SBLF v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 1477
•31 August 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SBLF v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 1477 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – application for protection visa – alleged jurisdictional errors arising from failure to adjourn Tribunal hearing and failing to provide a second s.424A notice – application refused. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.414, 420, 422B, 424A, 427, 474 and 476 The Constitution, paragraph 75(v) |
| NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 195 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61 SZCKJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 |
| Applicant: | SBLF |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | ADG 260 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Lindsay FM |
| Hearing date: | 11 April 2007 |
| Date of last submission: | 11 April 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 31 August 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Ower |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | McDonald Steed McGrath |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Roder |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The Amended Application filed on 5 April 2007 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADG 260 of 2006
| SBLF |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act (the “Act”) for an order by way of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) of 7 August 2006. That decision affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
This Court has the same jurisdiction as the High Court pursuant to paragraph 75 (v) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia in relation to judicial review. However the effect of s.474 of the Act is that the decision of the Tribunal will be a privative clause decision and therefore final and conclusive unless it can be shown to have been vitiated or affected by jurisdictional error.
An Amended Application was filed on 5 April 2007.
The applicant is a citizen of Albania although he arrived in Australia on a false Italian passport on 2 November 2005. He made his application for a protection visa on 29 November 2005. It was refused by the delegate of the Minister on 2 February 2006. In the documents filed by him with his application the applicant contended that he was a Catholic and that Christians were a minority religious group in the area of Albania in which he lived (a town called Durres). He said that on election day in Albania on 3 July 2005 he voted for the Socialist Party. On that day he got into an argument with members of a Muslim political party. Thereafter, he claims, he was threatened and lost his employment because his boss was a Muslim. The Muslim political party was known as the Homeland Party.
He claimed that whilst the new Albanian constitution purported to guarantee religious freedom, in practical terms that did not occur.
He claimed that he continued to be in regular contact with his father who was advising him that it was still unsafe for him to return to Albania on account of the members of the Homeland Party who were still seeking to punish him for his behaviour on election day.
It should be noted that before making his decision the delegate of the Minister invited him to provide further information. The request was made of his then migration agent, a Mr Alevizos. The request did not elicit any response.
When he filed his application for review with the Tribunal the applicant made no new claims. The hearing before the Tribunal was postponed twice, the first time on account of Mr Alevizos’ unavailability and the second time because of the applicant’s ill-health. Ultimately the Tribunal scheduled the hearing for 8 May 2006.
The applicant obtained alternative representation and on 5 May 2006 those new representatives sought that the Tribunal hearing be adjourned claiming that Mr Alevizos had not properly prepared the applicant’s case and requesting further time to do so. The application for adjournment was refused.
At the hearing before the Tribunal the applicant was represented by his new migration agent. The applicant gave evidence. An interpreter was present.
In his evidence the applicant claimed that since he had left for Australia his parents had moved from Durres to a nearby village of Shkozet on account of fears the family had of harm by persons who had previously threatened the applicant.
The applicant claimed that prior to the election he had spoken out against the Islamic Party which he described at the Albanian Fatherland Party. He said that that party was comprised of members who were Muslims. He said that he was beaten up in public in June 2005 by members of the Fatherland Party. He said that he was beaten so badly he had to go to hospital. He said he had reported this incident to the police the day after it happened but they were not interested in his report. He said that following this incident he was threatened with death by many Muslim people. He said that he had reported the threats on his life to the police but that they were not interested. He said that the threats to his life were made both before and after the election. He said that the first attack on him took place on or around 25 or 26 June 2005. He said that his car was fired upon the day after the election was held on 3 July 2005 although he gave the date of this event as 7 July which was some 4 days after the date he claimed the election occurred.
He told the Tribunal that he had not been a member of a political party. He said notwithstanding this the Muslim Party members wanted to make an example of him. He claimed that the Muslims commanded approximately 70% of the political support in Albania.
He claimed in his evidence that he was sacked from his job in August 2005 because he was a Catholic and had spoken out openly against the Muslim party. At the Tribunal hearing the applicant was challenged by the Tribunal with the country information obtained by the Tribunal which was said to indicate a high degree of tolerance amongst the religious groups in Albania and an absence of conflict between extremist Muslims and Catholics in 2005 whether at the time of the election or otherwise. The applicant did not resile from his claims. He went on to say that the election on 3 July 2005 the Muslim Party supporters had forced him to vote for them by threatening him with a gun.
