Roberman v Metropolitan Health Service Board

Link copied
Case Copied 17 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   ROBERMAN -v- METROPOLITAN HEALTH SERVICE BOARD [2001] WASC 330

CORAM:   MASTER SANDERSON

HEARD:   27 NOVEMBER 2001

DELIVERED          :   4 DECEMBER 2001

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2202 of 2000

BETWEEN:   BRIAN ROBERMAN

Plaintiff

AND

METROPOLITAN HEALTH SERVICE BOARD
Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application to strike out parts of substituted statement of claim - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Hospital and Health Service Act, s 15

Public Sector Management Act, s 3, s 76, s 81

Result:

Leave to replead
Plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of the application

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr N W McKerracher QC

Defendant:     Mr R L Le Miere QC

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Clayton Utz

Defendant:     Blake Dawson Waldron

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596

Case(s) also cited:

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564

Attorney General v Quinn (1990) 170 CLR 1

Edwardes v Kyle (1995) 15 WAR 302

Johns v ASC (1993) 178 CLR 408

Roberman v Metropolitan Health Service Board [2001] WASC 74

Victoria v Master Builders Association (1995) 2 VR 121

  1. MASTER SANDERSON:  This is the defendant's application to strike out the plaintiff's substituted statement of claim dated 26 November 2001.  This is the second application brought by the defendant to strike out the statement of claim.  The earlier application was successful.  The pleading has now been substantially recast, some causes of action have been dropped and the remaining causes of action are more carefully particularised.  But the defendant says that the pleading is still defective and it cannot stand.  It is perhaps worthy of note that although the defendant seeks to strike out the substituted statement of claim, it does not apply for judgment in the action.  The defendant does not say that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action, but rather that any cause of action he may have is not properly pleaded by the present substituted statement of claim.  It is implicit in the way the application is framed that if it was successful, leave to replead would be granted.

  2. Because of the significant differences between the original statement of claim and the substituted statement of claim, it is necessary, to understand the grounds of the application to state generally the nature of the plaintiff's case.  I will deal more fully with the pleading below, but I will first set out the sequence of events about which the plaintiff complains.

  3. The plaintiff is and was at all material times the medical director of the obstetric clinical care unit at King Edward Memorial Hospital ("KEMH").  The defendant is responsible for running the KEMH and is the employer of the defendant.  As medical director, the plaintiff was responsible for the administration of the medical services provided by the hospital and for the clinical organisation of those services.  None of these matters are controversial and are common ground between the parties.

  4. In March 2000 the defendant, for reasons which…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Roberman v Metropolitan Health Service Board and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2001] WASC 330
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Roberman v Metropolitan Health Service Board, the plaintiff, Brian Roberman, sought relief on the grounds of a lack of procedural fairness after a review of obstetric and gynaecological services at King Edward Memorial Hospital (KEMH) led to adverse findings against him. The defendant, Metropolitan Health Service Board, brought an application to strike out parts of Roberman's substituted statement of claim, arguing that the pleading was defective and failed to properly articulate a cause of action. The court needed to determine whether the plaintiff's claims were adequately pleaded and whether any procedural fairness issues were properly raised.

The court found that while the plaintiff's initial pleadings had been substantially recast, certain paragraphs were still deficient. Specifically, paragraphs 8 and 9 of the statement of claim, which dealt with the plaintiff's legitimate expectations and the defendant's duty of procedural fairness, were flawed. The court held that these paragraphs did not sufficiently plead facts that could give rise to a right of procedural fairness prior to the review being conducted. Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff's reliance on the Public Sector Management Act was misplaced as the necessary facts to invoke the Act were not adequately pleaded. Despite these deficiencies, the court recognised that the plaintiff might have a cause of action concerning the handling of the review report by the defendant once it was in the defendant's possession. The court allowed the plaintiff general leave to replead and ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the application.

In summary, the court struck out certain parts of the plaintiff's statement of claim, granted leave to replead, and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff, Brian Roberman, was the medical director of the obstetric clinical care unit at King Edward Memorial Hospital (KEMH). The defendant, Metropolitan Health Service Board, is responsible for running KEMH and is the employer of the plaintiff. In March 2000, the defendant decided to set up a review of the obstetric and gynaecological services at KEMH, appointing two individuals to conduct the review. The plaintiff was not consulted about the terms of reference for the review. Upon completion of the review, the report contained findings which reflected adversely on the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that he was not given an opportunity to comment on the contents of the report and, as a consequence, he has been denied natural justice because of a lack of procedural fairness.

This is the second application brought by the defendant to strike out the plaintiff's statement of claim. The earlier application was successful, leading to the plaintiff recasting the pleading, dropping some causes of action, and more carefully particularising the remaining ones. The defendant argues that the substituted statement of claim is still defective and cannot stand. The application is heard by Master Sanderson.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Are the plaintiff's legitimate expectations as pleaded in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the substituted statement of claim valid and sufficient to give rise to a duty of procedural fairness?
2. Does the handing over of the report to the defendant by the individuals conducting the review amount to publication, thereby triggering a duty of procedural fairness to the plaintiff?
3. Does the defendant, upon receiving the report, have a duty of procedural fairness to the plaintiff to provide him with an opportunity to comment on the adverse findings in the report?

Held
1. The court concluded that the plaintiff's legitimate expectations as pleaded in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the substituted statement of claim were not valid and sufficient to give rise to a duty of procedural fairness. The court struck out these paragraphs from the statement of claim.
2. The court found that the handing over of the report to the defendant by the individuals conducting the review did not amount to publication, thereby not triggering a duty of procedural fairness to the plaintiff. The court struck out the related parts of the statement of claim.
3. The court held that it was arguable that once the report was in the hands of the defendant, a duty of procedural fairness arose, and the defendant had not complied with that duty. The plaintiff therefore had a cause of action in this regard.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the plaintiff's claim that he was not given reasonable notice and an opportunity to comment on adverse allegations in the report prepared by the individuals conducting the review, which he believed breached procedural fairness. The court examined the statutory provisions under which the review was conducted and the principles of procedural fairness as established in relevant case law. The court found that the plaintiff's legitimate expectations as pleaded in paragraphs 8 and 9 were not valid or sufficient to trigger a duty of procedural fairness, as they related to allegations made before the review was established. The court also concluded that the handing over of the report to the defendant by the individuals conducting the review did not amount to publication, and therefore, no duty of procedural fairness arose at that point.

Regarding the defendant's role, the court noted that while there was no duty on the defendant to make the findings public, it was arguable that they were authorised to do so. The court found that once the report was in the hands of the defendant, a duty of procedural fairness arose, and the defendant had not complied with that duty, as the report could potentially find its way into the public domain. The court allowed the plaintiff to replead his claim to address these issues. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a duty of procedural fairness may arise when a statutory body receives a report containing adverse findings that could potentially be published, and the person affected by the findings must be given an opportunity to comment on them.