RICHARDS & MORRIS (IDENTIFICATION OF NOTIFIER)
[2014] FamCA 1027
•19 November 2014
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| RICHARDS & MORRIS (IDENTIFICATION OF NOTIFIER) | [2014] FamCA 1027 |
| FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Leave – Where Court gave parties leave to ask questions of the father which might disclose the identity of, or lead to the identification of, relevant notifiers to the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services – Where all parties support the grant of leave – Where identity of some of the notifiers to the Department were already known by the parties – Where the name of the notifier was not redacted from the material produced by the Department in answer to the subpoena, rather the full name of the notifier was disclosed – Where some notifiers have identified themselves in materials filed in proceedings – Where Court considered the relevant tests of ‘critical importance’ and ‘compelling reasons in the public interest’ contained in section 186 – Where Court noted that if prohibition contained in that section is overcome, it would enable the opportunity for the exercise of discretion but no more – Where Court noted the ultimate question was whether, taking those matters into account on the facts, it is in the interest of justice for the leave to be granted – Where alleged the father, his family or others at his behest have made numerous notifications with the express intention of undermining the mother – Where Court satisfied such is a matter of critical importance – Where Court satisfied that in the circumstances of the case collectively amount to a compelling reason in the public interest of whether or not the father is a notifier, or whether those associated with him are – Where Court gave consideration as to whether discretion should be exercised – Where Court satisfied the interests of justice weigh in favour of discretion being exercised so as to grant leave – Where Court considered whether the test in section 67ZW(6) is met, mindful that it may be a stand-alone test – Where Court satisfied that to the extent that disclosure might identify that the father or his associates made many of the notifications, a failure to permit such would prejudice the proper administration of justice in this case. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 67ZW Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 186 |
| Department of Family & Community Services v Jordan (2012) 47 Fam LR 666 Rittman v Rittman (No. 2) [2011] FamCA 187 Susskind v Dean [2011] FAmCA 924 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Richards |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Morris |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Meehan |
| FILE NUMBER: | TVC | 829 | of | 2013 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 19 November 2014 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Townsville |
| PLACE HEARD: | Townsville |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Tree J |
| HEARING DATE: | 6 November 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPLICANT: | In person |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Byrne |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Mr Victiore |
| SOLICITORS FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | M M Meehan |
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Richards & Morris (identification of notifier) has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT TOWNSVILLE |
FILE NUMBER: TVC 829/2013
| Mr Richards |
Applicant
And
| Ms Morris |
Respondent
RULING
INTRODUCTION
On 6 November 2014 I gave leave to the parties in this proceeding to ask questions of the father which might disclose the identity of, or lead to the identification of, relevant notifiers to the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services. Further, there was a grant of leave to tender material containing evidence of the identity of such notifiers, or from which the identity of the notifiers might be deduced. These are my reasons for so giving leave.
BACKGROUND
The application for leave arose on the third day of the trial of parenting proceedings in which the father is the applicant and the mother the respondent. Although the proceedings relate only to two children (being fraternal twins) the mother has another three older children, the younger two of whom have always been in her care, and the eldest of which has from time to time been in her care. The two fathers of those children are amongst the witnesses to be called in the trial: the father of the eldest two children is to be called by the father; the father of the youngest child is to be called by the mother.
Up until the publication of the Family Report in these proceedings in July of this year, the twins had been in the care of the mother. However subsequent to the release of the Family Report, Judge Coker ordered that the twins forthwith transfer to the father’s care in Brisbane. Those orders were in accordance with the recommendations made in the Family Report.
I was told without objection by counsel for the mother that there has been a truly vast history of child welfare authorities’ involvement in relation to the mother’s five children over many years, and particularly, that there may have been hundreds of notifications.[1] I was told that none of the investigations of those notifications by the relevant authorities had ever found any substantiated risk of harm to the children whilst in the mother’s care.
[1]After the grant of leave and as the trial progressed, it became clearer that there were no more than 50 notifications, albeit containing far more individual allegations.
