Ritchie v The State of Western Australia
[2023] WASCA 120
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: RITCHIE -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2023] WASCA 120
CORAM: BUSS P
MAZZA JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 20 JUNE 2023
DELIVERED : 11 AUGUST 2023
FILE NO/S: CACR 57 of 2022
BETWEEN: ADAM SHAUN RITCHIE
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: BARBAGALLO DCJ
File Number : IND KAL 76 of 2020
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Appellant convicted on his pleas of guilty of aggravated burglary (count 1), stealing (count 2) and unlawfully driving or otherwise assuming control of a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner (count 3) - Appellant sentenced to 4 years' immediate imprisonment on count 1, 2 years' immediate imprisonment on count 2 and 12 months' immediate imprisonment on count 3 - The sentence for count 2 was ordered to be served cumulatively upon the sentence for count 1 and the sentence for count 3 was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for count 1 - Total effective sentence of 6 years' imprisonment - Double punishment - Section 11 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA)
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 371A, s 378, s 400(1), s 401(2)(ba)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), Sch 1, cl 5(1)(c)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 11(1)
Result:
Appellant's application for leave to adduce additional evidence in the appeal granted
Leave to appeal granted on ground 1
Leave to appeal refused on ground 2
Appeal allowed
Appellant resentenced
Category: D
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Ms S H King |
| Respondent | : | Ms K C Cook |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Legal Aid Western Australia |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Beekman v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 130
Kitto v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 161
Kolek v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 180
Pryor v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 143
Taylor v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 38
Thompson v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 1
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
This is an appeal against sentence.
The appellant was convicted, on his pleas of guilty, of three counts in an indictment.
Count 1 alleged that on 24 April 2020, at Kambalda East, the appellant, James Daniel Pugh and Thomas Luke Gibbons, while in the place of Royal Nickel Corporation without its consent, committed the offence of stealing, contrary to s 401(2)(ba) of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Code). The count also pleaded, as circumstances of aggravation, that the appellant and his co‑offenders were in company with each other and that the appellant and his co‑offenders were armed or pretended to be armed with a dangerous weapon, namely a firearm.
Count 2 alleged that on the same date and at the same place as in count 1, the appellant, Mr Pugh and Mr Gibbons stole gold ore, a safe, welding equipment, chains and car keys, the property of Royal Nickel Corporation, contrary to s 378 of the Code.
Count 3 alleged that on the same date and at the same place as in count 1, the appellant, Mr Pugh and Mr Gibbons unlawfully drove or otherwise assumed control of a motor vehicle, namely a Toyota LandCruiser the property of HMR Drilling Pty Ltd, without the consent of HMR Drilling Pty Ltd, contrary to s 371A read with s 378 of the Code.
The maximum penalty for count 1 is 20 years' imprisonment. The maximum penalty for each of counts 2 and 3 is 7 years' imprisonment.
On 16 June 2022, Barbagallo DCJ imposed on the appellant the following individual sentences of immediate imprisonment:
(a)Count 1: 4 years;
(b)Count 2: 2 years (reduced from 2 years 6 months in the application of the totality principle); and
(c)Count 3: 12 months.
Her Honour ordered that the sentence for count 2 be served cumulatively upon the sentence for count 1 and that the sentence for count 3 be served concurrently with the sentence for count 1. The total effective sentence was therefore 6 years' imprisonment. The sentence was backdated to 24 December 2021 to take account of time the appellant had spent in custody solely in relation to this offending. A parole eligibility order was made.
The appellant relies upon two grounds of appeal. Ground 1 alleges in essence that the primary judge contravened s 11 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) by ordering that the individual sentence for count 2 be served cumulatively upon the individual sentence for count 1. Ground 2 alleges in essence that the total effective sentence of 6 years' imprisonment offended the first limb of the totality principle. The State conceded ground 1 but not ground 2.
At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal, the court informed counsel that the court was unanimously of the opinion that:
(a)the State's concession in relation to ground 1 was properly made;
(b)it was unnecessary to determine ground 2; and
(c)in the circumstances, counsel should make submissions in relation to the resentencing by this court of the appellant.
