Schwarze v State of South Australia (No 2)

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
SCHWARZE v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (No 2)
[2023] SASC 167
Decision of Judge Bochner a Master of the Supreme Court
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - PARTICULAR ITEMS - COUNSEL FEES - DAILY OR HOURLY RATES IN LIEU
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - PARTICULAR ITEMS - COUNSEL FEES - NUMBER OF COUNSEL
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - PARTICULAR ITEMS - COUNSEL FEES - CONFERENCES AND CONSULTATIONS
Costs - second and third junior counsel - conferences with counsel - multiple and overseas experts - lack of file notes.
Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), referred to.
Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470; Players Pty Ltd (In liq)(Receiver Appointed) & Ors v Clone Pty Ltd & Ors (No 3) [2020] SASC 165; Burford v Allan (1997) 68 SASR 217; Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (No 2) [2020] FCA 974, considered.

SCHWARZE v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (No 2)
[2023] SASC 167
CIVIL

In November 2022, I delivered reasons relating to two preliminary points on the taxation of the applicant’s costs in this matter. A number of issues have now emerged, the resolution of which may allow consensus to be reached between the parties on a substantial portion of the costs remaining in dispute between them. The parties have agreed that I should deal with these issues on the papers. To that end, the applicant relies on two affidavits and each party has filed written submissions.
The topics addressed in these reasons are:
1.The use of multiple counsel;
2.Fees charged by counsel;
3.Conferences with counsel and the absence of file notes; and
4.The use of multiple experts including interstate and overseas experts.
The use of multiple counsel
Over the course of the matter, the applicant retained four counsel, Mr Eriksen from 2012, Ms Atkins from 2014, Ms Eriksen for the limited task of proofing lay witnesses in 2018 and Mr Semmler KC from 2019 until the conclusion of the matter. Mr Eriksen was regarded as “lead counsel” until Mr Semmler was retained.
The applicant says that it was appropriate to retain two junior counsel both before Mr Semmler’s retainer, taking into account the complex nature of the legal and factual issues raised by the case. In his affidavit (FDN 75) Mr Jackson has described the extensive research and investigations that were undertaken to prepare the applicant’s case; there is no doubt that significant work was undertaken by Mr Jackson and counsel. The applicant also says that, in determining that the matter is fit for more than one counsel, it is appropriate to take into consideration the length of the trial listing (six weeks) and the quantum for which the claim ultimately settled ($9,500,000.00). The applicant accepts that additional work occasioned as a result of retaining more than two counsel is not claimable.
The respondent takes the position that it was neither necessary nor appropriate to brief two (and at times three) junior counsel from 2017 onwards, and particularly once Mr Semmler was retained. It concedes that it was appropriate to brief senior and junior counsel for the purpose of the mediation and trial. It says, however, that, save for this period, a very experienced personal injury barrister such as Mr Eriksen should have been capable of managing the matter by himself.
The respondent accepts that a large amount of work was done by counsel; it says, however, that because this work was spread over a many years, the volume of work at any one time did not justify retaining more than one barrister. As a result, the respondent contends that there was no justification for the briefing of Ms Atkins at any time. Prior to the retention of Mr Semmler, two counsel were not required.
The respondent also takes the view that the retention of Ms Eriksen was not justified. It says that the proofing of witnesses should have been carried out by Mr Jackson, without the need to engage counsel to undertake this task.
I do not consider that it was necessary to brief two junior counsel prior to the retention of Mr Semmler. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into account the words of Barwick CJ in Stanley v Phillips,[1] where he said:
This Court in Kroehn v. Kroehn expressed a test for deciding whether the fees for two counsel should be allowed in a party and party taxation. The question propounded by Griffith C.J. when he says: "Would a prudent person not compelled by poverty come into Court in such a case without two counsel?" must be understood in relation to the basic matter in issue, which is the presentation of the case to ensure a just adjudication. The question is not whether a man in seeking his own maximum advantage would be imprudent not to engage counsel of a particular level of experience or skill. The question is whether the services of more than one counsel are reasonably necessary for the adequate presentation of the case. That this is so appears from a perusal of all the judgments in Kroehn v. Kroehn. It is noticeable that all the participating justices agreed with the views of Gordon J. of the Supreme Court of South Australia which Griffith C.J. quotes.