A critical component of the mother’s case, as submitted by her counsel, Mr Byrne, is that the father, or his family members, or others at his behest, have made the vast majority of those notifications, and have done so with the express intention of undermining the mother, and particularly her capacity to parent the twins. Additionally it is said that the sheer volume of the number of notifications was intended to be a smoke screen to create the impression that the mother must be a less than adequate parent, and presented some form of risk to the children.
Further, it was said that the identity of two specific notifiers, being the mother’s own general medical practitioner and the mother’s own lawyer, was given significance by the Family Report writer in preparing her report and recommendations. It was therefore said by Mr Byrne that the identity of the notifiers was an important matter in this case. I will consider that argument a little later. However before doing so, it is important that I note that which is inferentially identified above, namely that the identity of some of the notifiers to the Department is already known by the parties.
During the course of argument before me, a number of facts emerged. The first is that, quite properly, the Independent Children’s Lawyer had subpoenaed the Department to obtain relevant records from it. These included a number of notifications. Apparently in as many as seven instances, contrary to law and the Department’s otherwise seemingly invariable practice, the name of the notifier was not redacted from the material produced in answer to the subpoena, but rather the full name of the notifier was disclosed. Additionally, some notifiers have identified themselves as such in other material, including in affidavits which the parties have filed in these proceedings.
In part because of the apparent inadvertent disclosure of the identity of notifiers by the Department, I arranged for a departmental officer to appear before me by telephone. I also gave that officer the opportunity to make submissions in relation to the father’s application for leave, and Mr M, the departmental officer who appeared, made some useful submissions.
At this point it is also appropriate to note that all parties appearing before me supported the grant of leave as sought by Mr Byrne, and Mr M, on behalf of the Department, did not oppose the grant of leave. I will discuss his submissions and those of the parties in due course.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Section 186 of the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) provides as follows:
186 Confidentiality of notifiers of harm or risk of harm
(1) This section applies if a person (the notifier) notifies the chief
executive, an authorised officer or a police officer that the
notifier suspects—
(a) a child has been, is being or is likely to be, harmed; or
(b) an unborn child may be at risk of harm after he or she is
born.
(2) The person who receives the notification, or a person who
becomes aware of the identity of the notifier, must not
disclose the identity of the notifier to another person unless
the disclosure is made—
(a) in the course of performing functions under this Act or a
child welfare law or interstate law of another State to
another person performing functions under this Act or a
child welfare law or interstate law of another State; or
(b) under the Child Protection (International Measures) Act
2003, part 6; or
(c) to the ombudsman conducting an investigation under the
Ombudsman Act 2001; or
(e) for the performance by the chief executive (adoptions)
of his or her functions under the Adoption Act 2009; or
(f) by way of evidence given in a legal proceeding under
subsections (3) and (4).
Maximum penalty—40 penalty units.
(3) Subject to subsection (4)—
(a) evidence of the identity of the notifier or from which the
identity of the notifier could be deduced must not be
given in a proceeding before a court or tribunal without
leave of the court or tribunal; and
(b) unless leave is granted, a party or witness in the
proceeding—
(i) must not be asked, and, if asked, cannot be
required to answer, any question that cannot be
answered without disclosing the identity of, or
leading to the identification of, the notifier; and
(ii) must not be asked to produce, and, if asked, can
not be required to produce, any document that
identifies, or may lead to the identification of, the
notifier.
(4) The court or tribunal must not grant leave unless—
(a) it is satisfied—
(i) the evidence is of critical importance in the
proceeding; and
(ii) there is compelling reason in the public interest for
disclosure; or
(b) the notifier agrees to the evidence being given in the
proceeding.
(5) In deciding whether to grant leave, the court or tribunal must
take into account—
(a) the possible effects of disclosure on the safety or
wellbeing of the notifier and the notifier’s family; and
(b) the public interest in maintaining confidentiality of
notifiers.
(6) As far as practicable, an application for leave must be heard in
a way that protects the identity of the notifier pending a
decision on the application.
Also potentially relevant to this application is s69ZW of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) which provides as follows:
69ZW Evidence relating to child abuse or family violence
(1) The court may make an order in child‑related proceedings requiring a prescribed State or Territory agency to provide the court with the documents or information specified in the order.