The hearing of the appeal proceeded on that basis.
In our opinion, leave to appeal should be granted on ground 1; leave to appeal should be refused on ground 2; the appeal should be allowed; and the appellant should be resentenced by this court. Our reasons are as follows.
The facts and circumstances of the offending
The facts and circumstances of the offending, as found by the primary judge or not in contest between the parties, are as follows.
The complainant in counts 1 and 2, namely Royal Nickel Corporation, operated the Beta Hunt Goldmine at Kambalda East.
The complainant in count 3, namely HMR Drilling Pty Ltd, stored its vehicles at the Beta Hunt Goldmine.
On the afternoon of 24 April 2020, the geology manager and general manager of Beta Hunt Goldmine left about 85 kg of gold ore in a locked shipping container at the mine site. The shipping container also contained a locked safe which at the time, and unknown to the appellant and his co‑offenders, was empty. The gold ore contained about 100 oz of gold with an estimated value of $270,500.
At about 9.51 pm on 24 April 2020, the appellant and his co‑offenders drove a dual cab Toyota LandCruiser, with a hydraulic loading crane, to the Beta Hunt Goldmine. The appellant and his co‑offenders covered their faces with balaclavas. The actions of the appellant and his co‑offenders at the Beta Hunt Goldmine were captured on CCTV footage.
The appellant and his co‑offenders did not have permission to be at the Beta Hunt Goldmine. They were not entitled to use any equipment at the Beta Hunt Goldmine or to remove any gold, gold ore, vehicles or equipment from that site.
Upon arrival at the Beta Hunt Goldmine, the dual cab Toyota LandCruiser driven by the appellant and his co‑offenders stopped at the front of the shipping container. The appellant and his co‑offenders alighted from their vehicle. They used an angle grinder to cut open the padlocks on the shipping container. The appellant and his co‑offenders then removed the gold ore from the shipping container and used the hydraulic loading crane to deposit the gold ore in the rear of their dual cab Toyota LandCruiser.
Next, the appellant and his co‑offenders removed an oxyacetylene set and associated equipment from a workshop that adjoined the shipping container. They used that equipment to attempt to cut open the safe while the safe was still in the shipping container. Their efforts were unsuccessful.
The appellant and his co‑offenders then affixed chains to the safe and used a front‑end loader at the site to remove the safe from the shipping container. The appellant and his co‑offenders placed the safe onto another LandCruiser vehicle that was at the site. This LandCruiser vehicle was owned by HMR Drilling Pty Ltd. The vehicle had an estimated value of $52,000.
During the carrying out of the burglary, one of the appellant's co‑offenders retrieved a rifle with a cut down stock from the dual cab Toyota LandCruiser. This co‑offender carried the rifle while he walked around the site.
The appellant and his co‑offenders put the oxyacetylene set and associated equipment into the LandCruiser belonging to HMR Drilling Pty Ltd. They then repositioned the front‑end loader and another vehicle that was at the site across an access road.
Next, the appellant and his co‑offenders left the Beta Hunt Goldmine with their dual cab LandCruiser and the LandCruiser belonging to HMR Drilling Pty Ltd.
The appellant and his co‑offenders were at the Beta Hunt Goldmine for about 30 minutes while they carried out the offending.
In addition to the gold (with an estimated value of $270,500) and the LandCruiser belonging to HMR Drilling Pty Ltd (with an estimated value of $52,000), the appellant and his co‑offenders stole the safe (which had a value of about $3,000), the oxyacetylene set and associated equipment (which had a value of about $1,300), chains and straps (which had a value of about $150) and car keys (which had a value of about $100).
On 26 April 2020, police located the stolen LandCruiser and the stolen safe at a remote location. Both the LandCruiser and the safe had been destroyed by fire.
On 2 May 2020, police arrested the appellant. The appellant participated in an electronically recorded interview with police. He denied having participated in the offending. The appellant told the police of his involvement at that time with the Gypsy Jokers motorcycle gang in Kalgoorlie.
