SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Introduction
The applicant is serving a life sentence of imprisonment for murdering his 19 year old brother on 15 July 2007. He was 16 years old at the time of the offence and 17 years old when he entered pleas of guilty and was convicted and sentenced to this and other lesser offences, under the Juvenile Justices Act 1992 (Qld), on 15 September 2008.[1] The applicant was eligible for parole on 16 July 2022 after serving 15 years of the sentence.[2] But he remains in custody, having now served over 16 years in detention.[3]
[1]The offences and penalties are as follows: misconduct with a corpse by interfering [nine months]; stealing [twelve months]; unlawful use of a motor vehicle [three months]. All of these sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
[2]The eligibility date was ordered by the sentencing judge White J (as her Honour then was).
[3]At the time of the sentence on 15 September 2008, the applicant had served 426 days of pre-sentence custody, which was declared to be time served under that sentence.
The applicant applied under various sections of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) for a review of the respondent’s decision on 6 March 2023, to refuse his application for parole pursuant to s 193 of the Corrective Services…
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- Case
- [2023] QSC 253
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the respondent's failure to inquire about the availability of treatment outside of custody did not amount to an error of law. The court emphasised that the decision to grant parole was inherently discretionary and involved assessing the risk posed by the applicant to the community. While the respondent did not ask QCS why the recommended treatment was not offered, the court held that this omission was not a matter of central relevance and importance to the ultimate decision on parole. The respondent was already aware that the applicant had not received the recommended treatment, and the court found that the decision to refuse parole was based on the applicant's untreated status and the associated risk factors. The court further noted that the respondent's decision appeared reasonable and within the scope of its discretion, thus not warranting judicial review.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the application for judicial review. The court held that the respondent had properly exercised its discretion in refusing parole and that any errors made by the respondent were matters of policy or discretion, not legal error. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the court indicated that it would hear the parties on the issue of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
I will hear the parties about costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As the following observations of Bowskill J (as the Chief Justice then was) reveal, a proper consideration is important and requires more than just “mere advertence” but rather that the respondent give “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” to the (relevant) matters raised by the applicant:[41]“To take something into account in this context is to give it “proper, genuine and realistic consideration”. Mere advertence to a matter required to be taken into consideration is not sufficient. In considering this ground of review, care must be taken to avoid a “slide into impermissible merit review”. However, as the Full Court of the Federal Court said in Reece v Webber (2011) 192 FCR 254 at [70]:“Whatever reservation must be exercised when considering whether ‘proper, genuine and realistic’ consideration has been given to particular material, the importance of ensuring that proper consideration has been given to particular material is only heightened when it goes to a matter of central relevance and importance to the ultimate conclusions to be reached.”” [Footnotes omitted – bold emphasis added][41]Calanca at [62]. Finally, and with these matters in mind, the following observations of Gibbs J in Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110 are apposite to the function of the court on a judicial review where the decision-making power is discretionary: [42]“In all such cases the authority must act in good faith; it cannot act merely arbitrarily or capriciously. Moreover, a person affected will obtain relief from the courts if he can show that the authority has misdirected itself in law or that it has failed to consider matters that it was required to consider or has taken irrelevant matters into account. Even if none of these things can be established, the courts will interfere if the decision reached by the authority appears so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could properly have arrived at it. However, where the matter of which the authority is required to be satisfied is a matter of opinion or policy or taste it may be very difficult to show that it has erred in one of these ways, or that its decision could not reasonably have been reached.”[Emphasis added][42]Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110 at 118-119; See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [130]-[137] per Gummow J.Analysis Turning then to each of the grounds relied upon by the applicant. Ground one: The respondent inflexibly applied a policy that the treatment must be undertaken in custody. Before addressing the issue of the respondent’s alleged “inflexibly”, it is necessary to turn to the factual premises underpinning this ground, namely that the respondent did not ask QSC why the treatment was not made available to the applicant; and did not consider whether the necessary treatment was available in the community. I accept at the outset that there were no enquiries by the respondent as to why the programs or interventions were not offered to the applicant by QCS. But I am not satisfied that such a consideration or question is a matter of central relevance and importance to the ultimate issue to be reached by the respondent – that is, the level of risk that the applicant may pose to the community. This is not a case where the applicant was refused parole for refusing available treatment – rather he was refused parole because he remained untreated. In the present case, the respondent’s decision to refuse parole was made knowing and accepting that the applicant had not been given access to the recommended treatment as identified as necessary during the sentencing process by QSC.[43] [43]For the reasons discussed in respondent’s submission at [40]-[42], I accept the present case is distinguishable from the facts of Sweeney v Queensland Parole Board [2011] QSC 223 (per Fryberg J) which was relied upon by the applicant.