In my opinion, the result of the authorities and the meaning of the regulation is that the taxing master is to allow the fees of more than one counsel where he is satisfied that the nature and circumstances of the case are such that the services of two counsel are required if the case is to be presented to the court in such a manner that justice can be done between the parties.[2]
(footnotes omitted)
[1] (1966) 115 CLR 470.
[2] Ibid, 478-479.
He went on to say:
The question for the taxing master is whether the case by reason of any of its features, the volume of material to be handled, the number or character of the witnesses to be examined, the nature or extent of the cross-examination required, the anticipated length of the case, the complexity of its issues of fact or of law, the extent of the preparatory research of fact or of law to be undertaken, the involvement of charges of fraud, or other serious imputations of personal reputation or integrity, the complexity of the required presentation and so on, make it reasonably necessary or proper that the services of two counsel be engaged in order that the court may do justice between the parties.[3]
[3] Ibid, 479-480.
I accept that the causation issues in this matter were difficult and required significant investigation. I also accept that, if the matter went to trial, the trial would be lengthy. There is also no doubt that, in the event that causation was established, quantum would be substantial. By themselves, however, these matters are not sufficient to justify retaining two counsel from 2014 (when Ms Atkins was retained) to 2019 when senior counsel was retained.
The length of time between the applicant’s first retaining solicitors and the referral of the matter to mediation was protracted. Mr Jackson was retained by the applicant’s parents in May 2012 and Mr Ericson was retained as counsel in September 2012. Mr Semmler was retained some seven years later. The investigations carried out by the applicant developed in an organic way; they were not carried out at the same time but rather developed as the evidence evolved. It appears that different lines of inquiry were pursued at different times, as the investigation focused first on one aspect of the evidence and then another. I do not see why an experienced solicitor and experienced junior counsel could not carry out and manage this work without the assistance of additional counsel.
I have considered the invoices provided by Mr Eriksen and Ms Atkins, as well as Mr Jackson’s claim for costs. Together, these documents give the impression of Mr Eriksen, Ms Atkins and Mr Jackson working as a team, with each of them participating in most, if not all activities including conferences with experts, drafting correspondence, reading reports and so on. They almost invariably met both before conferences with experts and afterwards, such meetings described as “preparing for” these conferences and “debriefing” afterwards. There is no doubt that they would have provided a mutually supportive environment within which to work, and each would have fulfilled the role of “sounding board” for the other. I have no doubt that this was important for them in preparing the case for mediation and trial and advantageous for the applicant. But, to use the words of Barwick CJ, the question is whether this is “reasonably necessary for the adequate presentation of the case”. While I am able to conclude that the use of both Mr Eriksen and Ms Atkins was advantageous to the applicant, I cannot conclude that it was necessary to allow the applicant’s case to be presented to the Court in such a way as to allow justice to be done between the parties. Consequently, I do not consider that Ms Atkins’ fees are a party-party cost for which the respondent is liable.
As to Ms Eriksen’s fees, I consider that the work that she undertook was essential for the conduct of the case, and isolated from the work undertaken by Mr Eriksen and Ms Atkins. The applicant should be entitled to claim the cost of this work as part of his party-party costs. I do not, however, consider that it was necessary for counsel to undertake this work, if counsel’s fees are higher than those charged by an experienced solicitor. Of course, if it is more cost effective for counsel to undertake the work, then there can be no objection to that. Otherwise, the taking of statements from lay witnesses is work that would normally be undertaken by a competent and experienced solicitor. I consider that the applicant is entitled to claim for this work at either the rates charged by Ms Eriksen or at the rates allowed for an experienced solicitor to undertake the work, whichever it the lesser amount.
Fees charged by counsel
