Sarina v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sarina v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 190

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Sarina v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 521
File number: NSD 675 of 2018
Judges: RARES, MARKOVIC AND BROMWICH JJ
Date of judgment: 31 October 2018
Catchwords: DEFAMATION – application for leave to appeal and appeal from summary judgment under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether deed of release extended to publications not referred to in it – distinctions between legal and equitable principles of construction applicable to wide or general words of release in deed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 26.01

Cases cited:

Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575

Grant v John Grant and Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 112

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451

Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 240 CLR 45

Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2011) 42 WAR 59

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165

Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 356 ALR 178

Date of hearing: 31 October 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords         
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G O’L Reynolds SC with Mr D P Hume
Solicitor for the Applicant: Sanford Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A T S Dawson SC with Ms L Rich
Solicitor for the Respondent: Banki Haddock Fiora

ORDERS

NSD 675 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CLINTON SARINA

Applicant

AND:

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD ACN 003 357 720

Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, MARKOVIC AND BROMWICH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

31 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant be granted leave to appeal and the appeal be treated as being instituted instanter in the form of the draft notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Simon Maxwell sworn 1 May 2018, on condition that the applicant file and serve a notice of appeal in that form on or before 1 November 2018.

2.The orders of the Court made 17 April 2018 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that:

(a)The interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 12 October 2017 be dismissed.

(b)The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application.

3.The respondent pay 75% of the costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal and, if leave be granted, an appeal against the decision of the primary judge summarily to dismiss, pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the applicant’s,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Sarina v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 190
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Sarina v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Mr Sarina, sought to challenge the summary judgment granted to the defendant, Fairfax Media Publications, in a defamation case. Fairfax Media had argued that a deed of release signed by Mr Sarina precluded him from suing over certain publications. The primary judge found in favour of Fairfax Media, and Mr Sarina appealed both the summary judgment and the refusal of leave to appeal. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia considered the appeal and the application for leave to appeal. The primary legal issue was whether the deed of release signed by Mr Sarina extended to publications not explicitly referred to in the deed. Fairfax Media argued that the deed covered all publications related to the third article mentioned in the deed, while Mr Sarina contended that the deed only released claims related to the third article. The Full Court examined the deed's language and the principles of construction applicable to wide or general words of release in a deed. The Full Court held that the deed did not extend to the first and second articles, as they were not referred to in the deed and were not related to the third article. The Full Court found that the primary judge erred in accepting Fairfax Media's argument that the deed covered the first and second articles. The Full Court set aside the orders of the primary judge, dismissed Fairfax Media's interlocutory application, and ordered Fairfax Media to pay 75% of the costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be granted leave to appeal and the appeal be treated as being instituted instanter in the form of the draft notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Simon Maxwell sworn 1 May 2018, on condition that the applicant file and serve a notice of appeal in that form on or before 1 November 2018.

2. The orders of the Court made 17 April 2018 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that:

(a) The interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 12 October 2017 be dismissed.

(b) The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application.

