FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sarina v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 190
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Sarina v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 521 File number: NSD 675 of 2018 Judges: RARES, MARKOVIC AND BROMWICH JJ Date of judgment: 31 October 2018 Catchwords: DEFAMATION – application for leave to appeal and appeal from summary judgment under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether deed of release extended to publications not referred to in it – distinctions between legal and equitable principles of construction applicable to wide or general words of release in deed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 26.01
Cases cited: Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575
Grant v John Grant and Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 112
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451
Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 240 CLR 45
Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2011) 42 WAR 59
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118
Date of hearing: 31 October 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G O’L Reynolds SC with Mr D P Hume Solicitor for the Applicant: Sanford Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A T S Dawson SC with Ms L Rich Solicitor for the Respondent: Banki Haddock Fiora ORDERS
NSD 675 of 2018 BETWEEN: CLINTON SARINA
Applicant
AND: FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD ACN 003 357 720
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, MARKOVIC AND BROMWICH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
31 OCTOBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant be granted leave to appeal and the appeal be treated as being instituted instanter in the form of the draft notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Simon Maxwell sworn 1 May 2018, on condition that the applicant file and serve a notice of appeal in that form on or before 1 November 2018.
2.The orders of the Court made 17 April 2018 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that:
(a)The interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 12 October 2017 be dismissed.
(b)The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application.
3.The respondent pay 75% of the costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an application for leave to appeal and, if leave be granted, an appeal against the decision of the primary judge summarily to dismiss, pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the applicant’s,…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 190
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant be granted leave to appeal and the appeal be treated as being instituted instanter in the form of the draft notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Simon Maxwell sworn 1 May 2018, on condition that the applicant file and serve a notice of appeal in that form on or before 1 November 2018.
2. The orders of the Court made 17 April 2018 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that:
(a) The interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 12 October 2017 be dismissed.
(b) The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application.
3. The respondent pay 75% of the costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Fairfax Media argued that the primary judge was correct to have accepted the argument it had put to him to rely on Grant 91 CLR 112 in support of the proposition that Mr Sarina’s knowledge and intentions, or lack thereof, in respect of the first and second articles at the time that he entered into the deed, would have been admissible and relevant evidence. It argued that his failure to give evidence that he was not aware of one or both of those or did not intend that the deed would release any claims he had in respect of those articles, justified the primary judge’s inference that he knew and intended that the release would extend to both the first and second articles. Fairfax Media contended that it would have made no sense to reasonable persons in the position of a publisher, such as the Fairfax group, to settle proceedings in respect of only the third article and leave itself exposed to subsequent proceedings being brought on the first or second articles based on subsequent publications by downloading from the group’s websites. It submitted that it must have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time of entry into the deed that everything would be the subject to the release that was the subject of, or somehow related to, the third article the subject of the District Court proceedings.Consideration Section 31A(2) is apposite to be applied where, as it provides, there is no reasonable prospect of an applicant succeeding in a claim. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ said in Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 356 ALR 178 at 183 [22]:in Spencer v Commonwealth [(2010) 241 CLR 118] this Court considered whether the test for summary judgment prescribed by s 31A of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), namely, that the court is satisfied that the other party has “no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or … part of [it]”, differs from the test espoused in Dey and General Steel. All members of the Court except Heydon J emphasised that the power to dismiss an action summarily should not be exercised lightly [at [24] per French CJ and Gummow J, [60] per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ] but Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ added that the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of s 31A would be defeated if its application were read as confined to cases of a kind falling within the test in Dey and General Steel [at [56], [60]]. In the present context, the deed provided for settlement of the District Court proceedings that it described in recital A as being “over the publication of” the third article and expressly provided that the Fairfax group would take down that article from its websites. The deed said nothing about any other article or publication by the defendants/releasees. The words of cl 3.4(a) described past liabilities or actions that, as at the date the deed was entered into, might have been available to Mr Sarina as being the subject of his release. As Newnes, Murphy JJA and Mazza J said in Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2011) 42 WAR 59 at 65 [14], at common law, a release is a discharge under seal of an existing obligation or right of action. They added that a release of a cause of action, once accrued, had to be by deed under seal, for which no consideration was required.