SCAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SCAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 677

MIGRATION – application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 – allegation of actual bias by the decision maker and jurisdictional error – allegations made out – application dismissed.

R v Hickman;  ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 referred to
Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 438 referred to
Kwan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 498 referred to
SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 applied
Hussain v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 523 referred to
Abedi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1081 referred to
Anwari v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 217 referred to

SCAP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

No S 64 of 2002

von DOUSSA J
ADELAIDE
30 MAY 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 64 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

SCAP
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MAY 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Application dismissed.

2.Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 64 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

SCAP
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE:

30 MAY 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to set aside a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 31 January 2002 in which the Tribunal affirmed a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  2. The Tribunal’s decision, being one made after 2 October 2001, is a privative clause decision as defined by s 474(2) and (3)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) and therefore subject to the provisions of s 474(1) which provides:

    “(1)     A privative clause decision:

    (a)is final and conclusive;  and

    (b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court;  and

    (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.”

  3. The applicant contends that on two grounds the decision under challenge is invalid, and that the invalidity is not protected by s 474(1).  First, it is alleged that the decision is vitiated by actual bias because the Tribunal had a pre-determined fixed view on issues critical to the applicant’s claims, and secondly, because the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in failing to make an essential finding of fact upon which the applicant’s claim depended.  The applicant contends that s 474 does not operate to validate the Tribunal’s decision in these circumstances and relies upon the judgment…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 677
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SCAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involves an applicant seeking to challenge a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, which rejected his application for a protection visa. The applicant argues that the decision was flawed on two grounds: that the decision maker had a pre-determined view on issues crucial to the applicant’s claims, thereby exhibiting actual bias, and that the decision maker failed to make an essential finding of fact that was necessary for the applicant’s claim. The applicant contends that these errors render the decision invalid and not protected by section 474(1) of the Act. The applicant relies on several judicial precedents to support his argument that the decision is invalid due to actual bias and jurisdictional error.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the alleged actual bias and jurisdictional error rendered the decision invalid, and if so, whether section 474(1) of the Act could validate the decision. The applicant argued that the decision maker's alleged pre-determined view and failure to make a critical finding of fact constituted actual bias and a jurisdictional error, respectively. The court was required to determine whether these alleged errors indeed invalidated the decision and, if so, whether they were of a kind that section 474(1) could not validate.

The court examined the grounds of the applicant’s challenge and the provisions of section 474(1). It considered whether the applicant had sufficiently demonstrated actual bias on the part of the decision maker or a jurisdictional error. The court found that the applicant had not established the actual bias as alleged, nor had he demonstrated a jurisdictional error of the kind that would render the decision invalid. The court held that the decision was not vitiated by actual bias or jurisdictional error, and thus section 474(1) effectively validated the decision. Consequently, the application was dismissed.

The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs. This decision highlights the stringent requirements for establishing actual bias and jurisdictional error in administrative law and the protective scope of section 474(1) of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application dismissed.

2. Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant contends that on two grounds the decision under challenge is invalid, and that the invalidity is not protected by s 474(1). First, it is alleged that the decision is vitiated by actual bias because the Tribunal had a pre-determined fixed view on issues critical to the applicant’s claims, and secondly, because the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in failing to make an essential finding of fact upon which the applicant’s claim depended. The applicant contends that s 474 does not operate to validate the Tribunal’s decision in these circumstances and relies upon the judgment of Dixon J in R v Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 616, Wilcox J in Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 438 and Finkelstein J in Kwan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 498. It will only be necessary to consider the interpretation and scope of s 474 of the Act in the event that the applicant makes good the grounds of invalidity alleged.Background Facts The applicant is a 24 year old who says that he was born and lived for all his life in Diptarak, Eacha in Jaghori, Ghanzni Province of Afghanistan. He says he is of Hazara ethnicity and follows the Shi’a branch of Islam. He says Diptarak is a small village of about thirty houses. His family comprise his parents, four younger brothers, three older married sisters and three younger unmarried sisters, all of whom remain in Afghanistan. He says that he worked for his family and looked after a flock of sheep and that his father had a grocery shop in Baba Bazaar which was about one and a half hours walk from Diptarak. The applicant arrived in Australia on 1 April 2001 from Indonesia, and on 8 June 2001 lodged an application for a protection visa on the ground that he was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Refugees Convention and Refugees Protocol as those expressions are defined in s 5(1) of the Act. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol, and owes protection obligations to people who are refugees as defined in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention, namely to any person who:“… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” The applicant in his application for a visa, and in subsequent communications with officers of the respondent’s department and the Tribunal, asserted that he had a well founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his race and religion by the Taliban. The applicant alleged that the Taliban had come to his village about three years before he fled to Australia. He said that his father had been beaten, he believed because he was Hazara and a Shi’a. The Taliban forbade Shi’as from praying in their particular style. He said his paternal uncle was treated in the same way. Then in 2000, the Taliban sent a letter to the village elders to say that all young Hazara men should present themselves for military service. Most attempted to escape, including the applicant’s paternal uncle. A week later his uncle was found bound and shot. The applicant said he was therefore too afraid to escape and says that if the Taliban knew that his uncle was related to him, he and other members of his family would suffer the same fate. The applicant said he and his father considered that his life was in danger from the Taliban and so a smuggler was engaged to take him from the country.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established