(2) The documents or information specified in the order must be documents recording, or information about, one or more of these:
(a) any notifications to the agency of suspected abuse of a child to whom the proceedings relate or of suspected family violence affecting the child;
(b) any assessments by the agency of investigations into a notification of that kind or the findings or outcomes of those investigations;
(c) any reports commissioned by the agency in the course of investigating a notification.
(3) Nothing in the order is to be taken to require the agency to provide the court with:
(a) documents or information not in the possession or control of the agency; or
(b) documents or information that include the identity of the person who made a notification.
(4) A law of a State or Territory has no effect to the extent that it would, apart from this subsection, hinder or prevent an agency complying with the order.
(5) The court must admit into evidence any documents or information, provided in response to the order, on which the court intends to rely.
(6) Despite subsection (5), the court must not disclose the identity of the person who made a notification, or information that could identify that person, unless:
(a) the person consents to the disclosure; or
(b) the court is satisfied that the identity or information is critically important to the proceedings and that failure to make the disclosure would prejudice the proper administration of justice.
(7) Before making a disclosure for the reasons in paragraph (6)(b), the court must ensure that the agency that provided the identity or information:
(a) is notified about the intended disclosure; and
(b) is given an opportunity to respond.
It appears as though most, if not all, of the States and Territories have provisions akin to s186 of the Queensland Child Protection Act. The Full Court considered the New South Wales equivalent, together with s69ZW, in Department of Family & Community Services & Jordan (2012) 47 FamLR 666. That was an appeal against an order, seemingly under s69ZW for the production to the Court of a Notification of Suspected Abuse and associated documents. The order specifically required the Director General to disclose the relevant notifier’s identity. The trial Judge identified that the credit of several key parties was under consideration in the trial before her, and for that reason, concluded that “the details of the report is critically important to the proceedings.”
Having discussed the relevant statutory provisions, the Full Court said as follows at [53]-[58]:
53. In this case it is clear that her Honour addressed the first limb, namely that the identity and information was critically important but did not go on to consider whether failure to order disclosure would prejudice the proper administration of justice. In our view and notwithstanding that her Honour said the notifier’s identity was of critical importance, she did so primarily on the basis that this would assist her to make credit findings. We are unable to agree that disclosure for this reason would satisfy the test. In this regard we agree with the Director-General that in most cases the identity of the notifier will not be relevant. What is relevant is the findings and investigation which resulted from the notification.
54. We also agree with the submission made by counsel for the mother that her Honour was required to engage in an active intellectual process in which each limb of the test received genuine consideration: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [105]. Had her Honour considered the decision of Johnston J in Halsen v Nasser Talbet (2010) 44 Fam LR 248 it would have been clear that s 29 of the State Act and not s 69ZW was the governing provision. This would also have reminded her Honour of the important second limb of the State (and Federal) test and that she was ultimately required to balance critical importance to determination of a child’s best interests with public policy considerations that ensure an effective system of child protection notification.
55. There is no attempt in s 69ZW to provide procedural fairness to the notifier. Rather, s 69ZW(7) affords procedural fairness to the agency. This is a matter of some significance and reinforces the notion that the agency and the Court are obliged to protect the identity of notifiers in accordance with the Act and State or Territory legislation.
56. It follows that s 69ZW does not empower a court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to override protections afforded to notifiers by State and Territory legislation. As we trust the above analysis makes clear, the scheme of s 69ZW is to preserve to the States and Territories the power to legislate in relation to disclosure of identification material entrusted to the agency. Consistent with Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, by virtue of s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 29 of the State Act is picked up in effect as a surrogate law of the Commonwealth. Although reference to the Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2006 (Shared Parental Responsibility) was unnecessary to determine the meaning of s 69ZW of the Act, we observe it is consistent with our interpretation.
57. It follows that in each State and Territory, in relation to children where child abuse or family violence is suspected, there is a coherent system of protection offered to persons who report their concerns to child welfare agencies. In each place, child welfare agencies will thus have a uniform system for how, where and in what circumstances information which does or could disclose the identity of a notifier is handled.
