Sasso and Australian Securities & Investments Commission

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Sasso and Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2024] AATA 2617 (23 July 2024)

Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number(s):2024/2906      

Re:Pedro Eduardo Sasso  

APPLICANT

Australian Security and Investments CommissionAnd  

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member D Benk

Date:23 July 2024

Place:Sydney

The applications for stay and confidentiality orders pursuant to ss 41 and 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) are refused.

.............................[SGD] .............................

Senior Member D Benk

Catchwords

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of decision and confidentiality orders – applicant banned from providing any financial services for five years – whether discretion of the Tribunal is enlivened to grant a stay – whether a stay is desirable for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing – applicant no longer providing financial services – whether consequences for applicant and third parties substantiated – public interest considerations –  presumption of openness and transparency of proceedings – whether grounds for confidentiality orders made out – reputational damage and financial hardship not sufficient – applications for stay and confidentiality orders refused

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 35, 41
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1
Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) ss 12CB, 920A, 920B, 1041H(1), 911A(1)

Cases

Dart and Director-General of Social Services (1982) 4 ALD 553

Birdseye v Tax Practitioners Board [2020] FCA 1235

Poidevin and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 124

McLean v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 22

Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 133 ALD 39

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2007] NSWSC 1489

Scott and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 798

Trading Life Services Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2022] AATA 4746

Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2009] FCAFC 185

Daly and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 1516

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v McCormack [2017] FCA 672

Devasahayam and Comcare [2010] AATA 784

Flood & Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 182

Re Lawrance and CRS Australia (2004) 85 ALD 238

Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 64

Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 33

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member Benk

23 July 2024

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 2 May 2024, the Australian Security Investments Commission (the respondent) issued a five-year banning order[1] on Mr Pedro Sasso (the applicant) preventing him from performing any function involved in carrying on of a financial services business and from controlling, either alone or with others, an entity that carries on such a business. 

    [1] An order made under sections 920A and 920B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

  2. The applicant seeks review of that decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). Stay, confidentiality and non-publication orders were sought and the subject of this interlocutory hearing.

  3. I have had regard to the written and…

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Details
Case
[2024] AATA 2617
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) had banned Mr. Sasso from providing financial services for five years. Mr. Sasso applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a stay of this decision and for confidentiality orders regarding the proceedings. The dispute centred on whether the AAT had the discretion to grant a stay and confidentiality orders, and if so, whether the circumstances warranted their imposition.

The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether its discretion was enlivened to grant a stay of ASIC's decision, and if so, whether a stay was desirable to secure the effectiveness of the hearing. Additionally, the Tribunal had to determine whether grounds for confidentiality orders were made out, considering the presumption of openness and transparency in proceedings. Mr. Sasso argued that the consequences for himself and third parties, including reputational damage and financial hardship, justified these orders.

The Tribunal considered that while a ground to enliven the discretion to grant a stay existed, it was not satisfied that a stay should be granted. The Tribunal placed paramount importance on public interest considerations, particularly the general deterrence purpose of such regulatory actions. It found that Mr. Sasso's reputational and financial interests alone did not outweigh the global public interest in ensuring the public has sufficient information to make informed decisions and that the Regulator can meet its statutory objectives. Regarding confidentiality, the Tribunal noted the strong presumption in favour of public hearings and the disclosure of evidence, requiring proper and cogent reasons to depart from this principle. It found that reputational damage and financial hardship were not sufficient grounds to justify confidentiality orders.

Consequently, the applications for both a stay of the decision and for confidentiality orders were refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

