Rowell v Health Insurance Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rowell v Health Insurance Commission [2002] FCA 693

STATUTES – construction – settlement of claims for personal injury by claimants agreeing to accept an amount to be determined in accordance with the settlement agreement – whether the amount payable to the claimants is ascertainable at the time the settlement agreement is made – whether the Commonwealth is entitled to reimbursement of the Medicare benefits paid by it in respect of the claimants’ injuries

WORDS AND PHRASES – ascertainable

Health and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995 (Cth) ss 3, 8, 23, 24, 28 and 38

Oil Basins Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 178 CLR 643 - cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household and Body Care (2000) 201 CLR 520 - cited
Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497 - cited
Gregg v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 91 - cited

PHILIP JOHN ROWELL as Trustee of the Dow Corning Australia Settlement Trust and as Trustee of the Expedited and Capitalized (Certain Australian Claimants, Dow Corning Breast Implants) Settlement Trust v HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION
V 235 OF 2002

JUDGE:         MERKEL J
DATE:           3 JUNE 2002
PLACE:         MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 235 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

PHILIP JOHN ROWELL as Trustee of the Dow Corning Australia Settlement Trust and as Trustee of the Expedited and Capitalized (Certain Australian Claimants, Dow Corning Breast Implants) Settlement Trust
APPLICANT

AND:

HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MERKEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 JUNE 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT within 14 days the parties exchange and file their submissions as to the form of declaratory relief and the costs orders that appropriate to give effect to these reasons for judgment.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 235 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

PHILIP JOHN ROWELL as Trustee of the Dow Corning Australia Settlement Trust and as Trustee of the Expedited and Capitalized (Certain Australian Claimants, Dow Corning Breast Implants) Settlement Trust
APPLICANT

AND:

HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MERKEL J

DATE:

3 JUNE 2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant and the respondent are in dispute as to whether the provisions of the Health and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Act”) apply to the amounts payable to Australian claimants as a result of the settlement of their claims against Dow Corning Corporation (“DCC”) for loss and damage suffered as a result of defective breast implants.

  2. The Act provides for the recovery by the respondent, as agent for the Commonwealth, of Medicare benefits paid by the Commonwealth in respect of a person’s injury (“the compensable person”) prior to compensation being paid to that person in respect of that injury. Under the Act the Medicare benefits paid by the Commonwealth in respect of an injury to a compensable person are to be reimbursed to the Commonwealth by the…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 693
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Rowell v Health Insurance Commission involved the claims of 3,181 Australian women and over 200,000 women from other countries for damages resulting from defective breast implants manufactured by Dow Corning Corporation (DCC). The claimants' claims were settled through a settlement agreement known as the Dow Corning Settlement Option, which was part of DCC's plan of reorganisation in the United States Bankruptcy Court. The specific claims of the 3,181 Australian claimants were settled by the Australian Subclass Agreement, a part of the Settlement Option. The Settlement Option claimants agreed to receive compensation payments in a staggered manner over seven years, subject to the approval of the United States Bankruptcy Court. To expedite payments, the claimants agreed to capitalise their settlement amounts through an agreement with several United States insurance companies. This led to the creation of the Expedited and Capitalised (Certain Australian Claimants, Dow Corning Breast Implants) Settlement Trust Deed. The claimants assigned their rights to receive staggered payments to the US insurers in exchange for immediate payment of the capitalised amount.

The legal issues in the case primarily revolved around the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, the nature of the compensation payments, and whether these payments triggered Medicare reimbursement obligations under the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the compensation payments were "orders" or requirements under section 3(1) of the Act, which would necessitate the Health Insurance Commission to reimburse Medicare benefits paid. Another key issue was whether the Settlement Agreement, particularly the form of release executed by the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants, constituted an enforceable agreement for the payment of compensation. The court also needed to address the impact of the Commonwealth's right to reimbursement under the Act on the Settlement Agreement.

