FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rodriguez v Telstra Corp Ltd [1999] FCA 1400
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal, affirming decision of delegate of Telstra Corporation Ltd, rejecting applicant’s claim for compensation for major depressive disorder – Administrative Appeals Tribunal in error - matter remitted to Administrative Appeals Tribunal for further consideration.
WORKERS COMPENSATION – availability of compensation pursuant to Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 for major depressive disorder – status of respondent, Telstra Corporation Ltd, as “licensed authority” under Part VIIIA of Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 - whether events occurring in workplace, and conduct of officers of respondent, contributed in a material way to contraction or aggravation of applicant’s major depressive disorder – whether respondent liable to pay compensation in circumstance where applicant’s view of events occurring in the workplace (whether correct or erroneous) contributed to the onset or aggravation of his disorder – whether conduct constituting “reasonable disciplinary action” solely responsible for disorder.
WORDS AND PHRASES – “reasonable disciplinary action”.
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 4(1), s 24(1), s 27, s 107M
Commonwealth Employment (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1992 s 28
Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Amendment Act 1992
Part VIIIB
Commission for Safety and Rehabilitation of Commonwealth Employees v Chenhall (1992) 109 ALR 361 referred to
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing (1999) 161 ALR 489 referred to
Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch (1964) 110 CLR 626 followed
Westgate v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1987) 17 FCR 235 referred to
Kirkpatrick v Commonwealth of Australia (1985) 9 FCR 36 referred to
Re Welsford and Commonwealth Banking Corporation (1984) 1 AAR 42 referred toGABRIEL RODRIGUEZ v TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
QG 144 OF 1998SPENDER J
14 OCTOBER 1999
BRISBANE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QG 144 OF 1998
ON APPEAL FROM THE GENERAL DIVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY A SENIOR MEMBER
BETWEEN:
GABRIEL RODRIGUEZ
ApplicantAND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
RespondentJUDGE:
SPENDER J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 OCTOBER 1999
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The order made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 16 October 1998 affirming the decision of the delegate of 17 December 1996 denying compensation for major depressive disorder, be set aside, and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for further consideration according to law.
3.The respondent pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QG 144 OF 1998
ON APPEAL FROM THE GENERAL DIVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY A SENIOR MEMBER
BETWEEN:
GABRIEL RODRIGUEZ
ApplicantAND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGE:
SPENDER J
DATE:
14 OCTOBER 1999
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This application is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 16 October 1998, whereby the Tribunal affirmed…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1400
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the relevant legal principles, referencing previous cases such as Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch and Westgate v Australian Telecommunications Commission. The court noted that the triggering event did not need to be a special, unusual, or wrongful factor within the employment, but rather that the employment must have positively contributed to the condition. The court emphasised that the statute required only a contributing factor and that the irrational response of the plaintiff to an event did not negate the contribution of the employment. The court held that the Tribunal's approach was in error in not recognising that the employment could be a contributing factor to the plaintiff's condition, even if the plaintiff's reaction was irrational.
The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's decision and remitting the matter for further consideration. The court ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision underscores the importance of considering the broader context of employment contributions to psychological conditions, even when the employee's perception of the causative events is irrational.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The order made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 16 October 1998 affirming the decision of the delegate of 17 December 1996 denying compensation for major depressive disorder, be set aside, and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for further consideration according to law.
3. The respondent pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The principles to be applied in relation to Mr Rodriguez's case were referred to by Windeyer J in Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch (1964) 110 CLR 626 at 642, where his Honour said:"The question involved is difficult. Can the event to which a disordered mind irrationally attributes physical suffering, that is real to the patient but delusional, be properly called a contributing factor? Ordinarily concepts of cause and consequence are perhaps not applicable. Yet it seems to me that the incident which precipitated or stimulated, however irrationally, the worsening of her condition could be regarded as a factor contributing to it. It was said that in any event she might have broken down sooner or later: that some other incident might have provided a focus for her delusions. But it was this event at work that in fact did so."[my emphasis] In Westgate v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1987) 17 FCR 235, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had found that the applicant's depression, whether it was reactive or endogenous, was triggered by his having to work at all, rather than by some characteristic or condition of his work for the respondent, and considered some factor in the applicant's personal life or circumstances might just as readily have triggered his depression as did working for the respondent, or working generally. As a result of this finding, the Tribunal had affirmed a determination that the applicant's condition was not the result of the contraction, aggravation, acceleration or recurrence of a disease to which his employment was a contributing factor, as required by s 29 of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth). Davies J allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal's approach was in error. Davies J referred, at 239, to the observations of Windeyer J in Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd, to which I have referred, and then said at 240:"A like problem was examined in O'Neill v Commonwealth Banking Corporation (1987) 75 ALR 154. In that case, Pincus J went on to make plain a further point which is also relevant in the present appeal, namely, that it is sufficient that the employment contributes in a material way to the contraction of a disease, its aggravation, acceleration or recurrence. It is not necessary to establish fault on the part of the employer or any unusual stress or factor or special circumstance in the employment itself."Davies J noted:"As Windeyer J pointed out in Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch (supra) at 643, 'all that the statute requires is "a contributing factor" '. In the passage that I have set out above, Windeyer J pointed out that it is necessary to look "to what the worker in fact does in his employment". It does not matter that the worker's response to what occurred in the course of employment was irrational. It is sufficient that there was an incident or an event or circumstances in the employment constituting a fact or factors which contributed to the contraction of the disease, its aggravation, acceleration or recurrence. Windeyer J used the words "precipitated or stimulated". "Davies J held at 242:"Although the applicant had to show more than that the employment was merely the scene in which the development of his depression took place, a purely inert factor upon which the applicant's developing depression focused its attention, it was not necessary that the applicant show that there was a special, unusual or wrongful factor of his employment which was the contributing factor. It was sufficient that the employment positively contributed to the development of the applicant's depression, that is to say that the employment provided external stimulus to aggravate or accelerate his disease."