S, CM v M, Ss - [2019] SASCFC 20

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
S, CM v M, SS & ORS
[2019] SASCFC 20
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Stanley, The Honourable Justice Bampton and The Honourable Justice Parker)
4 March 2019
SUCCESSION - FAMILY PROVISION - ELIGIBLE APPLICANTS - SPOUSE OR PARTNER
Appellant appeals a Master’s dismissal of her application seeking a declaration as to domestic partnership pursuant to s 11B(2) of the Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) (“the FRA”) — where appellant not entitled to make a claim under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) for maintenance out of the testator’s estate unless she was the domestic partner of the testator as at the time of his death — where Master did not accept evidence of appellant or her father —whether Master erred in finding appellant was not in a close personal relationship with testator for the purposes of s 11B(2)(b)(i) of the FRA.
Held, per Bampton J (Stanley and Parker JJ agreeing):
1. The Master’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence and her father’s evidence was clearly open to her.
2. There was no evidence upon which the Master could make the findings sought and be satisfied that the appellant and the testator were in a close personal relationship for the purposes of s 11B(2)(i) of the FRA.
3. Appeal dismissed.
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) s 4, s 6(ba); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 11A, s 11B; Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 (SA); Firearms Act 2015 (SA); Firearms Regulations 2017 (SA); Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 136, referred to.
Piras v Egan [2008] NSWCA 59; Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201; Taddeo v Taddeo (2010) 269 LSJS 309; Hayes v Marquis [2008] NSWCA 10; Bezjak v Wyatt [2018] NSWSC 199; Burgess v Moss (2010) 43 Fam LR 260; Re Pamplin; Irwin v Pamplin [2017] NSWSC 1477; Vaughan v Hoskovich [2010] NSWSC 706; House v The King (1935) 55 CLR 499; Golosky v Golosky [1993] NSWCA 111; Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, applied.
KQ v HAE [2007] 2 Qd R 32; Sadiq v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 716; Amprimo v Wynn [2015] NSWCA 286; Daniel v Van Zwol (2015) 294 LSJS 305; Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513, considered.

S, CM v M, SS & ORS
[2019] SASCFC 20
Full Court: Stanley, Bampton and Parker JJ

STANLEY J: I would dismiss the appeal. I agree with the reasons of Bampton J.
BAMPTON J: C and G went on their first date on 8 January 2014. They spent the following 18 months in each other’s company until G’s death on 23 July 2015. They attended marriage preparation counselling and had planned to marry at their parish church. G, who suffered oesophageal cancer, died aged 63 and did not make any provision for C in his will dated 30 January 2011.
As C is not entitled to make a claim under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) (“the IFPA”) for maintenance out of G’s estate unless she was G’s domestic partner as at the time of his death,[1] she sought a declaration pursuant to s 11B of the Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) (“the FRA”) (“C’s application”) that as at 23 July 2015 she and G were domestic partners.
[1] Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1975 (SA) s 6(ba).
Following a four-day trial, a Master of this Court dismissed C’s application. C now appeals that decision
G’s will
By his will, G appointed the Public Trustee as executor and left his estate in equal shares to The Gideons International in Australia, the Port Adelaide Magpies Football Club Incorporated, the Port Adelaide Football Club Incorporated and Christian Blind Mission International. Probate of the will was granted to the Public Trustee on 28 October 2015.
The commencement of the IFPA proceedings and C’s application
G was married to J for approximately 17 years, from 1981 to 1998. During their marriage G and J adopted three children: S, L, and M. G did not make any provision in his will for S, L, or M, who are now adults. S and J (as litigation guardian for M, who has significant disabilities) commenced these proceedings on 1 March 2016 pursuant to the IFPA seeking provision out of G’s estate. L is not a claimant and her whereabouts are not known.
On 26 April 2016, C sought to be joined as a plaintiff to these proceedings. On 7 September 2016, a Master made consent orders amending the name of the second plaintiff to M and removing J as his litigation guardian. The Master also ordered that C be joined as third plaintiff to the proceedings and as a claimant pursuant to s 11B of the FRA.
As S and M do not accept that C was their father’s domestic partner, the Master listed C’s application for trial as a preliminary point.
C gave evidence at trial and called her father, F, and her parish priest, Fr H. The respondents called G’s brother, and the Port Adelaide Football Club bequest officer, Mr R.
The Master rejected C’s and F’s evidence and found there was insufficient evidence to conclude that C and G’s relationship “had the hallmarks of a couple committed to each other on an enduring basis, such that it could be characterised as one where they were living together in a close personal relationship” as required by s 11B(2)(b)(i) of the FRA. The Master went on the state that even if she had found that C and G were living together in a close personal relationship, she was not satisfied in accordance with s 11B(2)(b)(ii) of the FRA that the interests of justice require that a declaration of domestic partnership be made.
On appeal, C argued that the Master erred:
1in not being satisfied on the balance of probabilities that she and G were living in a close personal relationship for the purposes of s 11B(2)(b)(i) of the FRA where under s 11 “a close personal relationship” means the relationship between two adult persons “who live together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis; and
2in concluding that she was not satisfied that she and G were, on the date of G’s death, living together in a close personal relationship, she was not persuaded that the interests of justice require that a declaration of domestic partnership be made for the purposes of s 11B(2)(b)(ii) of the FRA.
C contended the Master should have been satisfied of both these matters and made the mandatory declaration pursuant to s 11B(2) that she was G’s domestic partner as at the date of G’s death.
S and M are the respondents to this appeal.
Having read the transcript of the trial before the Master, I am of the opinion that the Master’s rejection of C and F’s evidence was clearly open to her. C’s evidence is unsatisfactory and on certain topics completely unbelievable. Likewise, F’s evidence. The state of the evidence is such that on my assessment the Court could not be satisfied that C and G were living in a close personal relationship as at the date of G’s death. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.
The legislation
Before I discuss the evidence heard by the Master and the parties’ submissions, I set out the relevant sections of the IFPA and the FRA.
The IFPA
Section 6(ba) of the IFPA provides that the domestic partner of a deceased person is entitled to claim under the IFPA. Section 4 of the IFPA defines “domestic partner” in relation to a deceased person as “a person declared under the Family Relationships Act 1975 to have been the domestic partner of the deceased as at the date of his or her death, or at some earlier date”.
The FRA
Section 11A of the FRA provides:
11A—Domestic partners
A person is, on a certain date, the domestic partner of another if—
(a)the person is, on that date, in a registered relationship with the other; or
(b)the person is, on that date, living with the other in a close personal relationship and—
(i) the person—
(A)has so lived with the other continuously for the period of 3 years immediately preceding that date; or
(B)has during the period of 4 years immediately preceding that date so lived with the other for periods aggregating not less than 3 years; or
(ii) a child, of whom the 2 persons are the parents, has been born (whether or not the child is still living at that date).
Section 11 defines a “close personal relationship” as the relationship between two adult persons (whether or not related by family and irrespective of their sex or gender identity) who live together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis (and does not include a married couple or a relationship where care is provided for fee or reward).
Section 11B(1) provides that a person whose rights or obligations depend on whether:
(a) the person and another person; or
(b) 2 other persons,
were, on a certain date, domestic partners 1 of the other may apply to the Court for a declaration as to domestic partners.
Section 11B(2) mandates that if on an application for a declaration the Court is satisfied that:
(a) the persons in relation to whom the declaration is sought were, on the date in question, domestic partners within the meaning of section 11A; or
(b) in any other case—
(i) the persons in relation to whom the declaration is sought were, on the date in question, living together in a close personal relationship; and
(ii) the interests of justice require that such a declaration be made,
the Court must declare that the persons were, on the date in question, domestic partners 1 of the other.
Section 11B(3) prescribes that when considering whether to make a declaration under s 11B, the Court must take into account all of the circumstances of the relationship between the persons in relation to whom the declaration is sought, including any one or more of the following matters as may be relevant in a particular case:
(a) the duration of the relationship;
(b) the nature and extent of common residence;
(c) the degree of financial dependence and interdependence, or arrangements for financial support;
(d) the ownership, use and acquisition of property;
(e) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
(f) any domestic partnership agreement made under the Domestic Partners Property Act 1996;
(fa) any Part VIIIAB financial agreement made under the Family Law Act 1975 of the Commonwealth;
(g) the care and support of children;
(h) the performance of household duties;
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
The evaluative assessment – living together in a close personal relationship
C had not lived with G continuously for three years immediately prior to his death, or for three years out of the preceding four years, and did not have a child with G. As such, she does not meet the time requirement prescribed in s 11A for her to be deemed a domestic partner of G and is not entitled to seek a declaration as to domestic partnership pursuant to s 11B(2)(a).
