Sanrus Pty Ltd v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd

Sanrus Pty Ltd appealed against a decision of the trial judge who refused leave for Sanrus to adduce additional expert evidence at trial. Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd opposed the appeal. The dispute arose out of a joint venture between the parties to exploit a coal deposit. Sanrus, the appellant, sought to adduce additional expert evidence in the form of a report by Mr Chris Hartley, a mining engineer. Monto Coal, the respondent, opposed this application on the basis that it would cause unfair prejudice to them. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the trial judge erred in his assessment of the prejudice to the respondents if the appellant were permitted to adduce additional expert evidence and whether the Court of Appeal should re-exercise the discretion by allowing the appellants to tender the additional expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge’s evaluation of prejudice should be accorded appropriate deference, given his familiarity with the issues and the evidence. The court found that the trial judge’s findings as to the aspects of prejudice were findings which were open to him on the evidence. The court did not agree that the trial judge accorded the prejudice claimed by the respondents more weight than it deserved. The court concluded that the appellants had not demonstrated that the trial judge’s exercise of a discretionary judgment on a matter of practice and procedure was vitiated by an error of the kind described in House v The King. The court found that the appeal did not disclose any appealable error and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The court ordered that the appeal be allowed, the orders in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the orders made on 18 June 2019 be set aside, the appellants be permitted to adduce expert evidence in the form of the report of Mr Chris Hartley filed 10 June 2019, save for paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 and 4, and the respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the application in the trial division and their costs of the appeal.