Romeo v The Queen; Ricciardello v The Queen
[1991] HCATrans 72
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth Nos Pl0 and P9 of 1990 B e t w e e n -
RALPH ROMEO and ANTHONY SERGIO
RICCIARDELLO
Applicants
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
| Romeo | 1 | 13/3/91 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 13 MARCH 1991, AT 10.16 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| MR R. RICHTER, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
my learned friend, MR O.P. HOLDENSON, for the
applicant Romeo. (instructed by Pryles & Defteros)
| MS L. LEIDER: | May it please the Court, I appear also with |
my learned friend, MR O.P. HOLDENSON, for the
applicant, Ricciardello. (instructed by Pryles &
Defteros)
MR R.J. DAVIES, OC: If the Court please, with
MR J.A. SCHOLZ I represent the Crown in this
matter. (instructed by the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions)
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Richter.
MR RICHTER: | May it please the Court, the applicants Ricciardello and Romeo were convicted together with | |
| a third person by the name of Marinovich upon two | ||
| ||
|
MASON CJ: Yes, I had not realized they had been handed in,
Mr Richter.
| MR RICHTER: | Thank you, Your Honour. Three persons were |
convicted of a three-headed conspiracy. The allegation was that Marinovich, Ricciardello and
Romeo conspired together - to put it in brief - to
possess for sale or supply contrary, it was said,
to section 33(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act in
Western Australia.
It is important for the Court to appreciate
that the convictionsl and indeed the trial, arose
out of a series of tape recorded meetings that were
conducted at the home of the man Marinovich. There
were five conversations. To the first two all three men were parties. To the last three Marinovich and Ricciardello were parties, although
that does not bear upon the issue because the jury
must have found, and we are happy to approach it on the basis, that Ricciardello was acting on behalf
of Romeo for the purposes of argument. So nothing really turns on who was present at the
conversations.The fact is the conversations were there, and
the Crown put its case essentially on the basis
that this is a rather unique case. You do not often have the opportunity of having the actual
evidence of the actual agreement, and the Crown
relied on the content of the conversations against
all three to prove that they all three conspired to
possess for sale or supply and to prove that all
three had agreed on all the essential elements
required.
| Romeo | 2 | 13/3/91 |
Now, one thing that has to be noted at this
stage to put the case in context is this: nothing
happened. No one got any heroin. Any particular source of heroin was never identified. There was a
lot of to-ing and fro-ing between the three in the
first two conversations and the two in the lastthree conversations, about what is going to be
done, what is not going to be done and so on, and
essentially the defences of Ricciardello and Romeo
were that there was no finality. There was no real
agreement reached.
The fact is, on the evidence, police waited
and waited and waited after the conversations,
nothing happened. In the end arrests were effectedand the charges were laid. So, there were no drugs
that were shown to exist. There were no drugs
seized, there were no drugs purchased. There was
an allegation in a third count against the man,
Marinovich, that going on something that he had
said in one of the tapes he had, in fact, obtained
four ounces of heroin but he was acquitted of that.
There was a no-case submission which was made
in which it was argued, amongst other things, that
it was no offence shown unless someone was shown to
be in possession and by that we mean someone of the
conspirators or parties to the agreement.
The applicants were all three convicted on
this three-headed conspiracy. They all appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal on grounds which for
Ricciardello and Romeo became amended subsequently
and so on, but for present purposes the relevant
grounds were that there was essentially no
sufficient evidence upon which the three could be
lawfully convicted on the tripartite conspiracy,
there were simply none. There was no hypothesis by
which a reasonable jury could find that that was
the agreement, that it was a three-headed
agreement. Essentially, that proposition rested on
the basis that the evidence was common to all three, in other words, the tape recordings - all
five conversations - were equally admissible
against all three, although the last three
conversations become admissible as against Romeo,
who is absent on the preconcert basis as anutterance and furtherance.
The evidence was all equally admissible and
the real question, and only question, was, on the
evidence, could one prove a tripartite conspiracy
such as the one alleged and such as the one that
was driven home to the jury.
BRENNAN J: Is that not the very question, though, whether
it could prove a tripartite conspiracy or whether
| Romeo | 3 | 13/3/91 |
it could prove a conspiracy to which two or more of
the accused were parties?
| MR RICHTER: | The question might have been that, if the question had been posed, "Can you prove, as against |
| tripartite conspiracy? Can you prove against the | |
| two? Assuming you have an insufficiency of | |
| evidence to prove against one of the three, that his agreement was to be a party to the tripartite | |
| agreement. If you had sufficient evidence | |
| to - - -" | |
| BRENNAN J: | Does this not rather highlight the problem of defining what the conspiracy is, what are the |
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, Your Honour. | In this particular instance |
the incidents that identified the conspiracy were
the tape recorded conversations.
| BRENNAN J: | No, that is the evidence? |
MR RICHTER: That was the evidence.
| BRENNAN J: | If you wish to describe the conspiracy you must |
describe it by reference either to the parties or
to its content or to both.
| MR RICHTER: | Yes. | And the conspiracy that was run before |
the jury was described both as to its parties as a
three-headed conspiracy; as to its content as athree-headed conspiracy and went to the jury on
that basis and the jury determined it on that
basis.
DAWSON J: | You put it a little differently, do you not? say that the conspiracy was an agreement to possess | You |
drugs with a certain intent which were supplied by
Marinovich.
| MR RICHTER: | Which Marinovich acquired and would hand on to |
Romeo and Ricciardello.
| DAWSON J: | The agreement between the two who were convicted |
was an agreement, not just to possess drugs but to
possess drugs which became part of the agreement
via Marinovich's involvement.
MR RICHTER: Yes, and the agreement as alleged was that
Marinovich would put the other two in possession but that they all agreed that they all be to that
extent, in some way, jointly possessed when it
came - - -
| Romeo | 4 | 13/3/91 |
DAWSON J: There was interaction between the three of them
and when Marinovich disappeared there was no
agreement.
