessed by some unauthorised person(s). The internal reviewer also did not consider that storing the firearms at a different address would mitigate the risk. This was despite a finding that she is “otherwise a person of good standing in the community” and that “at no time has it been alleged or reported that you have been involved in, or connected with, any unlawful activity or incident”. Nor was the applicant “adversely known to Police for any criminal conduct or offence”.

11. A key concern appeared to be that the applicant’s husband had acquaintances (including Marshall Darcy) who were associated with outlawed motorcycle gangs (OMCGs). The reviewer relied on some decisions of the Tribunal where it had been decided that these associations created a risk that the person could come under pressure to make their firearms available to unauthorised persons.

12. As noted above, the applicant then applied to the Tribunal for review.

Regulatory framework

13. The key relevant statutory provisions governing the decision before the Tribunal are contained in the Act and the Regulation. Section 3 of the Act sets out the principles and objects as follows:

3 Principles and objects of Act

(1)    The underlying principles of this Act are--

(a)    to confirm firearm possession and use as being a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety, and

(b)    to improve public safety--

(i)    by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms, and

(ii)    by promoting the safe and responsible storage and use of firearms, and

(c)    to facilitate a national approach to the control of firearms.

…

14. Section 11 of the Firearms Act is also central. It relevantly provides:

11 General restrictions on issue of licences

…

(1)    The Commissioner may issue a licence in respect of an application, or refuse any such application.

…

(3)    A licence must not be issued unless--

(a)    the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person and can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace, and

(b)    in the case of a person who has never held a licence (including a firearms licence under a previous Act), the applicant has completed, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, such firearms training and safety courses as are prescribed by the regulations in respect of the licence concerned, and

(c)    the Commissioner is satisfied that the storage and safety requirements set out in Part 4 are capable of being met by the applicant, and

(d)    the Commissioner is satisfied that the person to whom the licence is to be issued is a resident of this State or is about to become a resident of this State.

...

(4)    Without limiting the generality of subsection (3) (a), a licence must not be issued if the Commissioner has reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms because of--

(a)    the applicant's way of living or domestic circumstances, or

(b)    any previous attempt by the applicant to commit suicide or cause a self-inflicted injury, or

(c)    the applicant's intemperate habits or being of unsound mind.

...

(7)    Despite any other provision of this section, the Commissioner may refuse to issue a licence if the Commissioner considers that issue of the licence would be contrary to the public interest.

(8)    The regulations may provide other mandatory or discretionary grounds for refusing the issue of a licence.

15. There is power under the Firearms Act to impose conditions on a firearms licence. By s 19(1) a “licence may be issued by the Commissioner subject to such conditions as the Commissioner thinks fit to impose.” Section 19(2) provides for a range of conditions, such as, by s 19(2)(a) that a licensee comply with the relevant safe keeping and storage requirements under the Act.

16. The power to revoke a licence is contained in s 24. By a 24(1), there are circumstances that give rise to automatic revocation: these include if the licensee becomes subject to a firearms prohibition order or an apprehended violence order. None of those applies in this case.

17. By s 24(2) of the Act:

(2) A licence may be revoked—

(a) for any reason for which the licensee would be required to be refused a licence of the same kind, or

(b) if the licensee—

(i) supplied information which was (to the licensee’s knowledge) false or misleading in a material particular in, or in connection with, the application for the licence, or

(ii) contravenes any provision of this Act or the regulations, whether or not the licensee has been convicted of an offence for the contravention, or

(iii) contravenes any condition of the licence, or

(c) if the Commissioner is of the opinion that the licensee is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence, or

(c1) if the Commissioner is satisfied that the licensee, through any negligence or fraud on the part of the licensee, has caused a firearm to be lost or stolen, or

(d) for any other reason prescribed by the regulations.

Section 75 of the Act provides for review of certain decisions made under the Act; these include

(a) the refusal of or failure by the Commissioner to issue a licence or permit (other than a permit in respect of a prohibited firearm) to the person,

…

(c) the revocation of a licence or permit issued to the person (other than a revocation on the basis that the holder of the licence or permit is subject to a firearms prohibition order or an apprehended violence order),

…

(e) the cancellation of the registration of a firearm by the Commissioner,

9(g) a decision made under the regulations concerning the person that belongs to a class of decisions prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph.

