Saha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Saha v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 520

MIGRATION – application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision not to grant a protection visa – whether Tribunal committed reviewable error in reaching findings of fact or in observation of procedures required of it or in interpretation or application of law – no reviewable error disclosed

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 424B, 441A & 476(1)

Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 referred to
Tharaisara v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 520 referred to
Pannasara v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1331 referred to
Nader v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 908 referred to
Santa Sabina College v Minister for Education (1985) 58 ALR 527 referred to
Carlos v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 301 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Wu Shang Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council [2001] HCA 12 applied

TITO KUMAR SAHA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

NO. N 58 OF 2001

JUDGE:         BEAUMONT J
DATE:           27 APRIL 2001
PLACE:         SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 58 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

TITO KUMAR SAHA
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 APRIL 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed, with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 58 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

TITO KUMAR SAHA
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE:

27 APRIL 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEAUMONT J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, (“the Tribunal”), under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to affirm the decision of the Minister to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa. The grounds for review are:

    1.That the Tribunal failed to make a finding on the material question of fact and this constitutes a reviewable error under s 476(1)(a) and (e) of the Act.

    2.That the Tribunal failed to observe the procedures required of it by ss 424A and 424B, and 441A of the Act, and that within the meaning of s 476(1)(e) of the Act, the Tribunal made errors of law, being an incorrect interpretation of the law and/or an incorrect application of the law to the facts.

  2. In order to understand the issues that now arise it will be necessary to refer to the Tribunal’s reasons.  The Tribunal first noted the applicant's claims and evidence as follows:

    (a)       The applicant's claims made to the Department

  3. The Tribunal noted that…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 520
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Saha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a citizen of Bangladesh, sought a review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal which had rejected his application for a protection visa. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his religious beliefs or political career. The applicant's primary contention on judicial review was that the Tribunal erred by not addressing a material question of fact concerning an incident in 1990 where he was allegedly attacked by Muslims and subsequently faced a false charge. The applicant argued that this omission constituted a failure to make a finding on a material question of fact, as per the statutory provisions.

The court examined the argument that the Tribunal's omission to address the specific incident of the false charge was an error. It considered whether the incident was material to the Tribunal's process of reasoning or if the Tribunal was required to deal with it given the manner in which the applicant's case was presented. The court found that the Tribunal's overall assessment of the applicant's credibility, influenced by the timing and manner in which the details of the incident were presented, justified the Tribunal's decision not to focus on this particular point. The court concluded that the Tribunal's approach was legitimate and that the incident was not material for the purposes of the statutory provisions.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the application for judicial review. The decision underscored the importance of the Tribunal's assessment of credibility and the sequence in which information is presented. The court held that the omission did not constitute a material error as it did not impact the overall credibility assessment conducted by the Tribunal. The applicant's application was dismissed with costs.

ORDERS:
1. The application be dismissed, with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed, with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns an applicant, Saha, who sought protection under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees due to his religious beliefs and political career. In 1990, Saha claimed to have been attacked by Muslims who were attacking a Hindu temple in Bangladesh. He alleged that he was injured during this incident, chased to the edge of a roof, had his throat scratched with a razor, was forced to jump from the roof, and sustained severe injuries. Saha also claimed that a false charge was subsequently filed against him by "Muslim fanatics." The applicant argued that these events constituted persecution, warranting refugee status in Australia. The Tribunal, however, found that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his religious beliefs or political career.

