Ross v Adams (An Inspector of the RSPCA)

Link copied
Case Copied 35 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

ROSS v ADAMS (AN INSPECTOR OF THE RSPCA)

[2019] SASC 48

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Doyle

29 March 2019

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

ANIMALS - VARIOUS STATUTORY PROVISIONS - DOGS - REGISTRATION, IDENTIFICATION OF OWNERS AND SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION

Appeal from an order made by a Magistrate authorising that a number of dogs seized by an inspector of the RSPCA be sold, destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the Minister thinks fit.

An RSPCA inspector seized a number of dogs from the appellant, a dog breeder. The appellant was charged with 17 offences under the Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) (the Act). The inspector also applied for the above forfeiture order under s 31C(2) of the Act. The Magistrate granted the application, reasoning that it would be unreasonable or impractical for the dogs to be retained in the RSPCA shelter pending determination of the criminal proceedings against the Minister.

Held (per Doyle J):

1.      The appellant has not established that the Magistrate failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness, failed to take into account any relevant considerations, erred in his conclusion that it was unreasonable or impractical for the dogs to continue to be retained by the RSPCA until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, or otherwise erred in the exercise of his discretion under the Act.

2.      Appeal dismissed.

Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) ss 28, 31C(2), 32A, 34B; Animal Welfare Regulations 2012 (SA) s 5; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) ss 10, 10AB, 10B; Magistrates Court Rules 1992 (SA) rr 4, 29, referred to.
Theofylatos v Animal Welfare Authority [2013] NTSC 61; Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 77 ALJR 1598; Hamra v The Queen (2017) 260 CLR 479; Spanos v B & K Paton Pty Ltd [1998] SASC 6879; Hollow v Maragozidis [2001] SASC 375; FA & SP Holland Pty Ltd v Bayside Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd [2014] SADC 138; Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 67 ALJR 841, considered.

ROSS v ADAMS (AN INSPECTOR OF THE RSPCA)
[2019] SASC 48

Magistrates Appeal

  1. DOYLE J: This is an appeal from an order by a Magistrate pursuant to s 31C(2) of the Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) (the Act) authorising that a number of dogs seized from the appellant (Mr Ross) on 23 October 2018, and their issue, be sold, destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the Minister thinks fit.

    Background

  2. Mr Ross is a dog breeder from Lameroo.  On 23 October 2018, 15 dogs were seized from a facility operated by Mr Ross and Ms Fitzpatrick.  Ten of the dogs seized were adult dogs; the remaining five were puppies. 

  3. On 11 January 2019, Ms Adams (an inspector under the Act, employed by the RSPCA) filed an information in the Magistrates Court alleging 17 offences by Mr Ross and Ms Fitzpatrick under the Act, committed between 19 July 2018 and 23 October 2018. The…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ross v Adams (An Inspector of the RSPCA) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] SASC 48
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ross v Adams involved an appeal by Mr Ross against an order made by the Magistrate under the Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) concerning the seizure and retention of certain dogs by the RSPCA. The appeal was heard by the Supreme Court of South Australia, which was tasked with reviewing the decisions and proceedings of the Magistrates Court.

The primary legal issues before the court included whether the Magistrate erred in exercising his discretion under s 31C(2) of the Act, the procedural fairness of the hearing, and the sufficiency of the evidence presented. Mr Ross contended that the application should have been brought in civil rather than criminal proceedings, that the Magistrate failed to consider relevant factors, and that the proceedings were not conducted fairly. He also argued that the evidence was insufficient to justify the retention of the dogs by the RSPCA.