MR RICHTER: That is right and the further element upon
which it was - - -
| DAWSON J: | I put that badly, but when, for our purposes, |
Marinovich disappeared from the so-called
conspiracy then the conspiracy fell to the ground
as it were.
| MR RICHTER: | Yes. | It was not so much a matter of |
disappearance as in cessation of activity
| DAWSON J: | No, no. |
| MR RICHTER: | - - - once you determine on the evidence which |
is equally admissible against all three that
Marinovich is not a party to a tripartite agreement
on the evidence, in other words, that there is no
tripartite agreement as to each element which
includes the notion of agreeing to supply to
another and the reason the Court of Criminal Appeal
found that he was not a party to it was that on the
evidence what he agreed was to supply them and
whilst he might have foreseen that they would
supply to another that was not part of his
agreement, therefore there was no tripartite
agreement.
That is, in effect, what the Court of Criminal
Appeal finds, there was no tripartite agreement and
what the Court of Criminal Appeal did was to
substitute a two-party agreement, that is, both
between Ricciardello and Romeo, the applicants
herein, to acquire possession and to sell or supply
to another.
DAWSON J: There is nothing wrong with that if the third
party is not essential to that particular
agreement.
MR RICHTER: That is right, with respect, of course.
| DAWSON J: | I mean a conspiracy with persons unknown is |
frequent enough.
| MR RICHTER: | Of course. | The only problem is it was |
essential here in the way the case was pleaded and the way it was run and what it was the jury determined.
DAWSON J: That, as Justice Brennan points out, is what you
have got to make out, that it was essential.
| Romeo | 13/3/91 |
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, and, indeed, that is what our summary of |
submissions relating to grounds 1 and 2 are
intended to do by drawing the Court's attention to
some references. But could we, before we go to that summary, say this: one thing is clear, the
jury convicted all three of a three-headed
agreement, not of a two-headed agreement. It found
that all three were parties to an agreement which
the court subsequently found the jury could not
have found. And in substituting convictions for a two-party agreement, that reversed the whole
way - - -
| DAWSON J: | I will not interrupt any more but does that |
follow? I mean, it was essential to the agreement between Ricciardello and Romeo that there be an
agreement to supply - - -
| MR RICHTER: | To another. |
DAWSON J: - - - heroin, was it?
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, that was the allegation. |
DAWSON J: But it was not essential to the agreement between
them that the supplier should have the same intent
as they had and, in that sense, Marinovich was not
essential to their conspiracy. That is the other
side of the coin.
| MR RICHTER: | That is the other side of the coin but it was |
never a side that was run, that Marinovich was not
essential to the conspiracy, because the agreement
alleged was that they all three agreed that it besold to another.
DAWSON J: All right, and so it was found against two that
one aspect of the allegations was made out and
against one that it was not.
MR RICHTER: | No, what was found against the two was that there was an agreement between the two that they | supply or sell to another, not that there was an |
| ||
| Court of Criminal Appeal did was - - - |
DAWSON J: That does not matter, does it?
MR RICHTER: In our respectful submission, it does because
what it means is that since there has to be
agreement on all the essential elements the Court
of Criminal Appeal convicted Ricciardello and Romeoof a two-headed conspiracy with which they were
never charged.
| BRENNAN J: | No, the Court of Criminal Appeal did not convict |
them of anything.
| Romeo | 6 | 13/3/91 |
| MR RICHTER: | I am sorry, retained their conviction. | The |
Court of Criminal Appeal did make a finding, essentially, on the evidence commonly admissible against all three, the only real evidence of the
agreement, the taped conversation.
DAWSON J: In any event, that is not right. It was a three-
headed agreement. There was an agreement between
the three of them that heroin should be supplied by
one to the other two but it was just that the
necessary intent as to what they were to do with
the heroin did not exist in the case of one but
existed in the case of the other two. It is not a two-headed agreement at all, it is just intent on
the part of two was lacking on the part of one.
| MR RICHTER: | If that intent was lacking on the part of one |
then he was never a party to a three-headed conspiracy, not because of insufficiency of
evidence against him - - -
| DAWSON J: That begs | the question, a three-headed |
conspiracy. He was a party to a three-headed agreement. In his case it lacked the criminal element.
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, but the three-headed agreement to which it |
could be said that he was a party, was a
three-headed agreement to put the other two into
possession; not a three-headed agreement to
possess for sale or supply to another, and that
"another" has to be someone outside the
conspirators. Therein lies the problem of which we
complain and why we say the Court of Criminal
Appeal, in effect, ~eached inconsistent
conclusions.
| DAWSON J: | We know the parameters of the argument now. |
MR RICHTER: Yes, Your Honour.
| BRENNAN J: | Mr Richter, it seems that you are basing your |
argument on the conclusions reached by the Court of
Criminal Appeal. If special leave were granted in
this case it would be the function of this Court to
reach the decision, in the case of the two present
applicants, which ought to have been reached by the
Court of Criminal Appeal.
MR RICHTER: Yes, Your Honour.
| BRENNAN J: | So that we are not bound by anything that the |
Court of Criminal Appeal has said with regard to
those two.
MR RICHTER: With respect, we entirely agree with that.
| Romeo | 13/3/91 |
| BRENNAN J: | So that in order to make good your application |
for special leave you must show, basing yourself
upon the trial, that there is some vitiating
circumstance in the conviction which warrants thegrant of special leave.
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, Your Honour. | I am not too sure that we |
entirely agree with that proposition in this sense:
the jury reached verdicts that were internally
consistent. What we complain of is that with the quashing of the conviction and the acquittal of
Marinovich and the dismissal of the applications by
the other two, the Court of Criminal Appeal was
wrong in that it necessarily failed to have a
consistent outcome.
What we say as far as the trial process itself
is concerned is, in effect, what the Court of
Criminal Appeal did find and that was that on the
evidence it really was not open to find a
three-headed conspiracy where all three are agreed
as to all the elements; where all three are in
agreement that the three of them will possess in
some sense and that the three of them have the
joint purpose to sell or supply to another.