58. Thus notifiers to State and Territory agencies are protected to the extent that those States and Territories determine. To the extent that s 69ZW of the Act has a role to play it is by virtue of the limitations imposed on the documents and information amenable to a production order (which does not include the identity of a notifier) and to the extent required renders inoperative a contrary State or Territory law. Section 69ZW ensures that prior to disclosure of volunteered information that does or could identify a notifier there is another assessment of whether that information should be further disclosed. This further disclosure can only be ordered in accordance with the strict test and procedural fairness requirements of the section. Although this will mean that an equivalent test (ss 29 and 69ZW) will be applied twice, namely whether pursuant to State legislation to order disclosure to the Court and then, pursuant to the Act whether to disclose to the parties, the public policy imperatives that underlie this issue renders these safeguards appropriate.
The Full Court then concluded at [61] as follows:
61. Section s 69ZW did not provide her Honour with power to order the Director-General to disclose the identification of the notifier. In relation to this matter her Honour was required to apply the provisions of the State Act, in particular s 29(1)(f), (2) and (3). We are strongly of the view that the Director-General was correct in her contention that disclosure of the identity of the notifier was not critical and, that failure to order disclosure would not prejudice the proper administration of justice.
It will be appreciated that the test for the grant of leave under s 186 of the Queensland Act on the one hand, and s 69ZW of the Family Law Act on the other hand, are different. Particularly s 186(4)(a)(ii) requires there to be “compelling reason in the public interests for disclosure” whereas s 69ZW (6)(b) uses the language “failure to make the disclosure would prejudice the proper administration of justice.” That difference in language did not exist in the Full Court decision of Department of Family and Community Services & Jordan (supra) because s 29 of the New South Wales Act was in identical terms to the s 69ZW test.
There are few authorities on s 186(4). In Susskind & Dean [2011] FamCA 924 Murphy J adverted to the provision, but held that, at the stage of the proceedings before him, it was too early to determine whether the two requirements of subsection (4) had been met. He therefore concluded that the matter should await the trial proceedings, as by then the Court would be in a better position to determine what evidence would be directly relevant to determining the best interests of the child.
In Rittman & Rittman (No. 2) [2011] FamCA 187 Barry J referred to s 186 and s 69ZW, determined that the relative operative provision was the latter, and concluded that it was an appropriate case in which to identify notifiers “as it was important in the assessment of the validity of the conflicting evidence” irrespective of whether the test was under s 186 of s 69ZW. Apart from so concluding, his Honour did not appear to consider the meaning of the relevant limbs of the respective tests.
Notwithstanding the relative paucity of authority, I venture the following observations in relation to ss 186(3), (4) and (5). Firstly, subsection (4) contains a positive prohibition to the grant of leave unless one or both of the matters therein stipulated are established. However if one or more of those matters is established, overcoming the prohibition only generates the opportunity for the exercise of the discretion, but no more.
Secondly both the structure of subsection (4), and the language contained within it, tends to suggest that a grant of leave will rarely be made. Particularly, the tests of “critical importance” and “compelling reason in the public interest” when contained in a subsection which positively prohibits the grant of leave unless both of those two matters are affirmatively established, suggests that the task of even getting to the point where the discretion is available to be exercised, will be a particularly onerous one.
According to the Macquarie Dictionary, the relevant definition of “critical” in this context is “of decisive importance with respect to the outcome.” Whilst I do not accept that in order to be “of critical importance” the evidence would need to, of itself and without more, likely dictate the outcome of the proceeding in question, however were the evidence of such a character, it would plainly be of critical importance. However as a general proposition, I am of the view that something is of critical importance in a proceeding if it is likely to substantially contribute to or impact upon the outcome in a significant respect.
