Sargeant v Verity - [2009] NTSC 39

Sargeant v Verity [2009] NTSC 39

PARTIES: SARGEANT, CHRISTOPHER PETER
v
VERITY, BRETT JUSTIN
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE
NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF
SUMMARY JURISDICTION
EXERCISING TERRITORY
JURISDICTION
FILE NO: JA 21 of 2009
DELIVERED: 5 August 2009
HEARING DATES: 22 July 2009
JUDGMENT OF: OLSSON AJ
APPEAL FROM: COURT OF SUMMARY
JURISDICTION AT DARWIN
CATCHWORDS:
Sentence -- Appellant convicted on his plea of guilty of one count of offensive behaviour in or about a dwelling house -- Sentence of one-month imprisonment, suspended forthwith with operative period of 12 months -- whether learned magistrate erred in principle in approach to sentencing disposition or took irrelevant matters into account -- Whether offence inappropriately characterised -- Whether sentence manifestly excessive.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:

Appellant: S Barlow
Respondent: A Holland
Solicitors:

Appellant: North Australian Aboriginal Justice
Agency
Respondent: Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions
Judgment category classification: C

Judgment ID Number: Ols200905
Number of pages: 18
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
Sargeant v Verity [2009] NTSC 39
No. JA 21 of 2009 (20833131)
IN THE MATTER OF the Justices Act
AND IN THE MATTER OF an appeal
against the sentence of the Court of
Summary Jurisdiction at Darwin
BETWEEN:
SARGEANT, CHRISTOPHER PETER
Appellant

AND:
VERITY, BRETT JUSTIN
Respondent

CORAM: OLSSON AJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 5 August 2009)

Introduction

This is an appeal against a sentence imposed on the appellant on 8 April
2009 by a stipendiary magistrate constituting the Court of Summary
Jurisdiction at Darwin.
The appellant had pleaded guilty to one count of behaving offensively in or

about a dwelling house. Particulars of that charge were that the appellant
had entered Unit 14/10 Mardango Crescent, Batchelor and began yelling at
Allan Johnson and knocked him to the floor.

The learned magistrate imposed a sentence of imprisonment for one month,
to be suspended forthwith, with an operational period of 12 months.
The appeal was originally prosecuted on the ground that the sentence
imposed was manifestly excessive, it being asserted that the learned

magistrate gave excessive weight to the factor of deterrence and insufficient
weight to the concept of the Sentencing Act that a custodial sentence ought
to be a sentence of last resort.

On the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellant sought and obtained
leave to amend the grounds of appeal. As so amended those grounds assert
that:

(1) The learned magistrate erred in finding that the prosecutor should have
presented a victim impact statement or victim impact report to the
court;

(2) The learned magistrate erred by taking into account irrelevant matters;
(3) The learned magistrate erred by failing to properly consider the plea of
guilty;
(4) The learned magistrate gave insufficient weight to the principle of
imprisonment being a sentence of last resort;
(5) The sentence was manifestly excessive; and
(6) The learned magistrate erred by finding that the offence was a "violent
offence" or a "serious violence offence".
Narrative history

At approximately midnight on…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Sargeant v Verity

Details

AGLC: Sargeant v Verity [2009] NTSC 39
Case: [2009] NTSC 39
Decision Date: 05/08/2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, Sargeant v Verity was heard as an appeal against a sentence imposed by a stipendiary magistrate at Darwin. The appellant, Sargeant, had pleaded guilty to one count of behaving offensively in or about a dwelling house. The court was asked to determine whether the sentence imposed by the magistrate was appropriate and if there were any errors in the sentencing process.

The primary legal issues were whether the magistrate erred in his approach to sentencing, took irrelevant matters into account, or failed to properly consider the plea of guilty. Other concerns included whether the offence was inappropriately characterised and if the sentence was manifestly excessive. The appeal also questioned if the magistrate had correctly applied the principle that imprisonment should be a sentence of last resort.

The court found that while the magistrate did not explicitly mention the plea of guilty in his sentencing remarks, it was evident that he considered it. However, the sentence imposed was at the top end of the range, and there was no compelling reason to infer that an appropriate discount was given for the guilty plea. The court also noted that the magistrate's comments about the offence being a "violent offence" were inappropriate but did not affect the overall sentencing disposition. Despite these issues, the court concluded that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, given the inherent seriousness of the offence and the appellant's criminal history.

Ultimately, the appeal was allowed on the ground that the magistrate failed to adequately recognize the appellant's timely plea. The court re-sentenced the appellant to two weeks and two days imprisonment, fully suspended, with an operational period of 12 months, allowing for a discount for the guilty plea and time already served.

Orders