Now, we say that the jury could not have found
that in the first place. We say that the Court of Criminal Appeal in fact endorses that proposition
by what it did with respect to Marinovich but that
it then went on to misapply the concepts in Darby's case and to overlook the fact that the evidence was
identical.
| TOOHEY J: Mr Richter, could you test it this way? | If all |
three appeals had been dismissed by the Court of
Criminal Appeal, would any of the present grounds
of appeal be relevant?
MR RICHTER: | If all three appeals had been dismissed on the basis that there was sufficient evidence to uphold |
| |
| grounds 1 and 2 would have come to this Court by | |
| way of a special application saying there was not, or might have come. |
TOOHEY J: That is quite a different argument, is it not?
MR RICHTER: Yes, Your Honour. Essentially, what we are
complaining, if I could put it this way, is the
unfairness of the inconsistent determinations by
the Court of Criminal Appeal. One the one hand, to find that there was no evidence of a three-headed
conspiracy which, we would submit, required thatthey quash the convictions of Ricciardello and
Romeo and, on the other hand, by a misconstruction
of Darby to say that Marinovich is acquitted
| Romeo | 13/3/91 |
because of insufficiency of evidence against him
but that there is a sufficiency of evidence against
the others. The sufficiency of evidence against the others, to which the Court of Criminal Appeal
refers, is really a sufficiency of evidence of two
people agreeing with a third to obtain possession
from the third, but two people agreeing to on-sell to another, not three people agreeing, and if that
is right then, in our respectful submission, the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal must be
set aside, with respect, to the applicants. There
was never a cross-appeal by the Crown, with
respect, to Marinovich which asserted that the
Court of Criminal Appeal was wrong about the
non-existence of a sufficient case of a
three-headed conspiracy such as the one I haveoutlined.
| BRENNAN J: | Do you say that Marinovich could never have been |
convicted had the allegation been that the
conspiracy was that Marinovich should obtain the
"pink rock", or whatever it was called, to enable
Riccciardello and Romeo to have it in possession with the relevant intention on their part?
| MR RICHTER: | If it was no part of his business, other than |
foresight, that that is what they might do with it.
| BRENNAN J: | No, the proposition I put to you is, was it |
possible for a conviction to stand against
Marinovich if that had been the identified
conspiracy?
| MR RICHTER: | I am sorry, Your Honour. |
BRENNAN J: Let it be assumed that Marinovich did not have
any relevant intent.
MR RICHTER: Yes, sir.
BRENNAN J: Let it be assumed, however, that there was an
agreement that the pink rock should be obtained by Marinovich and held in possession by Romeo and
Ricciardello with the intent.
MR RICHTER: | If Marinovich agreed that it be held by them and that it be held by them with the intent, that |
| makes him a party to a three-headed conspiracy to | |
| supply another because he joins the purpose of | |
| supplying the heroin to another and if there had | |
| been sufficient evidence of that, his conviction | |
| could have stood on that. | |
| BRENNAN J: | I see. |
MR RICHTER: | The real problem is one of the inherent unfairness in what happened, in our respectful |
| Romeo | 9 | 13/3/91 |
submission, in the way that the matter was
disposed. Marinovich is acquitted - end of story
for Marinovich. Ricciardello and Romeo standconvicted on a basis which is inconsistent with
that acquittal on the judgment.
TOOHEY J: Why is it inconsistent, Mr Richter? For
instance, does it follow from your argument that if
two or more persons are charged with conspiracy of the sort that is charged here, if one is acquitted
by the jury or a conviction against one is set
aside, it must inevitably follow that the other two
cannot stand convicted of the same conspiracy?
| MR RICHTER: | No, not at all. | And Darby is really a case |
that adverts to the problem both ways. In other words, the facts in Darby are very interesting and
very illuminating and in a moment I will try to
expand on the hypothesis of three people agreeing
in a Darby situation.Darby and a man called Thomas were charged with a conspiracy to commit an armed robbery.
Darby had confessed. In other words, he said,
"Yes, what we were about, what Thomas and I were
about was we were going to commit an armed
robbery." Thomas declined to answer questions. So there was no evidence admissible against Thomas of
what the agreement was. Thomas and Darby were convicted by the jury.
Thomas applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal
on his own on the basis that the evidence could
never disclose that the agreement alleged against
him with Darby was to commit an armed robbery, as
against a murder or as against a kidnapping or as
against anything else. In other words, those
hypotheses not being excludable by the evidence he
could not be convicted of a conspiracy with Darby
to commit an armed robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld that and quashed his conviction and
entered an acquittal. Darby then decided that he would have a go and he appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal,
relying essentially on the Shannon type of doctrine
that if two people are charged with a conspiracy,one is acquitted, the other one must be acquitted. And what this Court essentially said in Darby was,
"No, you look at the sufficiency of the evidence
against each to prove the conspiracy alleged."
Now, you may have a situation where if the
evidence is the same it is sort of inconsistent to
say that as against A you have proved an agreement
between A and B but as against B you have not
proved an agreement between A and Band that makes
| Romeo | 10 | 13/3/91 |
perfectly understandable sense, in our respectful
submission, to say that.
What the High Court did in Darby was
essentially to say it is not an automatic reflexive
disposition of a case, a two-headed case in that
instance, to say if one is acquitted the other has
to be acquitted because it is an agreement between
the two. Rather, it is a question of assessing theevidence against the two and as against the one
there may be a sufficiency, as against the other,
not.
| DAWSON J: | You see, that really was the argument there: it |
takes two to make an agreement; if one, by
acquittal disappears, ergo it was said - - -
| MR RICHTER: | Ergo there was no agreement. |
| DAWSON J: | - - - there was no agreement and that was |
rejected.
