Queensland Police Service v DSL

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CHILDRENS (MAGISTRATES) COURTS OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Queensland Police Service v DSL [2019] QChCM 2

PARTIES:

Queensland Police Service

(Prosecution)

v

DSL

(Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

CCM-00026411/18(1)

DIVISION:

Magistrates Courts

PROCEEDING:

Criminal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Emerald

DELIVERED ON:

6 August 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Emerald

HEARING DATE:

31 July 2019

A/MAGISTRATE:

M Morrow

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Serious Animal Cruelty – Whether intention of inflicting severe suffering to the animal – proof of intention

Criminal Law – Criminal liability and capacity – presumption doli incapax – Where child approximately 12 years and four months at time of offending – Whether presumption of doli incapax rebutted – evidence necessary to rebut

Words and phrases – “doli incapax”, “knowledge of the moral wrongness of the act”, “merely naughty or mischievous”, “morally wrong”, “seriously wrong”.

SOLICITORS:

Sgt P Cramp appeared for Queensland Police Service

Ms Z Craven, Solicitor. ATSI Legal Services (QLD) Ltd for the Defendant.

  1. The defendant child was born on 12 July 2006. At the time of the alleged commission of the two offences on 13 November 2018 he was aged 12 years and four months.

  1. The charges relate to:

1.   That on the 13th day of November 2018 at Blackwater … DSL unlawfully killed an animal namely a number of birds with intention of inflicting severe suffering to the animal

2.   That on the 13th day of November 2018 at Blackwater … DSL without reasonable excuse did discharge a weapon namely a sling shot into a public place namely Rotary Public Blackwater.

  1. The prosecution has called Tracy Sharp, Det Sgt Michael Froggart and Sgt Robert Smith to give evidence.

  1. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to prove each and every element of the offence and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. It is for the prosecution to satisfy the Court that not only is guilt a rational inference that could be drawn from the proved facts, but it is the only inference.[1]

    [1] Shepherd (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 578.

  1. Further, the defendant has not given or called evidence. That is his right. He is not bound to give or to call evidence. The defendant is entitled to insist that the prosecution prove the case against him, if it can. The prosecution bears the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and the fact that the defendant did not give evidence is not evidence against him. It does not constitute an admission of guilt by conduct and it may not be used to fill any gaps in the evidence led by the prosecution. It proves nothing at all, and I must not assume that because he did not give evidence that adds in some way to the case against him. It cannot be considered at all when deciding whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and most certainly does not make the task confronting the prosecution any easier. It cannot change the fact that the prosecution retains the responsibility…

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Details
Case
[2019] QChCM 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Queensland Police Service v DSL involved a minor accused of serious animal cruelty. The court was required to determine whether the child had the requisite intention to inflict severe suffering on an animal and if the presumption of doli incapax was rebutted. The decision of the court was pivotal in assessing the child's capacity to understand the moral wrongness of the act.

The legal issues before the court encompassed the interpretation of the term "doli incapax" and the requirement to prove the child's knowledge of the serious moral wrongness of the offence. The court examined whether the prosecution had provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of doli incapax, which shields children under the age of ten from criminal liability, and whether the child's age and the nature of the offence warranted a higher threshold for rebuttal.

The court, in its reasoning, considered the child's age, which was approximately 12 years and four months at the time of the offence, and the gravity of the crime of serious animal cruelty. The court relied on previous case law, particularly the High Court decision in RP v The Queen, which established that rebutting the presumption of doli incapax requires clear evidence that the child knew the act was seriously wrong in a moral sense. The court noted that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not sufficiently demonstrate that the child had the requisite understanding of the moral wrongness of the act. The court concluded that the child's age and the nature of the offence did not automatically rebut the presumption without clear evidence.

In its final orders, the court found that the prosecution had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of doli incapax, and thus the child's conviction was quashed. The decision underscored the need for clear evidence of the child's understanding of the serious moral wrongness of the act to rebut the presumption of doli incapax.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In C (a minor) v DPP, Lord Lowry said at 181-2, “The fact that the presumption was rebuttable has led the courts to recognise that the older the child (see B v R (1958) 44 Crim App R 1 at 3) and the more obviously heinous the offence, the easier it is to rebut the presumption. Proof of mental normality has in practice (understandably but perhaps not always logically) been largely accepted as proof that the child can distinguish right from wrong and form a criminal intent. The presumption itself is not, and never has been, completely logical; it provides a benevolent safeguard which evidence can remove. Very little evidence is needed but it must be adduced as part of the prosecution’s case, or else there will be no case to answer”. He continued at 187, “The second clearly established position is that evidence to prove the defendant’s guilty knowledge, as defined above, must not be the mere proof of doing the act charged, however horrifying or obviously wrong that act may be.” He concluded that the presumption can only be rebutted by clear positive evidence that the child knew the act was seriously wrong, such evidence not consisting merely in the evidence of the acts amounting to the offence. There was some criticism of the case that the term ‘seriously wrong’ is conceptually obscure. [2005] EWHC 2993; [1995] 1 Cr App R 188. On appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Lowry concluded, however, that its meaning is relatively clear when contrasted with mere naughtiness or mischievousness. This distinction was also adopted in a number of Australian decisions that required proof that the child ‘knew it was seriously wrong, as distinct from an act of mere naughtiness or mischief’. BP v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 172 (1 June 2006) [27]. See also RP v The Queen [2016] HCA 53; (2016) 259 CLR 641; R v JA [2007] ACTSC 51; (2007) 161 ACTR 1; R v ALH [2003] VSCA 129; (2003) 6 VR 276; R v M (1977) 16 SASR 589. The High Court in RP v The Queen confirmed the approach, noting that aside from establishing that the child knew that the offence was seriously wrong in a moral sense, there was ‘the further dimension of proof of knowledge of serious wrongness as distinct from mere naughtiness’. [2016] HCA 53; (2016) 259 CLR 641, 650 [11]. In RP v R (2016) 340 ALR 212; 91ALJR 248; [2016] HCA 53, the High Court quashed convictions of an 11 year old convicted of rape on the basis that the prosecution had not rebutted the presumption of doli incapax in a situation where the prosecution relied principally on the surrounding circumstances of the offences. Keifel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ said: The test can be summarised as follows: Rebutting the presumption of doli incapax in each case will depend on the intellectual and moral development of the subject child, as children do not mature uniformly. For example, while some 10 year old children will understand the serious wrongness of their actions, other 13 year old children will not have that capacity (RP v The Queen [2016] HCA 53, [12]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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