FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Salubre v Owners – Strata Plan 10564
[2014] FCA 470
Citation: Salubre v Owners – Strata Plan 10654 [2014] FCA 470 Appeal from: Salubre v Jones (as trustee for the bankrupt estate of Pascual) [2014] FCCA 441 Parties: MARY ROSE SALUBRE and MYLA LONTOK PASCUAL v THE OWNERS - STRATA PLAN 10564 and MICHAEL GREGORY JONES AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MYLA LONTOK PASCUAL File number: NSD 318 of 2014 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 16 April 2014 Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 104, 178 Cases cited: Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Buckle (1998) 192 CLR 226 referred to
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 applied
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087 applied
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 applied
Salubre v Jones (as trustee for the bankrupt estate of Pascual) [2014] FCCA 441 referred to
Salubre v Jones [2013] FCCA 1706 referred toDate of hearing: 16 April 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 38 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr D Allen Solicitor for the Appellants Leigh Johnson Solicitors Solicitor for the First Respondent: Bannermans Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 318 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MARY ROSE SALUBRE
First AppellantMYLA LONTOK PASCUAL
Second AppellantAND: THE OWNERS - STRATA PLAN 10564
First RespondentMICHAEL GREGORY JONES AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MYLA LONTOK PASCUAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 APRIL 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The time for the applicants to seek leave to appeal be extended to 26 March 2014.
2.Leave to appeal be granted.
3.The appeal be allowed.
4.Orders 2 and 3 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 5 March 2014 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
“1. Mila Lomtok Pascual be joined as an applicant.
2.The applicants have leave to file a further amended application and further amended statement of claim in the form attached to the affidavit of Mary Rose Salubre sworn 14 December 2013 with any necessary updating amendments.
3.The applicants pay the respondents' costs of, and occasioned by, the amendments.
4.The costs of the application to amend be otherwise the parties' costs in the proceedings.”
5.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the application for extension of time and leave to appeal and of the appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 318 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MARY ROSE SALUBRE
First AppellantMYLA LONTOK PASCUAL
Second AppellantAND: THE OWNERS - STRATA PLAN 10564
First…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 470
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court had to decide included whether the claims made by the applicants were so disparate as to warrant denial of the application to join Pascual, the validity of the sequestration order, and whether the applicants had any interest in the property that would entitle them to challenge the actions of the Owners and the trustee. The court also had to consider whether the applicants had a justiciable case that warranted further proceedings, despite the procedural shortcomings in their initial application. The court's reasoning involved a detailed analysis of the principles governing the joinder of parties, the merits of the applicants' claims, and the appropriate procedural steps to ensure the case could proceed fairly and justly.
The court found that the claims, while complex, were not so disparate as to prevent the joinder of Pascual and that the application should have been allowed. The court also determined that the applicants had an arguable case that warranted further proceedings, despite the procedural errors. The court emphasised that the justice of the case required the substantive errors made by the trial judge to be corrected on appeal. The court concluded that the appeal should be allowed, the extension of time for seeking leave to appeal should be granted, and the relief sought in the interim application should be granted, including the joining of Pascual as an applicant and the allowance of further amended pleadings. The court set aside the previous orders made by the Federal Circuit Court and substituted them with orders that would facilitate the progression of the case to trial.
The final orders of the court included extending the time for the applicants to seek leave to appeal, granting leave to appeal, allowing the appeal, setting aside previous orders, and substituting new orders that would allow Pascual to be joined as an applicant, permit the filing of further amended pleadings, and allocate costs appropriately. The first respondent was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the application for extension of time and leave to appeal, as well as the costs of the appeal itself.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time for the applicants to seek leave to appeal be extended to 26 March 2014.
2. Leave to appeal be granted.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. Orders 2 and 3 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 5 March 2014 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
“1. Mila Lomtok Pascual be joined as an applicant.
2. The applicants have leave to file a further amended application and further amended statement of claim in the form attached to the affidavit of Mary Rose Salubre sworn 14 December 2013 with any necessary updating amendments.
3. The applicants pay the respondents' costs of, and occasioned by, the amendments.
4. The costs of the application to amend be otherwise the parties' costs in the proceedings.”
5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the application for extension of time and leave to appeal and of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It was unsatisfactory for the solicitors acting for the applicants, following their receipt of the Owners’ written submissions, not to have clarified the obvious problem with the form of the present application and those solicitors’ error in not having signed that application themselves. They should also have explained, as counsel for the applicants did in reply, that there was evidence that Ms Pascual was bringing the present application.Consideration The principles on which the Court proceeds in considering whether to grant an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal are well settled. In Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 and 519-520 [3]-[4], Brennan CJ and McHugh J (with whom Kirby J gave concurring reasons on this point: see at 540-541 [66(4)]) discussed the way in which the Court assesses whether to grant an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal. They approved what Lord Denning MR had said in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087 at 1091, namely:“We often like to know the outline of the case. If it appears to be a case which is strong on the merits and which ought to be heard, in fairness to the parties, we may think it is proper that the case should be allowed to proceed, and we extend the time accordingly. If it appears to be a flimsy case and weak on the merits, we may not extend the time. We never go into much detail on the merits, but we do like to know something about the case before deciding whether or not to extend the time.” Brennan CJ and McHugh J commented that his Lordship’s remarks were made in the context of an application for an extension of time to lodge an appeal. In that class of case, they said, the respondent to the application had a vested right to retain the judgment the subject of the appeal, adding that:“To grant the application for an extension of time is to put at risk a vested right of the respondent.” Here, the parties by consent treated the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal as a full argument on any appeal should the application for leave be granted. For the reasons that follow, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed. There were unsatisfactory features about the way in which the present application was filed, as I have mentioned. However, the justice of the case requires that what I consider to be substantive errors by the trial judge be corrected on appeal and the case the appellants now seek to propound be allowed to go to trial. Nothing that I say in these reasons amounts to a finding of fact that the allegations made by Ms Pascual and Ms Salubre in their pleading are true or correct. But, in order to determine whether their claim is justiciable and whether it ought to be allowed to go ahead, it is necessary to consider the pleadings on their face to determine if they evince an arguable case. His Honour’s order dismissing the proceedings against the Owners in their entirety was made because he found that the only proper respondent was the trustee. In my opinion, that was not a conclusion capable of being found on a summary application of the nature with which his Honour was dealing. It has no apparent foundation in principle.