MR RICHTER: That was rejected and
DAWSON J: That is not this case.
| MR RICHTER: | - - - for obvious reasons because as against |
Darby there was sufficient evidence but the real question is sufficient evidence of what? Not of his complicity with all sorts of vague notions but
as against him a jury could say, "He agreed with
Thomas to commit an armed robbery. As a matter of evidence we're satisfied that that agreement
existed." Notionally, of course, a case against
Thomas and against Darby must be separately
considered on evidence admissible against each.
The confessions of Darby were not admissible
against Thomas. Therefore, on a strict analysis ofthe case against Thomas one could not say that
Thomas had joined an agreement between himself and
Darby to commit an armed robbery.
So, if one assumes, for example, even if they
had been tried together it would have been quite
proper for a jury to acquit one and convict the other but only on the basis that the conspiracy
charged, all the elements of the agreement charged
were proved against that person; not on the basis
that some of the elements were proved against that
person but that all the elements were proved
against that person.
| DAWSON J: | I do not understand how that applies here. | Here |
you have alleged a conspiracy to possess a drug
with intent to supply.
| MR RICHTER: | To another, and that is important. |
| Romeo | 13/3/91 |
| DAWSON J: | And at the end of the day you look at the |
evidence, or the jury does and it says or could
say, "Well, now, look, as regards Romeo there
certainly was an intent to supply the drug, an
intent to possess the drug and for that matter an
intent to possess the drug supplied by Marinovich."
You look at Ricardo and you say the same thing
about him. Then you look at Marinovich and you say, "Well, look, we can say as to him there was
certainly an intent to possess the drug and that's
in conjunction, in agreement with the other two, but in his case we have a reasonable doubt about his intent. Therefore, there still is an agreement
but we cannot say that he is a party to that
agreement with the necessary intent or, if you
like, he is a party to the same agreement as were
the other two people.
| MR RICHTER: | Where that fails, in our respectful submission, |
is this, that it was an essential element of the
agreement charged that the three of them agree,
with respect, to the on-sale to another.
| DAWSON | J: | Why? |
MR RICHTER: Because that is the offence.
BRENNAN J: | Can you demonstrate that by reference to the record, that is by particulars that were given or |
| in any other matter of it? |
| MR RICHTER: | No. | The particulars that were given were |
really the taped conversations.
BRENNAN J: That was evidence~ The whole argument, it seems
to me, founders or succeeds according to your
capacity to demonstrate what the terms of the
charged conspiracy were.
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, Your Honour and |
| BRENNAN J: | And in the absence of particulars it seems to me |
that you must be able to point to something which
shows that the conspiracy was of its nature a
three- headed conspiracy.
MR RICHTER: Precisely, Your Honour, and that is what we
will seek to do because, in our respectful
submission, that is what the material bears out,
and that really is what we seek to do in our
outline of submissions and we would go to the first
paragraph which asserts that the agreement alleged
was between Marinovich, Ricciardello and Romeo and
that takes us to the indictment, first of all, the
indictment on its face and we are concerned with
counts 1 and 2 of course. The indictment on itself alleges that Marinovich, Romeo and Ricciardello:
| Romeo | 12 | 13/3/91 |
conspired together to possess a quantity of
heroin with intent to sell or supply it toanother.
DAWSON J: | But you see the agreement is to possess the quantity of heroin with the necessary intent. | The |
parties to the agreement may be various but that is
the agreement.
| MR RICHTER: | The agreement has to be, in our respectful |
submission, not just to possess; the agreement has
to be to supply as well, that has to be the common
purpose of supply to another.
BRENNAN J: But by whom?
| MR RICHTER: | By all three. |
| BRENNAN J: | Why? |
MR RICHTER: Because that is an essential element of the
offence in section 6(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act
BRENNAN J: Not it is not. With respect, that is not the
proposition. The proposition if A, Band C Join a conspiracy that A should commit the section 6(1)
offence, that is a conspiracy.
MR RICHTER: Yes, we agree, but in order to do that all of
them have to agree that A, and it has to be a part
of the agreement, that A supply or sell to another
and that is the precise point that we are making.
So that whilst we agree with what Your Honour
Mr Justice Brennan just put to me the narrow
proposition avoids what we say is the gravamen of
the offence because it is not - - -
BRENNAN J: Well then let us focus on that for a moment. Is
it the proposition that the conspiracy that was
charged in count 1 is that three parties agreed
that one of them or two of them should have
possession and that one of them or two of them should have possession with intent?
| MR RICHTER: | To supply to another, yes. |
BRENNAN J: Is that the proposition?
MR RICHTER: Yes, sir.
BRENNAN J: | So that what had to be proved against each of the accused was that each of them agreed that Romeo |
| and Ricciardello should have possession and have it | |
| with intent? |
MR RICHTER: Yes, Your Honour.
| Romeo | 13 | 13/3/91 |
BRENNAN J: | Now, did the evidence establish that against those two? |
| MR RICHTER: | No, it did not establish that those two were in |
agreement with Marinovich as to the sales.
BRENNAN J: That is not a point. Did it establish as
against Romeo and Ricciardello they had agreed that those two should have it in possession and with the relevant intent?
| MR RICHTER: | Yes. |
| BRENNAN J: | So that the proposition that you advance is that |
the conspiracy of its nature as alleged was that three of them had so agreed to that proposition?
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, Your Honour. |
BRENNAN J: Well now, it seems to me that that is where your
argument does succeed or founder.
MR RICHTER: That is what we need to show. In any event,
having taken the Court to the indictment, what we
say is that the Crown opened its case on the basis
that that was the agreement alleged. We take the Court first of all to page 54 of the appeal book
where Mr Davies, who prosecuted the trial, says as
follows:
What then is meant by the concept of
conspiracy? When one perspires - we all know what that means. When one expires - we all know what that means. When on conspires - if
you wish to take it literally, it means you
breathe together, but for more practical
purposes it means no more than an agreement.