During the investigation, police recovered, at various locations, gold ore containing about 20 oz of gold. The gold was linked forensically to the Beta Hunt Goldmine. The remaining gold ore, containing about 80 oz of gold, has not been recovered.
The primary judge's sentencing remarks including the appellant's personal circumstances
The appellant was aged 28 years at the time of the offending and was aged 30 when sentenced.
The appellant was born in New Zealand. He moved to Australia when he was aged 18. Since August 2020, the appellant has been in a relationship. His partner is supportive of him. The appellant has a good relationship with his partner's two sons. The appellant has been in regular employment since his arrival in Western Australia. At the time of the offending he was employed by a drilling services company in Kalgoorlie. Subsequently, the appellant ceased to be employed by that company but, while on bail before he was sentenced, he worked as a concreter.
The appellant has good physical and mental health. He admitted having used illicit drugs, but said his drug use was not a factor in his offending.
The appellant has a prior criminal record. His previous convictions comprise multiple traffic offences and one offence of disorderly behaviour in public. All of the previous offences were punished by fines.
The primary judge observed that the appellant's pleas of guilty were made 'at a very late stage' (ts 170). Nevertheless, her Honour allowed a discount of 10%, pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act, on the head sentence she would otherwise have imposed for each offence.
Her Honour said that, when initially confronted by police, the appellant denied any involvement in the offending. This stance of denial continued until mid‑May 2022. Her Honour noted that the appellant had 'every opportunity of providing information about where the unaccounted gold can be located', but he had failed to provide any information (ts 170). Her Honour also noted that the appellant had 'every opportunity of providing information about where the firearm [carried by the appellant's co‑offender while walking around the site] can be located', but he had failed to provide any information (ts 170).
The primary judge found that the appellant had failed to show 'real remorse' and that any remorse he had demonstrated was limited to his pleas of guilty (ts 170).
Her Honour referred to a number of written references from people who spoke well of the appellant.
The primary judge said that she was unable to make a finding as to the factors that had contributed to the appellant's offending, apart from his financial distress. In those circumstances, her Honour was unable to make any assessment about the appellant's prospects of rehabilitation.
Her Honour recognised that general deterrence was a significant sentencing factor. The object of the offending was to steal gold. Her Honour added that gold was readily available in the Kalgoorlie area and was attractive to thieves who 'wish[ed] to get rich quick without putting in the time, effort and money to obtain the gold legitimately' (ts 172 ‑ 173).
The primary judge had regard to the impact of the offending on the complainants. Her Honour observed (ts 166 ‑ 167):
(a)the nature of gold mining makes the industry vulnerable to theft;
(b)the complainants had invested significant amounts of money in infrastructure, equipment, exploration and staff;
(c)if offending of the kind in question became prevalent, it would impact on the willingness of companies to invest significantly in their businesses and employ large numbers of people who live in communities such as Kalgoorlie;
(d)gold is a metal that has many uses in the community, including in the medical field; and
(e)the impact of offending of the kind in question is likely to be passed on to consumers by increases in the cost of gold, and this in turn may cause employees to lose their jobs.
Her Honour noted a number of serious features of the offending. First, the offending was planned and premeditated (ts 172). Secondly, the appellant committed the offending in company to ensure that the gold was located and removed from the site quickly and efficiently (ts 172). Thirdly, the offending was protracted, persistent and committed at night (ts 172 ‑ 173). Fourthly, while committing the offences the appellant attempted to conceal his identity. Fifthly, during the offending a co‑offender retrieved a firearm from the dual cab Toyota LandCruiser and carried the firearm while he walked around the site. Matters could have escalated seriously if another person had arrived at the scene (ts 173). Sixthly, a substantial quantity of property was stolen. The total value of the stolen property was about $327,500. A significant amount of the stolen property was not recovered. The stolen safe and the stolen LandCruiser were destroyed by fire (ts 161, 164 ‑ 166, 173).
The primary judge emphasised the importance of personal and general deterrence as sentencing factors.
