Luckman v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   LUCKMAN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2024] WASCA 140

CORAM:   QUINLAN CJ

MAZZA JA

HALL JA

HEARD:   11 MARCH 2024

DELIVERED          :   12 NOVEMBER 2024

FILE NO/S:   CACR 69 of 2023

BETWEEN:   ROBERT JOHN LUCKMAN

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   EGAN DCJ

File Number            :   IND 696 of 2022


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Sentencing - Aggravated home burglary - Unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm in course of an aggravated home burglary - Mandatory minimum sentence - Whether sentencing judge acted in contravention of s 11 of Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) - Whether total effective sentence infringed first limb of totality principle - Principle against double punishment

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 294(1)(a), s 294(2), s 297(1), s 297(5)(a)(ii), s 401(2)(a)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 11(1)

Result:

Appeal allowed
Appellant resentenced

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : N Sinton
Respondent : R G Wilson

Solicitors:

Appellant : Legal Aid (WA)
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Beekman v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 130

Cotterill v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 52

Hunter-Aragu v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 80

Hurt v The King [2024] HCA 8; (2024) 98 ALJR 485

Johnson v The Queen [2004] HCA 15; (2004) 78 ALJR 616

Kelly v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 29

Larsen v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 181

Magaming v The Queen [2013] HCA 40; (2013) 252 CLR 381

Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610

Ritchie v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 120

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal against sentence. 

  2. The appellant was charged on indictment in the District Court of Western Australia with two offences, as follows:[1]

    (1)On 12 February 2021 at Singleton Robert John Luckman, while in the place of Daniel Adam Lyon without his consent, committed the offence of assault

    And that Robert John Luckman was armed with a dangerous weapon, namely a machete

    And that Robert John Luckman did bodily harm to Daniel Adam Lyon

    And that immediately before the commission of the offence Robert John Luckman knew or ought to have known that there was another person in the place

    And that the place was ordinarily used for human habitation.

    (2)On the same date and at the same place Robert John Luckman, with intent to do some grievous bodily harm to Daniel Adam Lyon, unlawfully did grievous bodily harm to Daniel Adam Lyon

    And the offence was committed in the course of conduct that constituted an aggravated home burglary.

    [1] WAB 35 - 36.

  3. In broad terms, in the early hours of 12 February 2021, the appellant broke into a house occupied by Mr Lyon and three others, without their consent, armed…

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Details
Case
[2024] WASCA 140
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Luckman appealed against his conviction and sentence for aggravated home burglary and unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm in the course of an aggravated home burglary. The appeal was heard by the Western Australian Court of Appeal. The appeal raised two primary legal issues: whether the sentencing judge acted in contravention of s 11 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) by imposing a sentence for the unlawful doing of grievous bodily harm and whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle and the principle against double punishment.

The Court of Appeal considered the principle against double punishment and the operation of s 11 of the Sentencing Act. The court found that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge for the unlawful doing of grievous bodily harm was not in contravention of s 11 of the Sentencing Act. The court found that the offence of unlawful doing of grievous bodily harm contained elements that were not common to the offence of aggravated home burglary and that distinct additional evidence was required to establish the commission of the grievous bodily harm offence. The court further found that the total effective sentence did not infringe the first limb of the totality principle or the principle against double punishment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 11(1) of the Sentencing Act provides:11.Person not to be sentenced twice on same evidence(1)If the evidence necessary to establish the commission by a person of an offence under the law of this State is also the evidence necessary to establish the commission by that person of another such offence, the person may be charged and convicted of each offence but is not to be sentenced for more than one of the offences. The principle against double punishment was described by McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ in Pearce v The Queen:[28]To the extent to which two offences of which an offender stands convicted contain common elements, it would be wrong to punish that offender twice for the commission of the elements that are common. No doubt that general principle must yield to any contrary legislative intention, but the punishment to be exacted should reflect what an offender has done; it should not be affected by the way in which the boundaries of particular offences are drawn. Often those boundaries will be drawn in a way that means that offences overlap. To punish an offender twice if conduct falls in that area of overlap would be to punish offenders according to the accidents of legislative history, rather than according to their just deserts.[28] Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610 [40] (McHugh, Hayne & Callinan JJ). Section 11(1) of the Sentencing Act does not abrogate the principle against double punishment. The purpose of each is to ensure that when a person is sentenced for offences which factually overlap, the offender is not doubly punished for the common conduct. The operation of s 11(1) of the Sentencing Act and the principle against double punishment have recently been considered in a number of cases decided by this court, namely Kelly v The State of Western Australia;[29] Beekman v The State of Western Australia;[30] and Ritchie v The State of Western Australia.[31][29] Kelly v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 29 [29] (Mazza, Beech & Vaughan JJA).[30] Beekman v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 130 [43] ‑ [46].[31] Ritchie v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 120 [63] (Buss P, Mazza & Vaughan JJA). In Beekman, the court summarised the common law principle concerning the avoidance of double punishment and the principles embodied in s 11(1) of the Sentencing Act, as follows:[32][32] Beekman [43] - [46].It is a well established common law principle that when an offender is to be sentenced for multiple offences which contain one or more common legal or factual elements, care must be taken by the sentencing court to avoid punishing the offender twice (or more) for the commission of the common elements. See Pearce v The Queen;[33] Johnson v The Queen.[34][33] Pearce [40].[34] Johnson v The Queen [2004] HCA 15; (2004) 78 ALJR 616 [27], [34] (Gummow, Callinan & Heydon JJ), [38] (Kirby J).No single correct mechanism exists for avoiding double (or more) punishment. For example, that outcome may be avoided by reducing the otherwise appropriate sentence for an offence or by ordering partial or total concurrency in relation to two or more sentences. See Cotterill v The State of Western Australia;[35] Hunter-Aragu v The State of Western Australia.[36][35] Cotterill v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 52 [27] (McLure P, Buss & Mazza JJA agreeing).[36] Hunter-Aragu v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 80 [33] (Buss JA, McLure P & Mazza JA agreeing).Section 11(1) of the Sentencing Act provides:'If the evidence necessary to establish the commission by a person of an offence under the law of this State is also the evidence necessary to establish the commission by that person of another such offence, the person may be charged and convicted of each offence but is not to be sentenced for more than one of the offences.'In Kelly v The State of Western Australia, this court held [29]:(a)The commission of an offence is not established unless and until all of its elements are proved.(b)Accordingly, the phrase 'the evidence necessary to establish the commission by a person of an offence', within s 11(1), refers to the evidence necessary to establish all of the elements of the offence.(c)That proposition also applies to the phrase 'the evidence necessary to establish the commission … of another offence', within s 11(1).(d)Section 11(1) is therefore engaged if, and only if, the evidence necessary to establish the commission of one offence establishes, without more, all of the elements of, and consequently the commission of, another offence.(e)Section 11(1) does not apply where there is overlap between the evidence required to establish the two offences, but where each offence requires some distinct additional evidence to establish the commission of that offence.(footnote omitted)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established