C contended that she satisfies s 11B(2)(b)(i) as she was, as at the date of G’s death, in a close personal relationship with him and it is in the interests of justice pursuant to s 11B(2)(b)(ii) that she be declared G’s domestic partner.
C therefore seeks a declaration pursuant to the two-stage process prescribed by s 11B(2)(b). The first stage requires a determination of whether C and G were living in a close personal relationship. If the Court is satisfied C and G were in a close personal relationship, the second stage requires the Court to decide whether the interests of justice require that the declaration be made.
The first stage is a jurisdictional question which is a question of fact involving the formation of an evaluative judgment.[2] The second stage involves the exercise of judicial discretion in determining whether the interests of justice require the making of the declaration.
[2] Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 211.
The Master was required by s 11B(3) to take into account all of the circumstances of the relationship between C and G including the list of matters set out in s 11B(3)(a) to (i) “as may be relevant” to the case. The evidence is to be considered as a whole and not under isolated discrete headings.[3]
[3] Hayes v Marquis [2008] NSWCA 10 at [73] per McColl JA citing Barnes v De Jesus [2001] NSWSC 19 at [26] per Windeyer J.
In considering whether to make a declaration the s 11B(3) matters “are reminders of matters that possibly might be relevant” in deciding whether C and G were in a close personal relationship, “but do not state its essence”.[4] In Piras v Egan,[5] Campbell JA (considering similar legislation which included a list of circumstances) held that “If two people do not ‘live together as a couple’, they do not satisfy the definition … regardless of what might be the situation concerning the various ‘circumstances’…”. It has been held that no particular finding in relation to the s 11B(3) matters is necessary in determining whether two persons have a close personal relationship[6] and none of the matters listed “is necessarily of decisive significance”.[7]
[4]    Piras v Egan [2008] NSWCA 59 at [146] per Campbell JA.
[5]    Piras v Egan [2008] NSWCA 59 at [146] per Campbell JA.
[6]    Re Pamplin; Irwin v Pamplin [2017] NSWSC 1477 at [30] per Lindsay J.
[7]    KQ v HAE [2007] 2 Qd R 32 at [16]; Sadiq v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 716 at [196] per Hallen J; Bezjak v Wyatt [2018] NSWSC 199 at [48] per Hallen J.
The s 11B(3) matters are not a substitute for the primary test set out in s 11B(2)(a).[8] The s 11B(3) matters “are not to be weighed against each other and given individual weightings of importance”, and should not overshadow the primary test.[9]
[8] Taddeo v Taddeo (2010) 269 LSJS 309 at [80] per Nicholson J.
[9] Bezjak v Wyatt [2018] NSWSC 199 at [49] per Hallen J.
The determination of the existence of whether a couple are or were living in a close personal relationship:[10]
[10] Bezjak v Wyatt [2018] NSWSC 199 at [80].
… is essentially impressionistic. Such a relationship only exists because of the factual circumstances of the parties, unlike marriage, where there is a legal status immediately created at the time of the public ceremony and registration. A value judgment is required to be formed. Accordingly, the Court is often required to assess multiple pieces of circumstantial evidence. If there are sufficient pieces of evidence, when viewed, with care and sensitivity, cumulatively, and with common sense and proper reasoning, which satisfy the finder of fact that the relationship is a de facto relationship, then the statutory test is met.
(Citation omitted)
The determination of whether C and G were in a close personal relationship living together as a couple on a genuine, domestic basis rests on an evaluative assessment of objective facts. The evaluative assessment involves:
1.regard being had to that fact that close personal relationships are diverse,[11] can exist in a wide variety of social settings,[12] and develop over time;[13]
[11] Burgess v Moss (2010) 43 Fam LR 260 at [11]; Bezjak v Wyatt [2018] NSWSC 199 at [66] per Hallen J.
[12] Re Pamplin; Irwin v Pamplin [2017] NSWSC 1477 at [28] per Lindsay J.
[13] Taddeo v Taddeo (2010) 269 LSJS 309 at [87]; Bezjak v Wyatt [2018] NSWSC 199 at [60] per Hallen J.
2.not being “confined by absolute, a’priori [sic] reasoning about how family relationships function”;[14]
[14] Re Pamplin; Irwin v Pamplin [2017] NSWSC 1477 at [30] per Lindsay J.
3.keeping in mind that a couple may “live together” without living exclusively in a single residence, that a couple may live together for a part of a week, and that a person can have more than one home.[15]
[15] Vaughan v Hoskovich [2010] NSWSC 706 at [53] per White J. See also Amprimo v Wynn [2015] NSWCA 286 at [75]–[76] per Meagher JA.
The overarching consideration is the nature of the relationship as a couple rather than how it manifests itself in quantities of joint time.[16]
[16] Bezjak v Wyatt [2018] NSWSC 199 at [54] per Hallen J citing Jonah v White (2011) 258 FLR 236 at [66] per Murphy J.
The question for the Master was did C and G display a relationship of “coupledom” such that their lives merged?[17]
[17] NSW Trustee and Guardian v McGrath [2013] NSWSC 1894 at [18] per Young AJ citing Jonah v White (2011) 258 FLR 236 at [60].
The approach on appeal
On appeal the Master’s evaluative judgment, that she could not be satisfied C and G were in a close personal relationship, is subject to the principles in House v The King concerning appellate review.[18] In Singer v Berghouse,[19] Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ agreed with the following comments of Kirby P in Golosky v Golosky:[20]
[18] House v The King (1935) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505.
[19] (1994) 181 CLR 201.
[20] Golosky v Golosky [1993] NSWCA 111.
Unless appellate courts show restraint in disturbing the evaluative determinations of primary decision-makers they will inevitably invite appeals to a different evaluation which, objectively speaking, maybe no better than the first. Second opinions in such cases would be bought at the cost of diminishing the finality of litigation in a troublesome area and, sometimes at least, with a burden of costs upon the estate which should not be encouraged.
Gummow and Hayne JJ approved this approach in Vigolo v Bostin.[21]
[21] Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191 at 220. See also Daniel v Van Zwol (2015) 294 LSJS 305 at [38]‑[39].
On appeal complaint is made about factual findings the Master made or did not make in determining the first stage. This Court may not interfere with the Master’s findings of fact unless those findings are demonstrated to be wrong by “incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony”, or they are “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”.[22]
[22] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118.
The evidence
In 1982 at the age of 16, C was involved in a motor vehicle accident which killed her mother. Her stepfather and brother were also in the vehicle. C and her brother sustained injuries which have left them with residual disabilities such that they each receive the disability support pension. In submissions, the Master was informed that C has partial frontal lobe brain damage, affecting her short-term memory and motor skills, such that she cannot manage a mobile telephone or a bank card. C is able to drive a car and is a recreational shooter holding a firearms licence. Clearly, she must suffer a permanent medical condition which meets the criteria for the disability support pension. No medical evidence was adduced detailing the disabilities C suffers.
C and her brother were adopted by their stepfather, F, following the death of their mother. C has a close relationship with F and refers to him as her father.
C and F are named the registered proprietors as the administrators of C’s mother’s estate on the Certificate of Title for the property located at Beaumont (“the Beaumont residence”).
C, F and C’s brother were living in the Beaumont residence at time of C’s first date with G in January 2014.
C gave evidence that she and G commenced “living together in a close personal relationship” very soon after their first date in January 2014 when she moved into G’s home at Glynde (“the Glynde residence”). C moved some of her clothes, “not all of my clothes”, some art, and “over time furniture, nothing major” to the Glynde residence.
C said that she left her set of keys to the Beaumont residence with her father and brother in January 2014. In cross-examination, she said she gave back the keys, “because they were no longer required and because my father and brother also live in the premises. They have a share in the property”. C said that she “had access to keys” to the Glynde residence, but did not have a set of her own.

C would return to the Beaumont residence to see her father and brother:
I’d either change clothes, pick up different items of clothing. I’d check that they hadn’t killed each other and the house was still standing. I’d pick up my bank book, do my banking, take my bank book back home.