18. The Regulation is also relevant. By reg 20, “The Commissioner may revoke a licence if the Commissioner is satisfied that it is not in the public interest for the licensee to continue to hold the licence”. The Commissioner relied on this power as well as the power set out in s 24 of the Act which in turn refers to s 11 of the Act.

19. Other relevant statutory provisions are s 9 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (ADR Act) which provides that the Tribunal has administrative review jurisdiction if enabling legislation provides that applications may be made to the Tribunal for administrative review (cf s 75 of the Act).

20. In determining an application for administrative review, by s 63 of the ADR Act the Tribunal is to decide what is “the correct and preferable decision” having regard to “any relevant factual material, and any applicable written or unwritten law”. That can include material that postdates the decision under review (see Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286 at [37]-[38], [45]-[46], [99], [143]; Bilanenko v Commissioner of Police [2022] NSWCATAD 76 at [10]). The Tribunal can exercise all of the functions of the person who made the decision. In determining an application for review, it can affirm the decision; vary the decision; set the decision aside and substitute for it a different decision, or set the decision aside and remit it to the decision maker for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.

21. By s 38(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (CAT Act), the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inquire into and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the rules of natural justice. But as the Appeal Panel explained in Meacham v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 107 (Meacham) at [54]:

Despite not being bound by the rules of evidence, the Tribunal is required to base its findings of fact on “logically probative material”, and not on “mere suspicion or speculation”, as a corollary of its obligation to act reasonably: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41 (“Pochi”) at 62, 68 (Deane J); [1980] FCA 85; Sullivan v Civil Aviation Authority (2014) 22 FCR 555; [2014] FCAFC 93 (“Sullivan”) at [5]-[8], [15]-[17] (Logan J). It is an error of law for the Tribunal to make a finding of fact with no evidence, or no probative evidence, to support it.

22. There is no formal onus of proof in the Tribunal: see Meacham at [75] but as noted by the Appeal Panel in that decision at [82]-[83]:

… [I]n an administrative review case, the parties put on such evidence as they wish and, in a matter of this kind involving the exercise of a discretion, it is a matter for the Tribunal to properly consider all relevant materials and ignore all irrelevant matters in exercising the power of the relevant administrator in review proceedings. This is especially the case where a decision has been taken on a discretionary basis in light of the public interest.

Proof of matters which are asserted is required in a practical sense, and a party asserting a fact is generally required to provide evidence to substantiate it. … [T]he Tribunal is required to base its findings of fact on “logically probative material”: Pochi at 62, 68; Sullivan at [5]-[8], [15]-[17].

23. A number of principles govern decision making under the Act. First, by s 3(1)(a), a key object of that Act is “to confirm firearm possession and use as being a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety” (emphasis added). It follows from this that the community’s interests take precedence over the private interests of an individual. As put by Hennessy DP in Cusumano v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWADT 50 (Cusumano) at [23], the powers in the Act “should be exercised in a way which promotes the principles and objects of the Firearms Act.”

24. In Ward v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 28 (Ward) at [28] the Tribunal said that in terms of public safety:

28 The Tribunal could never be totally satisfied that a person would not pose any risk to public safety if they were given access to a firearm. However, in the context of the Act, the Tribunal must be satisfied that there is virtually no risk. (emphasis added)

25. The Appeal Panel in Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force v Parish [2025] NSWCATAP 180 (Parish) recently noted (at [84]-[85]):

84   Since [the decision in Ward], Hennessy DP has cautioned against applying that language in a mechanistic way, pointing out in AML v Commissioner of Police [2013] NSWADT 5 that the Ward decision itself had set aside the Commissioner’s decision to revoke a firearms licence because her Honour was satisfied that despite the fact that he had assaulted his partner, he was a fit and proper person to have a firearms licence. ‘The “virtually no risk” comment was made in the context of the ‘fit and proper person’ test. It should not be understood as a judicial gloss on the plain meaning of that test, or of the reasonable cause test. The relevant tests are set out in the Firearms Act and comments in cases should not be substituted for those tests’ (at [7]).

85   Other cases have pointed out that the question of risk is not to be viewed as requiring an applicant to discharge an almost impossible burden of proving a near-absolute negative, but in a nuanced way, taking account of all the circumstances, including attitudes, character and prior conduct, with an overriding focus on public safety: Martin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 97 [64] – [66].