As we have mentioned, her Honour sentenced the appellant on 16 June 2022. However, her Honour backdated the sentence to 24 December 2021 to take account of time the appellant had spent in custody solely in relation to this offending. During that period in custody the appellant had been held in a cell for 22½ hours per day as a result of operational constraints at Hakea Prison during the Covid 19 pandemic. Her Honour said that 'being held [for] 22½ hours in a cell, day after day, [was an] additional hardship' which she took into account in sentencing the appellant (ts 174). Other mitigating factors comprised the appellant's pleas of guilty, his good work history and the support and care he had given to his partner and her children.
Ground 1 of the appeal
As we have mentioned, ground 1 alleges in essence that the primary judge contravened s 11 of the Sentencing Act by ordering that the individual sentence for count 2 be served cumulatively upon the individual sentence for count 1.
The counts in the indictment were pleaded, relevantly, as follows:
(1)On 24 April 2020 at Kambalda East, [the appellant and his co‑offenders], while in the place of Royal Nickel Corporation without its consent, committed the offence of stealing.
…
(2)On the same date and at the same place as in Count 1, [the appellant and his co‑offenders] stole gold ore, a safe, welding equipment, chains, and car keys, the property of Royal Nickel Corporation.
(3)On the same date and at the same place as in Count 1, [the appellant and his co-offenders] unlawfully drove or otherwise assumed control of a motor vehicle, namely a Toyota Land Cruiser … the property of HMR Drilling Pty Ltd, without the consent of HMR Drilling Pty Ltd.
As we have mentioned, count 1 was an offence contrary to s 401(2)(ba) of the Code; count 2 was an offence contrary to s 378 of the Code; and count 3 was an offence contrary to s 371A read with s 378 of the Code.
Section 401(2)(ba) of the Code provides, relevantly, that a person 'who commits an offence in the place of another person, when in that place without that other person's consent, is guilty of a crime'.
The term 'place' is defined in s 400(1) as follows:
place means a building, structure, tent, or conveyance, or a part of a building, structure, tent, or conveyance, and includes -
(a)a conveyance that at the time of an offence is immovable; or
(b)a place that is from time to time uninhabited or empty of property.
The term 'conveyance' is defined in s 1(1) to mean 'a vehicle, vessel or aircraft made, adapted, used or intended to be used for the carriage of persons or goods'.
Section 400(2) provides, relevantly, that 'a person enters or is in a place as soon as … any part of the person's body … or … any part of anything in the person's possession or under the person's control … is in the place'.
The current definition of 'place' in s 400(1) was inserted by the Criminal Code Amendment Act (No 2) 1996 (WA).
The legislative history in Western Australia and some other jurisdictions in relation to the offence of burglary was summarised by Mr M J Murray in his report 'The Criminal Code: A General Review' (1983) pp 258 ‑ 262.
The current definition of 'place' in s 400(1) and the current provisions in s 401(2)(ba) reflect in substance recommendations made by Mr Murray in his report.
In the present case, count 1 pleaded that the charged offence occurred on 24 April 2020 at Kambalda East. Each of count 2 and count 3, in pleading that the charged offence occurred '[o]n the same date and at the same place as in count 1', alleged that the charged offence occurred on 24 April 2020 at Kambalda East.
Each of these features of count 1, count 2 and count 3 reflect the requirements of clause 5(1)(c) of Sch 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). Clause 5(1)(c) states, relevantly, that a charge in an indictment must inform the accused of the alleged offence in enough detail to enable the accused to understand and defend the charge, and in particular must identify with reasonable clarity the date when the offence was committed or, if the date is not known, the period in which the offence was committed, and where the offence was committed.
