Rucinski v Monash University

Case [2012] FCA 362

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rucinski v Monash University [2012] FCA 362

Citation: Rucinski v Monash University [2012] FCA 362
Parties: JOHN RUCINSKI v MONASH UNIVERSITY
File number: VID 336 of 2010
Judge: NORTH J
Date of judgment: 29 February 2012
Date of hearing: 29 February 2012
Place: Melbourne
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C O'Grady
Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

VID 336 of 2010
BETWEEN:

JOHN RUCINSKI
Applicant
AND:

MONASH UNIVERSITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 FEBRUARY 2012

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent has leave to amend the Points of Defence in the terms of the attachment to the interlocutory application filed on 15 December 2011.

2.        The application is dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of 5 December 2011 fixed in the sum of $3500, in two instalments, the first instalment of $1750 by 1 May 2012, and the second instalment of $1750 by 1 June 2012.

Note:The entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

VID 336 of 2010
BETWEEN:

JOHN RUCINSKI
Applicant
AND:

MONASH UNIVERSITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE:

29 FEBRUARY 2012

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE APPLICATION FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 7 October 2011, the respondent, Monash University (Monash), filed an interlocutory application seeking an order under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act), and/or r 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, that summary judgment be given against the applicant, Mr John Rucinski. The grounds upon which Monash relied were that Mr Rucinski has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding (s 31A of the Act; r 26.01(1)(a)), no reasonable cause of action is disclosed (r 26.01(1)(c)), and/or the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court (r 26.01(1)(d)).

    BACKGROUND

  2. The proceeding was filed on 5 May 2010, and alleged that Monash had taken adverse action against Mr Rucinski.  On 26 July 2010, the Court ordered that the matter be referred to mediation before a registrar of the Court. The mediation commenced on 17 February 2011.  The mediation was attended by counsel for Monash together with Mr Andrew Picouleau, the Deputy Executive Director of Human Resources and the Director of Workplace Relations at Monash.  Mr Rucinski also attended and was represented by counsel and instructing solicitors from Harmers Workplace Lawyers.

  3. The matter was not resolved but the mediation was adjourned.  Following that session there were a number of telephone conferences in an attempt to advance the resolution of the matter.  Then, on 6 June 2011, a further mediation session was held and on this occasion the parties attended at the Court for that purpose.  As with the previous session, both parties were represented.  Mr…

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Rucinski v Monash University [2012] FCA 362
Case
[2012] FCA 362
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Rucinski v Monash University involved an interlocutory application by Monash University seeking summary judgment against Mr John Rucinski. The university argued that Mr Rucinski had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting his proceeding, no reasonable cause of action was disclosed, and the proceeding was an abuse of the court process. The proceeding in question was filed on 5 May 2010, alleging that Monash University had taken adverse action against Mr Rucinski. The matter was referred to mediation, which ultimately resulted in the execution of a deed of settlement and release on 7 June 2011. Under the terms of the deed, Monash University agreed to pay Mr Rucinski $60,000 as an employment termination payment, reimburse his legal costs, and provide other benefits. The deed also included a release by Mr Rucinski of all claims against Monash, except for those arising under workers' compensation or superannuation legislation.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether Mr Rucinski had the capacity to enter into the deed of settlement and release and if Monash University was aware of his incapacity. To overcome the effect of the deed, Mr Rucinski needed to establish that he lacked capacity to enter into the deed and that Monash University was aware or ought to have been aware of his incapacity at the time. The court considered the evidence presented, including the fact that Mr Rucinski attended the mediation with his own barrister and instructing solicitor, and that there were no indications of a power imbalance during the mediation process. The court also noted that Mr Rucinski actively considered the issues during the negotiation of the deed, as evidenced by a handwritten alteration to one of the clauses. The court found that Mr Rucinski understood and actively participated in the negotiation of the deed and that Monash University had no knowledge of his alleged lack of capacity.

The court dismissed the application for summary judgment, finding that Mr Rucinski had the capacity to enter into the deed of settlement and release and that Monash University was not aware of any incapacity. The court also ordered that Monash University have leave to amend the Points of Defence, and that Mr Rucinski pay Monash University's costs of the proceeding up to 5 December 2011 in the sum of $3500, to be paid in two instalments.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent has leave to amend the Points of Defence in the terms of the attachment to the interlocutory application filed on 15 December 2011.

2. The application is dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of 5 December 2011 fixed in the sum of $3500, in two instalments, the first instalment of $1750 by 1 May 2012, and the second instalment of $1750 by 1 June 2012.