The court found that most of Mr Ross' contentions had little merit, particularly those focusing on procedural aspects rather than substantive issues. The court noted that the application for the order under s 31C(2) was appropriately brought in the Magistrates Court as it fell under statutory jurisdiction, which is distinct from the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, while it would have been preferable for the applicant to provide affidavit evidence, the court did not find any procedural unfairness or error that warranted allowing the appeal. The court held that the Magistrate had exercised his discretion appropriately, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the order.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the Magistrate's decision. The court emphasised the importance of conducting such proceedings efficiently and practically, without undue focus on procedural formalities where substantive justice was served.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In relation to contention (v), it is true that most of the puppies the subject of the order were not physically seized from Mr Ross during the 23 October 2018 seizure. However, that does not mean that they were not validly included within the order made under s 31C(2) of the Act. It seems to me inherent in what occurred that the puppies born and retained at the RSPCA shelter were likely seized and retained (upon and from their birth) under the inspector’s powers pursuant to s 30(1)(f) or s 31A(1)(c) of the Act. If so, then they were dogs “seized and retained” under the Act for the purposes of s 31C(2)(a), and hence validly subject to an order under s 31C(2). As mentioned below, it would have been preferable had this matter been addressed in an affidavit filed by or on behalf of the applicant. But in the circumstances as they transpired below, and where the issue of the inspector’s power to seize and retain the puppies was not put in issue, I am not persuaded that it provides a proper basis to interfere on appeal.Grounds 3 & 4: Denial of procedural fairness and lack of evidence In response to contentions (vi) and (vii), I accept that it would have been preferable had the Magistrate required that the applicant provide affidavit evidence of the matters upon which she relied. While the Magistrate was right to appreciate that it was desirable that the application be dealt with expeditiously, and to focus upon the matters about which there was real dispute, I consider that this could have been achieved while at the same time requiring that the applicant put on affidavit material in support of the matters upon which she relied, and which were necessary to establish the basis for the Court’s exercise of power under s 31C(2) of the Act. However, I do not accept that it was necessary, or even appropriate, to further adjourn the matter so that the matter might be conducted as a “trial”. To my mind, the Magistrate got the balance right by permitting an adjournment to enable Mr Ross to gather the expert evidence upon which he sought to rely, but by then proceeding to hear the matter. By its very nature, the application was relatively urgent, and a matter that ought to have been conducted in an efficient and expeditious manner. While the Magistrate did not ultimately hear any oral evidence, this was a function of the way in which the parties elected to proceed. Neither party required that the experts, or any other person, give oral evidence or otherwise be presented for cross-examination. Despite my conclusion that it would have been preferable had the applicant been required to file affidavit evidence, I do not think this is a sufficient basis upon which to allow the appeal. In all the circumstances, I do not think there was any denial of procedural fairness or other error in the manner in which the proceedings were conducted. The parties, including Mr Ross, acquiesced in an informal approach to the application. While Mr Ross did object to the application being determined without evidence at the first hearing (on 15 January 2019), the Magistrate acceded to this submission and adjourned the matter to permit Mr Ross an opportunity to have the dogs inspected by his own experts. When the hearing resumed on 23 January 2019, the parties were given an opportunity to, and did, tender the evidence upon which they relied. While the parties, and in particular the applicant, also relied upon several matters put from the bar table, there does not appear to have been any challenge to the Magistrate receiving this “evidence” from the bar table. While Mr Ross did maintain his opposition to the order being made, including on the basis that the evidence did not establish that it was unreasonable or impractical for the RSPCA to retain the dogs, there was no objection to the form or process of the hearing or to the Magistrate receiving some of the evidence from the bar table.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In summary, I am not satisfied that Mr Ross has established that the Magistrate failed to take into account any relevant consideration, erred in his conclusion that it was impractical and/or unreasonable for the dogs to continue to be retained by the RSPCA until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, or otherwise erred in the exercise of his discretion under s 31C(2) of the Act.Conclusion For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

While not all of these alleged errors fall neatly under the grounds of appeal relied upon by Mr Ross, they can be loosely grouped on the basis that contention (i) relates to ground 1, contentions (ii) to (v) relate to ground 2, contentions (vi) to (ix) relate to grounds 3 and 4, and contentions (x) to (xv) relate to grounds 5 and 6.Consideration In my view, most of Mr Ross’ contentions on appeal have little merit. Many focus upon matters of form, and tend to ignore both the substance of what occurred before the Magistrate, and the desirability and appropriateness of proceedings such as the present being conducted in as efficient and practical manner as the justice of the case permits. In addition to this, in several cases they are contentions made for the first time on appeal. To the extent that these matters could have been addressed by the applicant in the hearing before the Magistrate had complaint been made at the time, they are not matters properly raised on appeal.[3][3] Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 77 ALJR 1598 at [51]. Against this general background, it is appropriate to address individually the grounds that I have managed to distil from Mr Ross’ submissions.Ground 1: Application should have been brought in civil proceedings In relation to contention (i), I am not persuaded that the applicant was required to bring the application in civil proceedings instituted in the Civil (General Claims) Division of the Magistrates Court. The application sought an exercise of the Magistrates Court’s jurisdiction to make an order under s 31C(2) of the Animal Welfare Act. This is an example of the statutory jurisdiction that s 10(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) recognises may be conferred upon the Magistrates Court. This statutory jurisdiction is dealt with separately in the Magistrates Court Act from the conferral of the Court’s civil and criminal jurisdictions (in ss 8 and 9 respectively of the Magistrates Court Act). Further, under s 10(2) of the Magistrates Court Act provides that the rules may assign a particular statutory jurisdiction (other than one specifically assigned by another Act to a particular Division) to either the Civil (General Claims) Division or the Criminal Division of the Magistrates Court. To this end, r 4 of the Magistrates Court Rules 1992 (SA) contains various rules governing the assignment of the Court’s statutory jurisdiction to the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Court. However, none these addresses or assigns the Court’s statutory jurisdiction under s 31C(2) of the Animal Welfare Act. In the absence of any specific rule assigning this head of statutory jurisdiction to either the Civil or Criminal Division of the Court, the applicant relies upon r 29 of the Magistrates Court Rules (which appears in Section B of those rules, being the rules relating to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in its Criminal Division). The applicant relies in particular upon r 29.01, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to s 10 of the Magistrates Court Act may be invoked by an application complying with Form 23. This was the procedure and form used by the applicant.