A conspiracy is an agreement; a meeting of the minds of the persons said to be conspiring
and their corning to an agreement to which they
all lend their minds. In other words, they
put their heads together -
et cetera. I will go to line 31, if I may, where Mr Davies says this:
You will remember, Mr Foreman and ladies
and gentlemen, that a few minutes ago I said
to you that the only difference in the wording
of the first two charges in the indictment is
that the second one speaks of a furtherquantity of heroin, but with that difference
it can be said too that the Crown case is that
perhaps starting at the same time, but
certainly very early in the period in
question, there were running together these
| Romeo | 14 | 13/3/91 |
two conspiracies directed to different
quantities of heroin.
It may be that as time went by - and we
are only talking about a few days - the second
one really took over the first; but the Crown case is that early in the meeting of the minds of the three accused what they agreed to
obtain was a quantity of 1 kilogram of heroin,it being a part of a larger quantity believed
to be available, and that when they agreed to
do that the scheme was, the conspiracy was,
that they would get it into their control - in
that regard the Crown would say to you it
mattered not particularly who actually held
it, conveyed it, stored it, moved it - each of
them being of the view that it wasn't, of
course, to be kept under the bed but was to be
on-sold.
Each of them being of the view.
Either right at the start, or perhaps more
realistically firming up a little after the
start of their discussions, there was, the
Crown says to you in relation to count 2, a
separate - sure, they are very closely related
and the material relevant to them is largely
the same, but a separate agreement, a separate
meeting of the minds, a separate joint
formation of the idea of getting intopossession a further - and you've guessed it; the rest of the large quantity of heroin that they were discussing, with intent that that
further quantity should also be on-sold,
obviously for profit. Again, the Crown would
say to you that we are speaking of the
agreement, it being an agreement that they
would get it into their control, each of them
being of a mind that it would then, by one or
more of them, be on-sold.
Let's just go over that again because it is something that, at the start of a longish
trial, you really need to have a clear
understanding of, is it not, Mr Foreman and
ladies and gentlemen? The charge is that the
three accused conspired, that is agreed, to
possess, that is to have in their custody
and/or control, a quantity of heroin, namely
1 kilogram, with intent that that quantity
should be sold or supplied to someone else,
and it matters not the identity of the other
person or persons - simply, to use a phrase
that the Crown will use regularly through the
trial, to be sold, or on-sold, if you wish.
In relation to the second count, the same
| Romeo | 15 | 13/3/91 |
considerations apply, that there was an
agreement to get into possession, that is tohave possession of, a further large quantity
of heroin with intent that that too be
on-sold.
And so the intent is rendered essential to the
three of them.
If I can then take the Court to page 60. The
relevant pages are really pages 60 to 65. What our learned friend, Mr Davies, said was this: In very short form, and not particularly
attempting to use the precise words, this is
the picture presented -
and he then goes through what appears on the
various tapes, and at page 60 when he discusses the
morning of Thursday, 13 November, all three of the
accused being present and that is important at that
stage.
At page 62, line 10, relating to the conversations that take place, the case is opened
on this basis:
Throughout that, the accused Romeo not
being present -
this is the last three conversations -
Ricciardello constantly speaks of Ralph -
"Ralph said this. I will ask Ralph that." Between the two of them you can hear them -
that is Marinovich and Ricciardello -
calculate that they will need -
some amounts of money and so on. The learned prosecutor continues going through the tapes, and
having come through the tapes at line 40 of page 64
he says this: That is what the cook might call, Mr Foreman and ladies and gentlemen, a potted
version of what the Crown says can be gleaned
from these five devastating tapes - and they
are almost entirely the Crown case. There is
a web around it and there's formal evidence
to the charge of agreeing to get a kilo, of
agreeing as well to get the rest or as much of
the rest as can be obtained, and disclosing
the fact, as you listen to the ordinaryaround it, but that is the Crown case related got 4 ounces and got rid of it.
| Romeo | 16 | 13/3/91 |
What then, is the framework of the
evidence? Obviously, the formal evidence of
the planting of the device; the setting up of
the receiver; the listening, monitoringconversations -
et cetera. The evidence that the learned Crown prosecutor opens at that page is evidence of the
three of them, all three of them acting together in
all purposes, in our respectful submission.
It is clearer, we would say, when one comes to
deal with the closure of the Crown case because we
assert that the Crown closed its case upon the
basis of a three-party agreement agreeing to all
the elements, and if I can take the Court to
page 409 of the appeal books at line 13, the
learned prosecutor addressing the jury says this:
What then are we dealing with primarily
in this case, Mr Foreman and ladies and
gentlemen? Leave aside for a moment count 3,
which is something of an adjunct to the total
proceeding really. You're dealing with a
matter of conspiracy. What is it? Well, it may be more helpful to deal with
some of the things that it isn't. It isn't a
charge of actually doing the acts which were
being discussed. If you had a conspiracy to
murder, it goes without saying that no one
would be suggesting that anyone was murdered
because, had that been so, no doubt the person
would have been charged with it. So it doesn't involve_your deciding whether they
actually got hold of anything; nor, for that
matter, just how close to getting hold of it
things proceeded.
What it does involve your contemplating
and deciding is this: did they agree? That's an ordinary English word. was there a concluded agreement to commit the offence in
question -
"the offence in question", of course, being one of
possession for sale or supply, and what he is
saying is "Was there a concluded agreement between
the three to commit that offence?"
In saying that, that must encompass in it
the notion of all the elements of that offence
being agreed to by the three of them and he is
putting it up as just that, an agreement between
the three to commit the offence. When one analyses what that must mean, it must mean there has to be an agreement by all three of them to each element
| Romeo | 17 | 13/3/91 |
of the offence because otherwise they would not be
agreeing to commit the offence. One of the elements of the offence is the intent to sell or
supply to another. He goes on: that is, possession of heroin with intent to
sell or supply it to another? Those words may sound very simple, Mr Foreman and ladies
and gentlemen. Was there a concluded agreement to do this?
