SCHOFIELD -v- AVINS [2002] WASCA 17

Jurisdiction:	SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA	Citation No:	[2002] WASCA 17
Case No:	SJA:1052/2001	Heard:	13 DECEMBER 2001
Coram:	WHITE AUJ	Delivered:	13/02/02
No of pages:	14	Judgment Part:	1 of 1
Result:	The appeal succeeds and the appellant's conviction is set aside
Category:	B
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Parties:	DAVID MICHAEL SCHOFIELD RONALD JOHN AVINS
Catchwords:	Criminal law Road Traffic Act 1974, s 61(1) Appellant convicted of dangerous driving The findings of fact not sufficient to justify a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of dangerous driving Turns on its own facts
Legislation:	Road Traffic Act 1974
Case References:	Nil Butler v Gray [1944] 46 WALR 91 Kaighin v The Queen (1990) 1 WAR 390 Mazza v Haime [2000] WASCA 42 McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44 Moore v Moore [2001] WASCA 126

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION : SCHOFIELD -v- AVINS [2002] WASCA 17 CORAM : WHITE AUJ HEARD : 13 DECEMBER 2001 DELIVERED : 13 FEBRUARY 2002 FILE NO/S : SJA 1052 of 2001 BETWEEN : DAVID MICHAEL SCHOFIELD

Appellant

AND

RONALD JOHN AVINS

Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Road Traffic Act 1974, s 61(1) - Appellant convicted of dangerous driving - The findings of fact not sufficient to justify a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of dangerous driving - Turns on its own facts

Legislation:

Road Traffic Act 1974

Result:

The appeal succeeds and the appellant's conviction is set aside

(Page 2)

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Dr J J Edelman

Respondent : Mr D J Matthews

Solicitors:

Appellant : Ilberys Lawyers

Respondent : State Crown Solicitor

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Nil

Case(s) also cited:

Butler v Gray [1944] 46 WALR 91
Kaighin v The Queen (1990) 1 WAR 390
Mazza v Haime [2000] WASCA 42
McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44
Moore v Moore [2001] WASCA 126

(Page 3)

1 WHITE AUJ: On 19 March 2001, the appellant was convicted in the Court of Petty Sessions at Perth on a charge of dangerous driving and he now appeals against that conviction on the following grounds:

"(a) The learned Magistrate erred in fact in finding beyond reasonable doubt that the Applicant was:

(i) travelling at an excessive speed that was dangerous in the circumstances;

(ii) travelling between the Gull Service Station and the accident site at an excessive speed; and

(iii) when there was no evidence or no sufficient evidence to support such findings of fact.

(b) The learned Magistrate erred in law in concluding that the Applicant had driven dangerously in that:

(i) there was insufficient evidence upon which to base a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the Applicant drove his motor cycle in a manner that is, having regard to the circumstances of the case, dangerous to the public or to any person;

(ii) he was in error in finding that dangerous driving should be imputed to the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Schofield v Avins

Details

AGLC: Schofield v Avins [2002] WASCA 17
Case: [2002] WASCA 17
Decision Date: 13 FEBRUARY 2002

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Schofield v Avins, the appellant was convicted of dangerous driving under section 61(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974. The conviction arose from an incident where the appellant was driving in a manner that was considered dangerous, leading to a collision. The appellant appealed against the conviction, arguing that the findings of fact were insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they were guilty of the offence. The court was required to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to justify the conviction, considering the elements required by the statute.

The court examined the evidence and the findings of fact, focusing on whether they were sufficient to establish that the appellant's driving was indeed dangerous. The court highlighted that the findings of fact needed to reach a level of certainty that satisfied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In this instance, the court found that the findings did not meet this threshold. The court concluded that the evidence did not conclusively prove that the appellant's driving was dangerous in the manner required by the statute.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, finding that the conviction could not be sustained. The court set aside the appellant's conviction, reflecting its view that the evidence did not establish the necessary level of certainty required for a conviction under section 61(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974. The decision underscores the importance of the standard of proof in criminal cases and the necessity for findings of fact to meet the high threshold required for such convictions.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal succeeds and the appellant's conviction is set aside

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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