RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd v Marmax Investments Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd v Marmax Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 681

Citation: RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd v Marmax Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 681
Parties: RPR MAINTENANCE PTY LTD (ACN 003 610 231) v MARMAX INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 001 147 511) and SPANLINE WEATHERSTRONG BUILDING SYSTEMS PTY LTD (ACN 002 968 087)
File number(s): NSD 804 of 2012
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 29 June 2012
Corrigendum: 9 July 2012
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for interlocutory injunctive relief – common law restraint of trade – whether there is a serious question to be tried – undertaking proffered – whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the interlocutory injunctive relief
Legislation: Restraints of Trade Act 1976 (NSW)
Cases cited:

Fleming Bros (Monaro Agencies) Pty Ltd v Smith (1983) ATPR ¶ 40-389
Giblin v Murdoch 1979 SLT (Sh Ct) 5
IRAF Pty Ltd v Graham [1982] 1 NSWLR 419
Knogo Corporation v Halligan (1984) ATPR ¶ 40‑460 Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Limited [1894] AC 535
Orton v Melman [1981] 1 NSWLR 583
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 286 ALR 257

Heydon JD, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008)

Date of hearing: 14 June 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 73
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms K Rees
Solicitor for the Applicant: Newhouse & Arnold Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr TJ Rickard
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Martin & Holmes Legal
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr MP Cleary
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Elliot & Sochacki Lawyers

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd v Marmax Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 681

CORRIGENDUM

1.In the fifth sentence of paragraph 46 of the reasons for judgment the word “a” is to be substituted for the word “no”.

2.In the second sentence of paragraph 60 of the reasons for judgment the words “second respondent” are to be substituted for the word “applicant”.

I certify that the preceding two (2) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Yates.

Associate:

Dated:       9 July 2012


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 804 of 2012

BETWEEN:

RPR MAINTENANCE PTY LTD (ACN 003 610 231)
Applicant

AND:

MARMAX INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 001 147 511)
First Respondent

SPANLINE WEATHERSTRONG BUILDING SYSTEMS PTY LTD (ACN 002 968 087)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 JUNE 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT:

1.NOTES that the applicant gives the usual undertaking as to damages.

2.ACCEPTS the undertaking by the first respondent to keep and maintain all business or accounting records in relation to sales/installations of Spanline Products since June 2006 until the final hearing and determination of this proceeding.

3.ORDERS that, in the absence of agreement between the parties on the question of…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 681
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd v Marmax Investments Pty Ltd involved an application for interlocutory injunctive relief concerning a common law restraint of trade. The applicant, RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd, sought to enforce a restraint against the first respondent, Marmax Investments Pty Ltd, which was a former franchisee of the second respondent, who was the franchisor of a retail sales and installation business. The dispute arose from the first respondent's alleged breaches of a Transfer of Business and Loan Agreement, which contained a restraint clause. The application was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had established a prima facie case for the alleged breaches and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of interlocutory relief. The court had to consider the validity of the restraint clause in the context of the arguments presented by both parties. The applicant argued that the first respondent had breached the restraint clause and that the balance of convenience favoured an interlocutory injunction. The first respondent contended that the restraint clause was invalid and that the balance of convenience did not favour the applicant.

The court found that the applicant had established a prima facie case that the first respondent breached the restraint clause, but acknowledged that the proper construction of the clause remained a live issue. The court also noted that the first respondent had raised substantial arguments regarding the validity of the restraint clause, which could potentially render it ineffective. However, the court was not persuaded that the challenge to the validity of the clause was so compelling as to deny the applicant's prima facie case. The court considered the strength of the applicant's case in the context of the first respondent's challenge when assessing the balance of convenience. Ultimately, the court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the applicant, and therefore, granted the interlocutory injunction.

