Ryan v The Queen - [1999] HCATrans 435

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S164 of 1998

B e t w e e n -
VINCENT GERARD RYAN
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

McHUGH J
KIRBY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON TUESDAY, 30 NOVEMBER 1999, AT 3.53 PM

MR P.A. JOHNSON, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Carroll & O’Dea)

MR A.M. BLACKMORE: If the Court please, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.D. ELLIS, for the respondent. (instructed by S.E. O’Connor, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (New South Wales))

McHUGH J: We might hear from you, Mr Blackmore. How can the trial judge say that he takes no account whatever of the character of the accused?

MR BLACKMORE: It is interesting that your Honour should go straight to the point. We were only just discussing that a minute ago. Our submission in respect to that is that whilst it could have been perhaps more carefully worded, that it is a question of his character that he is dealing with. Essentially, a man who commits offences over 20 years whilst he is a priest cannot come along and say, just because he has been doing other good deeds in that time, that he has good character. It does not mean that he takes it as a negative against him. He did not say he did that.

McHUGH J: I appreciate that, but that approach assumes that people are one dimensional characters, that they are either good or bad.

MR BLACKMORE: Yes, but, legally, character is a factor that can be taken into consideration positively for him.

KIRBY J: Reading Judge Nield’s remarks on sentence reminded me of nothing so much as the judge’s remarks to Oscar Wilde. I mean, why was it necessary for the judge to ‑ ‑ ‑

MR BLACKMORE: Some of the statements were probably unnecessary, it would be fair to say, but ‑ ‑ ‑

McHUGH J: It is an extreme statement to say of a priest who has served his congregation well, at least in other respects, to be said that he cannot see any good in him.

MR BLACKMORE: I appreciate that, your Honour, but I am trying to distinguish what he said from the way in which it could be dealt with by a court. Is there an error discernible in the statement? In our respectful submission, it would have to be one that you would infer because he does not, in fact, go the next step, for example, and derogate from the sentence by reason of his bad character. He does not add something to the sentence, I mean by that. He simply says he is not entitled to good character.

KIRBY J: No, but if he calls – he called eight witnesses, I think, and if they depose to the fact that he did good deeds, why do they…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ryan v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Ryan v The Queen [1999] HCATrans 435
Case: [1999] HCATrans 435
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by the applicant, Ryan, against his conviction for murder. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia, with Justices McHugh and Kirby comprising the bench. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence and its impact on the fairness of the trial.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that was obtained in circumstances that may have rendered it improperly obtained. This raised questions concerning the application of the exclusionary rule and the discretion of the trial judge to exclude evidence even if lawfully obtained, where its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The court was also required to consider whether the admission of this evidence, if improper, had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The High Court's reasoning focused on the principles governing the admission of evidence in criminal trials. Their Honours considered the balance between the need to admit relevant evidence and the imperative to ensure a fair trial. They analysed the potential for the impugned evidence to unfairly prejudice the jury against the applicant, weighing this against its relevance to the prosecution's case. The decision underscored the importance of the trial judge exercising their discretion judiciously to uphold the integrity of the trial process.

Orders