Reynolds & Sherman
[2015] FamCAFC 128
•30 June 2015
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| REYNOLDS & SHERMAN | [2015] FamCAFC 128 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CHILDREN – Child’s surname – Where the mother and father never cohabited and their relationship ended shortly after the mother became pregnant with the child – Where the mother appealed against an order for the child’s surname to be hyphenated – Where the mother was self-represented at trial – The trial judge made statements during the hearing that suggested she had prejudged the matter – The mother was denied procedural fairness because the trial judge did not explain what cross-examination was, or advise of the consequences of not cross-examining – Appeal allowed – Costs certificates granted. FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CHILDREN – Child’s surname – Matters to be considered – The trial judge did not consider whether the orders sought were parenting orders – If the orders were injunctions rather than parenting orders, the trial judge was not obliged to consider the s 60CC factors – If the orders fell within the scope of s 64B(2)(i) they would constitute “parenting orders” and the relevant s 60CC matters would have to be considered – In the absence of full argument it would not be proper to express a concluded view on the issue, but consideration of the relevant s 60CC factors may have assisted the trial judge in determining what orders would be appropriate. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – s 4(1), s 60CA, s 60CC, s 64B, s 68B Federal Proceedings Costs Act 1981 (Cth) |
| Beach and Stemmler (1979) FLC 90-692 Chapman and Palmer (1978) FLC 90-510 Flanagan and Handcock (2001) FLC 93-074 Jurchenko & Foster (2014) FLC 93-598 Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072 Ryan & Burnett [2008] FamCAFC 72 |
| APPELLANT: | Ms Reynolds |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Sherman |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 8456 | of | 2013 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | NA | 64 | of | 2014 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 30 June 2015 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Perth |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | May, Thackray & Aldridge JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 29 May 2015 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Circuit Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 23 October 2014 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2014] FCCA 2275 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPELLANT: | In person |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Whieldon |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Springwood Lawyers |
Orders
The appeal be allowed.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the orders made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 October 2014 be discharged.
The proceedings be remitted for rehearing in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia by a judge other than the primary judge.
There be no order as to costs.
The Court grants to the appellant mother a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred by her in relation to the appeal.
The Court grants to the respondent father a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by him in relation to the appeal.
The Court grants to the respondent father a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 8 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by him in relation to the rehearing of the applications.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Reynolds & Sherman has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
Appeal Number: NA 64 of 2014
File Number: BRC 8456 of 2013
| Ms Reynolds |
Appellant
And
| Mr Sherman |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Ms Reynolds (“the mother”) and Mr Sherman (“the father”) are the parents of a boy named C (“the child”), who was born in 2013.
The mother and the father never cohabited, but were involved in a fleeting relationship that ended shortly after the mother fell pregnant with the child.
Although their relationship has been acrimonious, the parents consented to orders for equal shared parental responsibility, and for the father to spend regular time with the child (with a requirement for them to attend mediation upon the child turning 3 years of age “for the purpose of making arrangements for the child to spend overnight time with the father”). The only issue on which they disagreed was whether the child should have his mother’s surname, or a hyphenated surname combining the names of both parents. As a result, the boy’s name has not yet been registered.
The matter was set down for a hearing (limited to one hour) in the Federal Circuit Court on 2 October 2014. Both parties filed an affidavit, but also referred in their submissions to a comprehensive Family Report.
After a hearing that took about 30 minutes, the trial judge reserved her decision. Judgment was delivered on 23 October 2014, and these orders made:
…
(2) That the child be known only as [C Sherman-Reynolds].
(3)That the parties be restrained and an injunction hereby issue requiring the parties to use the surname [Sherman-Reynolds] at all times, both in writing and orally when referring to the child’s surname.
…
The orders have been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. The mother informed us that the child has continued to be known as C Reynolds.
The Notice of Appeal
The mother initially relied on one vague ground of appeal. At the hearing, we gave her leave to rely on five grounds, which we thought encapsulated the propositions in her Summary of Argument.