The court reasoned that the compensation payments under the Settlement Agreement were not "orders" or requirements under the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), as they were determined by the terms of the Settlement Agreement rather than a court order. Therefore, the Commonwealth was not entitled to reimbursement of the Medicare benefits it paid from the settlement amounts. The court further found that the Settlement Agreement constituted a valid and binding agreement for the payment of compensation. The form of release executed by the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants, while different from the release given by the Settlement Option claimants, was still an enforceable agreement under which the compensation amount was fixed. The court concluded that the Commonwealth had no entitlement to reimbursement under the Act based on the actual agreements made. Consequently, the court was to provide declaratory relief to reflect these findings, limited to the agreements actually made. The court also ruled that the respondent should pay the applicant's costs, while the intervening party should bear its own costs.

This case underscores the importance of the specific terms of settlement agreements and the implications they have on statutory obligations such as Medicare reimbursement. The court's decision clarifies the nature of compensation payments under such agreements and their enforceability, providing guidance on similar future cases involving defective medical products and settlement agreements.

Background

Background to the litigation

Slater & Gordon, which acts as solicitors for approximately 2,500 Australian claimants, has applied for leave to intervene in the proceeding. The intervention was not opposed by the applicant or the respondent and submissions were made by Slater & Gordon to the Court in support of the applicant’s contentions.Background The claims of 3,181 Australian women, as well as the claims of in excess of 200,000 women from other countries, for loss and damage suffered as a result of defective breast implants manufactured by, or from breast implants made from materials manufactured by, DCC were settled by a settlement agreement known as the Dow Corning Settlement Option (“the Settlement Option”). The Settlement Option was part of a plan of reorganisation of DCC that was required to be submitted to the United States Bankruptcy Court as a result of DCC having filed for bankruptcy pursuant to Ch 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11 of the Code provides a procedure which permits a corporation to extinguish its liability for past debts and lawsuits through a plan of reorganisation which regulates payments to existing and future creditors. Although the plan of reorganisation was approved by the Bankruptcy Court on 30 November 1999, and affirmed on appeal on 13 November 2000, it remains the subject of a further appeal and its terms and conditions cannot be effectuated until the appeal process is completed. The claims of 3,181 Australian claimants (“the Settlement Option claimants”) were settled by that part of the Settlement Option known as the Dow Corning Settlement Option Regarding the Voluntary Australian Subclass (“the Australian Subclass Agreement”). That agreement provided for the payment of compensation of US$23.1 million to the applicant, inter alia, as trustee for the Settlement Option claimants who had elected to settle their claims in accordance with the Settlement Option, subject to the approval by the United States Bankruptcy Court of the plan of reorganisation of DCC. The Australian Subclass Agreement provided for staggered payments to the Settlement Option claimants of the total settlement amount over seven years from the “effective” date, which was a date after the final disposition of any appeal against the approval of the United States Bankruptcy Court of DCC’s plan of reorganisation. The Australian Subclass Agreement also provided for the capitalisation of the total settlement amount payable to Australian claimants under the Settlement Option. Under that provision several United States insurance companies (“the US insurers”) agreed with the applicant and the solicitors representing the Australian claimants to capitalise the total settlement amount payable under the Australian Subclass Agreement by payment to the applicant of the sum of US$18.15 million, which was agreed to be the present day value of the total settlement amount (“the Capitalisation Agreement”). The capitalised settlement amount was to be paid to the applicant to be held by him in accordance with the terms of a deed known as the Expedited and Capitalised (Certain Australian Claimants, Dow Corning Breast Implants) Settlement Trust Deed (“the Trust Deed”). Pursuant to the Australian Subclass Agreement, the Capitalisation Agreement and the Trust Deed (which I refer to collectively as “the Settlement Agreement”) the Australian claimants assigned and transferred their rights to receive staggered payments under the Australian Subclass Agreement to the US insurers in exchange for the right to receive payment from the applicant of the amount determined to be payable to them in accordance with the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. In substance, the Australian claimants substituted the rights they derived under the Settlement Agreement for the rights they derived under the Settlement Option. Consequently, the compensation entitlements of those claimants were no longer to be subject to the approval of the United States Bankruptcy Court to the reorganisation of DCC or to the staggered payment scheme under the Settlement Option. The implementation of the Settlement Agreement was, however, subject to the Victorian Supreme Court “permitting the Trustee to implement the Capitalised Trust” or to the plan of reorganisation of DCC becoming effective, whichever first occurred.