Rogers and Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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Rogers and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2024] AATA 954 (3 May 2024)

Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2023/9882

Re:Stephen   Rogers

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Securities and Investments Commission

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member G Lazanas

Date:3 May 2024

Place:Melbourne

The application for a stay pursuant to s 41(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) is granted on the condition that the applicant does not give scoped advice for the duration of the stay.

...................[SGD]..........................

Senior Member G Lazanas

Catchwords

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of decision – decision regarding making of instrument cancelling applicant’s registration as a relevant provider and prohibiting applicant from re-registration for period of two years – provision of scoped advice – whether discretion of the Tribunal is enlivened to grant a stay – whether a stay is desirable for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing – applicant no longer providing financial services involving scoped advice – financial consequences for applicant – public interest considerations – significant portion of the ban period would have passed before the hearing and determination of the application of review – application for stay granted on condition that applicant not to give scoped advice for duration of stay

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 41
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 921C, 921E, 921ZC, 961B, 961G, 961J, 1041H
Financial Planners and Advisers Code of Ethics 2019

Cases
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 181 FCR 130
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2007] NSWSC 1489
Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] 266 CLR 250
McLean and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 22
NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [1996] FCA 1134
Poidevin and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 124
Rent-to-Own (Aust) Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] AATA 68910
Schroeder and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 2453
Scott and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 798

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member G Lazanas

3 May 2024

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 21 December 2023, Mr Stephen Rogers, the applicant, applied to the Tribunal seeking a review of a decision made on 1 December 2023 by the Financial Services and Credit Panel (the Panel) convened by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the respondent. The Panel’s decision was to issue an instrument to Mr Rogers to the effect that his relevant provider’s registration under s 921ZC(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act) be cancelled with effect from 7 December 2023 and, additionally, that he should be prevented from being registered under s 921C(1) for a period of two years (the reviewable decision). The Panel’s decision operates as a de facto banning order against Mr Rogers in relation to him giving financial advice and will be referred to as such in this decision in…

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Details
Case
[2024] AATA 954
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for a stay of a decision made by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to cancel Mr Rogers' registration as a relevant provider and prohibit him from re-registration for two years. The application was heard by Senior Member G Lazanas of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).

The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the discretion under s 41(2) of the AAT Act was enlivened to grant a stay, and if so, whether a stay was desirable for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing of Mr Rogers' application for review. The Tribunal was required to consider factors including the applicant no longer providing financial services involving scoped advice, the financial consequences for Mr Rogers, and public interest considerations, particularly in light of a significant portion of the ban period potentially passing before the hearing.

The Tribunal reasoned that the discretion to grant a stay was enlivened. While acknowledging ASIC's submission that public interest considerations, including the deterrent effect of banning orders, favoured refusing a stay, the Tribunal also considered arguments regarding the public interest in the accessibility and affordability of financial advice, and the government's encouragement of scoped advice. The Tribunal noted that a significant portion of the ban would have passed before the substantive review, which weighed in favour of granting a stay to ensure the effectiveness of the hearing. The Tribunal also considered ASIC's intention to introduce additional client files not before the original decision-maker, which Mr Rogers' counsel argued was impermissible.

The Tribunal granted the application for a stay of the ASIC decision. The stay was conditional upon Mr Rogers not providing scoped advice for the duration of the stay. The Tribunal indicated that the question of jurisdiction, concerning the admissibility of the additional client files, would be determined separately.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