The applicant told the Tribunal that he feared that if he returned to Albania he would be made an example of by the Muslims and would be physically harmed by being beaten and shot. He said that he did not expect to obtain any assistance or protection from the Government or police. At the Tribunal hearing he was confronted with his statement in his documents filed in support of the application that he had been assaulted by a group of Muslim men on the election day but had not mentioned the attack of 25 or 26 June to which he had referred at the hearing. He responded that he had not thought it important and did not know the dates. He claimed to have papers from a doctor in Albania evidencing his injuries sustained on 25 or 26 June 2007.
On 10 May 2006 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant requesting his written comments on information provided by the Tribunal in purported discharge of its obligations under s.424A of the Act. Section 424A of the Act provides as follows:
(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:
(a)give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and
(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and
(c)invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.
(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:
(a)except where paragraph (b) applies -- by one of the methods specified in section 441A; or
(b)if the applicant is in immigration detention--by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.
(2A)The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 424AA.
(3) This section does not apply to information:
(a)that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or
(b)that the applicant for review gave for the purpose of the application; or
(ba)that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or
(c)that is non‑disclosable information.
It drew attention to the fact that in the documentary material filed with the application the applicant referred to an altercation with members of the Fatherland Party when he cast his vote on election day, 3 July 2005, and contrasted this with the applicant making no mention of this incident at the hearing. It then referred to the applicant’s account of the incident when he was attacked by supporters of the Fatherland Party on either 25 or 26 June 2005 and contrasted this with his failure to mention that incident in the documentary material filed with the application. Finally it referred to the differing accounts the applicant gave as to the party for whom he voted at the elections on 3 July 2005. It contrasted his contention in the documents filed at the time of the application that he voted for the Socialist Party with his contention at the hearing that he voted for the Fatherland Party because he was forced to do so at gunpoint by Muslim activists.
Drawing these matters together, the Tribunal said in its s.424A letter that it regarded the “contradictions, omissions and differences” between the documentary evidence and the oral hearing evidence as being matters that may reflect negatively on the applicant’s credibility and in particular that the Tribunal may draw the inference that the attacks of 25/26 June 2005 and 3 July 2005 did not occur and that he was not coerced into voting for the Fatherland Party at the elections. The letter of 10 May 2006 does not refer by its terms to s.424A but it is plain from the language used that the Tribunal considered itself as obliged to give the particulars of this information to the applicant. It did not say in the letter, to use the language of s.424A(1)(a) that the information “would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review” but the last paragraph of the first page of the letter which is set out CB 71 makes it plain that the Tribunal had this section of the Act in mind.
In acting in this way the Tribunal was in fact accepting obligations that did not arise under the Act and going further than it was required to go pursuant to its statutory obligations. This is because the information on which the applicant is invited to comment is plainly information that falls within the exclusion provided in s.424A(3)(b). That is, it is particulars of information that the applicant himself gave for the purpose of the application. It was plainly information given for the purposes of the application considered by the Delegate of the Minister. That does not mean that it was not also information provided by the applicant to the Tribunal. I think there is force in the submission of Mr Roder, for the first respondent, that the letter from the applicant’s current legal representatives which appears at CB 76 and is dated 5 May 2006 makes it clear that the statement of the applicant prepared for the purposes of the initial application to the Delegate of the Minster was also before the Tribunal notwithstanding that the reference in the letter is to an 18 paragraph statement whereas the only statement before the Delegate was a 14 paragraph statement. No other statement was brought to the attention of the Tribunal.
The Full Court of the Federal Court in NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 195 at [41]-[64] reviewed various decisions of the Full Court and of single judges of the Federal Court in relation to the issue of what s.424A(3)(b) of the Act means when it says that s.424A does not apply to information that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application and in particular addresses the status of evidence given at a Tribunal hearing. They say at [59]:
These authorities highlight the importance of giving careful consideration to the nature of the information that is said to fall within s.424A(3)(b) and the circumstances in which it is communicated to, or elicited by, the Tribunal. There may be good reasons for requiring that the applicant affirm or actively give specific ‘information’ for the purposes of the review, in order for the exemption in s.424A(3)(b) to apply. Both SZEEU and NAZY suggest that the exception may not apply where the appellant does no more than affirm the accuracy of a statement which contains many diverse pieces of information. At the same time, the weight of authority indicates that artificial distinctions should not be drawn between information that is provided by an applicant in the course of his evidence in chief rather than in answer to questions posed by the Tribunal.
In taking this view of the letter the Tribunal sent to the applicant on 10 May 2006 I recognise that it does not deal with all aspects of the point the applicant wishes to take about the Tribunal’s failure to comply with s.424A of the Act in the circumstances of this case. I will deal with this point in more detail hereunder.