I have already determined that the applicant is not entitled to claim the increase in counsel fees occasioned by retaining interstate counsel. This leaves the question, what amount is the applicant entitled to claim on account of Mr Semmler’s fees. In addition, the respondent takes issue with the fees charged by Mr Eriksen.
Mr Semmler’s fees
Mr Semmler charged $8,000 per day and $950.00 per hour plus GST. The Supreme Court Indicator on Counsel Fees (“the Indicator”) gives a range for senior counsel of between $3,200 and $4,800 per day and $400 to $600 per hour plus GST.
The applicant notes that, in 2018, Mr Frayne SC charged $650.00 per hour and $6,500 per day. He also notes that in Players Pty Ltd (In liq)(Receiver Appointed) & Ors v Clone Pty Ltd & Ors (No 3),[4] Auxiliary Judge Norman allowed a rate of $5,000 per day and $500.00 per hour for work done by senior counsel in 2015 and 2016. Against this background, and taking into account the size and complexity of the matter, the applicant submits that it is appropriate to allow $700.00 per hour and $7,000 per day for Mr Semmler’s fees.
[4] [2020] SASC 165.
The respondent says that $5,500 per day and $500.00 per hour are appropriate rates to allow for Mr Semmler’s fees. The respondent notes that, while Mr Frayne has indicated that he would have charged $6,500 per day and $650 per hour, Mr Lindsay KC would have been prepared to accept the brief for $4000 per day. It submits that the onus remains on the applicant to justify the fees sought; he is not entitled to the highest rate charged by local counsel. Further, it notes that the fees quoted by Mr Frayne and Mr Lindsay were on the basis of acting on a contingency basis. This does not necessarily indicate the usual fee that they would be prepared to accept for a brief such as this one. Finally, it submits that the Court must take into consideration the fact that senior counsel had the assistance of Mr Eriksen, a very experienced junior who had been advising in the matter for a number of years.
In Players Pty Ltd (In liq)(Receiver Appointed) & Ors v Clone Pty Ltd & Ors (No 3),[5] Auxiliary Judge Norman said this in relation to the quantification of counsel fees:
There has been reference to the Indicator to Counsel Fees. Its aim is to provide an indication of the range of counsel fees which adjudicating officers will regard as being within those limits. It has the status only of an Indicator and is not a scale. It is based on information obtained by the courts of relevant matters of how the courts might exercise their discretion by allowing and fixing counsel fees. It is in no way to bind the courts on how they will determine the proper quantum of counsel fees based on the admissible evidence about their quantum in a particular case. The ranges for the items reflect the likely degree of variation in the possible factual conclusions which may be reached on adjudications. The fees to be allowed will be what is fair and reasonable having regard to the time occupied, the complexity of the matter, the standing and experience of the particular counsel, the prevailing rates being charged for work of a particular type in this State, and any other relevant criteria. The Court will act on the admissible evidence and submissions received in a particular case in which it has to determine the proper quantum of allowable counsel fees. The Indicator superseded a previous Guide to Counsel Fees.[6]
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid, [67].
Very little evidence has been relied on by the applicant to justify counsel fees of $7,000 per day and $700.00 per hour. Indeed, the only factors pointed to by the applicant to justify fees of that amount are the size and complexity of the matter. On the basis of Mr Semmler’s invoices, however, it appears that, to a large degree, the complexities of the matter had been untangled by the time he was briefed. All of the experts, on both causation and quantum, had been retained and their reports received, lay witnesses had been identified and proofs taken, and the applicant’s case on causation and quantum was determined. While Mr Semmler settled the applicant’s position papers on liability, causation and quantum, amended statement of claim and the opinion recommending settlement, he has not charged for the initial drafting of these documents. It must be assumed that this work was done by someone else. It seems to me, therefore, that while the matter was undoubtedly complex and the materials voluminous, much work had been done by others to deconstruct the complexities before Mr Semmler was briefed and those others continued to provide similar services once he was retained. In the circumstances, I see no justification for allowing a rate of $7000 per day and $700.00 per hour plus GST.
I have reached the view that it is appropriate to allow a rate commensurate to that charged by Mr Frayne. Based on Ms Karpinski’s affidavit, it does not appear that this amount builds in a premium for accepting the brief on a contingency basis. After setting out his estimated fees, she says:
