Robowash Finance Pty Ltd v Robowash Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   ROBOWASH FINANCE PTY LTD -v- ROBOWASH PTY LTD [1999] WASC 134

CORAM:   MASTER SANDERSON

HEARD:   21 JULY & 10 AUGUST 1999

DELIVERED          :   17 AUGUST 1999

FILE NO/S:   COR 136 of 1999

MATTER                :Section 459E, s 459G, s 459H & s 459J(1)(b) of the Corporations Law

BETWEEN:   ROBOWASH FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 062 596 203)

Applicant

AND

ROBOWASH PTY LTD (ACN 051 785 203)
Respondent

Catchwords:

Corporations law - Application to set aside statutory demand - Whether application properly made - Whether copy of affidavit served

Legislation:

Corporations Law, s 459G(3)

Result:

Application properly on foot

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr J V O'Dea

Respondent:     Mr M A R Blundell

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Mallesons Stephen Jaques

Respondent:     Solomon Brothers

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Barristers Board v Tranter Corp [1976] WAR 65

Cooke v Vaughan (1838) 7 LJ Ex 219

David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265

Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville (1988) 164 CLR 234

Manson v Ponninghaus [1911] VLR 239

Re Hinchcliffe [1895] 1 Ch 117

Case(s) also cited:

71 Paisley Street, Footscray Pty Ltd v Vineyards Estate Pty Ltd, unreported; FCA; 18 August 1995

Atherton v Jacksons Corio Meat Packing (1965) Pty Ltd [1967] VR 850

Australian Broadcasting Corp v Redmore Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 454

Bailey v Hinch [1989] VR 78

Beck v Scammell (1986) RTR 162

Chief Constable of Surrey v Wickens (1985) RTR 277

Elders Trustee & Executor Co Ltd v Sach [1944] SASR 65

Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan S/O Velayutham [1980] AC 331

Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund (1996) 70 FCR 452

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

National Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Commonwealth [1981] 1 NSWLR 400

Pacific Capital Ltd v BBC Hardware Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 1652

Re Commercial Trade Finance Pty Ltd (1995) 19 ACSR 188

Re Cotton Crops Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 328

Re Koscot Interplanetary (UK) Ltd Re Koscot AG [1972] 3 All ER 829

Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally [1999] HCA 27

Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 24 ACSR 353

The Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue, unreported; SCt of VIC (Beach J); 30 April 1997

Toovey v Chief Constable of Northampton (1986) Crim LR 475

Trycala Pty Ltd v Natures Realm (Australia) Pty Ltd [1998] 1023 FCA; 24 August 1998

Vicbar Pty Ltd v Development Constructions (Newcastle) Pty Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 1120

  1. MASTER SANDERSON: This is an application to set aside a creditor's statutory demand. The application is brought under s 459G of the Corporations Law. Section 459G(3) deals with the requirements for making an application. It is in the following terms:

    "An application is made in accordance with this section only if, within those 21 days [being the 21 days referred to in s 459G(2)]:

    (a)an affidavit supporting the application…

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Details
Case
[1999] WASC 134
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Robowash Finance Pty Ltd v Robowash Pty Ltd dealt with an application to set aside a statutory demand under the Corporations Act 2001. The dispute arose between the applicant, Robowash Finance Pty Ltd, and the respondent, Robowash Pty Ltd. The primary issue before the court was whether the applicant had properly complied with the statutory requirements for making an application to set aside the statutory demand. Specifically, the court had to determine if the copy of the affidavit served by the applicant was complete, as required by section 459G(3) of the Corporations Act.

The court considered whether the term "affidavit" in section 459G(3)(b) includes the annexures attached to it. The respondent argued that the application was not properly made because the copy of the affidavit served was incomplete, lacking four pages of annexures. The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and case law, particularly the High Court decision in David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation, to ascertain the proper interpretation of "affidavit" in this context. The court found that the statutory demand scheme imposes strict conditions for making an application to set aside a demand, and non-compliance with these conditions can result in the application being invalid.

In conclusion, the court held that the incomplete affidavit did not meet the statutory requirements, and therefore, the application was not properly made. The court dismissed the application, finding that the omission of four pages of annexures rendered the copy of the affidavit incomplete. The case underscores the importance of strict compliance with statutory procedures in corporate law matters.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court considered the operation of s 459G in David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265. The question in that case was whether or not it was open to the court to extend the 21 day period for making an application specified in s 459G(2). However, in the course of his judgment, Gummow J considered the operation of the statutory demand scheme as a whole. His Honour put the position as follows (at 276 ‑ 277):"In providing that an application to the court for an order setting aside a statutory demand 'may only' be made within the twenty‑one day period there specified and that an application is made in accordance with s 459G only if, within those twenty‑one days, a supporting affidavit is filed and a copy thereof and of the applications are served, sub‑ss (2) and (3) of s 459G attach a limitation or condition upon the authority of the court to set aside the demand. In this setting, the use in s 459G(2) of the term 'may' does not give rise to the considerations which apply where legislation confers upon a decision‑maker an authority of a discretionary kind and the issue is whether 'may' is used in a facultative and permissive sense or an imperative sense … . Here, the phrase '[a]n application may only be made within 21 days' should be read as a whole. The force of the term 'may only' is to define the jurisdiction of the court by imposing a requirement as to time as an essential condition of the new right conferred by s 459G. An integer or element of the right created by s 459G is its exercise by application made within the time specified. To adapt what was said by Isaacs J in The Crown v McNeil (1922) 31 CLR 76 at 100 ‑ 101, it is a condition of the gift in sub‑s (1) of s 459G that sub‑s (2) be observed and, unless this is so, the gift can never take effect. The same is true of sub‑s (3)." Assuming that the documents served on the respondent were a copy of the application and a copy of the supporting affidavit with four pages of the annexures missing, can it be said that the applicant has complied with the requirements of s 459G(3). In other words, is a document with four pages of the annexures missing "a copy of the supporting affidavit". If it is not, then, in line with what was said in the David Grant case, no application is properly made. The respondent's argument turns on the meaning of "affidavit" in s 459G(3)(b). Does it mean just a copy of the sworn evidence of the deponent, or does it include the annexures referred to in the text? The term "affidavit" is referred to in s 9 of the Corporations Law but the definition is of no assistance in the present circumstances. The Corporations Rules, O 81G, do not define the term "affidavit". Rule 9(1) of O 81G requires that where an application is to be served, a copy of the affidavit shall be served with it. However, as the requirements of s 459G(3) are quite specific, r 9 is of no assistance. There is nothing else in O 81G which impacts upon the matters in issue.