Rojo Building v Jillcris

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CITATION: Rojo Building v Jillcris [2006] NSWSC 649
HEARING DATE(S): 22 June 2006
 
JUDGMENT DATE : 

22 June 2006
JURISDICTION: Technology & Construction List
JUDGMENT OF: McDougall J at 1
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 06/22/2006
DECISION: See para [55] of judgment
CATCHWORDS: ESTOPPEL - where Court on hearing (including of application for summary judgment) found pleaded cause of action unsustainable, gave reasons and made orders - where plaintiff has not sought to amend summons to allege alternative cause of action - whether parties estopped from contending to the contrary of orders made - whether matter should be reopened pursuant to UCPR 36.16(1) or inherent power of Court
LEGISLATION CITED: Building & Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999
CASES CITED: United Australia Limited v Barclays Bank Limited [1941] AC 1
PARTIES: Rojo Building Pty Ltd (Plaintiff)
Jillcris Pty Ltd (Defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 55002/06
COUNSEL: J S Drummond (Plaintiff)
M H Southwick (Defendant)
SOLICITORS: Hewitts Commercial Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Surry Partners (Defendant)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY & CONSTRUCTION LIST

McDOUGALL J

22 June 2006 Ex tempore (revised 23 June 2006)

55002/06 ROJO BUILDING PTY LTD v JILLCRIS PTY LTD

JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff as builder and the defendant as proprietor were parties to a contract made on 24 January 2005 whereby, in substance, the plaintiff agreed to construct residential premises at Bulli for the defendant. The plaintiff claims, among other things, that the contract was a "construction contract" to which the provisions of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (the Act) applied, and that the work carried out by it under the contract was "construction work" for the purposes of that Act.

2 The plaintiff claims to have served on the defendant a payment claim pursuant to s 13 of the Act. There is a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the date of service. Indeed, there is a dispute as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to avail itself of the mechanisms for recovery of progress payments laid down by the Act, but that can be put to one side for the moment.

3 The plaintiff claims that the defendant did not submit a payment schedule in response to its payment claim within the time limited by s 14(4) of the Act. Thus, on the plaintiff's case, it had available to it the options given by s 15(2). The first of those was to recover the unpaid portion of the claimed amount from the defendant as a debt due in a court of competent jurisdiction. The second was to make an adjudication application under s 17(1)(b) of the Act in relation to the payment claim. The plaintiff chose to proceed by way of the second option. It was therefore required to, and did, give the defendant notice of its intention to apply for adjudication, in accordance with s 17(2)(a) of the Act.

4 That notice was contained in a letter from the plaintiff's…

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Details
Case
[2006] NSWSC 649
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Rojo Building v Jillcris was heard before the court, where the central issue was whether estoppel applied to prevent the parties from disputing the orders made by the court. The plaintiff, Rojo Building, had originally brought an action against Jillcris, but after hearing arguments, the court determined that the cause of action pleaded was unsustainable. The plaintiff did not seek to amend the summons to allege an alternative cause of action. The court was required to decide whether the parties were estopped from arguing against the orders made and whether the matter should be reopened under UCPR 36.16(1) or the inherent power of the court.

The court considered the legal principles of estoppel and whether the orders made could be effectively contested by the parties. It examined the reasons provided for the unsustainable cause of action and the plaintiff's failure to seek an amendment. The court noted that the orders had been made and the reasons given, and that the plaintiff had not sought to challenge or amend these orders. The court determined that the parties were indeed estopped from disputing the orders, as they had acquiesced to the findings and reasons provided.

Based on the principles of estoppel and the conduct of the parties, the court concluded that the matter should not be reopened. It held that the orders made were final and binding, and that the parties were precluded from contesting them. The court did not find it necessary to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to reopen the matter. The orders made by the court were final and conclusive, and the matter was closed.

The court made orders affirming the estoppel and dismissing any attempts by the parties to dispute the orders made previously. The case underscored the importance of estoppel in preventing parties from challenging orders they have previously accepted.

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