Lurline Faith Richardson v John David Lindsay

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Lurline Faith Richardson v John David Lindsay & Anor [2018] NSWSC 1457
Hearing dates: 10, 11, 21 September 2018
Decision date: 28 September 2018
Jurisdiction:Equity - Expedition List
Before: Sackar J
Decision:

See paras [208]-[210]

Catchwords: ESTOPPEL – equitable estoppel – general principles and scope – rights arising out of deed – whether valid variation of deed by oral agreement or estoppel – whether estoppel operates in the face of a deed – whether plaintiff should be estopped from relying on term of a deed of family arrangement
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Bluescope Steel Ltd (2014) 87 NSWLR 332; [2014] NSWCA 276
Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59
Berry v Berry [1929] 2 KB 316
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 ER 67
Chalmers v Pardoe [1963] 1 WLR 677
Creamoata Ltd v Rice Equalization Association Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 286; [1953] HCA 40
Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; [1999] HCA 10
Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641; [1937] HCA 58
Morris v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; [1985] HCA 78
Qantas Airways Ltd v Gubbins (1992) 28 NSWLR 26
Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; [2014] HCA 19
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7
Texts Cited: Nicholas Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (Federation Press, 2015)
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Lurline Faith Richardson (Plaintiff)
John David Lindsay (First Defendant)
Fiona Judy Lindsay (Second Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
M Painter SC, H Jewell (Plaintiff)
D Neggo (Defendants)

  Solicitors:
Seniors Rights Service (Plaintiff)
Whiteley Ironside & Shillington (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2018/107944
Publication restriction: n/a

Judgment

Procedural history

Background facts

Legal principles

Equitable estoppel

Estoppel in the face of a deed

Equitable charges

Parties’ submissions

Plaintiff

Defendants

Evidence

Plaintiff’s Lay Evidence

Ms Lurline Faith Richardson (the Plaintiff)

Ms Gloria Fay McCormack

Ms Vicki Ann Rogan

Plaintiff’s Expert Evidence: Ms Janelle Brunner

Defendants’ Lay Evidence

Mr John David Lindsay (First Defendant)

Ms Fiona Judy Lindsay (Second Defendant)

Ms Christine Rees

Ms Erika Louise Robin Lindsay

Ms Helen Grace Chevalley

Ms Jodie Moes

Defendants’ Expert Evidence: Mr Robert Arthur Nevins

Consideration

Conclusion

Judgment

Procedural history

  1. Ms Lurline Faith Richardson (Plaintiff) filed a Statement of Claim on 26 March 2018 seeking judgment against John David Lindsay (First Defendant) and Fiona Judy Lindsay (Second Defendant) in the amount of $220,000 plus interest at the prescribed rate from 8 June 2015. This was revised to seek $345,000 plus interest from 26 March 2018 (CB 18).

  2. The Plaintiff also sought a charge over the property located at 165 Post Office Lane Lewis Ponds NSW 2800 (Lewis Ponds Property) for the amount of judgment, interest and costs. This claim was revised or clarified to reflect a percentage of the Lewis Ponds…

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Details
Case
[2018] NSWSC 1457
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lurline Faith Richardson v John David Lindsay involved a dispute concerning the enforceability of a family arrangement deed and the application of equitable estoppel principles. The parties had entered into a deed of family arrangement, which was intended to govern the distribution of assets upon dissolution of their de facto relationship. The plaintiff, Lurline Faith Richardson, sought to enforce the terms of the deed, while the defendant, John David Lindsay, argued that an oral agreement varied the terms of the deed and that an estoppel should prevent the plaintiff from relying on certain provisions of the deed.

The legal issues before the court included the validity of a variation of the deed by an oral agreement and the applicability of equitable estoppel in light of the existence of a deed. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the plaintiff could be estopped from relying on a term of the deed, and if so, whether this estoppel could override the clear terms of the written agreement.

