District Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Linda Joy Crawshaw v Natasha Coxon [2018] NSWDC 92 Hearing dates: 6 April 2018 Decision date: 13 April 2018 Jurisdiction: Civil Before: Mahony SC DCJ Decision: Leave granted to commence proceedings out of time. For Orders see [46]
Catchwords: Motor vehicle accident; late claim; full and satisfactory explanation; predictive assessment of damages Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW)Cases Cited: Al-Ebadi v Guo [2017] NSWDC 107
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
Dijakovic v Perez [2015] NSCCA 174
Eades v Gunestepe [2012] NSWCA 204
Harika v Stanley Tupaea (2003) 58 NSWLR 675
Medlin v State Government Insurance Office (1995) 182 CLR 1
Sinclair v Darwich (2010) 77 NSWLR 166Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Linda Joy Crawshaw (Plaintiff)
Natasha Coxon (Defendant)Representation: A Canceri (Plaintiff)
D Hanna (Defendant)
File Number(s): 17/36243018/41161 Publication restriction: Nil
Judgment on SUMMONS AND notice of motion
Introduction
-
On 7 February 2018 the plaintiff filed a Summons seeking the following relief:
“An order pursuant to s 109(1) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) (“MACA”) granting leave to commence proceedings out of time.
An order that the plaintiff’s explanation for the delay in making a claim is full and satisfactory.
An order that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of, and incidental to, this Summons and of these proceedings.
Such other orders as the court deems fit to make.”
-
The proceedings for which leave was being sought to commence out of time, had in fact been commenced by filing of a Statement of Claim on 30 November 2017. That prompted the defendant to file a Notice of Motion on 22 December 2017 in those proceedings seeking the following prayers for relief:
“That these proceedings be dismissed pursuant to s 109 of the MACA.
That the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, this Notice of Motion and of these proceedings.”
-
The plaintiff had suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 20 October 2011. The time for bringing proceedings pursuant to the MACA therefore expired on 20 October 2014.
-
The plaintiff served a claim form on the defendant insurer on 9 March 2015. As that claim was out of time, the plaintiff was required to provide to the insurer an explanation for the delay in bringing her claim. She did so by way of statutory declaration made on 21 July 2015.
-
On 7 August 2015 the insurer accepted the plaintiff’s explanation as being full and satisfactory. Further, the claim then proceeded through the MAS procedure to a CARS assessment, which resulted in an award in favour of the plaintiff on 20 October 2017. Pursuant to the MACA, the plaintiff elected not to accept the award, but to proceed to commence court proceedings.
-
Section 109 of the MACA provides as follows:
“109 Time limitations on commencement of court proceedings
(1) A claimant is not entitled to commence proceedings in…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Linda Joy Crawshaw v Natasha Coxon and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] NSWDC 92
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Crawshaw had provided a full and satisfactory explanation for her delay in commencing the proceedings. The court considered the circumstances surrounding Crawshaw's incapacity and her eventual understanding of the need to commence proceedings. The court also examined the availability and reliability of evidence, including the plaintiff's medical records and expert evidence, to assess the merits of the claim and the potential for a just and equitable outcome.
The court found that Crawshaw had provided a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay, taking into account her cognitive impairment and the circumstances surrounding her inability to seek legal advice. The court held that the delay was not attributable to any fault or neglect on Crawshaw's part and that the potential merits of the claim warranted the granting of leave to commence the proceedings out of time. The court also considered the availability of evidence, including the plaintiff's medical records and expert evidence, and the potential for a just and equitable outcome. The court concluded that it was in the interests of justice to grant leave to commence the proceedings out of time, and that the potential for a just and equitable outcome outweighed any prejudice to the defendant.
The court ordered that leave be granted to Crawshaw to commence the proceedings out of time. The court further ordered that the matter proceed to trial to determine the merits of the claim and the appropriate quantum of damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave granted to commence proceedings out of time. For Orders see [46]
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.