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event a certificate or decision as to the amount of compensation payable is not a judgment or an “order (by whatever name called)”: see s 3(1). It is no more than a determination of an amount that is to be due and payable in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. If the determination is to be enforced it is enforceable by reason of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Thus, the determination is not an “order” or a requirement, having the effect of an order, that the compensation payer pay the certified amount to the claimant.Conclusion For the above reasons I have concluded that, on the basis of the agreements actually made, the Commonwealth has not become entitled to reimbursement under the Act of the Medicare benefits it paid from the amounts that will become payable to the 3,181 Settlement Option claimants and to the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants. It is appropriate that within 14 days the parties agree on the appropriate form of declaratory relief to give effect to these reasons for judgment. Plainly, that relief is to be limited to the agreements actually made. As the applicant has succeeded it is appropriate that the respondent pay the applicant’s taxed costs of the proceeding. The intervening party should bear its own costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is unnecessary to set out all of the other terms of the Exhibit D2 release; they include, inter alia, provisions relating to confidentiality, warranties and discontinuance of proceedings. Relevantly, cl VII provides:“INTEGRATION CLAUSEThis Release represents and contains the entire Release and understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter of this Release and supersedes any and all prior agreements and understandings that are inconsistent with this Release.” While there is some attraction in the view that the Exhibit D2 release contains promises by a party to a pre-existing contract to perform an existing duty with the consequence that the stated consideration is “merely illusory” (see Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497 at 512), the preferable view is that the delivery of the executed release was intended to be a settlement agreement under which the claimant would accept the sum specified in the release in full settlement of her claims for compensation as a result of the defective DCC breast implant upon the terms and conditions set out in the release. Upon delivering a duly completed Exhibit D2 release the applicant would become obliged to pay the specified amount under an agreement constituted by his offer to do so and the claimant’s acceptance of that offer by executing and delivering the release. An agreement so made would appear to be “an agreement under which an amount of compensation that a party to the agreement agrees to pay to another person is fixed”: see s 3(1). It would be fixed as the amount of compensation is “specified in the…agreement”: see s 3(4). The immediate source of the respondent’s obligation to pay the amount specified would be the agreement. It would not be to the point that the Settlement Agreement is also a source, albeit a less immediate source, of the obligation to pay. However, for reasons that were not apparent from the evidence, the applicant adopted substantially the same settlement procedures for the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants as he adopted for the 3181 Settlement Option claimants. He forwarded to the Settlement Agreement claimants a form of release that was similar to the form of release sent to the Settlement Option claimants. Under that form of release, which was executed and returned by the Settlement Agreement claimants, those claimants gave releases to all relevant parties in respect of their claims in consideration “of the benefits provided” by the release. In substance those benefits were the entitlement to participate in the claims procedures provided for in the Settlement Agreement and to be paid the quantum of compensation determined by the Claims Administrator to be payable in accordance with the terms of that agreement. The form of release executed by the Settlement Agreement claimants differs from the release in Exhibit D2 in two important respects. Firstly, it is given prior to the commencement of the claims procedure and not after the completion of that procedure. Secondly, the consideration is the entitlement to be paid an unspecified amount to be determined in accordance with that procedure rather than a specified amount that has been determined in accordance with that procedure. Although the form of release executed by the 15 Settlement Agreement claimants includes a specific provision that the claimant be “paid the sum determined by the Claims Administrator” from the fund established in accordance with the Capitalisation Agreement and the Trust Deed, that provision does not involve payment of an amount that is ascertained or ascertainable at the time of the agreement.