Of course the word, "concluded", needs to be
looked at, doesn't it? What do we mean by
that? No more than - a question for you - had
the matter reached a stage of their agreeingto carry ut a course of conduct which, if
done, would amount to the commission of the
offence it is said they conspired to commit -
would amount to the commission of the offence by
the three of them acting together in agreement.
| BRENNAN J: | Why the three of them? |
MR RICHTER: Because he is asserting that that is the
agreement: they agreed to commit the offence
together. Otherwise, he is not putting up athree-headed conspiracy and, what we say is, that
is precisely what he is doing. He is putting up
the three-headed conspiracy, the three agreed to
each element of the offence.
DAWSON J: Well, he does that because he is asking for a
conviction of all three, but the judge separated it
all out in his summing up.
| MR RICHTER: | The judge separated it out, in our respectful |
submission, in a different way and adverting to
different principles. What the judge, essentially, was doing was putting it as a three-headed
conspiracy and by some omission a part of the
which becomes important because after the judge transcript was not included in the appeal books summed up, there were exceptions taken to the
references to the issue of whether two could be
convicted. Exceptions were taken by all counseland, in effect, what the judge was saying, "This is a Shannon case. They all three get convicted or
they all three get acquitted". He did not expatiate on that greatly to the jury in the end but he did redirect the jury and there was one particular page of which we had faxed up this morning and, unfortunately, it contains the fax heading and the like, but at page 2218 of the trial transcript, the learned trial judge, in fact, redirected the jury.
| Romeo | 18 | 13/3/91 |
Not going so far as to go into great detail,
but having earlier said in argument, over the
objections to the charge, that this is a three ornone conspiracy in so far as the elements of
agreement to possess and agreement to on-sell are
concerned, he had some discussion with counsel
about why he left the possibility of two. What if, for example, one of the two - if there was not
sufficient evidence against one of the two - to
establish that he had agreed to deal in heroin as
against some other drug, and that is why he had
initially charged the jury on that. We would seek
to pass up to our learned friends and to the Court
photocopies of the particular page at which the
learned trial judge added an emphasis to the jury,
and what he said was this - and it is the second
paragraph on the page, when the jury came back in:
When I explain to you that you cannot
convict one accused alone on a conspiracy in the circumstances of this case, but that you
can convict two, that direction does not
diminish the fact that you are being asked to
find and deal with a case fought upon the
basis of a conspiracy of three people.
What, in effect, the learned trial judge was trying to tell the jury throughout his charge was that the concept of agreement required at least two people.
There is no agreement by one person with himself or
herself and because of that there have to be at
least two parties to an agreement but that,
essentially - and this is reinforced in the
redirection - the Crown case is that it is a
three-headed agreement and that is the way it was
put and presented throughout.
I was reading from page 410 of the closing
address by Mr Davies and he says:
Of course the word, "concluded", needs to
be looked at, doesn't it? What do we mean by that? No more than - a question for you - had
the matter reached a stage of their agreeingto carry out a course of conduct which, if
done, would amount to the commission of the
offence it is said they conspired to commit?
Why do I dwell on this, Mr Foreman and ladies
and gentlemen? No doubt you will hear a lot said about the difference between agreement
and negotiation, and it is a very important
difference, as a matter of law, but it also
needs to be very carefully understood and
applied. Negotiation, in the relevant sense
there, that is, as an appropriate
consideration when asking the question, "Was
there agreement or just negotiation?" means
| Romeo | 19 | 13/3/91 |
negotiation between themselves, negotiation
between themselves as a step towards coming to
an agreement amongst themselves. You can see why that's important. That, Mr Foreman and ladies and
gentlemen, is very different from the question
of whether they are still negotiating with
someone else outside their group, in thiscase, of course, the potential supplier, and
that wouldn't matter.
Now, the question about the possibility of
convicting two, not the three, was not of
convicting two of a separate conspiracy but of thetripartite conspiracy. In other words, for
example, Ricciardello's defence involved the
assertion that there had not been a concluded
agreement. It was all - not serious and not
brought to finality; as did Romeo's defence.Marinovich's defence involved the assertion that what he was doing was trying to get money from
Ricciardello who owed him money; trying, in the parlance used, to rip him off, the money. So he
was not really in agreement. The jury rejected all that and found finality of agreement between the
three. But the learned trial judge's reference to the possibility of convicting two would have to do with the notion that what if, for example, with
respect to Ricciardello, the jury entertained a
doubt as to whether or not he had gone to final
agreement with the other two.The other two would still be convicted if the
jury found finality of agreeing to the tripartite
conspiracy, although, as against Ricciardello,
there would not be enough evidence of finality, as
against Ricciardello. As against the other two,
there might well be enough evidence of finality.
In other words, the jury has no doubt that the
other two had determined to go through with the arrangement, the tripartite arrangement.
| BRENNAN J: | I am not following you there, Mr Richter, |
because are you describing the tripartite
conspiracy now as being one to which all three were
party and the membership of the conspiracy was an
essential characteristic of the conspiracy?
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, Your Honour. |
BRENNAN J: Well, how could it be that if an essential
characteristic of the conspiracy was that three
should have been party to it, that it would have
been open to the jury for two to be convicted and
one to be acquitted?
| Romeo | 20 | 13/3/91 |
| MR RICHTER: | Because the jury might find that on the |
evidence admissible against Marinovich, for
example, and, say, Romeo, that those two had agreed
and, in their minds, had concluded agreement with
Ricciardello as well; in other words, the
agreement to which they subscribed their names was
the three-headed agreement. But because of an evidentiary deficiency in the case admissible
against Ricciardello, because of, for example,utterances in records of interview which might have
cast doubt - which were not cross admissible, of
course - about his having come to a concluded
agreement in this concert of the tripartiteagreement, he is entitled to be acquitted because
of the insufficiency.