I have had regard to the written and oral submissions and exhibits, which consisted of over 11,000 folios. I was also referred to several Tribunal decisions by both parties. It is axiomatic that each case turns on its own factual circumstances.BACKGROUND It is undisputed the applicant was the sole director and company secretary of Europe FX who was a Corporate Authorised Representative (CAR) under Union Standard International Group Pty Ltd (USG) Australian Financial Services license between 24 May 2018 to 31 January 2020. As the corporate authorised representative, Europe FX offered contracts for difference (CFD) including margin foreign exchange contracts to clients on behalf of USG using a trading MetaTrader4 trading platform. USG ultimately terminated its CAR agreement (effective on 31 January 2020) with Europe FX maintaining it had breached its obligations, noting that there had been 67 complaints made about its conduct. The respondent commenced an investigation. At all times the applicant maintained he was not a party to any alleged misconduct of Europe FX or USG; or alternatively if there was to be a finding of misconduct, it was appropriately directed elsewhere. For the purposes of the investigation, the respondent, whilst acknowledging the conduct and involvement of various third parties, concentrated on the applicant’s management of Europe FX in his role as a director and corporate authorised representative for the period 30 April 2019 to 31 January 2020. Following investigation which involved the review of 15 investor affidavits, the respondent determined the applicant had breached obligations under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act) by engaging in unconscionable conduct[2]; misleading statements to encourage deposits and discourage withdrawals;[3] engaged in the provision of personal advice, trading strategies and recommendations when not licensed to do so[4] amongst other matters. Further the respondent determined the applicant was not adequately trained or competent to provide financial services or carry on such business as his conduct demonstrated little oversight or knowledge of day to day operations; he was inactive in mitigating or addressing “significant” problems as they arose; he abrogated his responsibilities for supervision and oversight to persons offshore without a monitoring system in place; failed to investigate issues with regards to complaints as they arose and despite termination of the CAR continued to enter into contracts with third parties without consideration of the financial impact on EuropeFX.[2] Section 12CB of the Corporations Act.[3] Section 1041hH1) of the Corporations Act.[4] Section 911A (1) of the Corporations Act. The respondent acknowledged there may be an overlap in compliance obligations, however determined the blanket delegation of compliance tasks to third parties without safeguards was sufficient to warrant the above findings, especially as the applicant was the sole director. The respondent accepts that delegation of tasks is entirely within the orbit and discretion of a director, however the requirements of that office do not allow for an abandonment of the duties of a director in both financial and non-financial obligations with regards to care and diligence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The length of time that will pass before a hearing is held is a relevant consideration. The applicant expects to produce additional evidence but was not clear on the extent or nature. The respondent indicated it is able to commit to a timetable for final review and ‘was willing to cooperate with the applicant to ensure the matter can be prepared for hearing’ without delay. Given this, this has limited weight in the circumstances. Conclusion on the stay application I have balanced all of the competing factors in Scott. Whilst I have found a ground to enliven s 41(2) of the AAT Act, I am not satisfied that a stay should be granted primarily because I place paramount importance on the public interest considerations, particularly the general deterrence purpose. I cannot find that the applicant’s reputational and financial interests alone outweigh the global public interest factors which are intended to ensure the general public have sufficient information to make informed decisions and the Regulator is not unduly burdened in ensuring it meets its statutory objectives on a case by case basis. Consequently, for the reasons above, I find a stay is not desirable for the purposes of securing the effectiveness of any final review hearing and so refuse the application. Subsection 35(3) of the AAT Act gives the Tribunal power to make directions prohibiting or restricting the publication or other disclosure of information tending to reveal the identity of a party or witness in a proceeding. To this end, the Tribunal may allocate a pseudonym to a party or witness and use this instead of their name. Further, subsection 35(5) of the AAT Act makes plain that in considering whether to grant a confidentiality order under subsection 35(3) the Tribunal is to take as the basis of its consideration that ‘it is desirable’ that hearings of proceedings before the Tribunal be held in public and that evidence given before the Tribunal and the contents of documents received in evidence should be made available to the public. It is clear from the terms of section 35 of the AAT Act that the Tribunal must generally conduct a proceeding on the basis of openness, in the interests of maintaining public confidence in the fairness and integrity of that proceeding, and that the Tribunal should only depart from this approach if it is satisfied that there are proper and cogent reasons for doing so. Such relief has been explored exhaustively in a number of authorities; relevantly: In Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 64; (1979) 2 ALD 33 (Pochi), President Brennan said (at pp. 55-56):Yet the powers conferred upon this Tribunal by s 35(2) are not intended to lie dormant – they are there to be exercised, albeit sparingly. The purpose of their exercise is to secure to the Tribunal the availability of as much relevant information as possible, without violating the confidentiality which a party, a witness or the public is properly entitled to preserve (though a proper entitlement to confidentiality is not lightly established). A court may be constrained to violate that confidentiality in order to conduct its proceedings in public; but the Tribunal’s powers are intended to facilitate the flow of relevant information to it, and if the exclusion of the public or even of a party is essential to preserve the proper confidentiality of the information needed to determine the application, that is a price which has to be paid, however reluctantly.An order excluding the public may be justified more readily than an order excluding a party, but strict criteria govern the making of such an order. There must appear a real possibility of doing injustice to, or inflicting a serious disadvantage upon, a party, a witness or a person giving information if the proceedings were in public; or it must clearly appear that publication of the proceedings would be contrary to the public interest; or it must appear that the information to be given in the proceedings is of a kind described by s 36 (though in the last case, it is relevant that the Attorney-General has not given a certificate under that section). Where it is contended that publication of the proceedings would be contrary to the public interest, it is difficult to envisage a case justifying exclusion of the public which a court would not deal with by refusing to admit the evidence: this class of case is a narrow one. Where the publicity which traditionally marks curial proceedings may inhibit the production of evidence or lead to its rejection, the power conferred upon the Tribunal by s 35(2) authorizes it to remove those impediments to the receipt of information. Yet the power is conferred in order to do justice in exceptional cases – that is to say, where “the principle that it is desirable that hearings of proceedings before the Tribunal should be held in public” cannot be applied.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal's discretion under section 41(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) to grant a stay of the decision was considered, with the court acknowledging the existence of a ground to enliven this discretion due to the applicant's argument concerning the impact of the decision on his reputation and financial standing. However, the court balanced this against other factors, including the respondent's willingness to cooperate in expediting the hearing process and the broader public interest considerations, particularly the deterrence purpose. The court found that while the applicant's interests were significant, they did not outweigh the need for transparency and the importance of maintaining public confidence in regulatory processes. Consequently, the court refused the stay application.