26. The concept of public interest is not defined in s 11(7) or elsewhere in the Act but it has been held to be informed by the underlying principles and objects of the Act: see for example Emery v Commissioner of Police [2022] NSWCATAD 122 (Emery) at [26], referring in turn to Cusumano at [23]. As the Tribunal explained in Emery at [27]-[29]

27   In Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9, at [25], the Appeal Panel said that the ‘public interest' is an inherently broad concept giving the Commissioner (and hence the Tribunal on review) the ability to have regard to a wide range of factors in deciding whether to exercise a discretion adversely to an individual. In Hill v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2002] NSWADT 218 at [24], the Tribunal found that public safety is to be given paramount consideration.

28   In considering the question of public interest, the Tribunal takes into account the interests of public protection, public safety and the proper functioning of the legislative requirements of the firearm scheme. Constantin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADTAP 16 at [33].

29   In Davos v Commissioner of Police [2013] NSWADT 7 at [117], the Tribunal said:

The most fundamental principle of the Act is that the possession and use of firearms is conditional upon the overriding need for public safety. The legislation requires strict compliance precisely because misuse of firearms can result in catastrophic consequences.

Material before the Tribunal

Applicant

27. The applicant provided the following material to the Tribunal:

1. A “written submission” dated 17 June 2025 (in the nature of a statement);

2. A reference from Monique Williams dated 6 June 2025;

3. A reference from David Dwyer who has known the applicant since 2013 and who she has assisted with controlling vermin on his property;

4. A reference from Daniel Lewis, who has known the applicant since 2009 and comments on her leadership roles as the Captain of Fire and Rescue Station 491 in Warren, and as General Manager of the local pre-school;

5. A letter to the Tribunal from Lovett and Green Solicitors who acted for her at that time (though she appeared at the Tribunal unrepresented), making submissions as to why the decision should be set aside;

6. A coloured diagram of the property, which indicates, among other things, where the firearms were stored as well as photographs, including of the gun safe;

7. A reference from the approved provider of the “Little Possums Preschool and Early Learning Centre”, where she has the role of “Nominated Supervisor”.

8. Reference from Wade Haines with whom she works at 491 Warren Fire Station with Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW). He has known her since she commenced there in 2017. He is unstinting in his praise for her leadership, mentorship and “strong safety-first mindset” which he states is a “cornerstone of her leadership style”.

Respondent

28. The respondent filed the following in support of its case

1. Documents filed pursuant to s 58 of the ADR Act (filed 10 June 2025);

2. Supplementary documents filed pursuant to s 58 of the ADR Act (filed 19 June 2025);

3. Further supplementary documents filed pursuant to s 58 of the ADR Act (filed 1 July 2025);

4. Respondent’s bundle of further evidence (filed 25 July 2025); and

5. Respondent’s written submissions.

29. In addition, the Respondent provided a confidential bundle of documents and added a further confidential document at the hearing. These were discussed in a confidential session held in the absence of the applicant

The applicant’s case

30. The applicant’s case, in summary, is that there was no reason for her firearms licence to have been cancelled and it should be reinstated. There is no dispute before the Tribunal about the fact that she has no criminal record nor that there have been no incidents or issues raised about her firearms use in the period since she was granted the licence. Rather, the Commissioner’s case in relation to the applicant is that it is her connection with other people that poses a risk to public safety.

31. The Commissioner also relied on the fact that there was an altercation at the safe storage address and this demonstrated an actual risk of firearms harm. It was the Commissioner’s case that the shed was welded shut precisely because the applicant anticipated that a member of the applicant’s family (specifically, her father-in-law) might seek to access the gun safe and thus use the firearms in an unauthorised manner.

32. The applicant gave evidence and was cross examined by the respondent’s representative. She was questioned about the layout of the shed in which the firearms safe was contained (and which had been welded shut). She agreed that she had asked her husband to weld the shed shut to prevent her father-in- law from accessing its contents.

33. In her statement she had noted that there were four separate keys required to have access to the gun safe and the ammunition. To her knowledge, her husband does not know where she stores those keys.

34. The applicant submitted that the Commissioner appeared to be judging her by her relationship, rather than by her character. She asked (somewhat rhetorically) whether if she were to divorce her husband, would that help her case? In any event, she said she had been in a relationship with her husband for a long time and he had never tried to influence her activities.

