SAAK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SAAK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 4)
[2004] FCA 104

MIGRATION – application seeking orders permanently restraining the applicant from being removed from Australia by Minister – proposed removal under s 198(6) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether condition of exercise of power under s 198(6) that removal could constitute refoulement contrary to Australia’s obligations under the Refugees Convention or the Torture Convention – meaning of ‘finally determined’ under s 198(6) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether application for protection visa finally determined – whether ‘application’ to Minister under s 417 of Act means application for protection visa not finally determined – whether Minister’s discretion under s 417 is a form of review under Pt 7 of the Act.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 36, 198, 412, 417

Mokhtaryan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2001) 110 FCR 416; [2001] FCA 1057 referred to
SAAK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 185; [2002] FCAFC 86 referred to
SAAK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 921 referred to
NATB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 292 applied
M38/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 199 ALR 290; [2003] FCAFC 131 applied
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 referred to
VFAY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 14 distinguished
Colpitts v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 9 FCR 52 referred to

SAAK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 624 of 2003

MANSFIELD J
25 FEBRUARY 2004
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 624 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

SAAK
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 FEBRUARY 2004

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed. 

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 624 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

SAAK
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

25 FEBRUARY 2004

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) seeks orders permanently restraining the respondent from removing the applicant from Australia and returning him to Iran, he being a national of Iran, on the basis that the respondent is neither required nor authorised by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) to do so. The application is made after the applicant had applied for a protection visa under the Act on 10 July 2000. His application was refused by a delegate of the respondent on 14 September 2000, and on review by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) on 11 December 2000.

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SAAK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 4) involved an applicant seeking to amend their application for judicial review in relation to immigration matters. The respondent opposed the application due to its belatedness, but the court indicated it would consider the motion for summary judgment in light of the proposed amendment. The legal issues centred around whether the proposed amendment would provide the applicant with an arguable case, thereby preventing the motion for summary dismissal of the action from succeeding.

The court considered the principal argument of the applicant, which was based on the proposed amendment. The applicant argued that their application under section 417 of the Act had not been resolved, and this meant that the condition to the availability of the power to remove the applicant from Australia under section 198(6) of the Act did not exist. The applicant relied on the decision in VFAY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 14, which the court found did not directly apply to the present circumstances.

The court concluded that the proposed amendment would not provide the applicant with an arguable case and that it would be pointless to allow it as it would then be struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Therefore, the application was dismissed.

ORDERS:
1. The application is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

The respondent opposed the application due to its belatedness, but I indicated that I would consider the motion for summary judgment in light of the proposed amendment. If I considered that the proposed amendment, if allowed, would provide the applicant with an arguable case so that the motion for summary dismissal of the action would fail, I would be disposed to allow the amendment. If, on the other hand, I did not consider that the proposed amendment would give rise to any arguable case on the part of the applicant, I would not allow the amendment. It would be pointless to do so as it would then be struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action under O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules.CONSIDERATION OF CONTENTIONS The principal argument of counsel for the applicant is based upon the proposed amendment. It asserts (and I am unsure for the purposes of addressing the respondent’s motion, correctly) that the applicant made an application to the respondent under s 417 of the Act in about August 2003 which has not been resolved. It is then contended on behalf of the applicant that the existence of that application means that the condition to the availability of the power to remove the applicant from Australia under s 198(6) as specified in s 198(6)(c)(i) does not exist. Hence, the argument runs, the obligation which s 198(6) imposes does not arise and, in addition, it could not be said that an officer of the respondent would have the power to cause the removal of the applicant from Australia under s 198(6) of the Act. The argument is based upon the proposition that, by reason of the ‘application’ under s 417 of the Act, the grant of the visa has not been refused, and the application for the visa has not been finally determined. In support of the contention, counsel for the applicant relied upon the decision of Ryan J in VFAY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 14 (VFAY). I do not think that decision directly applies to the present circumstances. It concerned a decision of a delegate of the respondent made on 25 September 2003 to refuse the grant of a bridging visa. The respondent was directed to re-consider the application for a bridging visa. The applicant had unsuccessfully applied for a protection visa in Australia. The decision was affirmed by the Tribunal on 13 August 2003. The Full Court of this Court had set aside an earlier decision of the Federal Magistrates Court, and restored the decision of the Tribunal. The applicant had filed an application for special leave to appeal from that decision in the High Court on 3 September 2003. It had not been determined. In the meantime he had applied from time to time for a bridging visa under the Act whilst judicial review of the decision concerning the protection visa application was ongoing. The relevant application was one made on 17 December 2002 which had been rejected from 25 September 2003. One criterion for eligibility for a bridging visa was that described in sub-regulation 2.20(7)(b)(ii)(B) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), namely:‘A non-citizen applied for judicial review of a decision to refuse a Protection (Class XA) visa.’The delegate had taken the view that, upon the decision of the Full Court of 13 August 2003, there was no outstanding application for judicial review of the decision, notwithstanding the application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. Once, and if, the High Court granted special leave to appeal to the applicant, then the delegate’s view was that the sub-regulation would again be activated. Ryan J concluded that, by virtue of having lodged an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Full Court of this Court, the applicant had ‘applied for judicial review’ for the purposes of sub-regulation 2.20(7)(b)(ii)(B).