The court ordered that Marmax Investments Pty Ltd be restrained from engaging in certain business activities that were in breach of the restraint clause in the Transfer of Business and Loan Agreement, pending the final determination of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In general terms, the principal proceeding concerns the conduct of a franchisor and its franchisees operating under the Franchising Code of Conduct under the Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth). However, the present application does not directly relate to rights and obligations arising under the Franchising Code. In order to fully understand the nature of the present application it is necessary to go to some detail of the history of the relationship between the parties. Background The second respondent is the franchisor of a system involving the retail sale and installation of products by franchisees in respect of the building of additions and improvements to residential and commercial premises. The franchise system is conducted under the name Spanline Home Additions, as well as other names. The applicant is the second respondent’s franchisee in an area called the South Coast area. The first respondent is the second respondent’s franchisee in an area called the Illawarra area. Each area is delineated by a map attached to the written agreement under which each franchise has been granted. The two franchise areas were not always separate. In 2001 the applicant entered into a Franchise Agreement with the second respondent in respect of an area referred to in the relevant agreement as the “NSW South Coast Area”, which included the Illawarra area now franchised to the first respondent by the second respondent. By an agreement dated 9 October 2003, the applicant and the second respondent granted the first respondent a sub‑franchise in respect of the Illawarra area. The precise nature of this arrangement is unclear at the present time because the sub-franchise agreement is not in evidence, although its existence is referred to in a Deed of Termination, apparently entered into in about November 2004. At this time the applicant and the first respondent had reached agreement in relation to the first respondent’s purchase of the franchise business in the Illawarra area. The Deed of Termination appears to have been entered into as part of the arrangements to effect that transfer. The deed contained a number of releases, while at the same time containing an express affirmation that the sub-franchise agreement dated 9 October 2003 remained binding on the parties. The deed also referred to a Transfer of Business and Loan Agreement (TB & L Agreement), which was also apparently entered into in 2004, sometime after the deed was executed. The TB & L Agreement recited that the applicant, as vendor and lender, and the first respondent as purchaser and borrower, had agreed to transfer “the Business” to the first respondent for the purchase price of $296,367.41 and that to enable the transfer to be completed the applicant had agreed to advance $180,000 to the first respondent. The TB & L Agreement purported to define “the Business” by reference to a schedule. The schedule, unfortunately, provides a somewhat opaque definition of “the Business”. It describes it as “Spanline Illawarra Home Additions” and refers to the business name as “Spanline‑Illawarra”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I should add that s 4(3) of that Act allows a person subject to a restraint to apply to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for an order that the restraint, as regards its application to that person, is invalid or valid to such extent as the Court thinks fit. In order to obtain such an order the person subject to the restraint must establish manifest failure on the part of the person creating or joining in creating the restraint to attempt to make it reasonable. No such application has been made by the first respondent. Prima facie case – consideration In my view the applicant has established a prima facie case that the first respondent’s admitted conduct breaches cl 3.9 of the TB & L Agreement, despite the submissions advanced by the first respondent to the contrary. In so finding I wish to record that the proper construction of the clause remains a live issue. My finding is no more than a recognition that there is a sufficient probability, for the purposes of granting interlocutory relief, that, at final hearing, the applicant will establish that the first respondent’s conduct falls within the scope of the clause, properly construed. Even so, the applicant’s case will need to confront the challenge to the validity of the restraint sought to be imposed by that clause. In this connection the first respondent has raised issues of substance that, in light of all the evidence to be adduced, may well lead to a finding that the clause is void and thus ineffective to impose any restraint upon the first respondent’s business activities at the present time. I am not persuaded, however, that I should find at the present time that the challenge to the validity of the clause is so persuasive that it would deny a finding, on proper grounds, that no prima facie case has been established. Nevertheless, the strength of the applicant’s case, seen in the context of the first respondent’s challenge, is a matter which I should, and will, take into account when considering the balance of convenience. I should add that the applicant also sought to call in aid the provisions of the franchise agreement between the first respondent and the second respondent, in particular the notion of exclusivity of territory. I am unable to see how those considerations support the present claim for interlocutory relief. The applicant is not a party to the franchise agreement between the first and second respondents, and the second respondent is not a party to the TB & L Agreement.Balance of convenience – submissions Although the first respondent’s alleged breaches have been ongoing for some years – a factor that would strongly tell against the granting of interlocutory relief at the present time – the applicant points to the following matters which, it submits, establishes that the balance of convenience falls in its favour. First, it submits that the applicant was entitled to, and did, look to the second respondent, as franchisor, to require the first respondent to comply with its franchise obligations. It was not until earlier this year that it was perfectly clear that the second respondent refused to do so.