The matter came before the court as an application for judicial review by Saha against the decision of the Tribunal, which had rejected his application for refugee status. The Tribunal's decision was based on the assessment that Saha's claims lacked plausibility and credibility, particularly due to the late submission of certain details by his advisers. Saha's application for judicial review was grounded on the claim that the Tribunal failed to make a finding on a material question of fact, specifically whether the incident had led to a false charge being filed against him. This was argued to be an error under sections 430(1)(c) and 476(1)(a) of the relevant Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For those reasons the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not have a well founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the Convention for reasons of his religious beliefs or political career.CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW As mentioned, the applicant seeks to ground his application for judicial review on several bases. It will be convenient to deal with them in turn. The first ground relied upon is (as noted) a claim of failure to make a finding on a material question of fact. In support of this ground, in his careful written submission, Mr Lloyd of counsel has prepared a table which states first, the claims made by the applicant and secondly, the Tribunal's response, or in some cases non-response. The particular matter relied on for present purposes is as follows: In his written submission contained in his adviser's letter dated 27 July 2000, the applicant stated that in 1990 he was attacked by Muslims who were attacking a Hindu temple. He stated that he was attacked with hockey sticks, chased to the edge of a roof, had his throat scratched at with a razor, was forced to jump from the roof and was badly injured in the course of these activities. Following the incident a false charge was filed against him by "Muslim fanatics". On behalf of the applicant, it is said that the Tribunal accepted that the injury had occurred, but the Tribunal made no finding on the question whether the incident had led to a false charge being filed against him. Moreover, the argument runs, the Tribunal did not consider that the beatings/injuries he received were serious enough to constitute persecution. It is said, therefore, on behalf of the applicant, that although the Tribunal accepted that the incident occurred, it did not make any finding on the question of whether the applicant faced a false charge upon his return to Bangladesh, and that this failure constitutes an error of the kind described in Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287. It is said, in this connection, that the application for an order of review, for the sake of brevity, referred only to a breach of s430(1)(c) of the Act, but that this also constitutes a reviewable error under s 476(1)(a) of the Act (reference being made in this connection to the decision of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469). I have difficulty accepting the argument. In Singh's case, the majority of the Full Federal Court (at pars 55,56), explained that materiality in this context could arise in one of two ways. First, it could arise (obviously) if the matter were material to the Tribunal's process of reasoning. Secondly, materiality could arise (the majority of Full Court held), if the applicant's case was presented in such a way that it was necessary for the Tribunal to deal with a particular aspect. However, in the present case, when the Tribunal's reasons are read as a whole, I cannot accept that it was necessary for it to make a finding on the particular point raised. As noted, the allegation of the false charge incident was raised only in the letter written by the applicant's advisers, dated 27 July 2000. The Tribunal went to some length to emphasise that the lateness of the provision of the detail of this information reflected poorly on the credibility of the applicant's claims overall. In other words, the approach taken by the Tribunal to what was material was conditioned, properly I think, by the assessment or judgement that the Tribunal was not only entitled, but was bound, to make on the overall credibility of the case sought to be made on behalf of the applicant. As has been noted, the Tribunal found, for the reasons it gave, that overall the applicant’s case lacked plausibility and suffered from fundamental defects in terms of the exaggerated nature of the claims made. These are in truth issues not only of credit, but of credibility, which depend upon the Tribunal's assessment, guided as it was (and as it was entitled to be guided), by the sequence of events which objectively occurred, that is to say, the timing and manner in which the details of the information came forward to the Tribunal from the applicant’s advisers. In my opinion, given the Tribunal's legitimate approach on this aspect, I do not consider that the particular matter now pointed to was "material", for the purposes of s 430(1)(c) of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the argument that the Tribunal's failure to make a finding on the alleged false charge constituted a material error. The court examined the majority's explanation in Singh's case, which stated that materiality could arise either if the matter were material to the Tribunal's process of reasoning or if the applicant's case was presented in such a way that it was necessary for the Tribunal to deal with a particular aspect. In this case, the court found that the Tribunal's approach to what was material was conditioned by the overall assessment of the applicant's case, particularly the lateness and credibility of the information provided. The court concluded that the Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's credibility was legitimate and that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to make a finding on the alleged false charge. Therefore, the court held that the failure to make a finding on this particular point did not constitute a material error. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the necessity for the Tribunal to make a finding on a particular point depends on the overall assessment of the applicant's case and the credibility of the information provided.