I understand C’s reference to home in this context to be the Beaumont residence.
C and G spent their time together going to the movies, church, gardening, and shopping. C said that they shared a bed at the Glynde residence. She described how G, who suffered paroxysmal dystonic choreoathetosis, told her that when he was having a fit during the night, she was to ensure that his head was on a pillow, to take the covers off, to hold his hand and talk to him.
In January 2014 G said to C “Let’s get married” and she agreed. They planned to marry in “around October 2014 and honeymoon on the Ghan”. They discussed their plans with Fr H, their parish priest.
C was asked in examination-in-chief: “Did something happen to change your wedding plans?” C explained that G was diagnosed with oesophageal cancer in October 2014. G underwent radiotherapy and chemotherapy in November and December 2014. C said she was living at the Glynde residence and would take G to his medical appointments. G was prescribed a soft foods diet. C said they had to put their plans on hold as G was not well enough to do anything. C did not give any evidence about what plans had been made prior to G’s cancer diagnosis.
C said that during G’s admissions to hospital she stayed at the Beaumont residence. There is no evidence regarding the dates G was in hospital.
G was “told he was clear” from cancer in April 2015. At the suggestion of Fr H, C and G attended marriage preparation counselling in May 2015 and June 2015. C said they had further discussions with Fr H after the counselling. They met Fr H at the Glynde residence and discussed where the marriage “was going to be; what it was going to be”.
C detailed that the last discussion with Fr H about marriage occurred the day before G died when he was told that the cancer had returned and that he would receive palliative care. G told Fr H, “you have to prepare us for a wedding and a funeral”.
C and G did not have any formal engagement announcement or party. C said that the “closest that it came to a formality announcement would be 2014 Advertiser, 14 February, St Valentine’s Day thing in the paper. [G] had taken an advert out” proclaiming that he had “found his true love and all that”. C agreed in that no notice of intended marriage was completed during her relationship with G because no wedding date was set.
It was put to C in cross-examination that she and G did not discuss marriage until well into 2015, that she did not move into the Glynde residence as she described and that she stayed there from time to time but was not living there permanently. C said that she and G discussed marriage before February 2014 and that she moved into the Glynde residence and was living there permanently.
G gave C authority to operate his bank accounts
C gave evidence that G nominated her as a signatory to two of his bank accounts, “so that should he be in hospital again I would be able to pay the bills that he had”. Exhibit P8 is a copy of a Bank SA authority for third party. C’s address on this document, signed after April 2015, is the Beaumont residence.
In cross-examination, C said she gave the Beaumont address because she and G were not married. She asserted that her understanding was that one only changes one’s address when one got married and that she was not aware that she could do it otherwise. C then said the Beaumont address was her postal address and that she gave the bank that address because she was not married and it was her postal address.
It is to be noted that C and G’s signatures appear under the following words on the Bank SA authority: “I/we believe the above details to be true and correct. It is an offence to make a false and misleading statement”.
Centrelink
C confirmed in evidence that she received the disability support pension as a single person. G was also in receipt of the disability support pension prior to his death. She said that she took no steps to notify Centrelink that she was living with G as a couple. She said, “I wasn’t aware that I had to inform Centrelink and I regarded myself as still being single because we weren’t married”.
C did not think about whether she was single for Centrelink purposes before G’s death. C explained that after G’s death, she “went with [her] father to Centrelink to inform them that [G] had died and to take him off the roll” and to inform Centrelink “that we had been living together”.
C said that that then led to her disability support pension being suspended. C said she realised that she should have informed Centrelink that she and G were living together and that she was penalised for not bringing it to Centrelink’s attention while G was alive.
She received letters from Centrelink dated 31 August 2015 addressed to her at the Beaumont residence, one stating her disability support pension had been suspended pending enquires and the other enclosing a Form entitled “MOD P Partner details”. C explained that:
When you start living together with someone they give you a form, apparently, and I was supposed to fill in one side and the other person is supposed to fill in the other side. I got upset because I couldn’t do the job so I went back with dad to Centrelink and asked the gentleman behind the counter how I could do it because [G] was dead, so how could I do it. The gentleman said it was inappropriate I had been sent such a form and took it away and corrected my pension.
C said in cross-examination that the MOD P Partner details form was taken back to Centrelink and she was told that it should not have been sent to her because G was dead.
C was asked how she was penalised by Centrelink. She said that she believed her pension was suspended but she had no idea for how long and whether there was a reduction in her benefit. She gave evidence that she was told she would incur a fine but did not know whether she was fined.
C said she believed that she received correspondence from Centrelink each time there was a change in her benefit. She was asked about the second page of Exhibit R26 which bears the standard Centrelink wording:
Tell us if you marry, are in or commence a registered or de facto relationship either opposite or same sex, reconcile with a former partner or start living with someone as their partner, separate from your partner, or your partner dies, have a baby or have a child come into your care, start to share the care of the child, change the amount of time the child been living with you, or if your immediate family member dies.
C said that she had never read those words and maintained that she did not know she had to inform Centrelink if she commenced a de facto relationship. It was put to C that she knew very well that there was going to be a change in the rate of her pension if she engaged in a relationship. C said she was not aware.
She was then asked why she informed Centrelink of the relationship after G died. Her response was that her father told her to inform Centrelink because G had been receiving a pension and it had to be stopped. She said it was her responsibility because she and G were living together. C said her father, “insisted that we inform them that [G] had died, and promptly. I just couldn’t face going in there, into Centrelink to inform them that he’d died, [G] had died”.
C said that she then received the letter addressed to her at the Beaumont address dated 7 September 2015 from Centrelink stating, “Your Disability Support Pension will start again from 25 August 2015”. It was put to C that her pension was suspended on 31 August but was then retrospectively reinstated from 25 August 2015. C was asked how she was penalised. She said her pension was suspended and reinstated and backdated. It was put to C that she had not told Centrelink she was living with G and the evidence disclosed that the only action taken by Centrelink was a suspension of two weeks, then two weeks back-pay, and then an increase in payment. C conceded she had no other documentary evidence to prove she told Centrelink.
It was C’s father’s evidence that he thought C had “asked the question ‘I think there’s a death benefit’ because the Justice of the Peace that had arranged the funeral had suggested to [C] that she could ask for the death benefit to be paid to her because you know they were a couple”. The inference to be drawn from C’s and F’s evidence is that C attended Centrelink with her father to notify of G’s death and to inquire about any benefit (for example, the bereavement payment) she may have been entitled to upon G’s death.
In my view, it can be inferred that G did not notify Centrelink that he and C were living together between January 2014 and the date of his death. There is also no evidence of G telling anyone that he and C were living together.
C’s bank accounts and credit union accounts
C was cross examined about the bank statements she produced in answer to a Notice to Produce. All bank statements tendered into evidence record C’s address as the Beaumont address.
Exhibit R17 comprises copies of statements for C’s Big Sky Building Society Ltd account for 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 and 1 July 2015 to 31 March 2016.
No statements for the period 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 were produced prior to cross examination. In cross-examination, C said she had no idea why statements for this period were not produced. C agreed she did not tell Big Sky Building Society that she had changed her address to move in with G.
C said she has two People’s Choice Credit Union accounts. Exhibit R18 is a copy of People’s Choice Credit Union statements for the one account commencing 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2014. Again, statements for the period 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 were missing. When asked in cross-examination about this, C said she had given all statements to her lawyer and she confirmed she had not informed the People’s Choice Credit Union of her change of address.
Exhibit R19 is a bundle of copies of statements for C’s other People’s Choice Credit Union account starting at statement number 34 to number 39. Statements 40 to 51 for the period 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 were missing prior to cross examination.
C failed to produce statements for the three accounts for the year 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 prior to being cross examined. C said that, as far as she was aware, her lawyers had the documents and she had the originals at home. She also said that she was not aware that the respondents were, by the notice to produce, seeking specific statements.
When the missing statements were eventually produced to the Court, C was asked why they had not been produced earlier. C maintained that she thought that she had handed all statements to her lawyers.