The court assessed whether a stay was desirable for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing. Given the respondent's readiness to work with the applicant to expedite the hearing, and considering the limited weight of the applicant's expectation to produce additional evidence, the court concluded that a stay was not necessary to secure the effectiveness of any final review hearing. The public interest in ensuring that the Tribunal can carry out its functions without undue delay and the potential deterrence benefits of a timely hearing were deemed more compelling.

In evaluating the consequences for the applicant and third parties, the court examined the extent of reputational damage and financial hardship the applicant claimed. The applicant, who was no longer providing financial services, argued that a stay would mitigate these impacts. However, the court found that these consequences were not sufficiently substantiated to warrant a stay, especially considering the public interest in the timely resolution of the matter and the deterrent effect of upholding the decision.

The court weighed public interest considerations, particularly the general deterrence purpose, against the applicant's reputational and financial interests. The court emphasised the importance of the general public having sufficient information to make informed decisions and the regulator's need to meet its statutory objectives effectively. The deterrence purpose served by upholding the decision and maintaining the integrity of regulatory processes was deemed to outweigh the applicant's personal interests, leading to the refusal of the stay application.

Regarding the confidentiality order, the court considered whether there were proper and cogent reasons to depart from the presumption of openness and transparency of proceedings. The court highlighted the principle that hearings should generally be held in public to maintain public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the Tribunal's proceedings. The applicant needed to demonstrate a real possibility of serious disadvantage or contrary public interest if the proceedings were held in public. Given the nature of the allegations and the respondent's role in financial regulation, the court found insufficient grounds to justify excluding the public or restricting disclosure, thereby refusing the confidentiality order.

Finally, the court addressed whether reputational damage and financial hardship were sufficient grounds for the Tribunal to make a confidentiality order under section 35(3) of the AAT Act. The court acknowledged the applicant's concerns but found that these factors did not meet the stringent criteria required to justify such an order. The importance of maintaining the openness and transparency of Tribunal proceedings, particularly in regulatory matters, was paramount. Consequently, the court concluded that the applicant's reputational and financial interests did not warrant a confidentiality order, and the application was refused.