Note: The entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 7 October 2011, the respondent, Monash University (Monash), filed an interlocutory application seeking an order under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act), and/or r 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, that summary judgment be given against the applicant, Mr John Rucinski. The grounds upon which Monash relied were that Mr Rucinski has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding (s 31A of the Act; r 26.01(1)(a)), no reasonable cause of action is disclosed (r 26.01(1)(c)), and/or the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court (r 26.01(1)(d)). BACKGROUND The proceeding was filed on 5 May 2010, and alleged that Monash had taken adverse action against Mr Rucinski. On 26 July 2010, the Court ordered that the matter be referred to mediation before a registrar of the Court. The mediation commenced on 17 February 2011. The mediation was attended by counsel for Monash together with Mr Andrew Picouleau, the Deputy Executive Director of Human Resources and the Director of Workplace Relations at Monash. Mr Rucinski also attended and was represented by counsel and instructing solicitors from Harmers Workplace Lawyers. The matter was not resolved but the mediation was adjourned. Following that session there were a number of telephone conferences in an attempt to advance the resolution of the matter. Then, on 6 June 2011, a further mediation session was held and on this occasion the parties attended at the Court for that purpose. As with the previous session, both parties were represented. Mr Rucinski attended with counsel and instructing solicitor and Mr Picouleau attended with counsel for Monash. THE SETTLEMENT Later that day a deed of settlement and release was executed by Mr Rucinski, on his own behalf, and Mr Picouleau on behalf of Monash. The deed provided that Monash would pay to Mr Rucinski, within 14 days, the sum of $60,000, as an employment termination payment, and a further amount of $35,000, as reimbursement of Mr Rucinski’s legal costs. The deed also provided that Monash would give Mr Rucinski a letter, signed by the Deputy Vice Chancellor of Research, acknowledging his contribution to the Maintenance Technology Institute (MTI) and appoint him as an honorary associate to Monash for two years, with the entitlements associated with that position. The deed also obliged Monash to include a statement in MTI publications and on the MTI website, acknowledging that Mr Rucinski was one of the founders of the institute and the inaugural director from 2000 to 2008. The deed provided that, within 14 days of Monash complying with these provisions, Mr Rucinski:…will seek orders by consent dismissing the proceeding in its entirety with no order as to costs. There were other terms of the deed, including releases by Mr Rucinski in favour of Monash and its employees, in their capacity as such, its officers and agents from all claims. The expression “claims” was defined in the deed to include all actions, including but not limited to matters arising out of his employment with Monash, the cessation of the employment, all matters arising in the proceeding, and all matters relating to intellectual property, but excluding a claim arising under workers’ compensation or superannuation legislation.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral submissions, Mr Rucinski restated many of the matters referred to in his affidavit, but elaborated on some of them. In particular, he said that he thought that the release applied only to the Court proceeding and did not extend beyond it to intellectual property claims and other claims related to his employment. He said that he did not read the document, but trusted counsel. He maintained that the release was contrary to his instructions. For example, he had asked his legal advisers to negotiate a cooling‑off period, however, they did not do this. He said that at the mediation there was a power imbalance, he felt intimidated and only had a short time to read the deed. CONSIDERATION Much of the argument raised by Mr Rucinski reflected a deep disappointment and anger at the treatment which he had received in his workplace. Mr Rucinski is a very articulate person who was able to explain clearly the emotions which he felt surrounding these events. However, in order to overcome the effect of the deed, it is necessary for Mr Rucinski to establish that he lacked capacity to enter into the deed and that Monash was aware or ought to have been aware of his incapacity at the time: See Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423, at 441; and National Australia Bank v Koller (2011) VSC 228, at 81. The evidence establishes that Mr Rucinski was anxious and stressed over the events and during the mediation. All that can be readily understood. The experience of litigation and mediation in respect of a matter which is so bound up with high emotion over the recent past can provoke such reactions in even the strongest person. However, the evidence does not establish that Mr Rucinski failed to understand what was in the deed. He attended the mediation with his own barrister and instructing solicitor. The mediation was conducted by a registrar of the Court. These are all factors which are apt to provide Mr Rucinski with protection from any power imbalance. None of his legal advisers gave evidence that he lacked the capacity to understand the terms of the deed. In explaining his response to the deed, Mr Rucinski told the Court that when he first looked at it, he was overwhelmed with anger at the effect of the recitals which he perceived demeaned his contribution to the MTI. Quite apart from the lack of any evidence of mental incapacity, this evidence demonstrates that during the mediation Mr Rucinski actively considered the issues which arose. The sequence of events during the mediation as outlined by Mr Picouleau show that there was an opportunity for Mr Rucinski to give consideration to the points negotiated. Mr Rucinski was not able to recall how the handwritten alteration to cl 3.1 came into being. Mr Picouleau’s evidence established that the suggestion came from Mr Rucinski’s camp. This alteration is also indicative of a careful consideration of the scope of the releases. The evidence before the Court establishes that Mr Rucinski understood and actively participated in the negotiation of the deed. It is not necessary to go that far. It is sufficient, as I find, that Monash had no knowledge that Mr Rucinski lacked capacity to enter into the deed.