The Bank SA safety deposit box
C gave evidence about a Bank SA safety deposit envelope containing a crucifix, crosses and chains opened by the Public Trustee. In cross-examination, she repeated that the envelope held a crucifix, crosses and chains. She said there was not anything else in the envelope. She was asked, “Wasn’t it the case that there was a note from [G] to you in the envelope”. She said she could not remember. She was the questioned about an affidavit she had sworn deposing that:
After [G] died I opened the secure envelope and found a note to me from [G] together with some heirloom jewellery he wished me to have. The jewellery is not of great value but is sentimentally very important to me and [G].
C was asked if she had the note. She said it should be in the envelope and that she did not have it. The evidence is not clear as to whether there was in fact a note. C resiled from her evidence about opening the secure envelope saying that the secure envelope was in the hands of the Public Trustee. She said she opened another envelope. When asked why she deposed to opening the secure envelope if it was not true, she said she has no idea why she swore false evidence.
C said in cross-examination that the note from G was “on the external envelope”. C accepted that when she swore the affidavit she was deposing to the existence of the note inside the envelope and it was put to her:
Q.Now you’re saying that’s not true.
A.I assume so. I don’t know.
Production of the note was called for and a birthday card with no envelope was produced. A copy of the front of an envelope with the words “to [C] from your [G]”, Exhibit R13, was then produced.
During further questioning about the note, C said she had no recollection of whether there was a note inside the envelope. C accepted that she had told the Court there was a note inside the envelope and then said that there was not. There was a further call for production and a document was produced which read “Happy birthday sweet [C] from your [G]”. It was put to C that this was not the note that was in the envelope. C answered, “I’m afraid I have no recollection and I can’t help you without being able to sight it”.
It was then put to C that it was unlikely that the envelope that had been put in a safety deposit box with a crucifix and two crosses would have the words “Happy birthday” written on it. C answered, “No, I’m not saying that at all, you’re suggesting that”. C was asked, “Well, it’s clearly not the note that was inside the envelope, is it”:
A.No, I don’t believe it is, although I would have to see the original to make sure
Q.Original of what.
A.The note.
C’s evidence about the Bank SA safety deposit box was unclear.
Christmas cards and condolences
C gave evidence about receiving Christmas cards addressed to her and G which, on her case, supported her case that she and G were in a close personal relationship. Six such cards were tendered into evidence.
Following G’s death, C received condolences from friends and family and referred specifically to a condolence card and letter from G’s cousin.
C said she that was recognised as G’s partner at his funeral.
C’s firearms licence
C gave evidence that she has a class H firearms licence and owns a number of guns. The guns, according to C’s evidence, were secured at the Beaumont residence “as pertaining under the Firearms Act … Handguns have to be stored in a particular manner and ammunition separate from guns” and “The guns are placed in the correct containers as prescribed under the Firearms Act for the licence I hold”. She explained the reason she did not move the guns to the Glynde residence was:
I’d have to have a safe or similar item at [G’s] place. I’d have to notify the Firearms Branch, and G wasn’t aware I had a firearms licence until approximately two months before his death when he asked me where I was going on Wednesday morning early because I had to get home to pick up dad and the firearms and go up to the club.
C was asked how she accessed the keys to the firearms and ammunition stored securely at the Beaumont residence. Her answer was:
I returned to Beaumont when necessary to fulfil my firearms licence requirements, I returned early on a Wednesday, pressed on the doorbell and was let in. Then I used the other keys and gained access to my firearms and my ammo and took my father with me up to the range and then did my required shoots.
Whilst it is not clear whether C went shooting every Wednesday, I infer from C’s evidence that she went shooting on Wednesday mornings. If, as she asserts, she was living with G for 18 months there would have a number of Wednesday mornings she left to go shooting. Yet it was only two months before G’s death that G found out that C had firearms, when she left early one Wednesday morning to go shooting and he asked where she was going.
C was asked if she told the Firearms Branch that she was no longer resident at Beaumont. C asserted the Firearms Branch were aware she was no longer resident at Beaumont because she had “informed them after [G] [sic] and when I asked the gentleman that works at firearms regarding the disclosure of my licence and he said that only the judge should be shown the licence”. She was then asked:
Q.With respect that’s not an answer to my question. My question was when did you tell the firearms branch that you were no longer resident at Beaumont.
A.I never did until that day.
Q.When was that day.
A.I can’t tell you. I can’t recall I’m afraid.
Q.Was it before or after [G] died.
A.It was after.
Q.So during the currency of your relationship with [G] you didn’t tell the firearms branch that you were no longer resident at Beaumont.
A.No, but my firearms were resident at Beaumont. It’s the address where they are kept.
Q.But you didn’t tell them that you weren’t living there.
A.As far as I’m aware, it was unnecessary, I could spend up to 18 months away from my firearms.
Q.How do you know that.
A.Because I checked because I was intending to go away on a holiday before I met [G].
Q.Where were you going.
A.Europe.
It was put to C in cross-examination that her evidence had displayed a detailed knowledge of the Firearms Act 2015 (SA). C said that she had a moderate knowledge of that Act. She agreed that she was aware of her obligations.
C said, however, that she was not aware that she had to inform the Registrar of Firearms that her address had changed within 14 days of her move.
I note that Schedule 1, Part 2, cl 11 of the Firearms Regulations 2017 (SA) states that firearms must be secured at the licence holder’s principal place of residence.
C’s evidence on this topic lacks credibility. I also query why she would have to tell Firearms Branch anything after G died when, on her evidence, she returned to live at the Beaumont residence.
On my assessment, C’s evidence demonstrates that she has an excellent working knowledge of her obligations under the Firearms Act.
Driver’s licence and the ATO
Section 136 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) requires that a licence holder notify the Registrar of Motor Vehicles within 14 days of a chance of place in which a person is normally resident. C did not notify the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of her change of address.
The evidence reveals that C was fully aware of her obligations to the Australian Tax Office:
A.Being in receipt of a disability support pension, it is non-taxable. I fall below the threshold for interest payment notifications, so I do a non-lodgement form for the taxation.
Q.So the interest you earn on your savings is less than the tax free threshold.
A.It is less. It is under.
Q.So, in consequence, you haven’t been required to lodge tax returns in any of those years.
A.No, I haven’t. I merely lodge the non-lodgement form every year.
C agreed that she did not notify any government or regulatory authority or financial institution of her change of address.
Expenditure during the relationship
C said that while she lived with G:
[G] had credit cards and I don’t like credit cards, so [G] paid for his car insurance, his car registration, his household rates and utility bills, and because I didn’t like the fact that he’d use credit cards to pay for grocery, I paid for the household groceries and if it was $155.70 for a bill, one of the utility bills, I would pay the $5.70 towards it.
C agreed that G had “quite substantial credit card debts” and that she was in a much better financial position than him. She said she offered to pay off his debt but he refused and he paid the bills associated with the Glynde residence because he said “they were his bills” and he was “the man of the house”.
The will and Port Adelaide Football Club bequests
C gave evidence that she was aware G had a will in his bedside table. G told her that his estate was to be divided between Port Adelaide and two Christian charities. Other than saying “That’s great” she did not discuss the will with G. She did not ask him to do something about the will in light of the fact that they were going to get married, because she did not do anything about her own will. She went on to say, “when you get married all wills are revoked anyway, aren’t they?” and that G had “said that when we married we would become each other’s heirs”.
G’s diary

Exhibit P7 is G’s diary in which he described C as his “loving and supportive partner” and has written, “15 Nov 2014 … She does endless jobs and running around for me, she’ll be surprised this afternoon when she comes around that I head her off at the pass”.
It was put to C that G referred to her “coming around” because she did not live at the Glynde residence. C responded that she was living there and that she could not explain why G used that expression but “it does sound like she’ll be coming round the mountain when she comes and I’ll head her off at the pass”.
The property at Andamooka
C gave evidence about a property at Andamooka bought by her mother and F. She said that she bought out her mother’s share after she died. C and F are recorded as the registered proprietors of the property. C could not say when she bought the property or how much she paid for it.
C said that she had never held a paid job. She said that she took over her mother’s share in an opal mining/dealing business. She and F operated the business but she “wasn’t a successful opal miner or dealer” earning “no income whatsoever”.
The Beaumont residence
C gave evidence that the Certificate of Title for the Beaumont residence should only record her father as administrator of her mother’s estate. C’s evidence about this was:
Q.So it appears no steps have been taken since your mother’s death for the property to otherwise be transferred or dealt with into the names of you, your brother and your adoptive father in his own right.