35. In relation to the other person about whom the Commissioner has expressed concerns, Mr Marshall Darcy, she stated that while he was an acquaintance of her husband, he was not a “close associate”, that is, in her view, their relationship was not one in which Mr Darcy might exert influence over her husband.

36. She referred to the references she had provided and confirmed that it was her character to ensure that people are safe. As for welding the shed shut, she told the Tribunal that the key motivation for this was to prevent access to the shed, not specifically to the firearms. This was in anticipation of her father-in-law attending the property as he was known to steal money from his wife and hide it in the shed.

37. As for her father-in-law’s known involvement with the Comancheros OMCG, another matter raised by the respondent, the applicant noted that the period in issue was 2009-2013 and she obtained her gun licence in 2013. In any event, he is estranged from the family, and she has not seen him for about a year.

38. The applicant reiterated the purposes for which she used her firearms as being vermin control and preventing the inhumane deaths of animals on her property. She also referred to the assistance she provides a neighbour, Mr David Dwyer (one of the people who provided a reference for her) with vermin eradication on his property. She also wanted the return of her firearms as they included family heirlooms, ie firearms that came from her great grandfather.

39. The applicant suggested changing her safe storage address to Midway, which is Mr Dwyer’s property. The respondent raised concerns about the fact that in his reference, Mr Dwyer said that he had met the applicant through her husband, Matthew Scott. She was asked how her husband knew Mr Dwyer and she explained that Matthew had done some fencing work for Mr Dwyer.

The applicant’s submissions from a legal representative

40. As noted above, although the applicant was not represented at the hearing, some submissions were provided on her behalf by Lovett and Green Solicitors on 23 June 2025.

41. Those submissions reiterated the fact that she had “no criminal history, no adverse police findings, and no record of non-compliance with firearm laws or regulations” but that rather, the revocation of her licence was based on police information and incidents not involving her but “connected to her familial relationships and residence”. The solicitor noted that the applicant’s husband’s firearms licence had been revoked over a decade ago and the police relied on her relationship with him and others, including Marshall Darcy, a “known Hells Angels associate and friend” of the applicant’s husband.

42. Turning to s 11(4)(a) of the Act (the domestic circumstances provision), the solicitors referred to some analogous cases some of which were distinguishable. Specifically, they noted that the Tribunal had distinguished situations that involved an actual member of an OMCG from cases where the licence holder was related to such a person (see and compare, on the one hand, Adams v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 194; Cory v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2019] NSWCATAD 32 at [116]-[120]).

43. As for having the shed welded shut, while the Commissioner relied on this as a recognition of risk, the solicitors noted that, on the contrary, it was a proactive response that reflected “heightened responsibility”.

44. The solicitors submitted that if the Commissioner had concerns about storage issues (given that the firearms were stored at the property where there was an altercation), a way to address that would be to move the location of the firearms. They noted that this was consistent with what is contained in the Guidelines published by the Firearms Registry (presumably referring to the Firearms Registry Decision Making Guidelines - August 2019, which are to be found on the police website).

The Respondent’s case

45. The Respondent’s case is set out in detail in written submissions that were filed in the Tribunal on 25 July 2025. The Respondent also presented oral submissions, in an open session, and made further submissions in a confidential session where the respondent had also adduced confidential evidence that it relied on.

46. In summary, so far as the open submissions are concerned, they can be summarised as follows:

1. The respondent accepts that there is no material before the Tribunal to the effect that the applicant has engaged in unlawful or improper behaviour. There is also no material that would satisfy the tribunal that the applicant herself is not a fit and proper person to hold a licence.

2. Rather, the respondent relies upon what it described as the “heavy precautionary context of the Act and significant emphasis on controlling and avoiding risks to public safety”. In that context it submits that the decision should be affirmed because of what it described as “proximate and significant risks posed by persons close to the applicant”.

3. The respondent noted that the applicant's husband was convicted in 2013 of serious offences for which he was sentenced to an 18 month good behaviour bond. A consequence of that conviction was that his firearms licence was revoked.

4. In 2022, the applicant's husband was found to be in possession of 8 live rounds of ammunition in his motor vehicle and while an offence of “possess ammunition without holding required licence” was found established, it was dealt with without proceeding to conviction pursuant to s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).