The applicant responded to the letter by providing a detailed submission from his legal representatives together with a signed statement from the applicant personally (see CB 82-85 and 86-92 respectively).
The additional statement of the applicant provided a detailed account of his difficulties as a Catholic and as a supporter of the Socialist Party in Albania since 1997. He said that the government had promoted Muslim fundamentalism. He referred to the elections that were held in Albania on 3 July 2005. He said that approximately a fortnight before the elections he was in a bar and speaking with friends about the Muslim fundamentalist party, the Fatherland Party or Partia Shjiptar. He says that he was set upon by members of that party and so seriously beaten that he required hospitalisation for four days. He says that the police visited him in hospital but were reluctant about doing anything to apprehend his attackers.
He says that on election day he was attacked again by these persons who threatened to kill him and his family. He felt that he had no choice but to vote for their party even though he wanted to vote for the Socialist party.
He claimed that several weeks after the election he was shot at by machine gun whilst driving his motor vehicle. This led to his parents selling their home so as they could buy him a false passport. The Fatherland Party members who had attacked him had visited his parents’ home a number of times prior to his departure from Albania, saying they would burn the house down. He claimed in the statement that his family were still being threatened by these persons. The additional statement went on to say that his first migration agent had not properly prepared his case or interviewed him in depth. He said that were he to return to Albania he would suffer persecution from members of the Fatherland Party.
I have referred to the anglicised name of the Muslim party referred to variously in the Court Book at Partia Shjiptar or Partia Shjiptar Atdheu. I do not think anything turns on the distinction. Certainly the description of the particular party with which the applicant said he had so many difficulties is not a matter that is germane to the Tribunal’s findings (see CB 125.8).
The applicant’s second written statement made it clear that he was not a member of any particular political party but was opposed to the growing influence of Muslim fundamentalism. He made it clear that his concern was that the Albanian state and its police force were unable or unwilling to protect him.
The letter from his agent, which accompanied his second written statement, sought an extension of time to provide further material to assist the applicant in his claim. They indicated they had sought hospital records relating to the June 2005 admission following the beating and relating to the sale of the family home. They also indicated they were trying to obtain witness statements in respect of the beating in the bar referred to in the second statement and statements from the applicant’s parents corroborating his account of the threats made to the family and directed at him.
In fact, the applicant’s agents sent a further letter on 24 May 2006 containing country information thought to assist the applicant in his contentions.
On 14 June 2006 the applicant’s agents provided the Tribunal with a copy of the contract of sale of the parents’ home and a statement from a doctor in relation to the applicant’s hospitalisation on 25 June 2005. Both of these documents were accompanied by translations into English. The medical report, which is dated 1 March 2006, and is authored by one Arjan Tivari, medical doctor, says as follows:
The (applicant) is hospitalized (sic) at the hospital of Durres on 25/06/2005, at about 22:00 for five days, in coma condition, hardly beaten, with internal hemorrhage, broken jaws, scratches on the eyelashes. After a (sic) intensive medical treatments it was enable for him to leave the hospital upon respective special recommendations.
Since his condition continued to be critical, he reenter (sic) the hospital on 03rd July at 21:00.
The present s (sic) given upon the request of the patient.
On 26 June 2006 the applicant’s legal representatives provided what was described as a ‘draft statement’ of the applicant’s mother, indicating that “arrangements are in place” for the statement to be translated, checked and signed by the mother and returned to them “in the near future”. The accompanying letter from the agent goes on to say that the statement was obtained by an interpreter telephoning the mother. The letter ends with the agent saying:
We would be grateful if the Tribunal would take this information into account in assessing (the applicant’s) application.
Finally, on 12 July 2006 the applicant’s agent forwarded a further statement of the applicant addressing one matter that arose from the medical report set out above. The further statement (actually the third provided by the applicant) says that the suggestion in the medical report that the re-admission to hospital on 3 July 2005 was associated with the attack on 25 June 2005 is in fact incorrect and that the re-admission relates to the injuries sustained on election day, 3 July 2005.
The first ground of review is a contention that s.424A of the Act was not complied with and that the failure to comply with it meant that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. It is contended that in its Findings and Reasons the Tribunal made much of the inconsistencies between the first statement given by the applicant at the time the Application being lodged with the Department and the second statement given by the applicant enclosed under cover of the letter from the applicant’s agent of 23 May 2006.
