Robertson v State of Queensland & Anor

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Robertson v State of Queensland & Anor [2021] QCA 92

PARTIES:

MAUREEN JOY ROBERTSON
(appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first respondent)
GOLD COAST HOSPITAL AND HEALTH SERVICE
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 9488 of 2020
DC No 3311 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – [2020] QDC 185 (Barlow QC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

7 May 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

27 November 2020

JUDGES:

Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Henry J

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – MENTAL OR NERVOUS SHOCK OR PSYCHIATRIC HARM – AT COMMON LAW – FACTORS – EXISTENCE OF DUTY – BREACH OF DUTY – DAMAGE AND CAUSATION – where the appellant nurse alleged she incurred a psychiatric injury due to a breach of duty of care by the defendant hospital – whether the trial judge erred in concluding the appellant was not “bullied, badgered or mobbed” – whether during a performance management process the appellant exhibited signs heightening the foreseeability of psychiatric injury – whether the defendant owed the appellant a duty of care to protect from psychiatric injury – whether the alleged duty of care was breached – whether the appellant proved the alleged breach of the duty caused her psychiatric illness

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law(Queensland), s 237
Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 305B, s 305D

Eaton v TriCare (Country)Pty Ltd[2016] QCA 139, considered
Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44; [2005] HCA 15, considered
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377, cited
Robinson v State of Queensland [2017] QSC 165, explained
Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35, cited
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; [1980] HCA 12, cited

COUNSEL:

S D Anderson for the appellant
R C Morton for the first and second respondents

SOLICITORS:

Richardson McGhie Solicitors for the appellant
McInnes Wilson Lawyers for the first and second respondents

  1. FRASER JA:  I agree with the reasons for judgment of Henry J and the order proposed by his Honour.

  2. McMURDO JA:  The reasons of the trial judge are extensively analysed in the judgment of Henry J.  Substantially for the reasons which Henry J has given, I would dismiss the appeal because the respondents did not come under a duty to take reasonable care to avoid a psychiatric illness to the appellant.

  3. In Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd,[1] McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ said:[2]

    “It may be right to say that it is now a matter of general knowledge that some recognisable psychiatric illnesses may be triggered by stress.  It is, however, a further and much larger step to take to say that all employers must now recognise that all employees are at risk of psychiatric injury from stress at work.

    …

    The duty which an…

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Details
Case
[2021] QCA 92
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Robertson v State of Queensland & Anor, the appellant, Ms Robertson, a nurse, appealed against the decision of the trial judge that she was not subjected to bullying, badgering, or mobbing by her employer, the State of Queensland. The appellant alleged that she suffered psychiatric injury as a result of the defendant's breach of duty of care to protect her from such harm. The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the appellant was not subjected to bullying, badgering, or mobbing, whether the defendant owed the appellant a duty of care to protect her from psychiatric injury, whether the alleged duty of care was breached, and whether the appellant proved that the alleged breach of duty caused her psychiatric illness. The court found that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was not subjected to bullying, badgering, or mobbing was well open to him, and there was no basis to infer error. The court also found that the appellant did not exhibit signs heightening the foreseeability of psychiatric injury during a performance management process. Therefore, the court held that the appellant had not proved that the defendant breached its duty of care to protect her from psychiatric injury, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court's reasoning was based on the facts of the case as found by the trial judge. The court held that the appellant's evidence about some of the more extreme alleged features of the incidents went beyond or was inconsistent with her own notes about them. The incidents as found by the trial judge fell well short of having the character complained of, and they appeared to have been unremarkable workplace responses to managing concerns regarding the appellant's competency, particularly in administering medication. The court found that the appellant's feelings of exclusion and upset were not the result of deliberate exclusion by the defendant, and the registered nurses on duty comforted the appellant after the incident. The court also held that the appellant did not exhibit signs heightening the foreseeability of psychiatric injury during a performance management process, and therefore, the defendant did not owe the appellant a duty of care to protect her from psychiatric injury. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal with costs.

