SBKC v Minister for Immigration - [2010] FMCA 984

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SBKC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2010] FMCA 984

MIGRATION – Application for review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – application refused.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.48A, 65, 91R(3), 424A(3)(a), 424A(3)(b), 425, 427(1)(b) and 427(1) & (3)

Akpata & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1473
Akpata v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 402
Akpata v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1868
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 KB 223
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Mahon v Air New Zealand Ltd & Ors (1983) 50 ALR 193
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
Parker v D.P.P. (1992) 28 NSWLR 282
SBKC vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1906
SBKC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2] [2005] FCA 1456
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Turner v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 35 ALR 388

Applicant:

SBKC

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

ADG 333 of 2009

Judgment of:

Simpson FM

Hearing date:

15 March 2010

Date of Last Submission:

15 March 2010

Delivered at:

Adelaide

Delivered on:

15 December 2010

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant:

In person, by telephone

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr P d'Assumpcao

Solicitors for the First Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

Mr P d'Assumpcao

Solicitors for the Second Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

The application for judicial review filed on 27 November 2009 as amended is dismissed.
The applicant shall pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of $5,000.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT ADELAIDE

ADG 333 of 2009

SBKC

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

I have before me an Application for Review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which affirmed a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (“the Minister”) to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) Visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The Tribunal, the second respondent, indicated by filing a notice that it did not wish to be heard (save as to costs) and would abide by any order made.
The applicant claims to be a citizen of Nigeria who first arrived in Australia on 10 February 1994. He applied to the Minister for a Protection (Class XA) Visa on 15 January 2009. The delegate of the Minister decided to refuse to grant the visa on 1 July 2009 and notified the applicant of the decision and his review rights by letter dated 1 July 2009.
The delegate refused the visa application on the basis that the applicant was not a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the refugee convention.
On 15 July 2009 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for Review of the delegate’s decision. On 10 November 2009 the Tribunal decided that the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) Visa should be affirmed.

Background facts

The applicant was born in Nigeria in 1962 and is a citizen of that country. On 10 February 1994 he arrived in Australia with his wife and two children.
As will be seen from the following complex course of litigation before the Tribunal, the Federal Court and the High Court, the applicant was ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining the protection visa.
On 22 December 1995 the applicant applied for a protection visa which application was refused by a delegate of the Minister. A review by the Tribunal (differently constituted) was unsuccessful.
The applicant applied to the Federal Court to set aside the Tribunal’s decision. In Akpata & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1473 Mansfield J set aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for further consideration. The Tribunal affirmed the decision.
The applicant then sought judicial review of that decision in Federal Court proceedings SAD 40/1999. On 29 November 1999 von Doussa J made orders by consent which provided for the remittal of the matter back to the Tribunal. The Tribunal again affirmed the decision.
On 3 July 2000 the applicant applied to the Federal Court, again seeking judicial review. On 11 April 2001 O’Loughlin J dismissed the application (see Akpata v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 402).
An appeal from the decision of O’Loughlin J was dismissed by the Full Court comprising Grey, Dowsett and Stone JJ on 21 December 2001 (see Akpata v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1868).
On 4 February 2002 the applicant applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal from the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. On 11 April 2003 the High Court refused the application for special leave to appeal.
On 10 March 2004 the applicant applied to the High Court for prerogative writs in respect of the decision of the delegate of the Minister (which decision had been subsequently reviewed by the Tribunal for alleged jurisdictional error and affirmed on 19 May 2000). The High Court application was refused on 9 August 2004 (see summary in SBKC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2] [2005] FCA 1456 per Mansfield J.)
On 16 August 2005 the applicant again instituted proceedings in the Federal Court to have the decision of the Tribunal quashed for jurisdictional error. On 14 October 2005 Mansfield J dismissed the application (see SBKC vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2] [2005] FCA 1456.)
On 21 October 2005 the applicant sought leave to appeal from the decision of Mansfield J. On 19 December 2005 Finn J refused the application for leave to appeal (see SBKC vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1906).
On 2 August 2006 the applicant again filed proceedings in the High Court, being action number A17 of 2006, seeking constitutional writs in relation to the Tribunal’s decision. On 16 August 2007 Crennan J dismissed the application on the papers.