The word “compelling” is an unusual one in civil proceedings, which usually are determined by persuasion on the balance of probabilities. So far as my or counsel’s researches have established, no prior authority has determined what “compelling reason in the public interest for disclosure” might encompass. I have already observed that this phrasing is different to that employed in the New South Wales legislation, and indeed s69ZW(6) itself. The relevant definition of “compelling” in the Macquarie Dictionary is “convincing”. I would therefore conclude that in order to establish a compelling reason, one would need to do more than merely tip the balance in favour of something being in the public interest; the Court would need to be actually and positively convinced – not merely persuaded – that the public interest would be met or furthered by the particular reason advanced.
Finally, even if the prohibition in subsection (4) is overcome, the Court would nonetheless need to be positively persuaded to exercise the discretion in favour of identifying the notifier by considering, amongst other things, the two specified matters in subsection (5). However the ultimate question for the Court’s determination will be whether, taking those matters into account, on the instant facts raised by the particular case, it is in the interests of justice for leave to be granted.
SECTION 186
Generally
Notwithstanding the consent of the parties, and the absence of opposition by the Department, plainly the Court must nonetheless be satisfied of the matters specified in the tests established by statute before any leave can be given.
Is the grant of leave prohibited?
Critical importance
What is critically important in a case may change during the course of the trial, or alternatively may not become as clearly apparent until a later stage. Nonetheless at this point in these proceedings it seems clear that the stark contrast in the parties’ respective cases means that the question of whether the father, or those acting at his behest, have made the preponderance of notifications, will potentially have a determinative impact on the outcome of the case.
On the one hand, the father says that the mother is a risk of harm to the children when they are in her care on several bases, including both general neglect and also the risk posed by an asserted condition suffered by the mother, which is described by the Family Report writer as Munchausen’s by Proxy Syndrome.
On the other hand, the mother says that she is not such a risk of harm, but rather to the extent there have been such issues raised in relation to her, that has been done maliciously by the father, or those acting at his behest, and the asserted fact that they have made the vast preponderance of notifications, is critical in understanding the father’s malicious campaign against her.
Whilst, of course, I can only determine what appears to be critically important in the proceedings at the particular stage they are presently at, I am nonetheless satisfied in this instance that the identity of the notifiers, or more precisely the question of whether or not the father or those acting at his behest are substantial notifiers, is a matter of critical importance in these proceedings.
Compelling reason in the public interest
Mr Byrne argued that the compelling reasons here were threefold: firstly, that the proper administration of justice required the Court to act on complete facts; secondly, so as the father’s vexatious conduct could be revealed; and thirdly, that the best interests of the child is a sub-set of the broader public interest.
Mr M suggested that the curial determination of what was in a child’s best interests might, and in this case did, provide a compelling reason in the public interest for disclosure. I confess to some disquiet that, as a general proposition, the determination of a child’s best interests of itself and without more would comprise a compelling reason in the public interest for disclosure, because if that is what the test was intended to primarily direct attention to, it is curious that the section did not employ those words specifically.
I accept that there is a public interest in a Court being as fully informed as possible in proceedings in which the safety or welfare of children is engaged. Further, I accept that it is in the public interest that in such litigation, a Court should know whether or not one parent has acted vexatiously towards the other, and on the facts of this case, vexatiously (so it is alleged) to the point of perhaps hundreds of notifications having been made to the Department, none of which have ever been substantiated.
However in this case, there is the further unique circumstance, namely that the parties have already been made aware of the identity of seven notifiers to the Department, in consequence of the inadvertent disclosure of their identity by it when answering the Independent Children's Lawyer’s subpoena. Whilst that breach of s186(2) does not absolve the Court from its task under subsection (3), the fact that the parties know seven identifiers’ identities, does inform, albeit not overwhelmingly, the answer to the question of whether there is a compelling reason.
Upon balance I am satisfied, in the circumstances of this case, that this unique fact, together with the three matters relied upon by the mother, collectively amount to a compelling reason in the public interest for disclosure of whether or not the father is a notifier, or whether those associated with him and acting at his behest are notifiers.
Conclusion
Given that I am satisfied that both of the matters specified in s 186(4) are established on the facts of this case, it follows that the prohibition on the grant of leave does not apply. However as I have earlier observed, that does not automatically mean that the discretion will be exercised in favour of the grant of leave; before so granting leave, I would need to be affirmatively persuaded that the discretion should be so exercised.