5. The respondent submitted that should the applicant's licence be reinstated, her husband would be proximate to firearms and ammunition and have ready access to those items and that this, along with his association with a person who is a member of the Hells Angels OMCG, should be attributed significant weight.

6. The respondent also raised concerns about Mr Scott being in the company of Marshall Darcy who they submit to be an active member of the Hells Angels OMCG (a fact that does not appear to be disputed, as it is acknowledged in the submission presented on the applicant’s behalf). The respondent also noted that in relation to the charges arising out of the incident in December 2024 at the safe storage address, a bail condition imposed upon Mr Darcy was that he not possess or display OMCG Insignia.

7. The respondent also raised concerns about the applicant’s father-in-law, Steven Scott, who has historical links with the Comanchero OMCG.

8. Based on the applicant’s association with these three people, the respondent has concerns about the applicant’s ability to exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms. In the respondent’s submission, this rises to a level that is greater than a “mere suspicion or possibility that unauthorised access to firearms may occur”.

9. In its written submissions the respondent submitted that it would not agree to an alternative storage address at a place owned by the applicant and her husband as joint tenants, as the applicant’s husband would have a legal entitlement to occupy or otherwise be present at the address. That alternative storage arrangement would not, in the Commissioner’s submission, displace the public interest concerns related to the applicant's husband.

47. In its oral submissions, the respondent elaborated on the legal framework outlined in its written submissions and referred to the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in Kocic v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (2014) 88 NSWLR 159; [2014] NSWCA 368 where Basten JA at [1] referred to the Commissioner’s statutory power to grant a firearms licence under the Act as “tightly constrained”.

48. The respondent also addressed the issue of a “reasonable cause to believe”, the phrase used in s 11(4)(a) Act and acknowledged that this required more than mere suspicion or conjecture but submitted that the belief need only relate to a possibility, referring to the decision of the Tribunal in LY v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2004] NSWADT 115 (LY) (at [44]).

49. The respondent emphasised the seriousness of the offence of which the applicant's husband was found guilty in 2013 and the more recent finding of ammunition in his car and submitted that there is a risk that the applicant was the source of the ammunition found on her husband.

50. The respondent acknowledged that there is a live dispute as to whether the injury sustained by Mr Steven Scott in relation to which Marshall Darcy is facing charges occurred at the safe storage address or at the location of the second incident which took place in the town of Warren, at the shop of the applicant’s mother-in-law.

51. The respondent contended that the Tribunal should follow the approach taken by the Tribunal in Wilson v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2025] NSWCATAD 177 (Wilson) at [286]-[288] where the Tribunal had referred with approval to the approach taken by the High Court of Australia in M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68 at 77, a decision concerned with the appropriate response to allegations of risk of harm to children. As the Tribunal in Wilson put it at [288], “The possibility that some allegations may be true but cannot be the subject of positive factual findings as to their veracity but also cannot be rejected as untrue can, depending on the nature of the allegations, be relevant to the assessment of risk to public safety because an assessment of risk involves assessing the likelihood or possibility of events or occurrences.”

Confidential hearing

52. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

53. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

54. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

55. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

56. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

57. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

58. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

59. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

60. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

61. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

Consideration

62. The issues in this case are clear: specifically, should the revocation of the applicant’s firearms licence be set aside and her licence restored, or the respondent’s decision affirmed.

63. The matters relied on by the respondent in turn give rise to two questions for the Tribunal to answer:

1. Does the Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the respondent for the purpose of the review, have reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms because of her way of living or domestic circumstances (cf s 11(4)(a) of the Act); and/or

2. Whether it would not be in the public interest for the applicant to continue to hold a firearms licence.

64. It is clear from what is set out above that the respondent’s case about the applicant is based not on any criminal history, breach of licence condition or indeed any conduct of the applicant but rather on her associations with her husband, her husband’s father, and a friend/acquaintance of her husband who is acknowledged to be a member of the Hells Angels, an OMCG.