BRENNAN J: That can hardly be right, can it, because if the
tripartite agreement was the essential
characteristic of a conspiracy which gave it its
identity, it would be necessary to prove, as
against each accused, that all three had agreed,
not to prove as against two that they had agreed to
a three-party agreement but to prove as against
each that three had agreed? And that would have been on this state of the evidence, impossible.
MR RICHTER: | No, with respect, on the evidence admissible against each, just as it was possible as against | ||
| Darby to prove that he had agreed with Thomas that | |||
| it was not possible against Thomas to prove that he | |||
| had agreed with Darby. That is not a matter which | |||
| arises from the evidence that was commonly | |||
| admissible and formed the enunciation of the | |||
| formation of the agreement, namely of the tapes, | |||
| but that might arise because of the notion raised | |||
| by Ricciardello in police interviews with him that | |||
| it was not serious. | |||
| Now, if that is so then Darby would say, "Yes, you can convict two of the tripartite agreement | |||
| |||
| If, for example, Ricciardello had never been presented and the case is solely presented on the evidence against the other two, the two are | |||
| prosecuted, it is the Darby situation in the appellate forum, if we could put it that way. If only two of them had been prosecuted, and the | |||
| allegation had been, "You're guilty of a conspiracy | |||
| between the two of you and the third one who's not | |||
| |||
| prove, as against the two of you, that all three | |||
| agreed?" They could surely be convicted if the | |||
| evidence was sufficient to prove that. |
| Romeo | 21 | 13/3/91 |
If the third one is then brought to trial and
the evidence admissible against him because of some
peculiarities does not persuade a jury sufficiently
that as against him he had concluded an agreement;
not that he was party to a two-party agreement, butthe evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that
he had concluded a tripartite agreement, then he is
entitled to be acquitted.
That is essentially what Darby is about, in
our respectful submission, but it is not what this
case was about although the Court of Criminal
appeal sought to dismiss the applicants' appeals on
the Darby basis. Certainly there is a conspiracy
trial of three people going on, but there are three
trials going on within that one conspiracy trial.
Each one of those separate trials is aimed at
establishing that the particular accused had agreed
with the other two as to all elements of the
offence.
Now, as against one, there may or may not be a
sufficiency of evidence. If there is no
sufficiency of evidence he has to be acquitted and
can properly be acquitted. As against the other two there may well be a sufficiency of evidence
that they, in their minds, were agreeing to the
three-headed agreement and so they could be
convicted.
Essentially, in our respectful submission,
where the flaw lies in the Court of Criminal
Appeal's decision here is this: what they really
said was that the evidence admissible equally
against all of them was not capable of proving the
three-headed agreement because all it demonstrated
was that Marinovich would supply Romeo and
Ricciardello but he was not a party to the
agreement to on-sell to another.
Now, given that that conclusion emerged from on that issue, it was not possible as against the
the evidence that was identical against all three
other two to say that the evidence was capable of
proving that the other two had agreed to anything else because the objective situation of the analysis of the tapes demonstrated that the Crown
case against any of them could go no higher than toshow an agreement that Marinovich put Romeo and Ricciardello in possession but could go no further than that and could not prove that the three agreed that the heroin be on-sold to another. Therein, in
our respectful submission, was the error that occurred in the Court of Criminal Appeal.
MASON CJ: | Mr Richter, can you direct us to the passages in the summing up in which the trial judge indicated |
| Romeo | 22 | 13/3/91 |
to the jury that they could convict one or at least
two of the three accused?
MR RICHTER: Yes, those passages -
| MASON CJ: | Now, you have given us 2218. |
MR RICHTER: Yes, well perhaps what I could do is this: the
references in the summing up upon which we
particularly rely are references at pages 768 to
770 and 784 to 785 and also pages 790 and
additionally pages 855 to 856.
The Crown draws attention to some passages in
their summary of submissions at the following pages
which refer to the possibility of convicting two
and that is at pages 760, 768 - my learned friend's
notation there is line 14, it is in fact line 34 -
page 769, page 770 and page 857. There is also a
reference to that - which is not included by our
learned friend in his outline, but at page 853 at
lines 4 to 7 - but, in our submission - - -
BRENNAN J: Are there any passages in the summing up in
which the trial judge identifies the conspiracy by
reference to its content?
| MR RICHTER: | Yes, and those are really the passages on which |
we rely where he tells them what is alleged. If I could take the Court first to page 768 - - -
BRENNAN J: | When you say, "the passages on which you rely", that is the first set of passages you gave us? |
| Yes, Your Honour. At page 768, line 14, His Honour | |
| says this: |
Today, I am going to tell you about the
law of conspiracy. Tomorrow, I will give it a
little practical life in relation, I think you
will find, to the facts of this case. I say that to you now because, of course, examples are helpful but you must never let examples
from other circumstances interfere with your
judgment about these particular facts.
May I illustrate it in this way: a young
couple thinking about buying a house -
and then he gives an illustration, and at line 33:
What amounts to a conspiracy? Well, agreement is essential, and you must be
satisfied that two or more of these accused
agreed together to possess heroin with intent
to sell or supply it on the first count, and
also on the second. If I may use a very
| Romeo | 23 | 13/3/91 |
simple example, if it takes two to tango, well
it has got to take two to agree, hasn't it?
And that is really the context, in our submission,
which he is thinking about, the notion of two, the
explanation to the jury that it is the agreement
which is essential. The learned trial judge continues: People do not commit a criminal offence
merely by talking about the possibility of
committing some crime unless they reach a
stage where they have agreed to commit the
crime if it is within their power.
Furthermore, you must be satisfied that an
accused's mind goes with his words, and that
when he entered into the agreement, if you
find that he did, he intended to play some
part in the agreed course of conduct in
furtherance of its criminal purpose.
Now, you can have conspiracies where
there are major players and minor players.
Some people may just have a little part;
other people a very big part. It doesn't make
any difference. If they are agreed in the way
that I have described, then if you are
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the
elements in that particular case, then it
would be open to you to bring in a verdict of
guilty, but before you may convict these three
accused or any two of them of a conspiracy,
you must be satisfied that these accused had
passed beyond the sphere of negotiation or
intention. You must be satisfied that they have reached the stage when they have agreed
to commit the crime if it is within their
power.