The Decision

By letter to the applicant from the Department and dated 31 October 2008, the applicant was advised that the Department had become aware that in July 1999 the applicant had departed Australia for New Zealand for three days and, in doing so, had left the migration zone. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“Department”) advised the applicant that it took the view that the bar contained in s.48A of the Act did not apply to the applicant as he had left the migration zone subsequent to his initial application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa. He was advised that he was eligible to make a further Protection (Class XA) Visa.
On 15 January 2009 the applicant lodged a further application for a protection visa. On 1 July 2009 the delegate made adverse credibility findings and refused the application.
On 15 July 2009 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. On 24 August 2009 the Tribunal invited the applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present argument. The Tribunal conducted hearings on 1 and 8 September 2009. On 10 November 2009 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.
The applicant claims to fear persecution in Nigeria from the Nigerian authorities and “Muslims” on account of his anti-government political opinion, his imputed political opinion, his religion and his ethnicity. He also made a sur place claim arising out of his activities in Australia and because of his criminal and immigration related litigation.
The Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claims in its third decision in this way:
“The applicant purportedly fears persecution in Nigeria at the hands of the authorities and the “Muslims” because of his anti-government political opinion (i.e. because he has opposed the marginalisation of the people of the Niger Delta and the Islamisation of Nigeria), his imputed political opinion (i.e. because his parents were active politically for the cause of the Niger Delta and against human rights abuses and corruption), his religion (as a Christian and as a pastor) and his ethnicity (i.e. as someone from the “Delta group” or as a Delta person or for Ogoni rights). He claims to have spoken out against the governments policies and practices when he was Branch and Publicity Secretary for the Nigerian People’s Party (from February 1982 to December 1985 according to his protection visa application), as a senior pastor for the Jesus Crusade Church (from 1982 to 1991), and as a well known professional soccer player (from February 1982 to December 1985). He argues further that he has sur place claims arisen as a result of speaking out against the Nigerian authorities in Australia and New Zealand and because of media coverage in Australia related to previous Tribunal and Court cases about his immigration and criminal matters.” [1]
[1] Paragraph 112.
As to the political opinion portion of the claim the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was a high profile political and human rights activist. The Tribunal expressed its concerns with the applicant’s credibility, and it variously described the applicant’s answers at the hearing as “evasive”, “implausible” and “broad and at times jumbled”. The Tribunal also found that the applicant’s evidence was inconsistent and “mixed up” in some respects in that he provided “conflicting information”.
The Tribunal considered the corroborative material provided by Dr. Lee. It accepted the applicant’s claim that two officials from the Nigerian High Commission visited the applicant at Yatala Labour Prison on 4 March 2008 but rejected the claim that they were “secret agents” on instructions from headquarters who told him they would be waiting for him and he would disappear.
The Tribunal considered and rejected the applicant’s claims to fear persecution on the grounds of his religion and his race/ethnicity.
With respect to the sur place claim the Tribunal found that s.91R(3) of the Act did not apply to the applicant’s case because the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee. However the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant’s activities in Australia and New Zealand had come to the adverse attention of authorities to the extent that there was a real chance of serious harm amounting to persecution now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The Tribunal gave detailed reasons for reaching their conclusion which essentially centred on the credibility findings earlier expressed. In reaching its conclusion the Tribunal stated that it had regard to various documents including medical reports proffered by the applicant.
The applicant remains in custody as a result of his convictions for certain criminal offences. He has not been legally represented in these proceedings. The documents that he has filed in these proceedings are all handwritten. As is often the case with unrepresented litigants the documents are lengthy and contain much unnecessary or irrelevant material.
When the matter came before a Registrar of this Court on 23 December 2009, orders were made for the orderly conduct of the proceedings. The applicant was given leave to file and serve an Amended Application and any further material to be relied upon by 5 February 2010. The applicant failed to file an Amended Application and is therefore seen to be relying on his Application filed on 27 November 2009 and his affidavits filed on 27 November 2009 and 5 February 2010. I also have a 19 page document from the applicant titled “Written – Submission of the applicant” containing five grounds of appeal and annexing 32 pages of exhibits.
In addition to the usual Court Book containing the material from the Department file, the Tribunal file and the Country information relied on by the Tribunal, I also have a Supplementary Court Book containing copies of Tribunal decisions V96/05472 dated 3 April 1998, V99/09702 dated 18 May 1999 and N99/30534 dated 19 April 2000, all being cases in which the applicant sought decisions from the Tribunal. In addition to this material, I have been provided with the transcripts of Tribunal hearings in relation to this current application for the 1^st and 8^th of September 2009.

