FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Russell v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 110
Appeal from: Russell v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 2102 File number: NSD 2403 of 2018 Judge: NICHOLAS, BROMWICH AND BURLEY JJ Date of judgment: 25 June 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Court of Australia – where the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a “no jurisdiction” decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the primary judge erred in finding the appellant failed to lodge her application for a merits review to the Tribunal in accordance with s 500(6B) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether, pursuant to s 14A Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth), an electronic communication is “capable of being retrieved” by the Tribunal “at an electronic address designated” by the Tribunal once it enters the Tribunal’s information system – appeal dismissed Legislation: Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 14A
Electronic Transactions Bill 2011 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 161(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 500(6b), 501G, 494B(2)
Migrations Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.11(1), (5)
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (New York, entered into force 1 March 2013)
Cases cited: Pomare v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 458; 167 FCR 494
Date of hearing: 28 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 28 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms S. Kaur-Bains with Ms F. J. McNeil Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G. Johnson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 2403 of 2018 BETWEEN: RAEWYN HELEN RUSSELL
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
NICHOLAS, BROMWICH AND BURLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The first respondent has leave to file a short written submission within 7 days in support of any application for costs.
3.In the event that no submission is filed pursuant to the leave granted in accordance with order 2, there will be no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
1. INTRODUCTION
The appellant, Ms Russell, is a citizen of New Zealand. She arrived in Australia at the age of one and has resided here for over 44 years. On 16 June 2017, a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs cancelled her visa on character grounds pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). At that time, Ms Russell was incarcerated at Dillwynia Correctional Centre in New South Wales following her conviction on 8 March 2017 for one count of “specially aggravated break and enter and commit a…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 110
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The first respondent has leave to file a short written submission within 7 days in support of any application for costs.
3. In the event that no submission is filed pursuant to the leave granted in accordance with order 2, there will be no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Russell submits that the primary judge erred in failing to draw two inferences from the material; first, that the non-delivery email was sent from the mail server on behalf of the Tribunal; and secondly, that in order to send the non-delivery email, the application email from Ms Russell had entered into the “information system” of the Tribunal, because it is apparent that certain aspects of her application email, including its size and its intended address, had been processed to some degree. Ms Russell submits that at that point the application email became “capable of being retrieved” within s 14A(1)(a) of the Electronic Transactions Act. Further, she submits that in circumstances where a direction was made for the purposes of reg 4.11(1)(e) of the Regulations specifying the means by which an application for review may be transmitted to the Tribunal, but without any indication of the limit of the file size that may be transmitted, the Tribunal did not have the power or authority to refuse to accept an application because the size of the application was too big. On this argument, the primary judge erred in holding that Ms Russell had not made an application in circumstances where the relevant file had been submitted in accordance with the terms of the direction.4.2 Consideration The present appeal turns on whether or not Ms Russell lodged her review application within the time limit specified in s 500(6B) of the Act. The difficulty for Ms Russell is that her argument is predicated on a truncated reading of the language of s 14A(1)(a). The question is not merely when the electronic communication becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee, but when it becomes capable of being retrieved at an electronic address designated by the addressee. In the present case two factual matters are undisputed. The first is that the relevant electronic address designated by the Tribunal is mrdivision@aat.gov.au, and the second is that although the application email was so addressed, it was never received there. This was because the pdf file accompanying the email was too large. The message provided by the non-delivery email states that the application email was “undeliverable”. Ms Russell contends that the fact of non-delivery is not fatal. She submits that having regard to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Electronic Transactions Bill 2011 (Cth) (which added s 14A to the Electronic Transactions Act), and to the terms of the Explanatory note to the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (New York, entered into force 1 March 2013), an electronic communication becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee when the electronic communication comes within the “information system” of the recipient organisation. In the present case, that was when the email was received by the mail server operated by Macquarie Telecom. Two propositions stand in the way of acceptance of that argument. The first, as we have noted, is the explicit unmet predicate of s 14A(1)(a) that the communication be received at the designated address. That arises from the word “retrieved...at an electronic address”, which indicates that it must actually have arrived at that address. Secondly, the subsection makes no reference to an “information system”. That is a term defined in s 5 of the Electronic Transactions Act as meaning “a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic communications”. Receipt of a message within an information system would no doubt extend the scope for receipt beyond the electronic address specified. However, Parliament chose not to use that term in s 14A(1)(a). By contrast, the defined term does appear, in a different context, in s 14(3). In such circumstances we would not conclude that s 14A(1)(a) extends the concept of receipt to receipt within an information system.