Sarti and Sarti and Anor (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SARTI & SARTI & ANOR (No.2) [2020] FCCA 2595
Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Stay – application for stay pending determination of appeal of interim judgment – parenting proceedings – terminally ill grandfather seeking time with grandchild – proper consideration of evidence by trial judge – considerations regarding appeals from interim discretionary judgments – consideration of Full Court decisions regarding parenting applications by non-parents – stay application dismissed – costs reserved.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.60CA, 117

Cases cited:

Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106

AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160
Anderson v Senior (Stay Appeal) (2013) 279 FLR 399; (2014) 50 Fam LR 21
AON Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172

Crouper & Mitchell [2014] FamCAFC 246

Goode v Goode (2006) 206 FLR 212; 36 Fam LR 422

Gronow & Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513

Harries v Harries (2012) 45 Fam LR 598

Jennings Construction Ltd v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited (1986) 161 CLR 681

K & B (2006) FLC 93-288

Medlow v Medlow (2016) 306 FLR 183; (2016) 54 Fam LR 389; (2016) FLC 93-692
Perry & Perry (2015) FLC 93-669

Sigley v Evor (2011) 44 Fam LR 439

U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238

Valentine v Lacerra (2013) 49 Fam LR 255

Professor M Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016)

First Applicant: MR B SARTI
Second Applicant Respondent: MS SARTI
Respondent: MR SARTI
File Number: CAC 1154 of 2020
Judgment of: Judge W J Neville
Hearing date: 19 August 2020
Date of Last Submission: 18 August 2020
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 17 September 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr C Othen
Solicitors for the Applicants: Farrar Gesini Dunn
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Haddock
Solicitors for the Respondent: Kennedy & Cooke Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The Stay Application filed by the Applicants on 12 August 2020 be dismissed.

  2. Costs be reserved.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Sarti & Sarti & Anor (No.2) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT CANBERRA

CAC 1154 of 2020

MR B SARTI

First Applicant

MS SARTI

Second Applicant

And

MR SARTI

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Given that I was not the trial Judge, and that I am involved in the proceeding to deal only with the Stay Application that was filed on 12 August 2020 in relation to the Orders made by Judge Hughes on 31 July 2020, I make the following by way of observation only.[1]

    [1] In general terms, in my view litigants and their legal representatives are entitled to know the cause(s) for any delay in the provision of reasons.  In this instance, apart from the usual difficulties arising from the Court’s unconscionable and unsustainable workload, and in this Registry, where two Judges (with the assistance…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 2595
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Sarti and Sarti and Anor (No.2), the applicants sought a stay of an interim judgment pending the determination of their appeal. The proceedings concerned parenting arrangements, with a terminally ill grandfather seeking time with his grandchild. The court was required to consider the proper consideration of evidence by the trial judge, the principles applicable to appeals from interim discretionary judgments, and the specific considerations relevant to parenting applications made by non-parents.

The court was tasked with determining whether to grant a stay of the interim orders. This involved applying established principles for stay applications, both in general law and within the specific context of parenting proceedings. The court was guided by authorities that stress the discretionary nature of such applications, requiring them to be determined on their merits. Key principles considered included the onus on the applicant to establish a proper basis for the stay, the entitlement of a judgment holder to the benefit of that judgment, and the insufficiency of a mere appeal filing to warrant a stay. The court also had to weigh factors such as the bona fides of the applicant, the balance of convenience, the competing rights of the parties, the risk of the appeal being rendered nugatory, a preliminary assessment of the appeal's strength, the desirability of limiting changes to a child's living arrangements, the timeframe for the appeal, and the paramount consideration of the child's best interests.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for a stay. The decision reflects a careful balancing of the competing interests and legal principles, with the court finding that the applicants had not established a sufficient basis to warrant suspending the interim judgment. Costs were reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The Stay Application filed by the Applicants on 12 August 2020 be dismissed.

2.

Costs be reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I record the following from the Full Court’s decision in Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal).[3] At [17] – [18], the Court said (emphasis added):[3] Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106. For a more recent discussion, but no formal ruling, by a differently constituted Full Court (Thackray, Ainslie-Wallace & Murphy JJ) of stay applications, where Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) was distinguished but the comments of Brennan J in Jennings Construction Ltd v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited (1986) 161 CLR 681 were further considered, see Anderson v Senior (Stay Appeal) (2013) 279 FLR 399; (2014) 50 Fam LR 21 at [35], [37] and [38]. See also the comments of the Full Court (Warnick, Boland & May JJ) in K & B (2006) FLC 93-288, and more generally in relation to appeals against interlocutory Orders in the specific context outlined in Medlow v Medlow (2016) 306 FLR 183; (2016) 54 Fam LR 389; (2016) FLC 93-692.[17] This is an appeal from a discretionary judgment. There are well established principles on the limits on interference by an appellate court with such a judgment (see House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; (1979) FLC 90-716).[18] The principles to be applied in determining an application for a stay of orders both in the general law and in respect of parenting proceedings are also well known (see The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Myer Emporium Limited [No.1] (1986) 160 CLR 220 at 222; Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation (1985) 2 NSW LR 685; Jennings Construction Limited v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited (1986) 161 CLR 681; Clemett & Clemett (1981) FLC 91-013; JRN & KEN v IEG & BLG (1998) 72 ALJR 1329 at 1332). The authorities stress the discretionary nature of the application which should be determined on its merits. Principles relevant to this matter include the following:· the onus to establish a proper basis for the stay is on the applicant for the stay. However it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate any “special” or “exceptional” circumstances;· a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to the benefit of that judgment;· a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to presume the judgment is correct;· the mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to grant a stay;· the bona fides of the applicant;· a stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties - this may involve a court weighing the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties;· a weighing of the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted – this will be a substantial factor in determining whether it will be appropriate to grant a stay;· some preliminary assessment of the strength of the proposed appeal – whether the appellant has an arguable case;· the desirability of limiting the frequency of any change in a child’s living arrangements;· the period of time in which the appeal can be heard and whether existing satisfactory arrangements may support the granting of the stay for a short period of time; and· the best interests of the child the subject of the proceedings are a significant consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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