Rogers and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2024] AATA 954 (3 May 2024)
Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2023/9882
Re:Stephen Rogers
APPLICANT
AndAustralian Securities and Investments Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member G Lazanas
Date:3 May 2024
Place:Melbourne
The application for a stay pursuant to s 41(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) is granted on the condition that the applicant does not give scoped advice for the duration of the stay.
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Senior Member G Lazanas
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of decision – decision regarding making of instrument cancelling applicant’s registration as a relevant provider and prohibiting applicant from re-registration for period of two years – provision of scoped advice – whether discretion of the Tribunal is enlivened to grant a stay – whether a stay is desirable for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing – applicant no longer providing financial services involving scoped advice – financial consequences for applicant – public interest considerations – significant portion of the ban period would have passed before the hearing and determination of the application of review – application for stay granted on condition that applicant not to give scoped advice for duration of stay
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 41
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 921C, 921E, 921ZC, 961B, 961G, 961J, 1041H
Financial Planners and Advisers Code of Ethics 2019Cases
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 181 FCR 130
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2007] NSWSC 1489
Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] 266 CLR 250
McLean and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 22
NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [1996] FCA 1134
Poidevin and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 124
Rent-to-Own (Aust) Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] AATA 68910
Schroeder and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 2453
Scott and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 798Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member G Lazanas
3 May 2024
INTRODUCTION
On 21 December 2023, Mr Stephen Rogers, the applicant, applied to the Tribunal seeking a review of a decision made on 1 December 2023 by the Financial Services and Credit Panel (the Panel) convened by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the respondent. The Panel’s decision was to issue an instrument to Mr Rogers to the effect that his relevant provider’s registration under s 921ZC(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act) be cancelled with effect from 7 December 2023 and, additionally, that he should be prevented from being registered under s 921C(1) for a period of two years (the reviewable decision). The Panel’s decision operates as a de facto banning order against Mr Rogers in relation to him giving financial advice and will be referred to as such in this decision in…
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- Case
- [2024] AATA 954
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the discretion under s 41(2) of the AAT Act was enlivened to grant a stay, and if so, whether a stay was desirable for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing of Mr Rogers' application for review. The Tribunal was required to consider factors including the applicant no longer providing financial services involving scoped advice, the financial consequences for Mr Rogers, and public interest considerations, particularly in light of a significant portion of the ban period potentially passing before the hearing.
The Tribunal reasoned that the discretion to grant a stay was enlivened. While acknowledging ASIC's submission that public interest considerations, including the deterrent effect of banning orders, favoured refusing a stay, the Tribunal also considered arguments regarding the public interest in the accessibility and affordability of financial advice, and the government's encouragement of scoped advice. The Tribunal noted that a significant portion of the ban would have passed before the substantive review, which weighed in favour of granting a stay to ensure the effectiveness of the hearing. The Tribunal also considered ASIC's intention to introduce additional client files not before the original decision-maker, which Mr Rogers' counsel argued was impermissible.
The Tribunal granted the application for a stay of the ASIC decision. The stay was conditional upon Mr Rogers not providing scoped advice for the duration of the stay. The Tribunal indicated that the question of jurisdiction, concerning the admissibility of the additional client files, would be determined separately.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the public interest considerations, Mr Rogers’ counsel pointed out that accessibility and affordability of financial advice have remained a clear and consistent objective of Australia’s recent financial services law reforms and that scoped (or scaled or limited) advice has been actively encouraged by the Government and ASIC. This was in order to promote access and affordability to the public of quality financial advice. Against that background, Mr Rogers’ counsel argued that ASIC’s approach of refusing to grant a stay in circumstances where the underlying decision may be set aside results in permanently and irreversibly penalising an adviser for simply giving scoped advice and risks undermining the objectives regarding the provision of scoped advice generally. On the other hand, ASIC emphasised the public interest having regard to the objects of the regulated industry, especially the fact that the concerns raised were with respect to Mr Rogers’ advice on an individual’s superannuation. ASIC submitted the public interest factor should be the primary consideration in determining the desirability or otherwise of a stay being granted because “the central consideration remains…good regulation and good administration”: Rent-to-Own (Aust) Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] AATA 689 at [47]. ASIC’s position is that the conduct of Mr Rogers indicates that UGC operates a particular business model in which clients are referred to UGC by Wealth Rite, and they are then provided with what is described as “scaled” advice but which in essence encourages them to set up a SMSF, roll over their existing superannuation and then invest in UGC related products, without Mr Rogers as the adviser appropriately conducting a full and independent assessment as to whether that approach is in the best interests of the client. Understandably, ASIC stated that is especially concerning in circumstances where clients were at risk of losing their lifetime superannuation savings in speculative or highly speculative products. ASIC added that it did not appear Mr Rogers had expressed any remorse or insight into his conduct as he stated in his witness statements that he had acted on his employer’s instructions and his advice was in the best interests of Ms Jarram. ASIC also stated it could not be satisfied that Mr Rogers would behave any differently even though he proffered an undertaking to not give financial advice of that nature and UGC was no longer operating that business model. I accept that the public interest is an important factor, and that banning orders also have been recognised as having a deterrent purpose not only against the recipient of the order, as in protecting the public against any misconduct of a particular person, but as a general deterrent in respect of others involved in the industry to signal the serious consequences which will ensue if they breach their duties: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2007] NSWSC 1489 at [103]. This factor favours the refusal of the stay order even though I accept that Mr Rogers is no longer engaged in giving scoped advice.