For these conversations to constitute a
conspiracy, either on the first count or on
the second count, these accused must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have got beyond
mere negotiation to an agreement that, with
the intention of selling or supplying it to
others, they would get possession of heroin if
it was within their power to do so.
Now, the learned trial judge continues:
Possession of heroin is pretty simple for me to define in the circumstances of this case.
And he then gives them a definition of possession,
and at line 11 he says:
| Romeo | 24 | 13/3/91 |
As to the intent that it will be sold or
supplied, sell and supply have their ordinary
meaning. You don't need a judge to tell you what selling and supplying means. To sell is to dispose of heroin for a price or a
consideration. Supply covers the delivery of the drug from one to another and includes the
delivery by way of gift. In the context of this case, I don't propose to say a lot about
the evidence of intention because you might
think that the intentions are plain enough.
What matters are questions relating to
agreement and what the substance is, but I
shall have a lot more to say tomorrow about
what are the specific things that you have got
to consider.
It is not necessary for the Crown to
satisfy you that these accused had reached
agreement on all the ways and means by which
they would get or maintain possession or sell
or supply the drug. The whole object of the
crime of conspiracy is to make agreements to
commit crimes punishable even before matters
have even reached the stage of attempting thecommission of the crime, so it is no answer to
a charge of conspiracy for the accused to say
they have done nothing apart from talk,
because if the talk amounts to an agreement of
the sort I have described, that agreement is
the crime, and it is not an essential
agreement of the conspiracy charges in this
case for the Crown to prove that there was any
heroin to be had, or to prove why the
agreements it alleges were not carried
through, or that any accused knew that this
agreement was a crime. The crime of conspiracy is complete, even if afterwards the
conspirators repent, or stop, or have noopportunity to give the agreement effect -
et cetera. I have mentioned that you must be satisfied that at least two accused agreed in
that way because, as I have said, obviously
there must be at least two parties to anagreement, and on the first count or on the
second count you could convict all three, or
you could convict two of them, but if you
can't get to the stage of satisfaction that
two have agreed, in this case you should
acquit all three. You couldn't acquit two and leave one guilty of a count of conspiracy.
You will remember in what I am saying that
when I talk to you about conspiracy, entirely
| Romeo | 13/3/91 |
different considerations apply to the separate
counts against Marinovich.
Now, at page 784 the learned trial judge tells the jury how it was that Mr Davies opened the case:
yesterday I defined conspiracy to you in
general terms. From time to time I will come back to the definition. Now I will remind you
how Mr Davies opened these two conspiracies to
you, and I will read to you from pages 98 and
99 of the transcript.
The learned trial judge then reads those pages.
The opening never spoke of two agreeing to
on-sell. The sole agreement that the opening spoke of, and one could understand that in terms of the
fact that the Crown was trying to convict all three
of them, was always on the basis that the three
agreed to the elements. The three agreed to the possession. The three agreed to the on-sale. But what the learned trial judge does in
reading those passages from the Crown prosecutor's
opening is to put those assertions -
the three accused conspired, that is, agreed
to possess, that is, to have in their
custody/control ..... intent that it too be
on-sold.
That was the agreement alleged by the Crown - the
three of them did. And what the learned trial judge says at line 33 - and he is talking about
some criticism that Mr Heliotis for Marinovich made
about the way the case is put - he says that what
Mr Davies does is:
He didn't put a conspiracy to get 1 kilo of heroin no matter what the price, no matter
what the availability, no matter when it is available, but of course what Mr Heliotis is
saying is something that, when I come to deal
with his submissions - it is an argument that
he wants you to consider, and I will come back
to that.
That really relates to the question of finality.
The learned trial judge then continues:
True it is that if the agreement is to look at
things, rather than to do things, it is not an
agreement to possess, but when I come to
explain to you the particular facts of this
case, the law in relation to conspiracy, you
will see that you are constantly concerned
| Romeo | 26 | 13/3/91 |
with whether or not people have agreed to do
something or are still negotiating aboutwhether they will. No amount of wanting makes
a conspiracy, but if you do agree and you have
reached a concluded agreement, then you can
conspire, and I will come back to precisely
what the law is, but why I read out to you
what Mr Davies said at the beginning is
because those are the conspiracies that you
are concerned with and no other. If you see other conspiracies by any chance in the
evidence, ignore them. He has placed his case; that is the case he seeks to prove, and
you are not concerned with anything else.
If, for example, the evidence seemed to
prove a conspiracy to commit some other crime
than that he defined in opening; for example,
to possess some other narcotic or narcotics
generally, then the accused should be found
not guilty on these charges.
And this is all said in the context of the
Crown's opening, that the only agreement alleged is
the three-headed agreement where all three are in
agreement as to the elements of section 6(1); that
is, possess and the intent to sell or supply to
another.
At page 790, His Honour, at line 7, says,
having gone through the various general remarks:
With those general remarks we will turn
now to the first item of the agenda. Count 1,
matters common_ to all the accused - if you
wouldn't mind looking at your little check
list. First of all, agreement or merely
negotiations, and that embraces thesepropositions. Only the agreement that
Mr Davies opened on count 1 is the one that
matters, no other agreement - it's got to be that agreement. Has it arrived at being a concluded agreement of the sort I have
described, or are they merely negotiating?
And, once again, His Honour is reinforcing it
is only the agreement that Mr Davies opened which
is the one upon which the jury is to deliberate.And it obviously did because it found all three
guilty. And His Honour keeps repeating and endorsing what the learned prosecutor said in the
way he defined the agreement, as the only agreement
Accordingly, the applications for special
leave to appeal are refused.
AT 3.20 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
| Romeo | 80 | 13/3/91 |
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Criminal Law
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Evidence
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Charge
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Intention
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Sentencing
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Statutory Construction
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