FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sagoa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 418
File number: VID 141 of 2017 Judge: PAGONE J Date of judgment: 24 April 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time – significant delay without satisfactory explanation – no merits of claim – whether decision was unreasonable – whether there was no evidence – relevant and irrelevant considerations – error of law – procedural fairness Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 106
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91
Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1465
Tupkovic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 73
Date of hearing: 31 March 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 14 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Yuile Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 141 of 2017 BETWEEN: IMO KELLY SAGOA
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
PAGONE J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 APRIL 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application to extend time within which to make the application be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PAGONE J:
Mr Sagoa applied on 20 February 2017 for an extension of time pursuant to r 31.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to lodge an application which he ought to have made by 23 September 2015 to review a decision of the Minister which was made on 12 August 2015 to cancel Mr Sagoa’s Class AH Subclass 101 Child (Migrant) visa. The Minister cancelled Mr Sagoa’s visa on the basis that Mr Sagoa did not satisfy the character test under s 501(6)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Mr Sagoa had been notified on 19 August 2015 of the Minister’s decision to cancel the visa and any application by Mr Sagoa to review that decision was to have been made within 35 days. His application on 20 February 2017 to extend the time in which to seek to review the Minister’s decision was made some 16 months after the expiry of the time by which he was to have applied.
The Court has power to extend the time within which Mr Sagoa may make an application to have the Minister’s decision reviewed. Section 477A of the Act provides:
(1)An application to the Federal Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction under paragraph 476A(1)(b) or (c) in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
(2)The Federal Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 418
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the Minister's statement of reasons, which included references to the "privilege" as a principle, similar to the language critiqued in Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The court compared this to other cases such as Stretton and AZAFQ, where the language used by the Minister was deemed to be a general policy statement rather than an erroneous legal principle. The court found that the Minister's decision-making process was not distorted in the same way as in Tesic, as the references to the "privilege" were considered to be policy statements rather than legal principles. The court also highlighted that the Minister's decision was not unreasonable, as there was no evidence to support the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness or material errors in the decision-making process.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time to lodge the appeal, reinforcing the importance of adhering to procedural timelines in judicial review matters. The court's reasoning was grounded in the specific facts of the case and the proper application of legal principles regarding the Minister's decision-making process. The court concluded that the Minister's decision was lawful, and the applicant's appeal was without merit.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application to extend time within which to make the application be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ground 5 would seem to rely upon what was said by Collier J in Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1465. The further material filed by Mr Sagoa with his affidavit on 16 March 2017 also relied upon what her Honour had said in Tesic.In that case her Honour decided that references in a statement of reasons to a privilege as a “principle” had distorted the Minister’s decision making process. Language such as that considered by her Honour in Tesic was also used by the Minister in the statement of reasons cancelling the visa of Mr Sagoa. In Tesic Collier J said at [53]-[57]53.In his statement of reasons before me, the Minister referred to this “principle” of a “privilege” a number of times. Critically, I note his statement at paragraph 31 where he said in relation to the issue of protecting the Australian community:I also took into consideration that remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are law abiding. 54.This statement was complemented by paragraph 55 in the Conclusion to the statement of reasons where the Minister said: I am mindful of the principle that persons who commit serious crimes should expect to forfeit the privilege of remaining in Australia. 55.I do not accept that the statements of the Minister in respect of “privilege” in this case could properly be confined to rhetoric expounding the relevant considerations concerning Mr Tesic’s criminal history and the importance of protecting the Australian community. 56.The fact that the Minister “took into consideration” that remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens indicates that the decision making process was distorted. The “principle” coloured the Minister’s reasoning process. The Minister approached the decision from that perspective. As was explained by the Full Courts in both Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 and AZAFQ [2016] FCAFC 105, that perspective was not correct. The fact that the Minister subsequently repeated the statement concerning privilege in paragraph 55, elevating it to a “principle”, reinforces the point that the Minister attributed importance to this irrelevant consideration in reaching his decision.57The statement of reasons in this case may be contrasted with that of the Minister in Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11, where the Minister referred to the “privilege of being able to remain in Australia” in the conclusion, and in the course of elucidating the expectations of the Australian community. Similarly, in AZAFQ [2016] FCAFC 105 the Minister summarised his reasons for cancelling the appellant’s visa, including the generalised statement that non-citizens who committed serious, violent offences should “generally expect to forfeit the privilege of remaining in Australia”. Unlike in these cases, the Minister in the statement of reasons in Mr Tesic’s case referred to the “privilege” as a principle of law referable to the exercise of the power, rather than a general policy statement.Her Honour’s decision was distinguished in Tupkovic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 73 where Robertson J said at [33]-[36]:33On the facts of this case, however, I do not accept that the decision-making process was distorted, compare Tesic at [56], or that the Assistant Minister referred to the “privilege” as a principle of law, compare Tesic at [57]. In my opinion, the Assistant Minister was doing no more than taking into account a statement of policy. It follows that I do not accept that misunderstanding the “privilege” as a principle of law coloured the Assistant Minister’s reasoning process, compare Tesic at [57].34I reach this conclusion independently of the reference in cl 6.3 of Direction No 65 to the principle that “Being able to … remain in Australia is a privilege Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding…”35In my opinion, Tesic is to be distinguished. In Tesic it was said, at [57], that the statement of reasons was to be contrasted with that of the Minister in Stretton where the Minister referred to the “privilege” in the conclusion and in the course of elucidating the expectations of the Australian community. In Tesic, at [57], it was held that the Minister in the statement of reasons referred to the “privilege” as a principle of law referable to the exercise of the power, rather than a general policy statement. As I have said, in my opinion this did not occur in the present case. It is this which, at [56] in Tesic, was held to be an irrelevant consideration.36In so concluding, I have not made a bare comparison of the language used in one decision with the language of another. So to do, in my opinion, would be to mistake the application of a legal principle with the principle itself. It is therefore not determinative that a sentence in [31] and a sentence in [57] of the Assistant Minister’s statement of reasons is identical or almost identical to the sentences in the Minister’s reasons in Tesic reproduced at [53] and [54] of the judgment in that case.In Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 106 Perry J considered both of the decisions in Tesic and Tupkovic and in the case before her Honour concluded at [73]-[76] that the language used by the Minister had not elevated the “privilege” of being granted a visa to a legal principle but that the Minister had employed “inapt rhetoric” in referring to government policy.