He advised that whether would (sic) agree to take a matter such as this on a contingency basis would depend on the likely chances and involve an assessment of the range of outcomes and risk.[7]
[7] FDN 58, [9].
This suggests to me that his fee was $6,500 per day or $650 per hour, regardless of whether he accepted the brief on a contingency basis.
The Indicator applicable from 1 June 2017 suggests a daily fee for trial for senior counsel in the range of $3,200 to $4,800, with an hourly rate of between $400 and $600. While Mr Lindsay has indicated that he would have been prepared to charge an amount per day within the scale recommended by the Indicator, I consider that it is reasonable to allow substantially more than that. I note that, when Mr Semmler was briefed in 2019, Mr Lindsay had been appointed silk only in the previous year, while Mr Frayne had been appointed in 2009. Given the complexity of the matter, the likely length of trial, the number of witnesses likely to be called and the difficulty of the expert evidence to be traversed at trial, I consider that it would be appropriate to brief counsel with the length of experience as senior counsel as Mr Frayne.
The rate of $6,500 per day or $650 per hour plus GST will be allowed for work done by Mr Semmler.
Mr Eriksen’s fees
Mr Eriksen charged $380.00 per hour plus GST until August 2020. From 25 August 2020, his rate increased to $550 per hour and $4,000 per day plus GST. The applicant submits that these rates are reasonable given his seniority.
The respondent accepts that the rate charged by Mr Eriksen until August 2020 is reasonable. It says, however, that the increase to $550 per hour after this time should not be allowed. By this time, Mr Semmler had been briefed and Mr Eriksen was no longer acting as lead counsel. It says that, at the most, $400 per hour should be allowed for his work.
I am of the view that it is appropriate to allow Mr Eriksen’s fees of $550 per hour after August 2020, despite the fact that this is significantly in excess of the amount proposed by the Indicator. It is clear from his invoices that Mr Eriksen continued to have carriage of significant aspects of the litigation; indeed, I have discounted the fees charged by Mr Semmler on this basis.
Mr Eriksen’s fees are allowed at $380 per hour plus GST until August 2020 and $550 per hour plus GST thereafter.
Conferences with counsel and absence of file notes
The respondent has objected to many items in the applicant’s claim for costs on the basis that they are not supported by file notes. Mr Jackson has provided an affidavit (FDN 74) which seeks to substantiate the attendances for which a claim is made, through reliance on other notes, correspondence and context. In submitting that these items should be allowed, the applicant says that the taxing officer is not bound by the rules of evidence and can rely on context and other material to justify claimed items for which no file notes exist.
The respondent says that, while it accepts that a taxing master is not bound by the rules of evidence, the party claiming the costs must still satisfy the onus of proving that the costs were reasonably incurred. It submits that this will be difficult to achieve where there are no notes to outline the nature and purpose of the attendance.
The respondent says that Mr Jackson’s affidavit amounts to no more than speculation about what occurred at the conferences, on the basis of events before and after them. This should not, however, be sufficient to satisfy the Court that the conference was reasonable, either as to its length or at all. The respondent submits that, by his failure to maintain adequate file notes to justify his claim for costs, the applicant is in breach of rule 191.2(1) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020, which requires a party to maintain an adequate record of their costs in a proceeding. It submits that, in the absence of notes with respect to a conference or telephone call, the Court cannot be satisfied that the costs were reasonably incurred.
I have considered FDN 74 and its exhibits against the applicant’s claim for costs. Generally, I have not allowed conferences (whether in person or by telephone) where there are no notes to establish its content. I have allowed telephone attendances where they are supported by other documents. An example of this is Item 160, where the telephone attendance is referred to in an email to a third party. I have also cross-referenced many of the claimed conferences with counsel with Mr Eriksen’s invoice, although the mere fact that Mr Eriksen has detailed a conference on the same day has not been sufficient to persuade me that the claim should be allowed. This is on the basis that, in the absence of notes, it is impossible to determine whether the conference was necessary, excessive, or a duplication of work already done. Attached to these reasons is a schedule setting out the items allowed and disallowed.
The use of multiple experts including interstate and overseas experts