Grounds

In the first respondent’s Contentions of Fact and Law filed in this matter Counsel submits that the applicant relies on five grounds:
a)That the Tribunal failed to tell the applicant that it had credibility concerns, (Ground 1);
b)That the Tribunal relied on country information, (Ground 2);
c)That the Tribunal failed to obtain evidence of the cause of the applicant’s scaring (by, for example, arranging for a medical examination) as it was able to do under s.427(1) and (3) of the Act, (Ground 3);
d)That the Tribunal failed to ask the relevant questions and failed to take into account relevant materials, (Ground 4); and
e)That the Tribunal ignored relevant material and failed to take into account relevant material, (Ground 5).
At the hearing the applicant appeared by telephone from Port Lincoln prison. He was given the opportunity to put his submissions both before and after submissions were put by Counsel for the first respondent.
Prior to the hearing the applicant had been provided with the first respondent’s Contentions of Fact and Law. He did not suggest that the analysis of the grounds for his applications as suggested by Counsel for the first respondent were not as he stated. I propose to deal with this matter on the basis that the analysis of the grounds for the applicant’s application as summarised by Counsel for the first respondent accurately identifies the applicant’s grounds. Having had the opportunity to study the applicant’s materials I am satisfied that the respondent’s Counsel’s summary is a fair analysis of the case that the applicant wishes to put.
I propose to address each of the five grounds in turn save that grounds four and five can be conveniently dealt with together.

Ground 1

Applicant’s Submissions

The applicant submits that it was incumbent on the Tribunal to advise him that credibility was an issue before it. He says that the Tribunal should have asked relevant questions going to his credibility and that it failed to do so. The applicant refers to the cases of Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at pp. 628-629; Mahon v Air New Zealand Ltd & Ors (1983) 50 ALR 193; Parker v D.P.P. (1992) 28 NSWLR 282; Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 at 592; Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163. He submits that the fact that the Tribunal failed to give him the opportunity to address the question of his credibility amounts to jurisdictional error. He also makes mention of the Tribunal’s conduct of the proceedings which he submits amounted to a breach of procedural fairness.