65. It is well established as the respondent acknowledges that “reasonable cause to believe” requires more than “mere suspicion or conjecture”: see Conway v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2023] NSWCATAD 183 (Conway) at [27]. In Conway, Montgomery SM set out an extract from the frequently cited decision in LY where Judicial Member Higgins had considered that phrase at [41] - [43] as follows:

41    The term “reasonable cause to believe” has been considered by the courts in contexts other than those the subject of this application. For example, in the context of discovery under Order 15A, Rule 6 of the Federal Court Rules, in Austrac Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v New South Wales [2003] FCA 1013, BC 200305547, Emmett J stated:

“[10] There is no dispute as to the nature of the task that arises under r6(a). The words, ‘where there is reasonable cause to believe that the application has or may have the right to obtain relief’ are not satisfied by mere assertion. The belief requires more than mere suspicion or conjecture. On the other hand, it is not necessary for an applicant to establish even a prima facie case. It is necessary, however, for the applicant to show objectively that there is reasonable cause for the relevant belief. It is not necessary to demonstrate whether or not the applicant has the belief”.

42    In New South Wales v Taylor (2001) 178 ALR 32, the High Court considered the term “no reasonable cause to believe” as it appears in s.151A(5) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW). At [15] of the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Hayne JJ, they stated:

“It is true that the notion of ‘reasonable cause’, although often used in legal instruments, is an awkward expression. A cause is a cause is a cause. Beliefs about causes may be reasonable, but causes are neither reasonable not unreasonable. They are facts even if, as current legal doctrine insists, they often involve value judgments.”

43    In my opinion, the abovementioned principle in Taylor and test enunciated by Emmett J in Austrac equally applies in that the Tribunal, as was the Commissioner, must objectively be satisfied, from established facts of the matters set out in paragraph 24(2)(a) of the Act. These matters are that LY’s domestic circumstances are such that she may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over her firearm.

66. Before setting out the Tribunal’s findings, it is necessary to consider what weight to attach to the information that was heard in confidential session by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal’s approach to the confidential evidence

67. In Smith v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 350 (Smith), Andelman SM addressed the reliance that can be placed on confidential information as follows: at [51]-[55]:

51   While the rules of evidence do not strictly apply in this Tribunal, the general approach to fact finding in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336 and Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; 110 CLR 445 (“Neat Holdings”) do: Bronze Wing International Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW [2017] NSWCA 41 at [127]. It goes without saying that the same approach applies to evidence before the Tribunal that have been filed as Confidential Material.

52   In Neat Holdings at [171] it was said that:

[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have often been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary ‘where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found’. Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct. [citations omitted]

53   In Grant v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAD 158 the Tribunal set out its approach to dealing with confidential information which has not been disclosed to the applicant:

[23] In circumstances where the applicant is not entitled to see the confidential evidence, I have taken an approach to that evidence which is designed to achieve, as far as possible, “substantial justice.” That is, I have given little or no weight to the following:

1. Allegations about the applicant, where the source of the allegations is not identified;

2. Evidence which is adverse to the applicant, where the applicant could have been, but was not, cross examined in relation to the substance of the evidence;

3. Speculative comments in the evidence.

[24] It would be a denial of procedural fairness to make an adverse finding about a matter which was not put to the applicant in cross examination (see BCS v NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 126 at [51]). Whilst there may be some circumstances in which s 64(1)(d) of the NCAT Act implicitly permits such a denial of procedural fairness, I have not made adverse findings based upon the confidential evidence where I consider that a question about the substance of the evidence could have been put to Mr Grant in cross examination, without revealing confidential information.

[25] I note that it would also be an error of law to make a finding based solely on an allegation, in that this would be a finding without any probative evidence to support it (see BCS v NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 126 at [49] and [51]).

54   In Fawaz v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2022] NSWCATAD 317 at [146] the Tribunal added that where the confidential evidence directly contradicts the open evidence on a material point, some corroborative evidence is needed before substantive weight can be placed on it.

55   Where evidence is relied on by a party in a confidential hearing there ought to be an opportunity for the Tribunal to test the evidence and make inquiries about the evidence with the person(s) whose evidence is relied on; Children's Guardian v BRL [2016] NSWSC 1206 [29], [31].