The applicant retained nine experts. Three were paediatric neurologists, four were neonatologists, one was a neuroradiologist and one was a psychiatrist. He says that each expert had their own subspeciality and so there was no duplication in the evidence to be adduced from each one. Further, he submits that it is not unreasonable to retain two experts to provide evidence on the same point.
As to the use of interstate and overseas experts, the applicant says that this was reasonable. Many of the experts in South Australia had been involved in the applicant’s care at one stage or another, or were employed by the respondent. Further, the respondent’s lead expert witness, Professor Alastair MacLennan, is a world-renowned expert on the causes of cerebral palsy and had chaired an international task force on cerebral palsy which drafted a consensus statement on cerebral palsy and its causes which has been supported by professional colleges all over the world. As a result, it was necessary to put together a team of equally well qualified and regarded experts. In support of his position, the applicant relies on the case of Burford v Allan.[8] In that case, Matheson J reviewed the decision of a taxing master. He quoted with approval the following words of the taxing master:
[8] (1997) 68 SASR 217.
In Calcagno v State Government Insurance Commission (unreported, District Court, SA, Judge Kelly, 13 July 1992) I said:
'This ruling relates to the employment by parties of interstate experts and who claim their fees upon taxation as between party and party. In my opinion no hard and fast rule can apply to all circumstances but speaking generally I make these observations.
1. The party seeking such costs ought to demonstrate:
a) The proper enquiries have been made within this State as to those holding the necessary qualifications and expertise in the particular field. If there be none such, or clearly none that would either be acceptable to the Court in terms of knowledge, qualifications or expertise, or lack considerable reputation amongst their peers, then an allowance may be made for an interstate expert who does not suffer those disabilities.
b) That in some way the party would have been prejudiced by being restricted to South Australian resident experts in similar manner to one above and thus force to employ outside the State.
If the above cannot be demonstrated and I do not think it has been demonstrated in this case, then any charges over and above what a South Australian expert might have charged ought to be disallowed.'
I think that view is apposite to the circumstances of this case.[9]
[9] Ibid, 219-220.
The respondent submits that, generally speaking, a party is only allowed, on taxation, to claim one expert in each speciality, on the basis that a party is allowed only that which is necessary to prove their case. The respondent says that there is clear duplication with the applicant’s experts and the applicant has failed to establish that one expert was not enough to prove his case. In particular, the respondent says that at least four of the experts retained by the applicant were retained simply to “bolster” the evidence of his Adelaide based paediatric neurologist, Dr Harbord. It says that the approach adopted by the applicant lacks proportionality.
The respondent relies on a number of authorities to support its position that the general rule is that only one expert for each subject matter should be retained. In particular it relies on the case of Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (No 2),[10] where Burley J said:
There is merit in the Commissioner’s submissions, in the sense that the expert evidence adduced by Aristocrat somewhat over-egged the pudding. Even making allowances for the uncertainties arising from the development of the law in relation to the patentability of inventions involving computerisation, there was really no justification for calling three experts in separate fields to attempt to establish that there was a “technical effect” in Aristocrat’s secondary argument. Aristocrat was perhaps entitled to be creative in attempting to justify the patentability of its invention, but that should not be funded by the Commissioner, even on an ordinary basis. I agree that the Commissioner should bear 50% of the costs of Aristocrat’s experts.[11]
[10] [2020] FCA 974.
[11] Ibid, [12].
I accept that, in a straightforward case, it would be unusual to allow a party to claim the costs of more than one expert from a particular speciality on a party‑party basis. This was not, however, a straightforward case. Causation was hotly contested and it appears that almost no element of Dr Harbord’s opinion was accepted by the respondent.
The question of proportionality needs to be considered against the background of the settlement ultimately reached between the parties. The matter settled for the sum of $9,500,000. This is an extremely significant award of damages. Given the respondent’s rejection of the applicant’s expert evidence at the outset of the litigation, I am of the view that there was no lack of proportionality in retaining the number of experts that he did. I consider that they addressed differently nuanced aspects of the applicant’s case and contributed to the outcome which was eventually negotiated. I also consider that, in the circumstances, it was reasonable to retain experts from outside both South Australia and Australia.
I make no reduction to the amounts claimed by the applicant on account of expert evidence.
Conclusion
1.The respondent is not liable for the costs relating to the retainer of Ms Atkins.
2.The applicant is entitled to claim for the work done by Ms Eriksen, at the rates charged by Ms Eriksen, or at the rates allowed for an experienced solicitor, whichever is the lesser amount.
3.The rate of $6,500 per day or $650 per hour plus GST is allowed for Mr Semmler KC.
4.Mr Eriksen’s fees are allowed at the rate of $380 per hour plus GST until August 2020 and $550 per hour plus GST thereafter.
5.The items claimed which are unsupported by file notes are dealt with in the schedule to these reasons.
6.The applicant is entitled to claim for all of the experts retained by him.
7.No reduction is made for the use of interstate and overseas experts.

