FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd v Marmax Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 681
Citation: RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd v Marmax Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 681 Parties: RPR MAINTENANCE PTY LTD (ACN 003 610 231) v MARMAX INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 001 147 511) and SPANLINE WEATHERSTRONG BUILDING SYSTEMS PTY LTD (ACN 002 968 087) File number(s): NSD 804 of 2012 Judge: YATES J Date of judgment: 29 June 2012 Corrigendum: 9 July 2012 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for interlocutory injunctive relief – common law restraint of trade – whether there is a serious question to be tried – undertaking proffered – whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the interlocutory injunctive relief Legislation: Restraints of Trade Act 1976 (NSW) Cases cited: Fleming Bros (Monaro Agencies) Pty Ltd v Smith (1983) ATPR ¶ 40-389
Giblin v Murdoch 1979 SLT (Sh Ct) 5
IRAF Pty Ltd v Graham [1982] 1 NSWLR 419
Knogo Corporation v Halligan (1984) ATPR ¶ 40‑460 Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Limited [1894] AC 535
Orton v Melman [1981] 1 NSWLR 583
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 286 ALR 257Heydon JD, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008)
Date of hearing: 14 June 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 73 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms K Rees Solicitor for the Applicant: Newhouse & Arnold Solicitors Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr TJ Rickard Solicitor for the First Respondent: Martin & Holmes Legal Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr MP Cleary Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Elliot & Sochacki Lawyers FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd v Marmax Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 681
CORRIGENDUM
1.In the fifth sentence of paragraph 46 of the reasons for judgment the word “a” is to be substituted for the word “no”.
2.In the second sentence of paragraph 60 of the reasons for judgment the words “second respondent” are to be substituted for the word “applicant”.
I certify that the preceding two (2) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Yates. Associate:
Dated: 9 July 2012
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 804 of 2012
BETWEEN: RPR MAINTENANCE PTY LTD (ACN 003 610 231)
ApplicantAND: MARMAX INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 001 147 511)
First RespondentSPANLINE WEATHERSTRONG BUILDING SYSTEMS PTY LTD (ACN 002 968 087)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 JUNE 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT:
1.NOTES that the applicant gives the usual undertaking as to damages.
2.ACCEPTS the undertaking by the first respondent to keep and maintain all business or accounting records in relation to sales/installations of Spanline Products since June 2006 until the final hearing and determination of this proceeding.
3.ORDERS that, in the absence of agreement between the parties on the question of…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 681
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had established a prima facie case for the alleged breaches and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of interlocutory relief. The court had to consider the validity of the restraint clause in the context of the arguments presented by both parties. The applicant argued that the first respondent had breached the restraint clause and that the balance of convenience favoured an interlocutory injunction. The first respondent contended that the restraint clause was invalid and that the balance of convenience did not favour the applicant.
The court found that the applicant had established a prima facie case that the first respondent breached the restraint clause, but acknowledged that the proper construction of the clause remained a live issue. The court also noted that the first respondent had raised substantial arguments regarding the validity of the restraint clause, which could potentially render it ineffective. However, the court was not persuaded that the challenge to the validity of the clause was so compelling as to deny the applicant's prima facie case. The court considered the strength of the applicant's case in the context of the first respondent's challenge when assessing the balance of convenience. Ultimately, the court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the applicant, and therefore, granted the interlocutory injunction.
The court ordered that Marmax Investments Pty Ltd be restrained from engaging in certain business activities that were in breach of the restraint clause in the Transfer of Business and Loan Agreement, pending the final determination of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I should add that s 4(3) of that Act allows a person subject to a restraint to apply to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for an order that the restraint, as regards its application to that person, is invalid or valid to such extent as the Court thinks fit. In order to obtain such an order the person subject to the restraint must establish manifest failure on the part of the person creating or joining in creating the restraint to attempt to make it reasonable. No such application has been made by the first respondent. Prima facie case – consideration In my view the applicant has established a prima facie case that the first respondent’s admitted conduct breaches cl 3.9 of the TB & L Agreement, despite the submissions advanced by the first respondent to the contrary. In so finding I wish to record that the proper construction of the clause remains a live issue. My finding is no more than a recognition that there is a sufficient probability, for the purposes of granting interlocutory relief, that, at final hearing, the applicant will establish that the first respondent’s conduct falls within the scope of the clause, properly construed. Even so, the applicant’s case will need to confront the challenge to the validity of the restraint sought to be imposed by that clause. In this connection the first respondent has raised issues of substance that, in light of all the evidence to be adduced, may well lead to a finding that the clause is void and thus ineffective to impose any restraint upon the first respondent’s business activities at the present time. I am not persuaded, however, that I should find at the present time that the challenge to the validity of the clause is so persuasive that it would deny a finding, on proper grounds, that no prima facie case has been established. Nevertheless, the strength of the applicant’s case, seen in the context of the first respondent’s challenge, is a matter which I should, and will, take into account when considering the balance of convenience. I should add that the applicant also sought to call in aid the provisions of the franchise agreement between the first respondent and the second respondent, in particular the notion of exclusivity of territory. I am unable to see how those considerations support the present claim for interlocutory relief. The applicant is not a party to the franchise agreement between the first and second respondents, and the second respondent is not a party to the TB & L Agreement.Balance of convenience – submissions Although the first respondent’s alleged breaches have been ongoing for some years – a factor that would strongly tell against the granting of interlocutory relief at the present time – the applicant points to the following matters which, it submits, establishes that the balance of convenience falls in its favour. First, it submits that the applicant was entitled to, and did, look to the second respondent, as franchisor, to require the first respondent to comply with its franchise obligations. It was not until earlier this year that it was perfectly clear that the second respondent refused to do so.