Ground 1 – Prejudgment
By this ground it was asserted that the trial judge’s statements throughout the hearing gave rise to an apprehension that she had prejudged the issue.
In support of the complaint, the mother submitted that the trial judge:
10.… entered the courtroom already of the mind to rule in favour of the respondent and she spent the duration of the hearing making assumptions and defending the respondents [sic] requests. She ignored evidence that I put before her and shrugged off information she did not wish to hear. …
The complaint is founded, in part, upon this statement made at the start of the hearing (emphasis added):
HER HONOUR: ... Now, take a seat. I’m just – you’ve really got an hour to do this matter. Just for the benefit of you, Ms [Reynolds] – it is a little trial, so – the father is the applicant. I’m going to ask him, if you wish me to, to go into the witness box and you can ask him some questions. I’ve read your affidavit. I understand your case to be that it’s not in the child’s best interest because you’ve already started calling him [Reynolds]. He has got some little footprints in other little identification documents that are in that name, and that there’s – compound names are difficult, confusing and – I’ve read the whole affidavit so I understand your case. The father’s case is that it’s appropriate to use two names in these circumstances, it’s in the child’s best interest and – I’m probably inclined to favour him at the moment. That’s just a preliminary view. So did you want to ask the father some questions? If you don’t have any, you don’t have to.
With respect to her Honour, the reference to “little footprints in other little identification documents” could reasonably be seen as a somewhat dismissive description of a significant element of the mother’s case. This had been set out at [9] of her affidavit, which detailed all the places where the child’s surname had already been registered as “Reynolds”, or where he was known by this surname. The mother described this in her affidavit as his “social footprint”.
However, the matter of greater concern was that her Honour went on to express a view about the outcome, without having heard any submissions, or being told whether any of the evidence was to be challenged. In our opinion, the imprudence of such a course was not ameliorated by the view being couched as “preliminary”, especially as the mother was not represented.
In Jurchenko & Foster (2014) FLC 93-598, the Full Court expressed concern about judicial officers expressing “preliminary views”, even when invited to do so. As the Full Court said:
28.... the expression of preliminary views leaves a judicial officer open to complaint that he or she viewed the evidence through the prism of their already formed “view”. In our opinion, this is a real danger no matter what efforts are made to explain that the “view” might change as the trial progresses.
29.The remarks of Lord Greene M.R. in Yuill v Yuill [1945] 1 All ER 183 at 189, albeit in a different context, are apt to illustrate the point we wish to make concerning the dangers of a judicial officer descending into the arena before hearing all the evidence and considering counsel’s submissions.
A judge who observes the demeanour of the witnesses while they are being examined by counsel has from this detached position a much more favourable opportunity of forming a just appreciation than a judge who himself conducts the examination. If he takes the latter course he, so to speak, descends into the arena and is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict. Unconsciously he deprives himself of the advantage of calm and dispassionate observation.
30.A further danger with the proffering of a “preliminary view” ... is that it will encourage a party to abandon their original case and to attempt frantic amendments to meet “concerns” expressed in the “preliminary view”. ...
The impression of prejudgment in the present matter, which was created by the expression of the “preliminary view” at the outset of the trial, was aggravated by the way in which the trial judge then seemingly took over the role of the father’s lawyer (even though the father was represented). We do not propose to set out all the relevant parts of the short transcript, it being sufficient to say that each submission the mother made, or attempted to make, was met by her Honour rejecting it, or by putting to the mother what her Honour seemed to perceive to be the strength of the father’s case.
One example will suffice (transcript, 2 October 2014, p 10):
MS [REYNOLDS]: You know. He’s saying that he needs the name for him to bond with the child. The family report says that he has got the bond.
HER HONOUR: I don’t really mind much what either of you think.
MS [REYNOLDS]: Yes.
HER HONOUR: It’s of absolutely little interest to me.
MS [REYNOLDS]: Yes.
HER HONOUR: But how this child is going to grow and develop and what this child needs is what I have to turn my mind to.
MS [REYNOLDS]: Yes. Yes.