Item 61

Disallowed

Item 160

Allowed

Item 166

Disallowed

Item 194

Allowed

Item 218

Disallowed

Item 237

Disallowed

Item 291

Disallowed

Item 328

Disallowed

Item 335

Disallowed

Item 351

Disallowed

Item 380

Allowed

Item 381

Allowed

Item 394

Disallowed

Item 411

Disallowed

Item 458

Disallowed

Item 550

Allowed

Item 553

Allowed

Item 586

Allowed

Item 591

Disallowed

Item 592

Disallowed

Item 600

Allowed

Item 601

Disallowed

Item 608

Disallowed

Item 662

Allowed

Item 695

Allowed

Item 699

Disallowed

Item 712

Allowed

Item 729

Disallowed

Item 740

Disallowed

Item 753

Allowed

Item 788

Disallowed

Item 806

Disallowed

Item 838

Disallowed

Item 845

Disallowed

Item 847

Disallowed

Item 875

Disallowed

Item 896

Allowed

Item 918

Allowed

Item 937

Disallowed

Item 1002

Disallowed

Item 1016

Allowed

Item 1069

Disallowed

Item 1092

Allowed

Item 1120

Allowed

Item 1232

Disallowed

Item 1284

Allowed

Item 1331

Disallowed

Item 1333

Disallowed

Item 1367

Disallowed

Item 1383

Disallowed

Item 1390

Disallowed

Item 1400

Allowed

Item 1447

Disallowed

Item 1490

Disallowed

Item 1513

Allowed

Item 1520

Disallowed

Item 1527

Disallowed

Item 1551

Allowed

Item 1552

Disallowed

Item 1562

Disallowed

Item 1563

Disallowed

Item 1657

Disallowed

Item 1661

Allowed

Item 1662

Disallowed

Item 1690

Disallowed

Item 1693

Disallowed

Item 1759

Disallowed

Item 1806

Allowed

Item 1982

Disallowed

Item 2002

Allowed

Item 2022

Disallowed

Item 2026

Disallowed

Item 2030

Allowed

Item 2067

Disallowed

Item 2137

Disallowed

Item 2281

Disallowed

Item 2292

Disallowed

Item 2420

Disallowed

Item 2447

Allowed

Item 2478

Disallowed

Item 2526

Allowed

Item 2692

Allowed

Item 2731

Allowed

Item 2732

Allowed

Item 2768

Allowed

Item 2335

Disallowed

Item 2351

Disallowed

Item 2421

Disallowed

Item 2455

Disallowed

Item 2477

Allowed

Item 2484

Disallowed

Item 2541

Allowed

Item 2586

Disallowed

Item 2587

Disallowed

Item 3030

Allowed at $1200

Item 3044

Disallowed

Item 3050

Disallowed

Item 3053

Allowed