68. The Tribunal agrees with this approach to the consideration of the confidential material in this case.

69. The Tribunal accepts that the objects and principles of the Act support an approach to licensing under the Act that prioritises public safety over private interest, and that places at the centre of any consideration the statutory foregrounding of the “overriding need to ensure public safety”. Given that high threshold, it is well established that findings can be made in this context on allegations that, while they may amount to criminal conduct, have not been proven to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt. As the NSW Court of Appeal has made clear in Joseph v Commissioner of Police [2017] NSWCA 31 at [60]:

There was no reason in principle why the Appeal Panel could not take into account matters indicating criminal conduct on Mr Joseph’s part and do so after applying a lesser standard of proof than the criminal standard (Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 352; [2015] HCA 7 at [32]-[33])

70. Thus it is not impermissible for the Tribunal to consider matters that are not the subject of criminal convictions but which otherwise, on the balance of probabilities, establish matters that might give the Tribunal “reasonable cause to believe” that the applicant may not exercise control over her firearms because of her domestic circumstances or way of living: in this case, matters arising out of the relationship between the applicant and her husband and his family and friends.

Findings

71. Having considered all the evidence in this matter, including the confidential evidence, the Tribunal makes the following findings (some of which were not the subject of any dispute):

1. The applicant has no criminal history, nor has she ever been the subject of any criminal charges.

2. Since the applicant was granted a firearms licence in 2013, there have been no identified concerns about her use of the firearms or issues raised about the storage of the firearms, prior to the incident at the family home in December 2024.

3. It appears not to be in dispute that the applicant was not present at the family home at the time of the incident in December 2024. Nor is it contended that she was present at the other incident that took place in the town on the same day

4. No firearms were accessed by any unauthorised person in the December 2024 incident.

5. The applicant is the manager of a child care centre, and has provided two references from people she works with there both of which indicate that she is held in high regard, not least because of her leadership .

6. The applicant is also highly regarded in her role in the local Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) service which she has been involved with since 2017. She has had a leadership role with that organisation since March 2023 and that was the subject of references that are in evidence.

72. Thus, as the respondent acknowledges, there is nothing in the applicant’s conduct or character that would make her not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence (cf s 11(3) of the Act).

73. The Respondent’s case is not that she is not a fit and proper person, but that her relationships to other people might give rise to a relevant fear of harm.

74. The Tribunal does not disagree that there are circumstances arising out of relationships such as familial relationships that might warrant a finding such as is contemplated by s 11(4)(a) of the Act. Thus there are a number of cases where it has been found that a family relationship with a person living at the same address has warranted either the refusal or revocation of a firearms licence, or the imposition of a condition on a licence: see for example Emery v Commissioner of Police [2022] NSWCATAD 122; Snow v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 214; GQG v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 323.

75. It is also the case that membership of an OMCG is a significant factor that militates against the grant of a firearms licence: see eg Adams v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 194; Cory v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2019] NSWCATAD 32 at [116]-[120]. But by contrast, in Azzopardi v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2013] NSWADT 205 (Azzopardi), a revocation was set aside as the relationship between the applicant and the person of concern – his cousin – was not on the facts considered sufficiently close in relation to the OCMG activities as was the relationship in Plunkett v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWADT 104, where a close associate was a member of an OCMG: see Azzopardi at [53].

76. In this case, there is no evidence that the applicant’s husband is himself a member of an OMCG. As for the applicant’s father-in-law, the evidence about his association with OMCGs predates the applicant’s grant of a licence in 2013 and in any event it appears to be accepted that he is estranged from the family. On that basis his only connection with the family appears to be that he continues to be the registered proprietor of the property at which the applicant resides which, until the revocation of her licence, was also the safe storage address.

77. The respondent referred to Smith at [65]-[68] where Andelman SM referred to a series of cases where the factual circumstances of the relationship between the applicant and others had led to findings that there was reasonable cause to believe that they might be influenced by others in a way that enabled unauthorised access to firearms.

78. This is not a case where the applicant is applying for a licence for the first time: she had previously held a licence since 2013 and it is acknowledged that in the period between then and the date her licence was revoked, nothing in her conduct or use of firearms had given rise to any concern. In that period, she has been in a relationship with her husband (they have three children) and presumably has also had familial relationships with her in-laws. Whatever risks those relationships may carry, none has come to fruition.

79. While the respondent has urged the Tribunal to consider the possibility of some future harm occurring, the Tribunal, while conscious of the need to take an approach that leads to “virtually no risk” (albeit conscious of what was said by the Appeal Panel in Parish extracted above at [25]), prefers to rely on the fact that, but for the incident that took place at the applicant’s home (and safe storage address), it is likely that the applicant would still hold her licence.

