SCHW and National Disability Insurance Agency

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SCHW and National Disability Insurance Agency [2021] AATA 591 (12 March 2021)

Division:NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME DIVISION

File Number:          2019/4718

Re:SCHW

APPLICANT

AndNational Disability Insurance Agency

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President J W Constance
Dr L Bygrave, Member

Date:12 March 2021

Place:Sydney

The Tribunal decides that:

·the reviewable decision made by the National Disability Insurance Agency on 12 July 2019 is set aside; and

·pursuant to subsection 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the matter is remitted to the National Disability Insurance Agency with the direction that funding for an assistance dog for the Applicant is a reasonable and necessary support in accordance with subsection 34(1) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth).

..............................[SGD]..........................................

Deputy President J W Constance

CATCHWORDS

NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME – reasonable and necessary supports – dissociative identity disorder ­– whether funding of assistance dog is a reasonable and necessary support –  where ‘Including Specific Types of Supports in Plans Operational Guideline – Assistance Animals’ not followed – where Tribunal satisfied the funding is a reasonable and necessary support – decision set aside and remitted

LEGISLATION

National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 34

National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013 (Cth)

CASES

McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency [2017] FCA 308

Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] AATA 179; (1979) 2 ALD 634

TYKL and National Disability Insurance Agency [2021] AATA 135

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Planning Operational Guideline

Including Specific Types of Supports in Plans Operational Guideline – Assistance Animals

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President J W Constance
Dr L Bygrave, Member

12 March 2021

A.   INTRODUCTION

  1. The Applicant, SCHW, is [redacted] years old. She has been diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder, complex post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety. These diagnoses originate from the Applicant’s experiences of severe sexual, emotional, psychological and physical abuse.

  2. The Applicant became a participant in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (the NDIS) from 11 August 2017; her first NDIS plan commenced on 21 September 2017.

  3. The matter under review relates to the Applicant’s NDIS plan for the period from 31 October 2018 to 31 October 2019. Prior to the implementation of that plan, the Applicant had requested her plan include funding for additional supports, namely, an assistance dog.  

  4. In the Applicant’s NDIS plan of 31 October 2018, the Respondent decided not to include funding for an assistance dog and, on 24 January 2019, the Applicant requested a review of this decision.

  5. In accordance with section 100 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (the NDIS Act), the Respondent determined on 12 July 2019 that an “assistance animal (therapy dog)” was not a reasonable and necessary support for the Applicant but decided that “10 hours for appropriate assessment” was “reasonable and necessary”.[1]

    [1] Exhibit R1-T2, page 8.

  6. On 5 August 2019, the Applicant made an application to the NDIS Division of the Administrative Appeals…

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Details
Case
[2021] AATA 591
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by SCHW (the applicant) against a decision of the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA). The dispute centred on whether funding for an assistance dog constituted a reasonable and necessary support for the applicant, who has been diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) was required to determine this issue.

The primary legal question before the Tribunal was whether the provision of an assistance dog was a reasonable and necessary support for the applicant, as defined by subsection 34(1) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth). This required an assessment of whether the support would assist the applicant in pursuing her goals and aspirations, and whether it was reasonable in the circumstances, considering the nature and impact of her disabilities. The Tribunal also considered the relevance of existing research on the efficacy of assistance dogs for individuals with psychiatric conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder.

The Tribunal's reasoning involved a detailed examination of the evidence presented, including expert testimony from the applicant's clinical psychologist and research articles on the benefits of assistance dogs. The Tribunal accepted the validity of peer-reviewed research, noting that while studies on dissociative identity disorder were limited due to the rarity of the condition, research on post-traumatic stress disorder was relevant given the overlap in symptoms. The Tribunal applied the principles outlined in *McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency*, emphasising that the assessment of "reasonable" and "necessary" supports requires a case-by-case evaluation based on probative evidence. The Tribunal found that the applicant's diagnoses, the impact of her disabilities, and the potential benefits of an assistance dog, as supported by research, warranted funding.