HER HONOUR: And so I think it’s really important for this child to have a relationship with both parents.
While it is proper for a judicial officer to test submissions as they are made, we consider that the exchanges between the mother and her Honour compounded the impression that had already been created that the trial judge had made up her mind. In contrast, the father’s submissions (which were ultimately handed up in written form) were not tested at all. There was merely a discussion as to whether it would be better for the mother’s name to appear after the hyphen, rather than before it as the father had proposed.
We accept that the mother did not ask the trial judge to disqualify herself, as she would have been entitled to do. Instead, she enquired at the end of the hearing about her right of appeal. However, as was properly conceded, the failure to object at the time is not fatal to the mother pursuing this complaint.
In our view, Ground 1 is made out and the appeal must be allowed on this basis. Nevertheless, we will also address the other grounds of appeal.
Ground 2 – Procedural fairness
The second ground asserts that the trial judge erred in failing to afford the mother procedural fairness. This complaint is intertwined with the first ground, but we propose to deal here with a further concern about the hearing.
In dealing with Ground 1, we recited the trial judge’s opening remarks, which concluded with her Honour enquiring: “So did you want to ask the father some questions? If you don’t have any, you don’t have to.” The mother responded to this enquiry by saying: “Actually, I kind of do have some questions.”
However, the proceedings were then diverted into a discussion of the mother’s anxiety about having just been handed the father’s submissions. At the conclusion of that discussion, and notwithstanding that the mother had already said she did “kind of … have some questions”, her Honour asked the mother: “Do you wish to cross-examine the father?” The mother responded: “No. No, your Honour.”
The trial judge did not then ask the mother why she had seemingly changed her mind, nor explain what was meant by “cross-examine”; which we consider should have been done in circumstances where the mother had already said that she did wish to ask questions. More importantly, her Honour also failed to advise the mother of the consequences of not cross-examining. Counsel for the father then advised that he did not have any questions for the mother and her Honour then announced: “Well, that means the trial is over.”
Our interchange with the mother satisfied us that she was unsure what “cross-examination” involved. It was also apparent that she had no conception that the trial judge was entitled, in the absence of cross-examination, to accept the father’s evidence. The mother advised us that she disputed the father’s evidence and, after we had explained the consequences of not doing so, assured us that she would want to cross-examine if there was a rehearing.
As the Full Court explained in Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072, a trial judge should ensure, as far as is possible, that procedural fairness is afforded to both parties to ensure a fair trial. Amongst other things, the Full Court said that a judge should:
·inform a self-represented litigant how the trial will proceed;
·advise the self-represented litigant that he or she has a right to cross-examine (which, in our view, must also involve ensuring the litigant knows what “cross-examine” means); and
·draw attention to the law (where the interests of justice require it).
The failure of the trial judge to explain what was meant by cross-examination, and the consequences of not cross-examining, fell short of what was required. The result was not only that the father’s evidence was not tested, but that her Honour was then left to make her assessment of the father by reference only to documents prepared for him by his legal representative.
The opportunity for the trial judge to make her own assessment of the father was essential in circumstances where an important part of the mother’s case was a concern that the father may “disengage” from the child, leaving him with a surname to bear as “the reminder of a man who deserted him” (mother’s affidavit at [13]). Instead, the trial judge proceeded on the basis of what appears to us to be no more than assumptions about the likely future relationship between father and child, and the impact that the choice of name would have on that relationship. We will revisit these assumptions when we come to the complaint about the adequacy of the reasons. It is sufficient at this point to say that we also find merit in Ground 2.
Ground 3 – Taking account of an irrelevant consideration
By this ground it was alleged that the trial judge failed to take account of relevant considerations and took into account irrelevant considerations.
Given the merit in other grounds, it is unnecessary to engage with the complaints under this heading, save in relation to her Honour’s statement at [11] that “the mother concedes that she possesses a surname that is different from her own mother’s name”. It was, in fact, the father who made this claim, and it was not conceded by the mother, who assured us that she had borne the same name as her mother throughout her childhood. (The statement in [11] is couched in the present tense, and is now strictly correct, but the implication was that her Honour was dealing with the period when the mother was a child.)