The reference in each of count 2 and count 3 to 'the same place as in count 1' was a reference to Kambalda East and not a reference to that part of count 1 which pleads that the appellant and his co‑offenders committed the offence of stealing 'while in the place of Royal Nickel Corporation without its consent'. (emphasis added)
Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the State submitted that 'the place of Royal Nickel Corporation' where the appellant and his co‑offenders committed the offence of stealing was:
(a)the shipping container in which the gold ore and the safe particularised in count 2 were located; and
(b)the workshop (adjacent to the shipping container) where the other items particularised in count 2 were located. (emphasis added)
Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the State also submitted that 'the place of Royal Nickel Corporation' pleaded in count 1, where the appellant and his co‑offenders committed the offence of stealing, did not include the open unimproved area on which the LandCruiser particularised in count 3 was located when it was stolen by the appellant and his co‑offenders. (emphasis added)
Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the State further submitted that count 2 (and not count 3) was the grounding offence for count 1.
Unfortunately, at the sentencing hearing before her Honour, the question of the grounding offence for count 1 and the question of the avoidance of double punishment were not addressed.
It is not apparent from the primary judge's sentencing remarks that her Honour reduced the sentence she would otherwise have imposed for count 1 or count 2 for the purpose of avoiding double punishment.
The submissions of counsel for the appellant and counsel for the State to which we have referred at [57], [58] and [59] above should be accepted. It is apparent from the pleading of the counts in the indictment, in combination with the facts and circumstances of the offending as found by the primary judge or not in contest between the parties, that the place of Royal Nickel Corporation referred to in count 1 comprised the sea container and the workshop (adjacent to the shipping container). The place of Royal Nickel Corporation referred to in count 1 did not include the open unimproved area of land on which the LandCruiser particularised in count 3 was located when it was stolen. Count 2 (and not count 3) was the grounding offence for count 1.
In Beekman v The State of Western Australia,[1] Buss P, Mazza and Mitchell JJA summarised the common law principle concerning the avoidance of double punishment where an offender has committed multiple offences with common elements and the principles embodied in s 11(1) of the Sentencing Act. Their Honours said [43] ‑ [46]:
[1] Beekman v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 130.
It is a well established common law principle that when an offender is to be sentenced for multiple offences which contain one or more common legal or factual elements, care must be taken by the sentencing court to avoid punishing the offender twice (or more) for the commission of the common elements. See Pearce v The Queen; Johnson v The Queen.
No single correct mechanism exists for avoiding double (or more) punishment. For example, that outcome may be avoided by reducing the otherwise appropriate sentence for an offence or by ordering partial or total concurrency in relation to two or more sentences. See Cotterill v The State of Western Australia; Hunter-Aragu v The State of Western Australia.
Section 11(1) of the Sentencing Act provides:
If the evidence necessary to establish the commission by a person of an offence under the law of this State is also the evidence necessary to establish the commission by that person of another such offence, the person may be charged and convicted of each offence but is not to be sentenced for more than one of the offences.
In Kelly v The State of Western Australia, this court held [29]:
(a)The commission of an offence is not established unless and until all of its elements are proved.
(b)Accordingly, the phrase 'the evidence necessary to establish the commission by a person of an offence', within s 11(1), refers to the evidence necessary to establish all of the elements of the offence.
(c)That proposition also applies to the phrase 'the evidence necessary to establish the commission … of another offence', within s 11(1).
(d)Section 11(1) is therefore engaged if, and only if, the evidence necessary to establish the commission of one offence establishes, without more, all of the elements of, and consequently the commission of, another offence.
(e)Section 11(1) does not apply where there is overlap between the evidence required to establish the two offences, but where each offence requires some distinct additional evidence to establish the commission of that offence. (footnotes omitted)
In the present case, the grounding offence for the aggravated burglary offence charged in count 1 was stealing gold ore, a safe, welding equipment, chains and car keys the property of Royal Nickel Corporation. The property the subject of the stealing offence charged in count 2 was not different from the property the subject of the grounding offence for the aggravated burglary offence charged in count 1.
In the circumstances, the evidence necessary to establish the commission of count 1 also established, without more, all of the elements of, and consequently the commission of, count 2. No distinct additional evidence was required to establish the commission of count 2.
Consequently, the common law principle against double punishment and s 11(1) of the Sentencing Act precluded the primary judge from imposing additional punishment or sentencing the appellant for count 2. Her Honour infringed the common law principle and s 11(1) by sentencing the appellant for count 2 and ordering that the sentence for count 2 be served cumulatively upon the sentence for count 1.