Whilst the applicant acknowledges that the Tribunal sent a s.424A letter, it did so only in relation to information constituted by the inconsistency between that first statement and the oral testimony of the applicant at the hearing before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal’s concerns as to inconsistencies are set out in one paragraph at CB 129.5:
However, throughout the course of his application the applicant has provided conflicting and contradictory evidence in relation to these claims. In a statement accompanying his application for a protection visa he stated that he had been involved in an altercation with Partia Shjiptar Atdheu members on election day in Albania on 8 May 2006. He did not mention this incident at all at the Tribunal hearing. At the Tribunal hearing, the applicant discussed an incident with these party members that occurred on or about 25 June 2005 but had made no mention of such incident in his statement accompanying his application for protection. In this statement the applicant had also claimed that he voted for the Socialist Party at the election held on 3 July 2005 however at the hearing and in subsequent correspondence, the applicant insisted that he had not voted for the Socialist Party even though he had wanted to but had instead been forced at gunpoint to vote for Partia Shjiptar Atdheu against his will.
It will be noted that the three inconsistencies referred to in that paragraph are between the initial statement and the oral testimony, with the third inconsistency having the additional quality that the first statement was also inconsistent with the second statement.
In the following paragraph at CB 129.8, the Tribunal finds that the applicant’s response to the s.424A letter was unsatisfactory. It did not accept that the claim that the first agent of the applicant had provided insufficient detail of the applicant’s claims amounted to an explanation for the inconsistencies. I also set out this paragraph in full:
When invited to comment in writing and explain the direct conflicts and contradictions in his evidence over time, the applicant did not directly address the matter but submitted that his previous representative had not interviewed him in depth and the applicant had been concerned that he had not been given the opportunity to fully explain what had happened to him in Albania. I do not accept this as a satisfactory explanation for this conflicting and contradictory evidence as the evidence presented over time is not lacking in detail but is directly contradictory. The applicant has made no submission to indicate that the previous representative had in any way misrepresented his claims to the Department or the Tribunal or had made any errors in the information provided on behalf of the applicant.
There is no doubt that the inconsistencies form a major part of the reason for the Tribunal affirming the decision under review (see CB 129.9-130.3).
However, I agree with Mr Roder that a proper reading of the Tribunal’s Reasons indicates that the Tribunal was concerned with the inconsistencies between the first statement and the oral testimony. The account of the applicant in his second statement did not fulfil the function of satisfying the Tribunal’s concerns about the inconsistencies between the first statement and the oral testimony. The second statement, when examined carefully, constitutes a development or finessing of the matters put by the applicant in his oral testimony. Ultimately, in rejecting the truthfulness of the applicant’s claim, the Tribunal must be taken to have rejected the truthfulness of the account given in the second statement (the third statement was simply not given any weight at all for the reasons given at CB 130.3). There is nothing exceptional in this. Inconsistency of accounts of events undermines a Tribunal’s confidence in any of the accounts given.
The issue of whether inconsistencies between prior statements and later evidence at a hearing can provide the basis for obligations on the part of the Tribunal to arise under s.424A of the Act was the subject of careful consideration by Allsop J in SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214 at 263-264. A finding as to inconsistency might be thought to be a mental process and therefore not information giving rise to the obligation to provide the notice. Such subjective appraisals are not “information” in terms of the section (see the authorities for that proposition cited by Finn and Stone JJ in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 at [24]). However, as Allsop J makes clear, that is not necessarily so. As he says at [221]:
If a Tribunal says that it does not believe an applicant for reasons that can be seen to include the fact that one thing was said in the prior statement and another at the hearing, or the fact that if what is now being asserted at the hearing is true it would have been in the prior statement in that form, the information would be part of the reason. The information is the knowledge imparted to the Tribunal of a prior statement in a particular form. The significance given to it by considering it in the light of evidence is the product of mental processes.
And at [223]:
That information may have relevance to the Tribunal for all sorts of reasons. Such relevance is not limited to whether the information leads to a positive factual finding based on its terms. It may be relevant because it plays some part … in the conclusion as to the truthfulness of the applicant.
Obviously, there is no reason why, as in this case, those remarks do not apply to comparisons of one written statement and another. I am proceeding on the hypothesis at this point that the first written statement was not, as I have found earlier, information provided by the applicant to the Tribunal. I am evaluating the argument on the basis that I might have been wrong in categorising the first statement as one covered by the exception in s.424A(3)(b) of the Act.