A.No.
Q.Why is that.
A.Because dad applied to have the sale of the property deferred because my brother was 11 years old when our mother received mortar wounds and died of an open head injury, and it was determined by the Education Department and his headmaster that because mum had died … the loss of the property, [C’s brother’s] home, would have been too great for him.
Q.How old is [C’s brother] now.
A.[C’s brother] is 45.
Q.And how old are you.
A.51.
Q.Why hasn’t something been done about it recently.
A.You’d have to ask my father.
Q.While you were living there it was a very convenient arrangement, wasn’t it.
A.Yes.
Q.Three of you living there while registered in the name of your father as administrator.
A.Yes.
Assessment of C’s evidence
C’s evidence suggested that she is a competent, independent woman, despite her disability, who is well aware of her obligations to government authorities. Her evidence revealed that she knew that wills are revoked upon marriage, that she was aware of her obligations under the Firearms Act and her obligation to file tax returns. As noted by the Master, she was evasive and obstructive when challenged in cross examination.
C’s evidence about the keys to Beaumont residence and the note in the safety deposit box envelope is unsatisfactory.
C’s evidence of her understanding about when she needed to notify Centrelink of a change in living circumstances is another example of her unsatisfactory evidence. Her evidence was to the effect that as she was not married she did not need to notify Centrelink or any other authority of her change of address. Yet she said she attended Centrelink to advise that G had died and that they had been living together. C’s evidence about going to Centrelink after G’s death is particularly unsatisfactory. Whilst C did not mention the “death benefit” in her evidence, I strongly suspect, bearing in mind F’s evidence, that she attended Centrelink to enquire about whether a “death benefit” was payable to her. Her evidence on the topic of Centrelink is simply not credible.
C’s evidence was to the effect that she went shooting on Wednesday mornings, yet G only found out that she had firearms when he asked where she was going one Wednesday morning about two months before he died. If they were living together as C asserted, I query why he did not ask where she was going early on Wednesday mornings before this time.
The Master was, on my assessment of C’s evidence, entitled to conclude that it could not be relied on to establish that they were living together in a close personal relationship.
F’s evidence
C’s father said that C sustained frontal lobe brain damage and left side paralysis in the car accident that killed her mother. F said he adopted C and her brother after their mother’s death.
F gave evidence about not knowing where C was when she first moved out with G in 2014. He said:
The only thing I could get was the speedo reading on the car to find out the distance so I assumed it was in a circle which would include Glynde but I had no idea where she was and that was quite a worry.
In cross-examination, F was asked whether he spoke to C about where she was going and where she had been. F said:
A.Yes.
Q.What did you say.
A.I said that, you know, I wanted to know where she was.
Q.What did she say.
A.She said it was, you know, [G] wanted it to be their little secret.
Q.Did she tell you that it was [G] that wanted it to be their little secret.
A.No, not at that point. That was about 23 January and I still didn’t know. I was sitting at the phone trying to find, you know, like a phone number, because [C] normally writes stuff down, I thought I’d be able to find at least a phone number that she’d been using regularly. I suppose I could have checked the phone after she’d phoned him but I only thought of that the other day, that maybe I could have picked up a phone number, the last digit, you know the last number dialled, something like that but -
Q.Because she was at Beaumont ringing [G] or ringing this man to the best of your knowledge.
A.You know she’d contact him, put it that way.
Q.So if I understand correctly, at some point in January she didn’t come home one night without necessarily telling you where she’d gone and then the next night she was away for the entirety of the night.
A.That’s right.
Q.Is that correct.
A.Yes.
Q.And then there was a period after that where she also went and stayed somewhere without telling you.
A.That’s right.
Q.And you were concerned, you were thinking maybe you could use the telephone to or you’d recently considered that you should have used the telephone.
A.I recently thought of that while I’ve been sitting out here, you know there was a possibility that I could have done that, but it’s all right in hindsight to remember these things but -
Q.And when she was at Beaumont.
A.Yes.
Q.You asked her where she’d been.
A.Yes, she had to come home to pay her gun licence.
Q.Sorry, she had to come home to -
A.Pay her gun licence and we’d been to the gun club at different times and she’d got the number of shoots that she needs to provide to the police each year up-to-date, you know, she has to fire a certain number of shots, matches, and then she’d get a chit from the club that she could take to the registration office and pay the bill and at that time I was still asking her couldn’t she tell me where she was and who she was with.
Q.And she wouldn’t tell you that.
A.She wouldn’t tell me. She promised [G] that she wouldn’t tell me. She’s true to her word. She doesn’t, you know, she doesn’t say if something is unless she really means it and when I remembered it was [G] that I’d met at Marden Shopping Centre I put it to her that it was [G] and then she was free to say yes, it’s [G] and then I could find out where [G] lived and everything was rosy to me because at least I had an address.
Q.During this time would she come back and stay at Beaumont at all.
A.Well, she’d come home because we - the cars were virtually all in my name and, you know, family cars, everybody would drive a car when you needed to, but one car is large, one car is small, and sometimes she’d have to come home and swap the car.
F gave evidence that C took very large carry bags of clothes to the Glynde residence and returned to the Beaumont property on occasions. She returned to get mail. She returned “as often as he could get her but that wasn’t very often. Twice a week, if we were lucky”.
F said that C left behind her keys to the Beaumont residence when she went to live with G.
F visited the Glynde residence “quite regularly” when invited by C and G. G only visited the Beaumont residence once.
F was asked in examination-in-chief whether C and G told him anything about the nature of their relationship. He said:
Well, they were planning to marry. [G] got a Valentine’s day letter in The Advertiser which we had to keep a copy of because it was an extra copy for [C] as well as their copy that they would receive, and from that point they, you know, he declared his position, she was his fiancée to, you know, people that he introduced her to and shortly after that at the church sale I sat down at a table having coffee with them and he said that they were planning to get married in December and they would honeymoon on The Ghan.
F said, “in my mind it was Easter so it was the Easter month of 2014” that he was first told of G’s intent to marry C.
In cross-examination, F said he became aware of C and G’s intention to marry in January 2014:
Q.How long after that before she said they were thinking about getting married.
A.As soon as it was no longer a secret, which was in the January.
Q.So still in the January.
A.Yes, still in the January.
Q.And did [G] say anything to you at this stage.
A.Yes, I was quite aware that he had fond feelings for her. He said to me at the February jumble mart where they met — I had gone there because, you know, [C] would be there and he told me then. He thought she was somebody very special. I said ‘You better believe it’, because I wouldn’t have him thinking anything different.
Q.Did he say then that they were getting married.
A.Yes — well, he led me to believe that that would be the case.
Q.How.
A.I don’t know. It was his manner, the way he spoke. I think by that time I’d heard that he was introducing [C] as his fiancée and that is usually a good sign that that’s his intentions.
Q.Who had you heard that from.
A.From [C].
Q.Not anyone else.
A.No.
Q.And just from the way he held himself you thought he was going to marry [C].
A.Yes. They were very close. They were inseparable, yeah.
Q.But he didn’t say anything to that effect, did he.
A.I really can’t remember to the point of definitely saying that that was the case but –
F gave evidence that C first discussed marriage with him March 2014. He then gave evidence that the discussion took place on the first Friday in February 2014.
F said after G’s death he and C reported the death to Centrelink:
A.Yes. We went down and reported his death within the, you know, fortnight that’s, you know, expected I think is the word.
Q.Which Centrelink office did you go to.
A.The Norwood Centrelink office.
Q.And you were there at the same time with [C], were you.
A.Yes, I sat at the table with [C] while she gave the chappie the instructions. He was on the computer, he typed it all through. I think he was rather shocked that she’d reported it as quickly, he said ‘People don’t normally do it’.
Q.Was there any discussion about [C’s] own position as a —
A.Well, she explained her position of who she was before she told him, the chappie, that [G] had died. She had all the paperwork, you know, to cancel his support pension.
Q.Do you remember what she told Centrelink about herself and [G].
A.That he was her partner, that they’d been living together and, you know, that they would need to stop the pension because he was dead. I think she asked the question about ‘I think there’s a death benefit’, the Justice of the Peace that had arranged the funeral had suggested to [C] that she could ask for the death benefit to be paid to her because you know they were a couple.
And then in cross-examination:
Q.In relation to Centrelink you gave some evidence earlier in relation to you going to Centrelink with her after [G’s] death.