The Tribunal set aside the NDIA's decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration, finding that funding for an assistance dog was a reasonable and necessary support for the applicant. The Tribunal recommended that decisions regarding assistance animals be made on an individual basis, considering the severity of the disability, the specific tasks the animal can perform to mitigate the disability's impact, and the applicant's capacity to manage the animal's needs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

We note that this definition of an assistance animal is consistent with subsection 9(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), which states:[4][4] Also see Exhibit R2-A40, page 710. …an assistance animal is a dog or other animal: (a) accredited under a law of a State or Territory that provides for the accreditation of animals trained to assist a persons with a disability to alleviate the effect of the disability; or (b) accredited by an animal training organisation prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph; or (c) trained: (i) to assist a person with a disability to alleviate the effect of the disability; and (ii) to meet standards of hygiene and behaviour that are appropriate for an animal in a public place.D. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE APPLICANT Evidence relied upon by the Applicant included:·the oral and written evidence of the Applicant, and written evidence of her daughter;·the oral and written evidence of Ms [SB] (the Applicant’s clinical psychologist); ·written reports by the Applicant’s medical and allied health specialists;·the oral and written evidence of Ms Diane Wegener (director and head trainer of K9 Tales); and·research articles on assistance dogs and persons with psychiatric conditions.The Applicant’s history The Applicant was subjected to horrific sexual, emotional, psychological and physical abuse by her family members and their friends from a very young age.[5] [Redacted.]The Applicant’s diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder[5] Although extensive details about the Applicant’s history were provided to the Tribunal, we decided to not disclose further details to ensure the privacy of the Applicant and her children. The Applicant’s psychiatric history spans over 40 years and has involved “numerous and lengthy admissions to various psychiatric facilities”.[6] She was diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder in 1997 as a “direct result of her history of abuse as a child”.[7] [6] Exhibit R1-T4B, page 34.[7] Exhibits R1-T4B, page 34 and R2-A50, page 836. Ms [SB], the Applicant’s treating clinical psychologist since 2016, described dissociative identity disorder as “a coping mechanism that a person uses to disconnect from a stressful or traumatic situation, or to separate traumatic memories from normal awareness”, and explained that complex post-traumatic stress disorder has all the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder but reflects an “accumulation of traumas” over time.[8] [8] Transcript of proceedings oral evidence of Ms [SB], 3 December 2020, page 85. The Applicant noted in her evidence that dissociative identity disorder “used to be called multiple personality disorder. It is a rare and complex psychological condition where a person’s identity is fragmented into two or more distinct personality states called ‘alters’”.[9] She described her experience of dissociative identity disorder with her “alters” or “insiders” as follows: I think of Dissociative Identity Disorder as like living in a bus that has its windows blacked out. You can only see outside of the bus when you’re in the driver’s seat. This bus is the body we [the Applicant and insiders] share. People outside the bus can’t see how many people are inside the bus, or who was driving it at any particular time. Anyone inside the bus can take over the driving at any time.This means that whatever the body is doing, or whoever is in the “driver’s seat, outside people only ever see [the Applicant].[10][9] Exhibit R2-A31, page 522.[10] Exhibit R2-A50, page 841.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Recommendations made to the Respondent in the report were:The decision on whether an [assistance animal] is a reasonable and necessary support should be made at the level of the individual, based on:(a) the severity and impact of the disability on the person’s life,(b) the specific supports able to be provided by an appropriately selected and trained [assistance animal], which we suggest should be at least three tasks that directly and clearly mitigate the impact of the owner’s disability (and thus cost of alternative supports), and(c) the person’s ability to manage the needs of an [assistance animal], either alone or in conjunction with a support system.[69] [emphasis added][69] Exhibit R2-A38, page 554.Research articles post-2016 Published, peer-reviewed research papers dated post the La Trobe report in 2016 were also filed with the Tribunal. No submissions were made that questioned the validity or veracity of this research, although the Respondent raised questions about the extent to which research on assistance animals and people with post-traumatic stress disorder can be extrapolated to the Applicant’s diagnoses of dissociative identity disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder. These research papers included four articles that concluded assistance animals may have positive effects on reducing post-traumatic stress indicators in military veterans:·Rodriguez et al (2018) concluded an assistance dog may have a “significant positive influence on both physiological and psychosocial indicators of wellbeing”.[70]·O’Haire et al (2018) concluded the addition of assistance dogs to “usual care may confer clinically meaningful improvements in [post-traumatic stress disorder] symptomology”.[71]·Bergen-Cico et al (2018) reported military veterans “benefit significantly from dog ownership in combination with a structured dog program”; they experience “significant decreases in stress and post-traumatic stress symptoms”, “less isolation and self-judgement” and “significant improvements in self-compassion”.[72]·Vincent et al (2018) reported their research confirmed the following effects of a psychiatric assistance dog for veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder:odecrease in nightmares and improvement in sleep;odecrease or interruption of post-traumatic symptoms such as cognitive intrusions, avoidance, alternations of mood, intrusive thoughts, and hyperarousal;odecrease in depressive symptoms;oimprovement in quality of life (physical health, environment, social relationship, psychosocial);oimprovement in social integration in the community, and comfort in public and commercial places.[73][70] Exhibit R2-A57, page 1134: Rodriguez et al, “The effect of a service dog on salivary cortisol awakening response in a military population with posttraumatic stress disorder” (PTSD) (2018) Psychoneuoendocrinology. [71] Exhibit R2-A58, page 1143: O’Haire and Rodriguez (2018) “Preliminary Efficacy of Service Dogs as a Complementary Treatment for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Military Members and Veterans”, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. [72] Exhibit R2-A59, page 1153: Bergen-Cico et all (2018) “Dog Ownership and Training Reduces Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms and Increases Self-Compassion Among Veterans: Results of a Longitudinal Control Study”, The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine. [73] Exhibit R2-A51, page 922.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

