Reported Decision:
58 NSWLR 675
Court of Appeal
CITATION: RITA HARIKA v STANLEY TUPAEA [2003] NSWCA 332 HEARING DATE(S): 17 October 2003 JUDGMENT DATE:
11 November 2003JUDGMENT OF: Mason P at 1; Tobias JA at 48; Foster AJA at 49 DECISION: Appeal upheld CATCHWORDS: Negligence - motor accident - damages - Motor Accidents Act 1988, s43A - late claim - whether full and satisfactory explanation - whether court satisfied that damages likely to be awarded did not pass threshold - "likely". (D) PARTIES :
RITA HARIKA v STANLEY TUPAEA FILE NUMBER(S): CA 41234/2002 COUNSEL: Appellant: K P Rewell SC / A Capelin
Respondent: M Elkaim SCSOLICITORS: Appellant: Carroll & O'Dea
Respondent: Abbott Tout
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: District Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC 1685/02 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :Karpin DCJ
CA 41234 of 2002
Tuesday 11 November 2003MASON P
TOBIAS JA
FOSTER AJA
RITA HARIKA v STANLEY TUPAEA
The appellant was a passenger in a stationary car that was hit from behind by a car driven by the respondent. She suffered soft tissue injuries.
The claim on the respondent’s insurer was not made until 15 months after the accident. Accordingly, under s43A of the Motor Accidents Act 1988, the respondent was entitled to have the proceedings dismissed if he satisfied the court
(1) that the appellant did not provide a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in making her late claim, and;
(2) that the total damages of all kinds likely to be awarded if the claim succeeded was less than 10% of the maximum that could be awarded for non-economic loss at the date of the accident.
HELD per Mason P (Tobias JA and Foster AJA agreeing), upholding the appeal:
1) Karpin DCJ was not properly satisfied as to the deficiencies in the appellant’s explanation. [17]
(a) The decision of the trial judge involved specific factual errors, questionable inferences from primary facts and omission to have regard to a critical matter. [11] - [16]
2) The respondent has not satisfied the Court that the appellant’s explanation was anything other than full and satisfactory. [18]
(a) The appellant gave a full account in that she placed the whole picture before the court. The respondent has not satisfied the court that a reasonable person in the appellant’s position would have acted otherwise than she did. [20]
3) The respondent has not satisfied the court that the total damages of all kinds “likely to be awarded to the claimant if the claim succeeds” are less than $27,300. [23]-[24], [45]-[46]
(a) The word “likely” should be construed in context. In this case, where the court is engaged in a predictive exercise and not the trial of the claim, the word is to mean “a real and not a remote chance or possibility, regardless of whether it is less or more than 50 per cent”: Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1979) 42 FLR 331 at 346-7 per Deane J, Secretary, Department of Employment, Education,…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWCA 332
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were: firstly, whether the District Court judge erred in finding that Ms. Harika had not provided a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in lodging her claim; and secondly, whether the District Court judge erred in concluding that it was not satisfied that the damages likely to be awarded would exceed the threshold stipulated by section 43A of the *Motor Accidents Act 1988*. The interpretation of the word "likely" in the context of assessing the probability of damages exceeding the threshold was also a key consideration.
The Court of Appeal found that the District Court judge had misconstrued the nature of the inquiry required by section 43A. The judge had impermissibly conflated the assessment of whether damages were "likely" to exceed the threshold with a final determination of the quantum of damages. The Court of Appeal held that the correct approach was to consider whether there was a real or substantial chance that the damages would exceed the threshold, rather than requiring a high degree of certainty. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal determined that the explanation for the delay, while not perfect, was sufficiently full and satisfactory in the circumstances.
Consequently, the appeal was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal upheld
Background
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