As these reasons explain, I have decided that the discretion under s 41(2) of the AAT Act is enlivened and that it is desirable to grant the stay order, regardless of the jurisdiction question. The jurisdiction question should be determined separately, if necessary, after the parties have filed their respective Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions. At the time of the interlocutory hearing, neither party had filed its Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND THE EVIDENCE The factual matters set out below are based on information extracted from the reviewable decision, the two witness statements of Mr Rogers dated 12 March 2024 and 27 March 2024, and the submissions of the parties with respect to the stay application. Mr Rogers did not give oral evidence and was not required for cross-examination by ASIC.Mr Rogers’ qualifications, financial planning experience and current employment Mr Rogers has a Diploma of Financial Planning and an Advanced Diploma of Financial Planning, each from Integrity Education Group. He is currently studying a Graduate Diploma of Financial Planning at Kaplan to meet educational standards required to be attained by 1 January 2026 for existing financial advisors. He plans to complete further studies, namely, a Masters in Financial Planning. Mr Rogers has been working in the financial services industry for over 10 years. This included being authorised to provide financial services on behalf of a former employer. On 2 May 2022, Mr Rogers commenced employment with United Global Capital Pty Ltd (UGC) which has approximately 35 employees, 1,400 clients, its own trading team, its own funds and substantial funds under management. Until the cancellation of his provider registration as a result of the Panel’s decision, Mr Rogers was an authorised representative of UGC. UGC holds a financial services licence and its sole director is Mr Joel Hewish.Advice to Ms Jarram and the relationships of relevant entities In May 2022, Mr Rogers was referred a client by the name of Ms Jarram. Ms Jarram was referred to Mr Rogers (and his employer, UGC) by a company called Wealth Rite Pty Ltd (Wealth Rite). Wealth Rite was previously a corporate authorised representative of UGC. Wealth Rite’s process appears to have involved cold calling potential customers to obtain information about their current superannuation and to provide them with information regarding different options. Wealth Rite then went on to “book” those people who expressed interest and met relevant criteria to have further discussions with their “specialists” in regard to their superannuation, including the possibility of earning potentially higher returns through a self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF). Mr Rogers stated his team leader handed him the client file of Ms Jarram which included a document tiled “Self-Managed Super Fund (SMSF) Establishment & Statement of Advice Proposal” (Proposal) signed by UGC’s CEO/Chief Investment Officer. The Proposal had been earlier sent to Ms Jarram. Mr Rogers was also provided with, and followed, a script to conduct his initial call with Ms Jarram.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Two other topics were emphasised by Mr Rogers’ counsel at the interlocutory hearing which it is necessary to additionally refer to. First, Mr Rogers’ counsel noted that ASIC had sought to introduce six additional instances or client files of allegedly deficient advice that were not before the Panel (the post-decision allegations), and which Mr Rogers had not had an opportunity to address. Secondly, Mr Rogers’ counsel urged the Tribunal to consider whether the nature of the penalty imposed on Mr Rogers – including the two year banning period - was unjustified and manifestly excessive in his circumstances. According to Mr Rogers’ counsel, the Tribunal is not empowered to consider the post-decision allegations for either the stay application or the substantive review more generally due to the legislative requirements in the AAT Act and the Corporations Act that the Tribunal must confine itself to the reviewable decision. Critically, Mr Rogers’ counsel submitted that the Panel had based its decision on a single client file. Furthermore, Mr Rogers’ counsel argued that ASIC’s attempts to refer to further client files changed the nature of the reviewable decision before the Tribunal. According to Mr Rogers’ counsel, ASIC’s proposal to introduce the additional client files was, therefore, impermissible. Mr Rogers’ counsel relied on Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2019] 266 CLR 250 (Frugtniet) at [15] per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ; Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 (Shi) at [147] per Kiefel J (with whom Crennan J relevantly agreed); and Schroeder and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 2453 (Schroeder). ASIC’s counsel opposed the stay of the banning order. ASIC submitted that the power under s 41(2) of the AAT Act was not enlivened such that a stay was necessary to effect the statutory purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing and determination of the application for review. Furthermore, ASIC argued that even if the Tribunal were satisfied that the effectiveness of the hearing may be jeopardised, it was not appropriate for the Tribunal to exercise the discretion because no evidence had been provided to support the proposition that, absent a stay, the hearing would be rendered nugatory or otherwise ineffective. With reference to the two additional topics raised by Mr Rogers’ counsel, ASIC’s counsel acknowledged that ASIC would be submitting that the Tribunal should vary the reviewable decision to increase the duration of the ban imposed by the Panel on account of the further client files which gave rise to further breaches of the Corporations Act. Nevertheless, ASIC’s counsel submitted that the jurisdiction issue raised by Mr Rogers’ counsel was misconceived and his reliance on the decisions in Frugtniet and Schroeder, in particular, was misplaced. ASIC’s stance was that the Tribunal was being asked to consider the same question that was before the Panel as the original decision-maker. Moreover, ASIC’s position was that it was entitled to add the additional client files as further evidence and that Mr Rogers was able to address the matters as part of the Tribunal proceeding in accordance with the position in Shi. ASIC argued that, in all the circumstances, the two year ban was also not excessive.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the public interest considerations, Mr Rogers’ counsel pointed out that accessibility and affordability of financial advice have remained a clear and consistent objective of Australia’s recent financial services law reforms and that scoped (or scaled or limited) advice has been actively encouraged by the Government and ASIC. This was in order to promote access and affordability to the public of quality financial advice. Against that background, Mr Rogers’ counsel argued that ASIC’s approach of refusing to grant a stay in circumstances where the underlying decision may be set aside results in permanently and irreversibly penalising an adviser for simply giving scoped advice and risks undermining the objectives regarding the provision of scoped advice generally. On the other hand, ASIC emphasised the public interest having regard to the objects of the regulated industry, especially the fact that the concerns raised were with respect to Mr Rogers’ advice on an individual’s superannuation. ASIC submitted the public interest factor should be the primary consideration in determining the desirability or otherwise of a stay being granted because “the central consideration remains…good regulation and good administration”: Rent-to-Own (Aust) Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] AATA 689 at [47]. ASIC’s position is that the conduct of Mr Rogers indicates that UGC operates a particular business model in which clients are referred to UGC by Wealth Rite, and they are then provided with what is described as “scaled” advice but which in essence encourages them to set up a SMSF, roll over their existing superannuation and then invest in UGC related products, without Mr Rogers as the adviser appropriately conducting a full and independent assessment as to whether that approach is in the best interests of the client. Understandably, ASIC stated that is especially concerning in circumstances where clients were at risk of losing their lifetime superannuation savings in speculative or highly speculative products. ASIC added that it did not appear Mr Rogers had expressed any remorse or insight into his conduct as he stated in his witness statements that he had acted on his employer’s instructions and his advice was in the best interests of Ms Jarram. ASIC also stated it could not be satisfied that Mr Rogers would behave any differently even though he proffered an undertaking to not give financial advice of that nature and UGC was no longer operating that business model. I accept that the public interest is an important factor, and that banning orders also have been recognised as having a deterrent purpose not only against the recipient of the order, as in protecting the public against any misconduct of a particular person, but as a general deterrent in respect of others involved in the industry to signal the serious consequences which will ensue if they breach their duties: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2007] NSWSC 1489 at [103]. This factor favours the refusal of the stay order even though I accept that Mr Rogers is no longer engaged in giving scoped advice.