Supreme Court
New South Wales
Case Title: RH v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) Medium Neutral Citation: [2013] NSWSC 520 Hearing Date(s): 3 May 2013 Decision Date: 10 May 2013 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Hoeben CJ at CL Decision: Time extended for the bringing of the appeal pursuant to Pt 51B rule 6 Supreme Court Rules 1970.
Appeal dismissed.
No order as to costs.Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - Appeal from Magistrate - offender aged 12 - aggravated break and enter - issue on appeal whether prosecution rebutted presumption of doli incapax - admissions by offender - sufficient evidence to rebut presumption. Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 - s112(2)
Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 - s55(1)(b)
Supreme Court Rules 1970 - s51B rule 6(2)(a)Cases Cited: BP v Regina; SW v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 172
C (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions [1996] 1 AC 1
Fleet v District Court of NSW [1999] NSWCA 363
R v ALH [2003] VSCA 129; 6 VR 276
Regina v CRH (NSWCCA, 18 December 1996, unreported)Category: Principal judgment Parties: RH - Plaintiff
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) - DefendantRepresentation - Counsel: Counsel:
Ms D Yehia SC - Plaintiff
Ms A Mitchelmore/Mr N Kelly - Defendant- Solicitors: Solicitors:
Aboriginal Legal Service (NSW/ACT) Ltd - Plaintiff
SC Kavanagh, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions - DefendantFile Number(s): 2012/324592 Decision Under Appeal - Before: G Dunlevy LCM
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR:
Nature of proceedings
The plaintiff proceeds by way of amended summons for the following orders:1. An order pursuant to s51B rule 6(2)(a) Supreme Court Rules 1970 extending time for the institution of the appeal to 18 October 2012.
2. An order pursuant to s55(1)(b) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 setting aside the plaintiff's conviction.
The appeal is brought pursuant to s52(1) of that Act from a decision of his Honour Mr Dunlevy LCM of 6 July 2012 in which he convicted the plaintiff of the offence of aggravated break and enter contrary to s112(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 which was said to have occurred between 1 and 2 October 2010. At the time, his Honour was sitting as the Wentworth Children's Court.
No objection was raised by the defendant to time being extended for the hearing of the appeal. Accordingly, I make that order.
It was common ground that for the appeal to succeed, the Court had to be satisfied that the decision of his Honour was affected by legal error (Fleet v District Court of NSW [1999] NSWCA 363 at [59]).
The grounds of appeal were:
Ground 1 - The Magistrate erred in law in finding that there was evidence capable of rebutting beyond a reasonable doubt the presumption of doli incapax.
Ground 2 - The Magistrate erred in law in applying an objective test to the question of whether the presumption of doli incapax was rebutted beyond reasonable doubt.
Ground 3 - The Magistrate erred in law in relying on factual matters that constituted no…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read RH v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] NSWSC 520
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered three main grounds of appeal, all focusing on the legal standards and evidence used to rebut the presumption of doli incapax. RH's counsel argued that the magistrate erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and that the magistrate incorrectly applied an objective test rather than assessing RH's subjective state of mind. Additionally, the defence contended that the magistrate relied on facts that merely indicated the commission of the offence, rather than proving RH's understanding of the wrongdoing.
The court held that, while the magistrate's finding regarding RH's maturity was not supported by sufficient evidence and thus should be disregarded, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that RH understood the seriousness of his actions. The court highlighted RH's admissions to his cousin and mother, his boasting about the stolen items, and his actions following the break-in, such as playing on the stolen computer and discarding the stolen balloons in public, as indicative of his awareness that his actions were seriously wrong. These admissions and actions, coupled with the objective evidence of the break-in and theft, provided a comprehensive picture that supported the magistrate's decision. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In resolving this matter, I propose to apply the law as stated by Hodgson JA in BP and SW. In my opinion, his Honour's statement of the law is not only consistent with authority, but is appropriately tempered by common sense.Submissions and consideration The first point made by the plaintiff related to the second ground of appeal, i.e., that his Honour had applied an objective test to the question of whether the presumption was rebutted. That ground of appeal was directed to the observation by his Honour at T.6.1 (6 July 2012) where he said:"I have also taken into account the young person's maturity. He is not that young and by the age of 12 he should be well aware that you cannot break into fire stations, particularly in the modern era of universal education, access to the internet, television, radio and so on." The plaintiff submitted that there was no evidence before his Honour which would justify a conclusion that his level of maturity was that of a normal 12 year old and that accordingly, he should be treated as such. The plaintiff submitted that C v DPP made it clear that the prosecution could not assume normal or average intelligence, but that this was a matter which had to be proved. It was common ground that the relevant test was a subjective one and concerned the state of mind of the particular minor. It could not be applied on the basis of what a normal child of 12 would have known or thought. The only evidence before his Honour as to the plaintiff's level of maturity was the response to his mother when she challenged him about where the computer came from and whether his sister was there, the conversation with his older cousin, CK, that night and on the following day and the comment by his sister that "He's at home playing the computer he stole". Was it open to his Honour to infer from that evidence that the level of maturity of the plaintiff was that of a normal 12 year old. I have concluded, not without some hesitation, that it was not open. The evidence concerning "playing the computer" could refer to very basic operations of it. I should observe that not much more evidence would have been required to enable his Honour to properly draw the inference which he did. Evidence from the plaintiff's mother concerning his performance at school or his behaviour generally, would have been sufficient. Absent that sort of evidence, I agree with the plaintiff that this finding by his Honour as to his maturity was not open and that that aspect of the appeal has been made out. This does not end the matter. What it means is that when considering the evidence which was before his Honour, I have to ignore that finding. The question remains whether by reference to the evidence as a whole, it was still open to his Honour to find that the presumption had been rebutted. Put another way, had the Crown on the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that RH knew that what he did at the fire station was seriously wrong as distinct from an act of mere naughtiness or mischief.