3. The respondent pay 75% of the costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As is now apparent, the publication, by downloading, of the first and second articles complained of occurred more than six months after the entry into the deed. Fairfax Media, the respondent in these proceedings, is a different corporation to the corporate defendant, Fairfax Digital, in the District Court proceedings. But it was common ground before the primary judge and the Full Court that Fairfax Digital and Fairfax Media were related companies or bodies corporate. The summary judgment application On 10 October 2017, Fairfax Media filed an interlocutory application seeking summary judgment pursuant to s 31A(2) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. Fairfax Media contended that in cl 3.4(b) of the deed, Mr Sarina either had released it from the claim he made in this Court or, alternatively, was bound by his covenant not to sue in cl 3.4(b). Accordingly, it contended, cl 4 gave it a complete defence to Mr Sarina’s claim. Before the primary judge, counsel for Mr Sarina, who was experienced in the field, the late C.A. Evatt, conceded that the release in cl 3.4 of the deed could be enforced by Fairfax Media, notwithstanding that it was not a party to the deed. During the course of the interlocutory stages in the District Court proceedings, the defendants had sought particulars of Mr Sarina’s allegation that the publication of the third article (on 19 October 2010) had been actuated by express malice so as to defeat a number of pleas in the defence. When he answered the request for particulars, Mr Sarina relied on, among other things, the fact that when the defendants published the third article, they knew that what it stated as facts were rather mere allegations contained in a police fact sheet that had been handed up in court some days before that publication. The particulars asserted that the defendants had published the second article on 16 October 2010, in which they reported that the police fact sheet had been handed up in court the previous day and reported the allegations in it as allegations, not facts. The particulars asserted that in light of what they had published in the second article, the defendants knew that what they reported in the third article as facts should have been referred to as allegations. Thus, Mr Sarina’s particulars argued that by publishing as facts what the defendants had themselves reported only three days previously in the second article as allegations, they had been actuated by express malice in the publication of the third article.The primary judge’s reasons The primary judge compared, as Fairfax Media had invited him to do, various defamatory imputations relied on in both the District Court and Federal Court proceedings that Mr Sarina alleged had been conveyed by the first, second and third articles in order, so Fairfax Media contended, to demonstrate a degree of overlap between the subject matter of all three articles. His Honour set out a table that specified the pleaded imputations from each of the three articles and found: From this comparison, and from an independent review of each of the three publications, it is apparent that the 19 October 2010 publication was the most extensive of the three. The 16 October 2010 publication was a publication which contained less material than that published on 19 October 2010 and the 14 September 2009 publication was an even less extensive publication. The 19 October 2010 publication, moreover, contained many statements which were not canvassed or repeated in the other two publications and statements relied upon in the District Court proceeding as being defamatory.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Fairfax Media argued that the primary judge was correct to have accepted the argument it had put to him to rely on Grant 91 CLR 112 in support of the proposition that Mr Sarina’s knowledge and intentions, or lack thereof, in respect of the first and second articles at the time that he entered into the deed, would have been admissible and relevant evidence. It argued that his failure to give evidence that he was not aware of one or both of those or did not intend that the deed would release any claims he had in respect of those articles, justified the primary judge’s inference that he knew and intended that the release would extend to both the first and second articles. Fairfax Media contended that it would have made no sense to reasonable persons in the position of a publisher, such as the Fairfax group, to settle proceedings in respect of only the third article and leave itself exposed to subsequent proceedings being brought on the first or second articles based on subsequent publications by downloading from the group’s websites. It submitted that it must have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time of entry into the deed that everything would be the subject to the release that was the subject of, or somehow related to, the third article the subject of the District Court proceedings.Consideration Section 31A(2) is apposite to be applied where, as it provides, there is no reasonable prospect of an applicant succeeding in a claim. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ said in Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 356 ALR 178 at 183 [22]:in Spencer v Commonwealth [(2010) 241 CLR 118] this Court considered whether the test for summary judgment prescribed by s 31A of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), namely, that the court is satisfied that the other party has “no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or … part of [it]”, differs from the test espoused in Dey and General Steel. All members of the Court except Heydon J emphasised that the power to dismiss an action summarily should not be exercised lightly [at [24] per French CJ and Gummow J, [60] per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ] but Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ added that the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of s 31A would be defeated if its application were read as confined to cases of a kind falling within the test in Dey and General Steel [at [56], [60]]. In the present context, the deed provided for settlement of the District Court proceedings that it described in recital A as being “over the publication of” the third article and expressly provided that the Fairfax group would take down that article from its websites. The deed said nothing about any other article or publication by the defendants/releasees. The words of cl 3.4(a) described past liabilities or actions that, as at the date the deed was entered into, might have been available to Mr Sarina as being the subject of his release. As Newnes, Murphy JJA and Mazza J said in Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2011) 42 WAR 59 at 65 [14], at common law, a release is a discharge under seal of an existing obligation or right of action. They added that a release of a cause of action, once accrued, had to be by deed under seal, for which no consideration was required.