Item 3059

Disallowed

Item 3066

Disallowed

Item 3148

Allowed

Item 3195

Disallowed

Item 61	Disallowed
Item 160	Allowed
Item 166	Disallowed
Item 194	Allowed
Item 218	Disallowed
Item 237	Disallowed
Item 291	Disallowed
Item 328	Disallowed
Item 335	Disallowed
Item 351	Disallowed
Item 380	Allowed
Item 381	Allowed
Item 394	Disallowed
Item 411	Disallowed
Item 458	Disallowed
Item 550	Allowed
Item 553	Allowed
Item 586	Allowed
Item 591	Disallowed
Item 592	Disallowed
Item 600	Allowed
Item 601	Disallowed
Item 608	Disallowed
Item 662	Allowed
Item 695	Allowed
Item 699	Disallowed
Item 712	Allowed
Item 729	Disallowed
Item 740	Disallowed
Item 753	Allowed
Item 788	Disallowed
Item 806	Disallowed
Item 838	Disallowed
Item 845	Disallowed
Item 847	Disallowed
Item 875	Disallowed
Item 896	Allowed
Item 918	Allowed
Item 937	Disallowed
Item 1002	Disallowed
Item 1016	Allowed
Item 1069	Disallowed
Item 1092	Allowed
Item 1120	Allowed
Item 1232	Disallowed
Item 1284	Allowed
Item 1331	Disallowed
Item 1333	Disallowed
Item 1367	Disallowed
Item 1383	Disallowed
Item 1390	Disallowed
Item 1400	Allowed
Item 1447	Disallowed
Item 1490	Disallowed
Item 1513	Allowed
Item 1520	Disallowed
Item 1527	Disallowed
Item 1551	Allowed
Item 1552	Disallowed
Item 1562	Disallowed
Item 1563	Disallowed
Item 1657	Disallowed
Item 1661	Allowed
Item 1662	Disallowed
Item 1690	Disallowed
Item 1693	Disallowed
Item 1759	Disallowed
Item 1806	Allowed
Item 1982	Disallowed
Item 2002	Allowed
Item 2022	Disallowed
Item 2026	Disallowed
Item 2030	Allowed
Item 2067	Disallowed
Item 2137	Disallowed
Item 2281	Disallowed
Item 2292	Disallowed
Item 2420	Disallowed
Item 2447	Allowed
Item 2478	Disallowed
Item 2526	Allowed
Item 2692	Allowed
Item 2731	Allowed
Item 2732	Allowed
Item 2768	Allowed
Item 2335	Disallowed
Item 2351	Disallowed
Item 2421	Disallowed
Item 2455	Disallowed
Item 2477	Allowed
Item 2484	Disallowed
Item 2541	Allowed
Item 2586	Disallowed
Item 2587	Disallowed
Item 3030	Allowed at $1200
Item 3044	Disallowed
Item 3050	Disallowed
Item 3053	Allowed
Item 3059	Disallowed
Item 3066	Disallowed
Item 3148	Allowed
Item 3195	Disallowed

[2023] SASC 167

28 November 2023