Rubock v Cooper

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RUBOCK & ANOR v COOPER [2017] FCCA 1355
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Review of registrar’s sequestration order – sequestration order set aside.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.52

Federal Circuit Court Act 1999, s.104

Cases cited:

Pattinson v Hadjimouratis (2006) 155 FCR 226 at [3] – [20] per Nicholson J, [39] per Jacobson J
Re Sarina; Ex p Wollondilly Shire Council (1980) 43 FLR 163, 165
Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666, 670
Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 8 at [44]

First Applicant: ERIC GRANT RUBOCK
Second Applicant: KYLIE MARIA WILKINS
Respondent: NICHOLAS DAVID COOPER
File Number: ADG 351 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Young
Hearing dates:

10 November, 6 December 2016 &

16 June 2017

Date of Last Submission: 16 June 2017
Delivered at: Darwin
Delivered on: 21 June 2017

REPRESENTATION

The Applicants appearing in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Runjajic
Solicitors for the Respondent: Perry Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The sequestration order and costs order made on 30 November 2015 are set aside.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

ADG 351 of 2015

ERIC GRANT RUBOCK

First Applicant

KYLIE MARIA WILKINS

Second Applicant

And

NICHOLAS DAVID COOPER

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application pursuant to section 104(2) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (‘FCCA Act’) to review a decision of a Registrar on 30 November 2015 to make a sequestration order against the estate of the applicants and an order that they pay the petitioning creditor’s costs in the sum of $7,979.10.

  2. The basis of the creditor’s petition was a single debt of $6,371.40 arising from a costs order made by a Registrar against the applicants on 24 November 2014.

  3. The applicants filed their application for review within time on 21 December 2015. On the same day they paid the sum of $7,979.10 directly to the creditor. This sum was accepted by the creditor and a receipt given.

  4. The applicants gave evidence before me that they had mistakenly believed that this was the sum of the judgment debt and it was the debt that they had intended to pay.

  5. The matter was listed for directions on 6 May 2016 and heard on 10 November 2016 and 6 December 2016.

  6. The applicants were not legally represented before the Registrar and were not legally represented before me.

  7. The applicants sought, in substitution for the orders made by the Registrar, as I read the applicants’ inexpertly self-drafted application, orders setting aside the sequestration order and, in the alternative, an annulment order and orders that they provide a statement of affairs to the trustee, that the trustee provide a remuneration notice setting out his fees and that the applicants enter a debt agreement with the trustee to pay the trustee’s fees.

  8. In an affidavit filed in support of the application to this court the first applicant said that he had sought an adjournment from the petitioning creditor’s lawyer before the hearing on 30 November…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 1355
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New South Wales, constituted by Judge Young, considered a dispute between Rubock and Cooper concerning a contract for the sale of land. The central issue revolved around whether the vendor, Cooper, had validly terminated the contract due to the purchaser's, Rubock's, alleged failure to comply with a notice to complete.

The court was required to determine whether the notice to complete served by Cooper was valid and effective in law. Specifically, it needed to ascertain if the notice provided a reasonable time for Rubock to complete the purchase, given the circumstances of the transaction and any prior conduct of the parties. The court also had to consider whether Rubock's purported failure to comply with the notice constituted a repudiation of the contract, thereby entitling Cooper to terminate.

Judge Young found that the notice to complete was not valid. His Honour reasoned that the time stipulated in the notice was unreasonable, particularly in light of the vendor's own conduct which had contributed to delays in the completion process. Consequently, the court held that Rubock had not failed to comply with a valid notice, and therefore, Cooper's purported termination of the contract was wrongful. The legal principle applied was that a notice to complete must allow a reasonable time for performance, and a party cannot rely on a notice that is rendered unreasonable by their own actions.

The court ordered that the contract for the sale of land remained on foot and that Cooper was not entitled to terminate it.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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