A.That’s right.
Q.How many times did do that, do you now recall.
A.The first time we told them the situation and we told them that [G] was dead and they recorded it and because I mentioned that she may — she was told that she may get a death benefit payment, they told her that she would need to ring interstate because they don’t have operators down there any more, everything’s done on the phone but to do that you need a Centrelink number that [C] didn’t have with her at the time so we had to return another day with the proper paperwork and then it took about three-quarters of an hour to get through on the telephone because you have to sit at a desk with the telephone or do it on computer but because [C] doesn’t use computer I sat down with her and the conversation went to the point where they said that [C] had been living with [G] and that they would have to stop her pension because she should have notified them that she’d been living with him before that.
Q.Do you know what happened at the next meeting.
A.Well, I know that a letter was sent to her saying that they discontinued her payments until an assessment was made. I remember the letter coming.
Q.And do you remember what happened after that.
A.After that they sent another letter through to her that said that [G] and her had to fill out paperwork. [C] — I think she filled out her part of the paperwork but when it come to filling out [G’s] there was no way she could fill out paperwork for [G] so we took it straight to Centrelink that day and a chappie came out and said to us that they’d sent the wrong paperwork, that it was inappropriate for them to do that, that, you know, that was no way to treat her when her partner had died and that he would sort it out and he went away to his computer and sorted the whole matter out and told her that her, you know, that her pension would be reinstated.
Q.Did [C] say to him that she’d been living with [G] since January 2014.
A.Yes.
Q.On that occasion.
A.Yes, as far as I know, that was automatic, it goes without saying.
Q.So it was the second visit that she told Centrelink that she’d been living with [G] since January 2014.
A.No, she told the first man.
Q.She told the first man.
A.Yes, but then because she wanted to make that claim she was told that she would need to ring to make the claim and it was when she made the phone call to make the claim that they actually said ‘Well, that’s wrong, you can’t do that, you can’t be living with a person and not notify us and that we will you know take your pension away from you’ and that’s when the paperwork came through and that they would reassess the pension accordingly.
Q.They didn’t take her pension away from her did they.
A.Well they stopped payment.
Q.For how long.
A.I don’t know for how long because I can’t see in the bank book but you’ve got the copy of the letter haven’t you?
F asserted that a Centrelink officer took G’s pension card from C and destroyed it by cutting it. His unbelievable evidence on this topic was:
Q.You didn’t see him destroy it.
A.Well he took it over to a counter and actually did something with it. I don’t know how he destroyed it but I think he cut it.
Q.Did you see him cut it.
A.Well as far as I could see he cut it.
Q.So that’s just a surmise on your behalf that he cut it.
A.Well he was only about 10’ away from us when he did it.
Q.When he did what.
A.Took the card and destroyed it.
Q.So you saw him destroy the card, is that what you’re saying.
A.As far as I’m concerned that’s what he did with it.
He later gave the following evidence on the same topic:
Q.To go back to one of your earlier answers, you didn’t see anyone at Centrelink destroy [G’s] card, did you.
A.You can’t see what somebody does on a counter but I have seen so many times banks had cut the card that it was quite visible what he did, his action was that he destroyed the card.
Q.Again, I ask you, did you see him destroy the card.
A.I could see the actions of him destroying the card, I don’t know that he actually destroyed but I should think he would have.
Q.So, you have just surmised that he destroyed the card.
A.All right, if that is the way you like to talk, but I saw him destroy the card.
Q.Because you know how Centrelink operates, they always destroy the card, don’t they.
A.No, I have never seen them destroy a card before.
Q.You have never seen them destroy a card before.
A.No.
Q.But you are quite happy to come along and tell her Honour, well, that is what happened, the card was destroyed.
A.Well as far as I was concerned that is what he did, he took the card to the counter. They normally go to a counter where there is a supervisor and that is what I assumed he did, I am very sorry if it is not exactly what he did but I don’t think they leave cards lying around so people can pick them up and use them.
Assessment of F’s evidence
F’s evidence was confused, verbose and at time appeared somewhat rehearsed. His evidence about checking the speedometer to work out where C might have travelled to and his evidence about having recently thought he could have dialled the last number on his phone to find out who C was with is an example of his rambling evidence. His evidence about when G and C first discussed marriage with him was confusing. He gave evidence that such discussion first occurred variously in January, February, March and at Easter of 2014. He said he inferred that G wanted to marry C from the way he behaved, for example because he had heard G was introducing C as his fiancée “and that is usually a good sign that that’s his intentions”. In cross-examination, F said that he heard that G was introducing C as his fiancée from C herself only.
G’s evidence about Centrelink destroying G’s pension card beggars belief. In my view, the Master was correct in rejecting F’s evidence.
Fr H’s evidence
Fr H’s evidence was that during 2014 C and G were in a relationship. He spoke with C and G about their developing relationship. He also spoke with G one on one about marriage to C. By reference to his diary, Fr H said that his first meeting with C and G to discuss marriage was on 27 April 2015. Fr H was asked about whether he noted that C and G were living together:
Q.Did you make any observations or were you told anything by either [C] or [G] or both of them as to where they were then living, one or other of them.
A.[G] was clearly living in his home. [C] — my impression was that [C] was caring for him both in terms of medication because they talked about medication, she was taking out his washing because they talked about, if I remember rightly, having had a fight over the washing and the washing line and something else about that. And the conversation included their sleeping arrangements. As a pastor of a Christian church I don’t encourage sexual relationships outside marriage and so that was an uncomfortable conversation where the fact that they were sleeping in the same bed was made obvious.
Fr H agreed he had had a conversation with G the day before he died, where G told him that he would need to prepare for a wedding and a funeral.

The effect of Fr H’s evidence is that G was “clearly living” in the Glynde residence. His impression was that C was caring for G and that they made obvious that they were sleeping in the same bed. It cannot be inferred from Fr H’s evidence that it was his belief that C “was clearly living” in G’s house.
Having regard to the whole of the evidence, the most that can be inferred is that C stayed at the Glynde residence at times.
G’s brother’s evidence
G’s brother’s evidence was to the effect that he had very little, if any, relationship with G from 2007 until his death. He said he visited G in hospital in February 2015 and that G “did not mention [C] at all”.
Mr R’s evidence
Mr R gave evidence that in his capacity as bequest coordinator at the Port Adelaide Football Club he had a discussion with G in February 2014. He said that on that occasion:
We just talked to him, how he was going, was he enjoying life, and did he enjoy the Bequest Society, and he said yes, and then he then informed me that he had met somebody at a shopping centre or shop and that she’s a nice lady and that, and things were going very slowly and he was happy with that …
(Emphasis added)
Mr R said he visited G at the Glynde residence in “probably early 2015”. C was present “standing there, wiping some cups or saucers”. In cross‑examination, he said this occurred in 2014.
Mr R was asked if G had said anything about getting married. His response was that G had not spoken about marriage and, in a telephone conversation in early 2015, G explained that he and C were: “… just ‘Good friends, slowly, slowly’”.
In cross-examination, Mr R’s evidence was unclear as to whether he met C at the Glynde residence on two or three occasions. He also said he first met C in February 2014 when she was drying dishes. He was asked whether he asked G about C when he met C for the first time. He explained: “I didn’t ask him, he told me. He said ‘This is [C]’, and I said hi to her, met her, and he told me he had met her before and they had been going out for a while”.
The Master’s reasons
The Master stated in her reasons that she found that at times C’s evidence was less than satisfactory. She explained that when challenged in relation to topics addressed in examination-in-chief, C became evasive and obstructive. The Master said that this has led her to form the view that while there is no need pursuant to the FRA for corroboration of evidence, she would be reluctant to accept C’s evidence without independent corroboration.
The Master found that F’s evidence was affected by his tendency to infer matters from context and to reconstruct conversations. This led the Master to conclude that F’s evidence was not reliable, in the absence of corroboration.
The Master referred to Fr H’s evidence as largely uncontroversial and to the effect that during 2014 it was clear that the deceased and the third plaintiff were in a relationship.
The Master did not find the evidence called by the respondents to be of assistance in determining the matter.
The Master found that C and G had discussed marriage, and intended to get married at some point. She accepted the evidence of Fr H that he had conversations with both to this effect and that the attendance at pre‑marriage counselling supports this conclusion.