Ground 1 has been made out.
Ground 2 of the appeal
As we have mentioned, it is unnecessary to determine ground 2.
The outcome of the appeal and the resentencing of the appellant
We would allow the appeal.
The sentences for count 1 and count 2 should be set aside. The sentence for count 3 was not challenged and that sentence should stand. The primary judge's orders for concurrency, cumulacy, the backdating of the total effective sentence and parole eligibility should be set aside.
This court has the material necessary to resentence the appellant.
By an application in an appeal filed 19 June 2023, the appellant applied for leave to adduce additional evidence in the appeal in connection with the appellant's resentencing. The State consented to the application. We would grant the application and admit the additional evidence, which is to the following effect:
(a)The appellant has participated in The Whitehaven Clinic's 'Addiction Recovery Process Program' while in custody. He has engaged well with counselling and is making steady progress in developing insight into his patterns of behaviour.
(b)Two written references, one from the appellant's mother and the other from his partner, state that they have observed a positive change in the appellant's outlook (including the expression of remorse and regret for his offending) while he has been in custody.
At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant and counsel for the State made submissions in relation to the resentencing. Counsel for the appellant mentioned that the appellant's security status in prison was about to be downgraded to minimum security as a result of his good behaviour while in custody.
Like the primary judge, we would allow a discount of 10%, pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act, on the head sentence we would otherwise have imposed for count 1.
We have taken into account the sentencing patterns for aggravated burglary offences that have emerged from previous decisions of this court in respect of offending that has some features comparable to the appellant's offending. See, for example, Thompson v The State of Western Australia;[2] Pryor v The State of Western Australia;[3] Taylor v The State of Western Australia;[4] Kolek v The State of Western Australia;[5] Kitto v The State of Western Australia.[6] In recent years this court has emphasised on numerous occasions the necessity for the firming up of sentences for aggravated home burglary offences. Sentences for offences involving the aggravated burglary of commercial premises should also be firmed up.
[2] Thompson v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 1.
[3] Pryor v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 143.
[4] Taylor v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 38.
[5] Kolek v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 180.
[6] Kitto v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 161.
We have taken into account, and allowed a discount for, the mitigating factors (apart from the pleas of guilty) referred to by the primary judge and the matters of mitigation that have occurred since the original sentencing.
We have taken into account the serious features of the appellant's offending which are set out at [41] above. The combined effect of those features means that the offending on count 1 was an especially serious example of aggravated burglary of commercial premises.
A sentence of imprisonment to be served immediately is the only appropriate sentencing option for count 1.
We would exercise the sentencing discretion afresh in respect of count 1 by imposing a sentence of 5 years' immediate imprisonment (reduced from 5 years 6 months in the application of the totality principle). This sentence includes punishment for all of the factual elements of count 2, namely stealing the gold ore, the safe, the welding equipment, the chains and the car keys, the property of Royal Nickel Corporation.
We would avoid double punishment in the resentencing of the appellant by imposing no penalty for count 2.
As we have mentioned, the sentence of 12 months' immediate imprisonment imposed by her Honour for count 3 should not be disturbed.
It is appropriate, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the offending on count 1 and the facts and circumstances of the offending on count 3 (including all aggravating and mitigating factors), and taking into account all relevant sentencing considerations, to order that the individual sentence for count 3 be served cumulatively upon the new individual sentence for count 1. The overall seriousness of the appellant's offending on count 1 and count 3, having regard to all relevant sentencing factors, would not be adequately marked if the individual sentences were not wholly accumulated.
The new total effective sentence is therefore 6 years' imprisonment.
The new total effective sentence of 6 years' imprisonment should be backdated to 24 December 2021 to take account of time the appellant spent in custody solely in relation to this offending before he was sentenced by the primary judge. A parole eligibility order should be made. The appellant will be eligible to be considered for release on parole when he has served 4 years in custody calculated from 24 December 2021.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
SG
Research Associate to the Honourable President Buss
11 AUGUST 2023
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