Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd & Ors

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] FCA 195

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – consideration of an application to extend time for the filing and service of a notice of appeal – consideration of whether the judgment appealed from is an interlocutory or final judgment – consideration of an application for summary dismissal of the proceedings under both s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and Order 20, rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules – consideration of the relationship between approaches to the striking out of a pleading and entering summary judgment pursuant to either s 31A of the Act or Order 20, rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules.

BANKRUPTCY – consideration of the nature of a claim falling within the exemption contained in s 116(2)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and whether the applicant in the proceedings has standing to maintain the particular claim.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – s 24(1), s 24(1A), s 25
Federal Court Rules – Order 52, rule 10; Order 52, rule 15(1); Order 52, rule 15(2)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – s 116(2)(g)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – ss 52, 51AA, 60, 82, 87(1D)

Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1708 - quoted
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Fox Symes & Associates Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1071 - cited
Trade Practices Commission v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Limited (1989) 22 FCR 305 - cited
Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd & Ors [2006] FCA 434 - quoted
Munnings v Australian Government Solicitor (1994) 120 ALR 586 - cited
Tampion v Anderson (1974) 3 ALR 414 - cited
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 - cited
Little v Victoria (1998) 4 VR 596 - cited
Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 - cited
Platypus Leasing Inc & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation [2005] NSWCA 399 - cited
Johnston v Cameron (2002) 124 FCR 160 - cited
Port of Melbourne Authority v Ashun Pty Limited (1980) 147 CLR 35 - cited
Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 - cited
Ogawa v University of Melbourne (No. 2) [2004] FCA 1275 - cited
Jess v Scott and Others (1986) 12 FCR 187 - cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Maritime Union of Australia (2001) 114 FCR 427 - cited
Cox v Journeaux (No. 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713 - cited
Beckham v Drake (1849) 2 HLC 579 - cited
Wilson v United Counties Bank Ltd (1920) AC 102 - cited
Faulkner v Bluett (1981) 52 FLR 115 - cited
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) 75 FCR 545 - cited
Mannigel v Hewlett Phelps BC9101907 - cited
Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales & Ors (1988) 79 ALR 591 - cited
Fortron Automotive Treatments Pty Ltd v Jones (No. 2) (2006) FCA 1401 - cited
Duncan v Lipscombe Child Care Services Inc

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 195
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd & Ors, the appellant, Mr Rogers, sought to appeal against the decision of Justice Collier, handed down on 7 December 2006. The primary issue before the court was whether a claim for personal injury based on a contravention of section 60 of the Trade Practices Act could be considered a claim within section 116(2)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. This question arose from the contention that any legal action from a contractual relationship between a consumer and a corporation vests in the trustee in bankruptcy if the consumer becomes bankrupt.

The court examined whether the judgment rendered by Justice Collier was interlocutory or final. The respondents argued that the order staying the action on grounds of it being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process should be treated as an interlocutory judgment, as it does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. However, the court considered that if Mr Rogers were to commence fresh proceedings, he would face a contention of res judicata, suggesting that the order might have a final effect on his claim. Ultimately, the court concluded that the order was indeed final, as it precluded Mr Rogers from re-litigating the same claim, aligning with the observations of Gibbs, Mason & Murphy JJ in Port of Melbourne Authority v Ashun Pty Limited.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time to file and serve a Notice of Appeal, finding that Mr Rogers had not established an arguable error on the part of Justice Collier. Additionally, the court ordered Mr Rogers to pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application by the applicant in the proceedings for an extension of time to file and serve a Notice of Appeal filed on 15 December 2006 is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondents of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GREENWOOD J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GREENWOOD J

As to the question of whether a claim for personal injury based upon a contravention of s 60 of the TPA might give rise to a claim within s 116(2)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act, her Honour said this at [32]:‘Section 60 of the Trade Practices Act specifically applies to conduct in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a consumer or the payment for goods or services by a consumer, and therefore is founded in an existing (or possible) contractual relationship between the corporation and the consumer. In the event that the consumer becomes bankrupt, it follows that any legal action arising from the contractual relationship between the consumer and the corporation vests in the trustee in bankruptcy.’ [emphasis added] Justice Collier pronounced judgment on 7 December 2006. The method of pronouncement adopted was to publish the dispositive orders made by her Honour that day and to post the reasons for judgment to the parties. The date of ‘pronouncement’ of a judgment must necessarily be informed by the method selected by the judge to effect communication of the dispositive orders and particularly the reasons for judgment to the parties. Mr Rogers contends that notwithstanding the pronouncement of the dispositive orders on 7 December 2006 at 4.30pm by means of a telephone conference, the reasons were not received until 11 December 2006 and then by reason of the changes, the final reasons were received on 14 December 2006. It seems to me that if the judgment of her Honour is an interlocutory judgment, an application for leave to appeal ought to have been made within seven days of 14 December 2006 or, alternatively, within 7 days of 11 December 2006. The application by Mr Rogers was filed on 15 December 2006 and is thus within time. If, however, the publication of the dispositive orders by means of a telephone conference and the selection of a method of communication of the reasons to the parties by post constitutes a ‘pronouncement’ of the judgment on 7 December 2006, the applicant is out of time by one day. However, having regard to the chronology of events, I am satisfied that the applicant has sufficiently explained any failure to file an application for leave to appeal from the orders of her Honour within the time required by the rules on the assumption that the operative date of pronouncement is 7 December 2006. The more fundamental question is whether the applicant has established an arguable error on the part of her Honour. The respondents contend that her Honour’s judgment is an interlocutory judgment and although her Honour’s order finally disposes of the particular proceedings, an order staying an action on the ground that it is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process or an order striking out an action on the ground that the proceeding does not disclose a cause of action, has always been treated as an interlocutory judgment. Such an order does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties (Tampion v Anderson (1974) 3 ALR 414; Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423; Little v Victoria (1998) 4 VR 596; Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1; and Platypus Leasing Inc & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation [2005] NSWCA 399 [24] – [30]). The rationale for such an approach seems to be that no final disposition of rights occurs because there has been no adjudication of the controversy of fact nor a dispositive application of the law to the facts as found. A question might arise as to whether the order has ‘the practical effect’ of determining the claim of an applicant to a remedial order (Johnston v Cameron (2002) 124 FCR 160). One difficulty, however, is the respondents also contend that should the applicant commence fresh proceedings (assuming, as appears to be the case, the limitation period has not expired), Mr Rogers would be met with a contention of res judicata. If that contention is good, it seems to me that the order must necessarily be a final order consistent with the observations of Gibbs, Mason & Murphy JJ in Port of Melbourne Authority v Ashun Pty Limited (1980) 147 CLR 35 at 38.