But the difficulty with the argument is that I do not accept that the findings of the Tribunal involved a comparison of the information in the first and second statements. The comparison which led to the fatal credibility findings was between the first statement and the oral evidence. The second statement, provided as it was in response to the s.424A notice, did not assuage or extinguish the Tribunal’s concerns about those inconsistencies. An obligation to send a further s.424A letter did not arise simply because the Tribunal was not satisfied of the applicant’s purported explanation of the inconsistencies. One can imagine circumstances where, if we were to hold otherwise, there would be a never ending cycle of explanations, notices under s.424A , further explanations and further notices. I am not satisfied that alleged inconsistencies between the first and second statement formed any part of the reason for the Tribunal affirming the decision of the Delegate of the Minister.
The second and third grounds of the Amended Application relate to the Tribunal’s rejection of the unsigned statement from the applicant’s mother. It is said that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to consider the mother’s unsigned statement or constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction by failing to comply with ss.414, 420 and 427 of the Act.
Section 414 of the Act provides:
(1)Subject to subsection (2), if a valid application is made under section 412 for review of an RRT‑reviewable decision, the Tribunal must review the decision.
(2)The Tribunal must not review, or continue to review, a decision in relation to which the Minister has issued a conclusive certificate under subsection 411(3).
Section 420 of the Act provides:
(1) The Tribunal, in carrying out its functions under this Act, is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick.
(2) The Tribunal, in reviewing a decision:
(a) is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence; and
(b) must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case.
Section 427 of the Act is a provision that sets out the powers of the Tribunal including the powers to compel persons to give evidence, to take evidence on oath or affirmation and similar provisions.
In essence the complaint is that the Tribunal, whilst not being bound by technicalities relating to the form of the evidence, rejected the statement because it was unsworn. Mr Ower emphasised that the Tribunal was not obliged to take the evidence on oath or even to require that the statement be signed. He emphasised the administrative nature of the review process.
However, in the circumstances of this matter, I do not think that there is any substance in this complaint. The letter from the applicant’s agent of the 26 June 2006 (see CB 105) indicates that the document is being provided on a provisional basis. It is conceded that the statement has not been signed by the mother nor even checked by her. It is apparent that it is yet to be translated to her. I take the applicant’s agent’s letter to be indicating that the Tribunal had been asked to receive the letter conditionally upon those matters being attended to. Subject to those implicit conditions, the Tribunal is asked to accept the statement. As matters transpired, the Tribunal did not deliver its decision until the 29 August 2006. No explanation for the failure to attend to the translating, checking and signing of the statement by the mother was provided to the Tribunal or to this Court. In these circumstances the Tribunal was entitled to take the view which it did that there was nothing to establish that the document was a reflection of the mother’s actual views or opinions (see CB 130.6).
The related complaint about the letter is that the Tribunal did not accord the applicant procedural fairness in that it did not give the applicant notice of its intention to reject the letter. I see no merit in that argument. The applicant’s agents themselves recognised that the document was provided provisionally and they failed to fulfil the conditions relating to its receipt. Even if I were wrong about that, s.422B of the Act provides:
(1) This Division is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.
As Mr Roder has pointed out, even if it is accepted that the remarks of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61 at [64]-[70] are obiter dicta, the same cannot be said of the decision of the same Full Court in SZCKJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 at [5]-[8]. The refusal to receive or give any weight to the unsigned statement of the mother did not constitute a breach of any part of the Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act or of any of the other sections or of Division 7A (see s.422B(2)).
The final complaint is that by failing to grant the adjournment sought by the applicant as requested by his agents in the letter of the 5 May 2006 (see CB 76) the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in that it did not accord the applicant procedural fairness. The Tribunal deals with the request for the adjournment at CB 120.5 and 120.7.
The applicant says that the fact that the Tribunal based its rejection of the applicant’s claim on the inconsistency between the first statement and the evidence given at the hearing which proceeded over the applicant’s objection (and also between the first statement and the second statement which was provided after the oral hearing) exacerbates the unfairness involved in not granting the adjournment.
Apart from the obstacle to the acceptance of this argument presented by s.422B of the Act, it cannot be overlooked that a period of some three months elapsed between the denial of the adjournment and the delivery of the Tribunal’s decision. In that time the Tribunal received further representations and documents and a further statement of the applicant all of which were given consideration (although not all were given weight). There is nothing to indicate that by the time the Tribunal delivered its decision the applicant had not been given ample opportunity to present his case. The difficulties for the applicant arising from the Tribunal’s view that the oral testimony was inconsistent with the first statement were not a function of an adjournment not being granted or at least there is nothing to indicate that such was the case.
For the forgoing reasons, no jurisdictional error is found in the decision of the Tribunal. The Application will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lindsay FM
Associate: Ms N. Julius
Date: 31 August 2007
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