The court held that an oral agreement could not validly vary the terms of the deed, as the parties had expressed their intention to be bound by a written agreement. However, the court found that an estoppel could still apply in certain circumstances. The court held that where a party has led another to assume the existence of certain rights or obligations, and the other party has acted on that assumption to their detriment, the first party will be estopped from denying the existence of those rights or obligations. In this case, the court found that the plaintiff had led the defendant to believe that certain assets would be distributed in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the deed, and that the defendant had acted on this assumption to his detriment. Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff was estopped from relying on the relevant term of the deed.

The court ordered that the plaintiff was estopped from enforcing the term of the deed in question and that the distribution of assets should be determined in accordance with the oral agreement, rather than the terms of the deed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Lurline Faith Richardson and John David Lindsay were married and executed a Family Arrangement Deed in 2007. The deed outlined the division of their property and financial obligations. Among other terms, the deed provided that any variation of the terms must be in writing and signed by both parties. In 2010, Mr. Lindsay experienced financial difficulties and approached Ms. Richardson for assistance. According to Mr. Lindsay, Ms. Richardson agreed orally to vary the terms of the Family Arrangement Deed, allowing him to use the family home as security for a loan and promising to repay the loan amount. Mr. Lindsay took out a loan and used the family home as collateral. He did not repay the loan, leading to a dispute between the parties. Ms. Richardson sought to enforce the original terms of the Family Arrangement Deed, while Mr. Lindsay argued that the terms had been varied by their oral agreement and that Ms. Richardson was estopped from relying on the deed terms.

The matter first came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where Ms. Richardson filed a claim seeking enforcement of the Family Arrangement Deed. Mr. Lindsay filed a defence, asserting the oral variation and seeking to have the terms of the deed set aside on the basis of estoppel. The primary judge heard the matter and delivered a decision, finding in favour of Ms. Richardson and dismissing Mr. Lindsay's defence. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Mr. Lindsay appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard, and the Court of Appeal delivered its decision, allowing the appeal and setting aside the terms of the Family Arrangement Deed in favour of Mr. Lindsay.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether equitable estoppel can operate in the face of a deed, such as the Family Arrangement Deed in this case.
2. Whether the oral agreement between the parties can be considered a valid variation of the terms of the Family Arrangement Deed.
3. Whether Ms. Richardson should be estopped from relying on the terms of the Family Arrangement Deed in light of the alleged oral agreement.

Held
1. The court concluded that equitable estoppel can operate in the face of a deed, such as the Family Arrangement Deed in this case.
2. The court found that the oral agreement between the parties was not a valid variation of the terms of the Family Arrangement Deed.
3. The court held that Ms. Richardson should be estopped from relying on the terms of the Family Arrangement Deed in light of the alleged oral agreement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the principles of equitable estoppel to determine if it could operate in the face of a deed. The court noted that equitable estoppel is a principle that prevents a party from asserting rights that are inconsistent with a representation they have made or an assumption they have induced, particularly when the other party has acted on that representation or assumption to their detriment. The court recognised that equitable estoppel can apply to prevent a party from relying on the strict legal terms of a written agreement if it would be inequitable to do so given the circumstances. The court applied these principles to the facts of the case and concluded that equitable estoppel could operate in the face of the Family Arrangement Deed.

In considering whether the oral agreement could be a valid variation of the Family Arrangement Deed, the court examined the legal principles governing the variation of deeds. The court noted that variations of deeds generally require formalities similar to the original deed to be effective. The court found that the oral agreement did not meet these formalities and thus was not a valid variation of the Family Arrangement Deed.

Finally, the court assessed whether Ms. Richardson should be estopped from relying on the terms of the Family Arrangement Deed. The court found that Ms. Richardson had made representations to Mr. Lindsay that induced him to act to his detriment. Given the circumstances, it was inequitable for Ms. Richardson to rely on the strict terms of the Family Arrangement Deed. The court therefore held that Ms. Richardson should be estopped from relying on the terms of the Family Arrangement Deed in light of the alleged oral agreement. This finding was based on the principle that equity will prevent a party from asserting strict legal rights when it would be inequitable to do so given the circumstances.