The court's decision was based on a careful consideration of the evidence and the applicable law. The court held that the trial judge's findings of fact were well open to him, and there was no basis to infer error. The court also held that the appellant had not proved that the defendant breached its duty of care to protect her from psychiatric injury. The court found that the appellant's feelings of exclusion and upset were not the result of deliberate exclusion by the defendant, and the registered nurses on duty comforted the appellant after the incident. The court also held that the appellant did not exhibit signs heightening the foreseeability of psychiatric injury during a performance management process, and therefore, the defendant did not owe the appellant a duty of care to protect her from psychiatric injury. The court dismissed the appeal with costs.

The final order of the court was that the appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that none of the grounds of appeal had succeeded, and the appeal must fail. The court ordered that costs should follow the event, meaning that the appellant would be responsible for paying the costs of the appeal. The court's decision was based on a careful consideration of the evidence and the applicable law, and it was a well-reasoned judgment that correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Consideration of the remaining complaints of error requires some overview of the facts of the case as the learned trial judge found them to be.FactsIntroduction Ms Robertson had a lengthy work history in the field of assistant nursing before qualifying as an endorsed enrolled nurse (EEN) in 2006 at the age of 52. In the hierarchy of nursing her new qualification meant she could administer medication and left her subject to the supervision of registered nurses. Ms Robertson had been working as an assistant in nursing at the Gold Coast Hospital prior to gaining her qualification and continued in employment there as an EEN. She commenced working as an EEN in the cardiology unit of the hospital in 2008. That unit neighboured the coronary care unit (CCU). While those units were separate wards, they shared a medication room and monitoring equipment and their nurses interacted with and helped each other. Ms Robertson worked in the cardiology unit on nightshift from the commencement of her time there through to and including the commencement in 2011 of the alleged incidents of badgering, bullying and mobbing. There was little call for her to administer medications when on nightshift. It is apparent from his Honour’s reasons that Ms Robertson’s evidence about some of the more extreme alleged features of those incidents went beyond or was inconsistent with Ms Robertson’s own notes about them. His Honour’s findings of fact involve repeated rejection of the more extreme aspects of the allegations. The incidents as his Honour found them to be fell well short of having the character complained of. Indeed, they appear to have been unremarkable workplace responses to managing concerns regarding Ms Robertson’s competency, particularly in administering medication.1 April 2011 – Patient death The first incident complained of was that on 1 April 2011, when a cardiology unit patient died, Ms Robertson was not offered any comfort, although a registered nurse was offered comfort in her presence. Ms Robertson had assisted the patient from the toilet to bed shortly before the patient died. No one appears to have been present when the patient died and the fact of the death was detected in the adjacent CCU where the patient was being monitored. Of the coronary unit’s two registered nurses, one, a young nurse, Ms Codd, was on a break and the other was elsewhere in the ward. The CCU monitoring nurse, Ms Brunton, went to the patient, found the patient to be dead and a medical alarm known as Code Blue or MET (for Medical Emergency Team) was called. When Ms Codd returned from her break to learn the Code Blue had been called and it related to one of her patients, she was very upset, not having previously experienced one of her patients dying on her shift. Ms Brunton and the other registered nurse on duty comforted Ms Codd. The learned trial judge accepted Ms Robertson may have felt upset and excluded but noted nobody knew Ms Robertson had had the last interaction with the patient and might be upset. His Honour also noted that after things had calmed down one of the registered nurses suggested Ms Robertson take a break. His Honour found there was no deliberate exclusion of Ms Robertson.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, ground five is merely a complaint about his Honour’s eventual conclusion, quoted above. On the facts as found it was a conclusion well open to his Honour and no basis to infer error was developed in submissions.Conclusion None of the grounds of appeal have succeeded. The appeal must fail. Costs should follow the event.Order I would order:Appeal dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established