FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rowell v Health Insurance Commission [2002] FCA 693
STATUTES – construction – settlement of claims for personal injury by claimants agreeing to accept an amount to be determined in accordance with the settlement agreement – whether the amount payable to the claimants is ascertainable at the time the settlement agreement is made – whether the Commonwealth is entitled to reimbursement of the Medicare benefits paid by it in respect of the claimants’ injuries
WORDS AND PHRASES – ascertainable
Health and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995 (Cth) ss 3, 8, 23, 24, 28 and 38
Oil Basins Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 178 CLR 643 - cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household and Body Care (2000) 201 CLR 520 - cited
Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497 - cited
Gregg v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 91 - citedPHILIP JOHN ROWELL as Trustee of the Dow Corning Australia Settlement Trust and as Trustee of the Expedited and Capitalized (Certain Australian Claimants, Dow Corning Breast Implants) Settlement Trust v HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION
V 235 OF 2002JUDGE: MERKEL J
DATE: 3 JUNE 2002
PLACE: MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 235 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
PHILIP JOHN ROWELL as Trustee of the Dow Corning Australia Settlement Trust and as Trustee of the Expedited and Capitalized (Certain Australian Claimants, Dow Corning Breast Implants) Settlement Trust
APPLICANTAND:
HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MERKEL J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 JUNE 2002
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT within 14 days the parties exchange and file their submissions as to the form of declaratory relief and the costs orders that appropriate to give effect to these reasons for judgment.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 235 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
PHILIP JOHN ROWELL as Trustee of the Dow Corning Australia Settlement Trust and as Trustee of the Expedited and Capitalized (Certain Australian Claimants, Dow Corning Breast Implants) Settlement Trust
APPLICANTAND:
HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MERKEL J
DATE:
3 JUNE 2002
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant and the respondent are in dispute as to whether the provisions of the Health and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Act”) apply to the amounts payable to Australian claimants as a result of the settlement of their claims against Dow Corning Corporation (“DCC”) for loss and damage suffered as a result of defective breast implants.
The Act provides for the recovery by the respondent, as agent for the Commonwealth, of Medicare benefits paid by the Commonwealth in respect of a person’s injury (“the compensable person”) prior to compensation being paid to that person in respect of that injury. Under the Act the Medicare benefits paid by the Commonwealth in respect of an injury to a compensable person are to be reimbursed to the Commonwealth by the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Rowell v Health Insurance Commission and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2002] FCA 693
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in the case primarily revolved around the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, the nature of the compensation payments, and whether these payments triggered Medicare reimbursement obligations under the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the compensation payments were "orders" or requirements under section 3(1) of the Act, which would necessitate the Health Insurance Commission to reimburse Medicare benefits paid. Another key issue was whether the Settlement Agreement, particularly the form of release executed by the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants, constituted an enforceable agreement for the payment of compensation. The court also needed to address the impact of the Commonwealth's right to reimbursement under the Act on the Settlement Agreement.
The court reasoned that the compensation payments under the Settlement Agreement were not "orders" or requirements under the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), as they were determined by the terms of the Settlement Agreement rather than a court order. Therefore, the Commonwealth was not entitled to reimbursement of the Medicare benefits it paid from the settlement amounts. The court further found that the Settlement Agreement constituted a valid and binding agreement for the payment of compensation. The form of release executed by the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants, while different from the release given by the Settlement Option claimants, was still an enforceable agreement under which the compensation amount was fixed. The court concluded that the Commonwealth had no entitlement to reimbursement under the Act based on the actual agreements made. Consequently, the court was to provide declaratory relief to reflect these findings, limited to the agreements actually made. The court also ruled that the respondent should pay the applicant's costs, while the intervening party should bear its own costs.
This case underscores the importance of the specific terms of settlement agreements and the implications they have on statutory obligations such as Medicare reimbursement. The court's decision clarifies the nature of compensation payments under such agreements and their enforceability, providing guidance on similar future cases involving defective medical products and settlement agreements.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is unnecessary to set out all of the other terms of the Exhibit D2 release; they include, inter alia, provisions relating to confidentiality, warranties and discontinuance of proceedings. Relevantly, cl VII provides:“INTEGRATION CLAUSEThis Release represents and contains the entire Release and understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter of this Release and supersedes any and all prior agreements and understandings that are inconsistent with this Release.” While there is some attraction in the view that the Exhibit D2 release contains promises by a party to a pre-existing contract to perform an existing duty with the consequence that the stated consideration is “merely illusory” (see Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497 at 512), the preferable view is that the delivery of the executed release was intended to be a settlement agreement under which the claimant would accept the sum specified in the release in full settlement of her claims for compensation as a result of the defective DCC breast implant upon the terms and conditions set out in the release. Upon delivering a duly completed Exhibit D2 release the applicant would become obliged to pay the specified amount under an agreement constituted by his offer to do so and the claimant’s acceptance of that offer by executing and delivering the release. An agreement so made would appear to be “an agreement under which an amount of compensation that a party to the agreement agrees to pay to another person is fixed”: see s 3(1). It would be fixed as the amount of compensation is “specified in the…agreement”: see s 3(4). The immediate source of the respondent’s obligation to pay the amount specified would be the agreement. It would not be to the point that the Settlement Agreement is also a source, albeit a less immediate source, of the obligation to pay. However, for reasons that were not apparent from the evidence, the applicant adopted substantially the same settlement procedures for the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants as he adopted for the 3181 Settlement Option claimants. He forwarded to the Settlement Agreement claimants a form of release that was similar to the form of release sent to the Settlement Option claimants. Under that form of release, which was executed and returned by the Settlement Agreement claimants, those claimants gave releases to all relevant parties in respect of their claims in consideration “of the benefits provided” by the release. In substance those benefits were the entitlement to participate in the claims procedures provided for in the Settlement Agreement and to be paid the quantum of compensation determined by the Claims Administrator to be payable in accordance with the terms of that agreement. The form of release executed by the Settlement Agreement claimants differs from the release in Exhibit D2 in two important respects. Firstly, it is given prior to the commencement of the claims procedure and not after the completion of that procedure. Secondly, the consideration is the entitlement to be paid an unspecified amount to be determined in accordance with that procedure rather than a specified amount that has been determined in accordance with that procedure. Although the form of release executed by the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants includes a specific provision that the claimant be “paid the sum determined by the Claims Administrator” from the fund established in accordance with the Capitalisation Agreement and the Trust Deed, that provision does not involve payment of an amount that is ascertained or ascertainable at the time of the agreement.