The Master considered the relevant factors set out in s 11B(3) of the FRA. Her Honour determined that:
[77]The evidence does not support any finding of financial dependence, interdependence of arrangements for financial support (s 11B(3)(c)) or the joint ownership, use and acquisition of property (s 11B(3)(d)).
[78]There has been no evidence as to the performance of household duties (s 11B(3)(h)), save that [G] and [C] enjoyed gardening together.
[79]As to s 11B(3)(a), that is, the duration of the relationship, it is clearly a short relationship, indeed only about half of that which is required for a finding of domestic partnership pursuant to s 11A.
[80]As to the nature and extent of common residence, I am not, despite the evidence of [C] and F, persuaded that [C] and [G] lived together as [C] described. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into account the following facts:
1      [C] never moved all of her belonging to the Glynde property, only “some of my clothes, not all of my clothes, some art and over time furniture, nothing major”.
2      [G] never gave her a set of keys to the Glynde property; she only ever had “access” to the deceased’s keys.
3      She left her bank books at the Beaumont property, and every time she needed to go to the bank, she returned to get them. This is particularly telling given that she does not use a debit card, a credit card, internet banking or telephone banking.
4      Throughout her evidence, she referred to the Beaumont property as “home” and the Glynde property as “[G’s] house”.
5      [C] advised no public authorities that she had moved her residence despite a legal obligation to do so.
6      She advised none of the institutions with which she banked that she had changed her address. Indeed, she gave evidence that in April 2015 she allowed a bank employee to record her address as the Beaumont property, without demur.
7      [G], in his journal entry of 15 November 2014, says in relation to [C] “this afternoon when she comes around…”. This is not the language of two people living together.
8      There were aspects of [C’s] evidence that were highly unsatisfactory, in particular in relation to her being penalised by Centrelink, the Bank SA safe deposit box, and the notice to produce. She left the impression that, whether deliberately or inadvertently, she was seeking to mislead the Court on these issues.
9      She called no corroborative witnesses except her father, whose evidence was also unsatisfactory.
(Footnotes omitted)
Other than an intention to marry, the Master found there was no evidence of a mutual commitment to a shared life. Her Honour noted, in particular, that G did not give C a set of keys to the Glynde property. C did not tell G of her interest in shooting, although her membership of a pistol club was clearly an important aspect of her life. The Master considered that these matters were indicative of a limited commitment to each other.
Her Honour found that the evidence as to the reputation and public aspects of the relationship was scant. The Master noted that, other than Fr H, no independent evidence was called to depose to the public nature of the relationship.
Accordingly, the Master was not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that C and G were living together in a close personal relationship, as required by s 11B(2)(b)(i).
Finally, the Master determined that if she were to find that C and G were, on the date of G’s death, living together in a close personal relationship, she was not persuaded that the interests of justice required that a declaration of domestic partnership be made.
The appeal
C’s arguments
C complained on appeal that the Master made no positive finding that she and G were not living together in a close personal relationship at the date of G’s death. It was submitted that the Master simply held that she did not have the required level of satisfaction on the balance of probabilities on the evidence that they were living together in a close personal relationship.
C submitted that the failure to find the relevant state of satisfaction on the evidence was based on errors in the evaluative process undertaken by the Master. These errors included not having regard to the totality of the evidence before the Court on the topics discussed by the Master in her reasons, and by drawing erroneous conclusions, and by conducting a piecemeal examination of the factors referred to in s 11B(3) rather than analysing the whole of the evidence.
C complained that the Master made limited reference to the quality of her relationship with G, noting only that the relationship was a short relationship and, indeed, only about half of that which is required for a finding of domestic partnership pursuant to s 11A. It was submitted that the inference to be drawn from the Master’s reasoning is that she viewed the duration of the relationship as a negative factor, tending to negate the existence of a close personal relationship as at the relevant date. It was argued that if the Master viewed this factor neutrally, then it is surprising that she did not state so expressly. C submitted that her relationship was prematurely brought to an end through G’s death.
On my reading of the judgment, the Master noted that the relationship was short. There is no suggestion in the reasons that the Master held the length of time of the relationship against C.
It was submitted that the fact that the relationship endured only from January 2014 to July 2015 is not a reason for the Court to fail to be satisfied that C and G were living together in a close personal relationship.
C contended that the Master failed to make any factual findings as to the nature and extent of her common residence with G at the Glynde residence as at the date of G’s death. She also contended that, to the extent that the Master made any finding, the point was cast in the negative, namely, that she was not persuaded that they lived together as C described. C submitted that the Master stated that she had taken into account matters she referred to as facts and failed to explain what significance or relevance she placed on each individual matter or fact in assessing the extent of the common residence of C and G. C contended that the Master failed to explain why the facts and matters referred to caused the lack of satisfaction that they lived together as at the date of G’s death. Further, it was submitted that the Master failed to evaluate the other evidence she heard dealing with this topic. C argued that the aspects of her evidence which the Master regarded as unsatisfactory did not go to topics related to the topic of living arrangements between her and G. She submitted that the Master’s criticisms of her evidence failed to take into account the effect of her residual disabilities from the 1982 motor vehicle accident, or that until the time she commenced a relationship with G she had lived a rather sheltered life and one which was different to many people.
The Master did not make any findings as to the nature and extent of common residence because she did not believe C or F. There was nothing in my review of the evidence that suggested C required some special allowance for her residual disabilities.
C argued that it was remarkable that the Master made no findings about the specific evidence she gave about living with G in his Glynde residence for about an 18-month period. For example, C argued that the Master made no findings rejecting the evidence, unchallenged in cross-examination, that she shared a bed with G or the specific evidence that G told her how to treat his symptoms of paroxysmal dystonic choreoathetosis. C complained that the Master did not even advert to this evidence when assessing the strength of the evidence as to the nature and extent of common residence. C asserted that the Master was plainly wrong when she said that there was no corroborative evidence called by C other than her father. C referred to her calling Fr H.
C contended that Fr H’s evidence concerning the living arrangements was important. It was asserted that his evidence was to the effect that she and G were living together at the Glynde residence and that they were in fact sleeping together in the same bed and in a sexual relationship. In my view, Fr H’s evidence cannot be taken this far. His evidence was that G was “clearly living” in his home and that C was caring for him and they shared G’s bed. The evidence does not allow, in my view, a conclusion to be drawn that C was living with G. The most that can be inferred is that C slept at the Glynde residence at times.
C complained that the Master failed to advert to the fact that the marriage counselling invoice recorded their address as the Glynde residence. It must be kept in mind that every other document tendered into evidence recording C’s address records the address of the Beaumont residence.
C also complained that the Master, in taking into account the “objectively erroneous” fact that no corroborative witnesses were called apart from her father, failed to say why that could be a matter of significance. C submitted that there is no requirement under the FRA for corroboration, either generally or in relation to particular aspects of the application.
C submitted that her father’s evidence corroborated her evidence that she commenced to live with G in January 2014. She submitted that some of that evidence was noted by the Master, but not evaluated when the Master considered the evidence about the nature and extent of common residence apparently on the basis that the Master considered F’s evidence was not reliable in the absence of corroboration.
C argued that the Master did not identify any reason why she could not accept F’s particular evidence on the topic of whether G and C were living together at the Glynde residence. The Master stated that the impression she had formed from F’s evidence was that he obtained the majority of his evidence about the relationship from C and tended to make assumptions based on observations. It was submitted that even if this was a fair criticism of the particular evidence of F on certain topics, it does not justify the rejection of his evidence on all matters. Further, C argued that the Master erred in failing to take into account that F’s evidence was corroborated by Fr H. It was submitted that there was no absence of corroboration of F’s evidence and no reason not to accept and act upon his evidence as to the common residence of C and G at the Glynde residence.
I have characterised above the evidence given by C and F and how, on my assessment of their evidence, it was well open to the Master to reject their evidence.
C contended that the Master failed to conduct a proper evaluation of Mr R’s evidence. She submitted that Mr R’s evidence was that, in about January 2014, G had mentioned to him that he had met C and that they were going to see each other. Mr R said that probably in early 2015 G told him that his will would still stand and that C has “got her own independent means”. It was submitted that this is significant because it tended to corroborate the depth of the relationship between G and C. It was submitted that Mr R’s evidence was also significant because he gave evidence of attending the Glynde residence to see G. C was in attendance on each occasion that he visited in 2014 and 2015. On the first occasion, C was drying dishes and wiping some utensils. Mr R was introduced to her and G said that they had been going out for a while. It was submitted that this is of significance because it tends to corroborate the evidence that they were living together in February 2014.