We make the following findings of fact in relation to the academic research and articles:·Research articles provided to the Tribunal have been peer-reviewed and published; we therefore accept the validity and veracity of this research regarding the support assistance dogs can provide persons with psychiatric impairment/s.·Research articles published post-2016 consistently acknowledge there is a gap in the literature/research regarding longitudinal and follow up studies, this is consistent with the conclusion in the La Trobe University report in 2016 that the “existing evidence base is weak but generally positive”.·Research post-2016 primarily focuses on the support of assistance dogs to reduce post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms in military veterans; nonetheless, we accept the relevance of this research based on the evidence of Ms [SB] that episodes of dissociation are a symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder.·We accept that diagnoses of dissociative identity disorder are relatively rare and, consequently, research with significant sample sizes, as would occur for people with vision or hearing impairment, is not able to occur.H. CONSIDERATION The sole issue for determination is whether funding for an assistance dog for the Applicant is a reasonable and necessary support in accordance with subsection 34(1) of the NDIS Act. We note the Respondent accepts the Applicant meets the requirements in paragraphs 34(1)(e) and 34(1)(f). We are satisfied on the evidence before us that this is an appropriate concession. Consequently, we do not address these requirements in our consideration of whether subsection 34(1) of the NDIS Act is met. We further note that the NDIA does not dispute the Applicant’s diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder, her current treatment, or her functional capacity in relation to her circumstances and social isolation. In our consideration below, we have regard to Mortimer J’s decision in McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency, which provides the following guidance to assess “reasonable and necessary supports” in the NDIS Act:Whether a support is “reasonable” requires a different assessment to whether a support is “necessary”. Again, it is not necessary in the context of this proceeding to be definitive about the nature and extent of the meaning of the phrase, or its components. It is enough to observe that using the concept of necessity would appear to tie one aspect of the CEO’s assessment to an evaluation of the kinds of factors set out in s 34(1)(a) and (b) and (d). The word “reasonable” would appear to be directed at factors such as those set out in s 34(1)(c) and (f). That is not to say the meaning of each word is exhausted by the factors set out in s 34(1): rather, it is to illustrate the different work that each concept does as an adjective in the phrase “reasonable and necessary supports”…In my opinion, the text and context of s 33(5)(c), read with s 34(1) indicates that the CEO (or the delegate or Tribunal) must either be satisfied that a support has the character of being a reasonable and necessary support, or that it does not. Once a support is identified and described…then the question for the CEO (or the delegate or Tribunal) is whether she or he is satisfied that support, as identified, is reasonable and necessary for that particular participant…That determination can only be made on the basis of probative evidence.Once a decision is made that the support…is reasonable and necessary, then subject to the other requirements in s 33(5) and s 34, the scheme requires and contemplates that support “will” be funded. In my opinion, that can only mean wholly or fully funded.The subject matter of the CEO’s approval in s 33(2)(b) is the reasonable and necessary supports that “will” be funded. The language is imperative, and in my opinion this is consistent with the Applicant’s contention that the relevant gateway established by the legislative scheme is whether the support is “reasonable and necessary”, and once through that gateway, the scheme intends the support will be fully funded…[77] [emphasis added]Paragraph 34(1)(a) of the NDIS Act: will the support assist the Applicant to pursue the goals, objectives and aspirations included in her statement of goals and aspirations?[77] [2017] FCA 308 at [91], [93-95].