In responding to a proposition from the bench, the mother submitted that it could not be assumed that the erroneous finding had no impact on the decision, because her Honour went to the trouble of including it in her reasons. While seeing the force of that argument, we consider that the offending statement was no more than an introduction to what followed in her Honour’s reasons.
In declining to discuss the balance of the complaints under this ground, we have in mind our intention to order a rehearing. The judge who hears the matter should be free to determine the relevant considerations, and the weight to be given to them, without regard to any views we may hold.
Ground 4 – Failure to give adequate reasons
By this ground it was asserted that the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons, in particular by incorrectly characterising the mother’s arguments and failing to address arguments that she advanced.
The mother drew attention to [11] of the reasons where, under the heading of “The Welfare of the Child” her Honour said:
In her affidavit the mother concedes that she possesses a surname that is different from her own mother’s name. She concedes that she lives in a mixed family and that there are many people who dislike hyphenated names. The mother lists the reasons for not having a hyphenated name and they are as follows:
a) It is a nuisance;
b) It has to be spelt out on the phone;
c) A hyphen can be misconstrued as a complex virus attack in computing;
d)The surname has to be shortened to fit forms and computing systems;
e)When contacting companies it is time consuming to find the persons file;
f)It is impossible to write their names on their homework sheets and lunch boxes;
g)When children with hyphenated surnames become teenagers they want to drop a surname but cannot decide which one; and
h)What surname will the child give their own children if they ever get married to someone also with a hyphenated surname?
The trial judge then went on to find at [12]:
...All of the indicia that the mother raises as concerns about the child’s surname really go back to the question of mere convenience and that is not a sufficient reason to object to the hyphenated name.
The mother’s first complaint is that the matters listed at [11] were not her concerns, but rather had been identified in her affidavit as concerns expressed to her by other people who had hyphenated names. We accept this is how the concerns were framed in her affidavit; however, we find no error in the trial judge treating them as if they were also the mother’s concerns, since their inclusion in her affidavit must be seen as her adopting them. This is not to say that we agree that the concerns should have been so readily dismissed.
The second complaint is that her Honour was wrong to say at [12] that “all of the indicia that the mother raises as concerns about the child’s surname really go back to the question of mere convenience”. The mother submits that this finding overlooks all the other reasons she expressed at [7] to [15] of her affidavit. We do not propose to set out those out in full, it being sufficient to say that they are manifestly not matters of “mere convenience” and go to the very heart of the best interests of the child.
However, [11] and [12] of the reasons must be read with the balance of the judgment, and it seems to us that the trial judge at [12] was referring only to the concerns expressed at [11]. Later, her Honour went on to discuss other issues raised by the mother that were not matters of mere convenience, for example, the possible embarrassment to the child (see [15]-[17] of the reasons).
We accordingly find no merit in this part of the complaint, which is not to say that we necessarily find her Honour’s reasons persuasive. In particular, we have some concern about [13], which was central to her Honour’s reasoning:
The father submits that the welfare of the child would be benefitted from the child possessing an identity with both families and an understanding of where he fits into each family. I accept that submission. The child will never live with his father in the current arrangements that are in place and if he does, it certainly will not be while the mother is living there as well. The child has two parents and I consider it is in his best interests to have a hyphenated surname. As a matter of his welfare, a hyphenated surname would benefit the child possessing an identity with both families.
Although we accept such matters may be seen as falling within a trial judge’s discretion, we consider that this line of reasoning comes dangerously close to a presumption in favour of hyphenating a child’s surname where the parents have different surnames. The corollary of the proposition would seem to be that the many children who grow up bearing the name of only one of their parents will not “possess an identity” with the family of the other parent and will not have an understanding about where they fit into each family. It would seem to us that many factors other than the child’s name would be more likely to affect these outcomes. However, in the absence of expert evidence, it would arguably be unsafe to make assumptions either way.