80. During the course of the hearing, the applicant made a further suggestion about an alternative storage address to the one that had been put earlier and rejected by the respondent on the basis that the property that was proposed was jointly owned by the applicant and her husband.

81. Instead, the applicant proposed that she store her firearms at the property of Mr David Dwyer. Mr Dwyer wrote a reference for her in which he stated the following:

1. He had known her since 2013, having met her through her partner, Matthew Scott;

2. He is a primary producer and a member of the Macquarie Valley Pistol Club (presumably he also has a firearms licence and thus is familiar with safe storage requirements);

3. The applicant has assisted him over the past decade with controlling vermin such as feral pigs and foxes on his properties and her assistance at this has been invaluable;

4. She has always “conducted herself with professionalism, respect and care when accessing and hunting on my properties … She has demonstrated a strong understanding of firearm safety, ethical hunting practices and a genuine regard for both the land and livestock”.

5. He considers her to be a “responsible and trustworthy individual”.

82. The Tribunal considers the risk of the firearms being accessed in an unauthorised manner to be slight, after consideration of the evidence (including the confidential evidence) adduced by the respondent about members of the applicant’s family and friends. However, for abundant caution, and in light of the statutory exhortation that the use of firearms is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety, the Tribunal considers that it would be appropriate in the circumstances to impose a condition on the applicant’s licence that she not store any firearms at a home owned by her husband or father in law. Mr Dwyer has apparently offered to permit her to store her firearms at his address and the Tribunal considers that this proposal obviates any risk or uncertainty that might arise from the incident that occurred at the former safe storage address in December 2024, which though it did not involve the applicant herself, involved her husband, her father in law and an acquaintance of her husband who is a member of an OMCG. If the firearms are not at a family address, then any remaining concerns about the family’s access to them, would be minimised.

83. Thus the Tribunal finds that, if the firearms are stored at a place other than a family address, there is not reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms because of her way of living or domestic circumstances (s 11(4)(a)).

84. The respondent also submitted that it is not in the public interest for the applicant to hold a licence, referring in its submissions to the breadth of the considerations that may come into consideration of the public interest under s 11(7), as noted by the Court of Appeal in Kocic at [39]-[41] per Basten JA; and at [92]-[93] per Leeming JA.

85. However wide may be the considerations that can be taken into account, they all depend for their application on what is found on the evidence in the particular case. If the relevant risk relied on by the respondent is potential unauthorised access by family or other acquaintances, against a known background of this not having occurred thus far in the twelve years the applicant has had the licence and stored the firearms at the family home, that risk (such as it is) can be alleviated or minimised by moving the firearms away from the family home. The public interest in public safety and public protection will be furthered by that precautionary step and thus take precedence over any private interest the applicant may have in relation to more ready access to her firearms.

A condition on the applicant’s firearms licence

86. As noted above, s 63 of the ADR Act provides that in determining an application, the Tribunal’s role is to make the correct and preferable decision and the Tribunal has the same powers as the primary decision maker. The remedial powers of the Tribunal include the power to substitute a different decision for the decision under review.

87. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal considers that any future risk that might arise from the family and domestic circumstances of the applicant (a risk that the Tribunal notes has not to date materialised) can be alleviated by the imposition of a condition in relation to the storage of her firearms. By s 19(1) of the Act, “A licence may be issued by the Commissioner subject to such conditions as the Commissioner thinks fit to impose”.

88. The Tribunal considers it appropriate to set aside the decision to cancel the applicant’s firearms licence and to substitute for it a decision that the licence is reinstated, subject to a condition that the applicant not store any firearms at a property that is owned or occupied by Steven Scott or Matthew Scott.

Orders

89. The Tribunal makes the following orders:

1. The decision under review is set aside and a decision substituted that the respondent restore the applicant’s firearms licence but with a condition pursuant to s 19(1) of the Firearms Act that the applicant not store any firearms at a property that is owned or occupied by Steven Scott or Matthew Scott.

2. Pursuant to ss 64(1)(b) and 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order, the publication or reporting of the confidential part of the hearing of this application, including any confidential evidence given in the hearing, is prohibited.

3. Pursuant to ss 64(1)(b) and 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order, the publication of any part of the reasons for decision dated 2 October 2025, that are marked as confidential, is prohibited.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 02 October 2025