First Respondent’s Submissions

The first respondent submits that s.425 of the Act (which was complied with by the Tribunal) requires that an applicant be invited to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising from the decision under review. Those issues, it is submitted, will not be sufficiently identified in every case by describing them simply as whether the applicant is entitled to a protection visa. The issues arising in relation to a decision under review are to be identified having regard not only to the fact that the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions conferred by the Act on the original decision maker, namely, the Minister’s delegate, but also to the fact that the Tribunal is to review the particular decision for which the decision maker will have given reasons. The Tribunal, it was further submitted, is not to be confined to whatever may have been the issues that the delegate considered. The issues that arise in relation to the decision are to be identified by the Tribunal (see SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [33] – [35]).
It is further submitted however that if the Tribunal takes no steps to identify some issues other than those that the delegate considered dispositive, and does not tell an applicant what those other issues are, then, the applicant is entitled to assume that the issues the delegate considered dispositive are the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. On review by the Tribunal, the issues arising in relation to the decision under review would be those that the original decision maker identified as determinative against the relevant applicant unless some other additional issues are identified by the Tribunal as they may be. If the Tribunal invites an applicant to appear and says nothing about an additional matter on the basis of which the Tribunal decides against the applicant then it would not have complied with s.425 as the applicant would not have been accorded procedural fairness.
Counsel for the first applicant referred to the following passage from the reasons of Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ observed in SZBEL:
“… procedural fairness does not require the Tribunal to give an applicant a running commentary upon what it thinks about the evidence given. On the contrary, to adopt such a course would be likely to run a serious risk of conveying an impression of pre-judgment.”
Finally on behalf of the first respondent it was submitted, that in the circumstances of the present case, the Tribunal gave the applicant the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues in relation to the decision under review. It was put that because the delegate determined the applicant’s claim as a result of an adverse credibility finding the applicant was entitled to assume that the Tribunal believed that his credibility was an issue concerning the political limb of his claim and further that, on the strength of SZBEL, there is no obligation for the Tribunal to put to the applicant the concerns it had with the applicant’s credibility in relation to the political limb of his claim since these were the same concerns held by the delegate.
Accordingly it is submitted on behalf of the first respondent that the Court should reject ground one.
In my opinion ground one of the applicant’s case fails. I accept the submissions put on behalf of the first respondent. In this case, the Tribunal did not identify and notify the applicant of issues other than those that the delegate considered dispositive. The applicant was therefore entitled to assume that the issues that the delegate considered dispositive were the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. The delegate made findings including the following:-
·“The confusing nature of discrepancies between Country information and the applicant’s claims in regard to the name of the party and the period in which he was active, undermining the plausibility of his claims to have been persecuted as a result of his political activities …”
·“The applicant has not satisfactorily explained the inconsistencies in the names of the party in which he claims he was an office bearer …”
·“The applicant’s claims of persecution for political opinion are further diminished by the fact that during the third RRT hearing he demonstrated no knowledge of significant political events in Nigeria …”
·“The plausibility of his claims to have been outspoken about these issues is further reduced by the fact that he is not Ogoni and that he has spent his entire life in Nigeria residing in Lagos on the other side of Nigeria …”
·“I concur with the RRT’s findings that these claims were concocted to engender claims that would have linked the applicant’s activities to the considerable international media coverage of the execution of the Ogoni poet Ken Saro-Wiwa at the time of his initial application for a Protection Visa …” and
·“Given the inconsistencies in the claims made by the applicant at various stages of his application for a Protection Visa, I am not satisfied that the claims advanced at the third RRT hearing and in support of his current application can be relied upon as being an accurate record of the experiences of the applicant prior to his departure from Nigeria.”

In my opinion, the applicant was alive to the Tribunal’s concern about the applicant’s credibility and the Tribunal was not therefore in breach of s.45 of the Act. This position is confirmed by s.424A(3)(b) of the Act. Section 424A(1) provides as follows:
Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:
(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and
(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and
(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.
Subparagraph (3) provides as follows:
This section does not apply to information:
(a)     …
(b)     that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or
(ba) …
(c)     …
In the circumstances, s.424A did not impose an obligation on the Tribunal to tell the applicant that it had credibility concerns.

Ground 2

Applicant’s Submissions

The applicant says that the Tribunal fell into error as a result of considering certain materials (ie Country information) without giving him the opportunity of putting submissions.

First Respondent’s Submissions

Counsel for the first respondent pointed to the fact that the information that the Tribunal considered was Country information that was not about the applicant but about a class of people that the applicant was a member of. It is submitted that s.424A(3)(a) provides a complete answer to this ground of the applicant’s case. Whilst s.424A(1) requires the Tribunal to “give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review …” that subsection is made subject to subsections (2A) and (3). Subsection (3) says:
(3) This section does not apply to information:
(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; …
I accept the submissions put on behalf of the first respondent. Ground 2 of the applicant’s case fails.