I disagree. G did not tell Mr R that he and C were living together, he said that they had been going out for a while. It was well open to the Master to find that Mr R’s evidence was not of assistance.
C submitted that the Master failed to advert to G’s perception of his relationship, for example, when, on 15 November 2014, he described her as his “loving and supportive partner”, that he had discussions with Fr H about them marrying, and his placement of the Valentine’s Day advert in February 2014 all corroborate C and F’s evidence as to when the relationship started and its depth. C complained that the Master did not advert to Fr H’s evidence on this topic or to the fact of the marriage preparation counselling which, it was submitted, showed a degree of mutual commitment to each other. This complaint overlooks the finding that C and G were in a relationship. It also overlooks the fact that there is no evidence G viewed C as his de facto or notified Centrelink that they were living together.
C contended that the fact that the marriage was delayed by two bouts of cancer is not a basis for concluding that there was not a mutual commitment. C complained that the Master placed undue emphasis on the fact that she did not inform G of the fact that she had a gun licence until about two months before his death.
In relation to the topic of keys, C submitted that the more probable inference to be drawn is that her having access to the keys reflected simply the arrangement that she was prepared to adopt of not retaining keys to either the Glynde or Beaumont residences. C argued that G making her a signatory to his Bank SA account demonstrates that the commitment between them extended to financial matters.
All of these complaints allege that the Master failed to consider serious matters.
In my opinion, each of these matters only go to the strength or otherwise to be given to primary findings made by the Master that C and G intended to get married. These complaints do not give rise to appealable error.
In relation to the performance of household duties, C complained about the Master’s finding that there was no evidence as to the performance of household duties, save that she and G enjoyed gardening together. C pointed out that she gave evidence that she provided all the necessary care for G when he became unwell and did most of the household chores. She purchased household groceries. C also referred to G’s description of her “doing endless jobs and running around for” him in the document dated 15 November 2014, Fr H’s observation that C was caring for G and performing washing, and Mr R’s evidence of C drying the dishes.
All of the evidence about the performance of household duties was considered by the Master. The Master accepted that C provided some care for G towards the end of his life
In relation to factors of financial dependence or interdependence, or arrangements for financial support, or the joint use and acquisition of properties, C pointed to F’s evidence that at a fete in March 2014 C and G bought pictures which he assisted in putting up on the walls of the Glynde residence, and the evidence of C that she lived in the Glynde residence with G.
C contended that there was significant uncontested evidence to the effect that she paid for household groceries, paid for bills when G was in hospital, and as to the joint purchase and arrangement of home decorations and gardening. She also referred to them jointly using items of property located at G’s house and the items of property brought to the Glynde residence. The issue is that whilst that evidence was uncontested, C and F’s evidence was found to be unreliable. I note that no evidence was given about exactly what items were brought to the Glynde residence by C. The only evidence about home decorations relates to some of C’s art and the jumble sale purchases.
As to the reputation and public aspects of the relationship, C took issue with the Master’s finding that the evidence in this regard was scant. C argued that the Master should have noted that this factor was of lesser significance given the fact that both C and G, as noted in the couple’s report from the marriage preparation counselling, tended to be reserved or introverted. I agree with the Master’s conclusion that the evidence about the public aspects of the relationship was scant.
The evidence that was available was considered by the Master to have little weight.
All of C’s complaints fail to identify how the Master erred in arriving at the conclusion that that she was not a reliable, credible witness.
The respondents’ submissions
The respondents argued that C sought on appeal to re-run her trial and that in doing so she faces three obstacles.
Firstly, the respondents submitted that C appears to complain that the Court should have made certain findings of fact based on her evidence and that of F. C and F were found to be unreliable witnesses, whose evidence could not be accepted without corroboration. It was submitted that the Master made findings of fact limited to the evidence that she did accept.

Secondly, the respondents submitted that C complained that the Master, having made the findings, wrongfully evaluated those facts or should have given them different emphasis or gave them the wrong weight. The respondents argued that the Master had to determine whether, as at the date of G’s death, C and G were living together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis. It was submitted that this was a value judgment, a decision “in respect of which there is room for reasonable difference of opinion, no particular opinion being uniquely right”.[23]
[23] Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 518-519.
It was submitted that there is no clear error and that complaints about “significance”, “evaluation”, and “weight” amount to no more than stating a disagreement with the importance, or lack thereof, given to various factors by the Master and as such do not give rise to appealable error.
Thirdly, it was submitted that C has still not identified why it is in the interests of justice that a declaration be made.
Analysis
C has not identified that any of the Master’s findings of fact are wrong by reference to “incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony” or that they are “glaring improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”.[24] As set out above, the reliability findings made by the Master and her rejection of C and F’s evidence were well open to her.
[24] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 128 (footnotes omitted).
At the risk of repeating myself, C’s evidence was unsatisfactory. Her answers regarding her firearms licence, the production of the bank statements, and her failure to notify institutions and authorities of her change of address were evasive and unconvincing. F’s evidence was confused and I, like the Master, have arrived at the view that he tended to infer matters and reconstruct events. It also appeared as though he had rehearsed certain aspects of his evidence, for example his evidence about when C and G commenced living together and their intention to marry. His evidence regarding the attendances on Centrelink verges on the farcical.
The Master had the opportunity to observe both C and F over several days during the trial. The Master’s reasons for finding C and her father unreliable are thorough and detailed.
The Master did consider Fr H’s evidence together with the fact that C and G had attended marriage counselling and determined that C and G were in a romantic relationship, that the relationship commenced in January 2014 and continued until G’s death in July 2015. The Master found that they spent significant time together. The Master also found that C made very little alteration to her life, and that she and G had discussed marriage and intended to get married at some point. These finding are supported by the evidence.
Her Honour’s finding that C did not tell G of her interest in shooting until two months before his death, that G did not give her a set of keys to his property, and that she did not move all of her belongings to the Glynde residence, left bank books at the Beaumont residence, did not advise any public authority or banking institution of her change of residence, and provided some care to G towards the end of his life, are all borne out by the evidence. Her Honour had regard to all of these matters and the factors identified in s 11B(3) of the FRA. Taking the whole of the evidence into account and addressing the factors in s 11B(3) the Master determined she was not satisfied that C and G were living together in a close personal relationship as at the date of G’s death.
The Master rejected C and F’s evidence as unreliable unless independently corroborated. The Master clearly directed herself that corroboration was no longer a legal requirement. There was simply no support for C’s evidence other than the matters Fr H referred to that enabled the Master to make findings in C’s favour. I stated earlier in these reasons that it can be inferred that G did not notify Centrelink that he was living with C. There is no evidence that he told anyone that C was living with him. The most that can be inferred from Fr H’s evidence is that in 2015 G “was clearly living” in the Glynde residence and that G and C “made obvious that they were sleeping in the same bed”. Mr R gave evidence that G had said in early 2014 that C was a “nice lady” and “things were going very slowly” and then in early 2015 that they were “good friends” and things were moving “slowly”. I suggest this is not the language of person who commenced living with his partner very soon after their first date, as C asserted, or the language of a person living with his partner.
Conclusion
Having analysed the whole of the evidence, it was well open to the Master to find C and F’s evidence not reliable or credible. The independent evidence that did support C’s evidence was limited and allowed the Master to make the findings she did. There was no evidence upon which the Master could make the findings sought by C and be satisfied that she and G were in a close personal relationship such that s 11B(2)(i) was met.
The evidence supports a finding that C did not move into the Glynde residence as she described. It also supports a finding that she and G were in a romantic relationship and intended to marry and that she stayed at G’s home at Glynde at times over the course of the 18-month relationship, but does not support a finding that she was living in a close personal relationship with him.
The ground of appeal regarding s 11B(2)(b)(i) is not made out.
Having determined that the finding that C and G were not living in a close personal relationship as at the date of G’s death was open to the Master, it is not necessary to consider the ground of appeal regarding s 11B(2)(b)(ii).
I would dismiss the appeal.
PARKER J: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons stated by Bampton J.