Should leave be granted?
Possible effects of disclosure
The father concedes that he has made notifications to the Department. The mother is aware that members of the father’s family have also made notifications. Whilst the father alleges that the mother harasses people who she perceives are acting contrary to her wishes or interests, even if she were to do so in relation to other members of the father’s family or his associates, I am not persuaded that their safety would be imperilled. However I accept that there may be some adverse effect upon their wellbeing if they commenced to receive unwanted text or email communications or the like, and I take that into account.
The public interest in maintaining confidentiality
Plainly a substantial matter which underpins the sustainable operation of the child protection system generally is that notifiers should be confident that their identities will be kept confidential. However there are two things which apply in this case, which may not apply in others. The first is that the extent to which the husband, or those acting at his behest, have been notifiers, is a matter directly relevant to the proceedings. The second matter is that in any event, the Department has inadvertently disclosed the identities of seven notifiers. Both of those diminish the weight which this consideration would otherwise command.
Interests of justice
The following matters suggest that it is in the interests of justice that the discretion be exercised by granting leave:
·Insofar as the father, or those associated with him, have made notifications to the Department, the father does not oppose that information being disclosed;
·The Department has inadvertently already disclosed the identity of seven notifiers;
·Some notifiers have identified themselves as such in their affidavits filed in these proceedings;
·The Department supports, or at least does not oppose, the grant of leave in this case;
·All parties consent to the exercise of the discretion by granting leave;
·At the present stage of the proceedings, the question of whether or not the father and/or those acting at his behest have made the preponderance of notifications, is of critical importance in the case;
·The Family Report writer has arguably attached some weight to the fact that the mother’s general medical practitioner and her solicitor are amongst the notifiers;
·It is in the best interests of these children for the Court to be acting on as full and complete knowledge of the facts as possible.
Conclusion
On the unusual facts of this case, I am satisfied that, notwithstanding the matters referred to in s 186(5), the interests of justice weigh in favour of the discretion being exercised so as to grant leave.
SECTION 69ZW(6)
Does it apply in this case?
On one view, s69ZW(6) may have application to situations where the Court is in control of proceedings where the identity of a notifier may be disclosed. I say that because subsection (6) contains a positive prohibition which is not necessarily linked with the preceding subsections, except subsection (5). Whilst the matter was not argued before me, my view is that construing the section as a whole, subsection (6) is directed to circumstances where the Court has made an order under s69ZW(1), particularly because of the opening words to subsection (6) are “despite subsection (5)”. However in the event that I am wrong, and subsection (6) is a separate stand-alone test which must be met even if no order has been made under subsection (1), it seems appropriate that I consider whether the test is met in this case.
Prejudice to the proper administration of justice?
Mindful of the possibility that s 69ZW(6) may be a stand-alone test, part of the reason why I had the Department notified of these proceedings, and had Mr M appear before me, is because of the obligation on the Court to ensure that the agency in question is notified about an intended disclosure, and given an opportunity to respond, as provided for in subsection (7).
Mr M said that the proper administration of justice required the determination of the child’s best interests, and whether or not the father has been acting so as to potentially destroy the relationship between the mother and the children is a relevant factor in determining where the children’s bests interests lie. If the Court did not have the full facts before it, the proper administration of justice would be prejudiced.
I am satisfied that, to the extent that the intended disclosure might identify that it was the father, or his family members or friends who made many of the notifications, a failure to permit that disclosure would indeed prejudice the proper administration of justice in this case. Given that the identity of seven notifiers are known to the parties, to prevent evidence of their identity being led would prevent the parties from putting their cases fully to the Court; that would prejudice the proper administration of justice. On the other hand, if only seven notifiers are identified in the evidence, that would carry a substantial risk that the Court might be acting on incomplete information and hence misled; that would also prejudice the proper administration of justice.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons I made the orders which I did on 6 November.
I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Tree delivered on 19 November 2014.
Associate:
Date: 19 November 2014
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