Richardson v Lindsay

Case [2019] NSWCA 148


Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Summary available
Medium Neutral Citation: Richardson v Lindsay [2019] NSWCA 148
Hearing dates: 17 April 2019
Decision date: 20 June 2019
Before: Macfarlan JA at [1];
Gleeson JA at [45];
White JA at [46]
Decision:

Appeal dismissed with costs

Catchwords: EQUITY – estoppel – rights arising out of deed of family arrangement – appellant provided capital to fund purchase of property in which she would live with respondents – appellant consented to subsequent move away from that property – respondents relied to their detriment on consent – appellant estopped from complaining of move
Cases Cited: Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; [1990] HCA 39
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22
Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; [1999] HCA 10
Miller Heiman Pty Ltd v Sales Principles Pty Ltd (2017) 94 NSWLR 500; [2017] NSWCA 106
Morris v Morris (1982) 1 NSWLR 61
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Lurline Faith Richardson (Appellant)
John David Lindsay (First Respondent)
Fiona Judy Lindsay (Second Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
M Painter SC with H Jewell (Applicant)
D Neggo (Respondent)

  Solicitors:
Seniors Rights Service (Appellant)
Whiteley Ironside Shillington (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2018/325406
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
Supreme Court
Jurisdiction:
Equity
Citation:
[2018] NSWSC 1457
Date of Decision:
28 September 2018
Before:
Sackar J
File Number(s):
2018/107944

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

Under a Deed of Family Arrangement (“the Deed”), the appellant (“Faith”) conditionally gave $220,000 to one of her daughters (“Fiona”) and Fiona’s Husband (“John”) to assist them to purchase a property in Orange, New South Wales. By the Deed, Fiona and John undertook to care for Faith, allow her to live with them and to fund her transition to an aged person’s unit or care facility when necessary.

Fiona and John subsequently sold the Orange property and purchased another property at Lewis Ponds, about 25 kilometres outside of Orange. Faith initially moved with Fiona and John to the Lewis Ponds property but later moved out and has not since returned to live there.

By her statement of claim filed in the Equity Division on 26 March 2018, Faith claimed the return of $220,000. The primary judge found that Faith was estopped from complaining of the move and was not entitled to the return of her “conditional gift”.

The issues on appeal were:

  1. Whether the primary judge erred in concluding that it was unnecessary to determine whether, but for her representation, Faith would have had an equitable charge and Fiona and John would have breached the Deed.

  2. Whether the primary judge erred in finding that Faith was estopped from seeking the return of her conditional gift on the basis of the move.

  3. Whether holding Faith bound by an estoppel causes loss to her which is disproportionate to any detriment suffered by Fiona and John.

Macfarlan JA, Gleeson JA, White JA held, dismissing the appeal:

In relation to question (1)

(Per…

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Richardson v Lindsay [2019] NSWCA 148
Case
[2019] NSWCA 148
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Richardson, sought to appeal a decision concerning rights arising out of a deed of family arrangement. The dispute centred on a property purchased with capital provided by the appellant, with the understanding that she would reside there with the respondents. The appellant later consented to the respondents moving away from this property, a move upon which the respondents relied to their detriment. The appeal was heard by Macfarlan, Gleeson, and White JJA.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the appellant was estopped from complaining about the respondents' move from the property, given her prior consent and the respondents' subsequent detrimental reliance on that consent. This involved an examination of equitable principles, specifically the doctrine of estoppel, in the context of rights established by a deed of family arrangement.

The court found that the appellant's consent to the move, coupled with the respondents' detrimental reliance on that consent, gave rise to an equitable estoppel. The legal principle applied was that where one party, by their words or conduct, intentionally causes another party to believe in a certain state of affairs, and that other party acts on that belief to their detriment, the first party will be estopped from asserting an inconsistent state of affairs. The court determined that the appellant was therefore estopped from complaining about the move.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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