Ground 3

Applicant’s Submissions

The applicant points to the fact that the Tribunal had before it 2 reports from Dr Michael Lee in which the doctor described the “size, look and cause of the scars on my body with precise detail which only a medical doctor could know.” The applicant says the Tribunal only made reference to this evidence in passing and gave it no weight. He submits that the Tribunal concluded that Dr Lee’s report was unable to conclusively show the cause of the scars on the applicant’s body and that physical scars are not evidence that he had experienced torture and brutality as he claimed. He points to s.427(1)(b) of the Migration Act which he says provides that the Tribunal in reviewing a decision can “require the secretary to arrange for the making of any investigation, or any medical examination, the Tribunal thinks necessary with respect to the review, and give to the Tribunal a report of that investigation or examination”. He says that the Tribunal failed to exercise its powers under that section and in failing to do so, constructively failed to exercise the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

First Respondent’s Submissions

The first respondent submits that the authorities established that the Tribunal has no general obligation to initiate enquires or to make out an applicant’s case. See Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151 at [60] and the authorities referred to therein. It is further submitted, that on the other hand, there is authority for the limited proposition that, in certain rare or exceptional circumstances, the Tribunal’s failure to enquire may ground a finding of jurisdictional error because the failure may render the ensuing decision manifestly unreasonable in the sense used in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 KB 223. It is the first respondent’s submission that the present case is not a case which involves unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense. As such, the first respondent submits that this ground should be rejected.
I agree with the submissions put on behalf of the first respondent. I note that in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at para [43], Justices Gummow and Hayne said:
“ … whilst s 427 of the Act confers power on the tribunal to obtain a medical report, the Act does not impose any duty or obligation to do so. Rather, s 426 provides that, even if an applicant requests that the tribunal take oral or written evidence from a witness (such as a medical practitioner or psychiatrist), the tribunal is not required to obtain such evidence. Thus, the tribunal is under no duty to inquire.”
This ground fails.

Grounds 4 and 5

Applicant’s Submissions

The applicant says that the Tribunal failed to ask relevant questions and either ignored or failed to take into account relevant material. The questions that the applicant says the Tribunal should have been asked included:
1. Why was the applicant tortured?
2. Had the applicant been tortured?
3. Whether and what is the cause of the scars on the applicant’s body?
4. Why did the applicant suffer from trauma and symptoms related to post traumatic anxiety disorder? etc
He says that because these questions were not asked, the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. The applicant points to certain material that was in the possession of the Tribunal regarding his 3 prior RRT decisions as well as the department’s files relating to the applicant. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by ignoring this relevant material which was “… credible and central to my overall credibility and surplus claims as a refugee …”.

First Respondent’s Submissions

The first respondent submits that the Tribunal did not commit any of the errors alleged by the applicant. It was submitted that the Tribunal’s decision comprehensively dealt with the applicant’s claims and materials advanced. It is put that in any event, the Tribunal’s reasons ought not to be scrutinised with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error. It was further put that authority clearly establishes that the failure of a Tribunal to mention a matter in its reasons does not necessarily mean that the matter was overlooked.
The applicant has not satisfied me that this is a case where the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error in failing to take into account a relevant consideration. As was said in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271:
“In (Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280) a Full Court of the Federal Court (Neaves, French and Cooper JJ) collected authorities for various propositions as to the practical restraints on judicial review. It was said that a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language … nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision- maker. The Court continued: “The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.”
These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleamed from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision.”
In Turner v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 35 ALR 388 at 392:
“In many cases it will be clear whether or not the decision-maker has taken a relevant consideration into account. This is not to say that the mere assertion by the decision-maker that he has done so will conclude the matter. It may be possible to demonstrate from a consideration of all the reasons leading to the decision, or indeed from the decision itself, that a consideration has not been taken into account in any real sense. Conversely the omission of an expressed reference to some consideration will not lead inevitably to a conclusion that it was not taken into account. An examination of the reasons for decision and of the decision itself may justify the inference that it was.”
A close reading of the reasons of the Tribunal do not suggest any jurisdictional error. Grounds 4 and 5 fail.
I make the orders to be found at the beginning of these reasons.

I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Simpson FM

Date: 15 December 2010