Apart from the more general assumption just discussed, we consider that her Honour’s reasons also proceeded on other assumptions that may not necessarily have been well founded. In particular, we have in mind the findings at [9] that:
·as a consequence of the agreement to share parental responsibility, “both parents will take a role in decision making for the child as the child grows”; and
·because there was a consent to the father having gradually increased time with the child, “the father will have incrementally increased the time he spends with this little child”.
These assumptions may be justified, but they could not be made automatically in face of the mother’s concerns about the father “disengaging” from the child, which were presumably fuelled by the fact that the father initially denied paternity when contacted by the Child Support Agency. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Family Report writer (while disclaiming expertise in such matters) said that giving the child a hyphenated name “may in part reduce the risk of the father disengaging from his son should disputes over parenting arrangements and the like be marked by further difficulties”.
The fact this issue was worthy of mention in the Family Report reinforces why we consider the trial judge should have attempted to form an impression of the father, since her Honour could then have attempted to engage with the mother’s concern about the impact on the child if he was required to take the name of a father who later “deserted” him. Instead, that issue was not addressed.
We therefore find some merit in this complaint.
Ground 5 – Failure to consider the matters in s 60CC
By this ground it was asserted that the trial judge failed to follow the requirements of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) by not giving consideration to the factors set out in s 60CC to the extent they were relevant.
The first question that arises is whether the orders the subject of this appeal were “parenting orders” within the meaning of the Act. If they were, then the child’s best interests were the paramount consideration (by operation of s 60CA); thus, her Honour would have been obliged to consider the matters in s 60CC to determine what order would be in the child’s best interests.
On the other hand, if the orders were injunctions within the meaning of s 68B, then the child’s best interests would not be the paramount consideration, and the failure to consider the factors in s 60CC would not constitute error (albeit a failure to have regard to best interests would almost inevitably warrant appellate intervention): Flanagan and Handcock (2001) FLC 93-074.
Subparagraph 64B(1)(a) of the Act provides that a parenting order is “an order under this Part ... dealing with a matter mentioned in subsection (2)”, which in turn relevantly provides that:
(2) A parenting order may deal with one or more of the following:
…
(c) the allocation of parental responsibility for a child;
…
(i)any aspect of the care, welfare or development of the child or any other aspect of parental responsibility for a child. …
Section 64B(3) provides:
Without limiting paragraph (2)(c), the order may deal with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long‑term issues in relation to the child.
The phrase “major long-term issues” is defined in s 4(1) as meaning:
issues about the care, welfare and development of the child of a long-term nature and includes (but is not limited to) issues of that nature about:
…
(d) the child’s name; …
Boland J considered s 64B(2)(c) when exercising the appellate jurisdiction of the Court in Ryan & Burnett [2008] FamCAFC 72. In that case, the father sought the following orders (at [24] of those reasons):
Each of the father and mother henceforth exclusively use the [hyphenated surname] as the name of the child, until now known as [current name] and not cause or permit any other person to use any name other than [the hyphenated surname], as the child’s surname.
The father be authorised to apply to the Registrar of the Births Deaths & Marriages to change the name of the child previously registered as [current name] to [the hyphenated surname] AND at all institutions and authorities at which the child’s name is recorded.
Boland J opined at [51] that the orders sought “could be regarded as a parenting order dealing with one aspect of the allocation of parental responsibility rather than a mandatory injunction under s 68B”, but her Honour did not express a concluded view, given that the matter was not argued before her. Her Honour also did not make any reference to s 64B(2)(i).
In the present matter, the father sought no orders relating to the child’s name in his Initiating Application. However, he sought these orders in his affidavit (at paragraphs 33-35):
That the parties do all such acts and things and sign all necessary documents to cause the Registrar of Births Deaths and Marriages ... to register the child’s name as [C Reynolds-Sherman].
That the parties be restrained, and an injunction is hereby granted restraining the parties, or either of them, from using or being complicit in the use of any name for the child other than [C Reynolds-Sherman].
In the event that the father and mother or either of them fails, refuses or neglects to execute any document or do anything necessary to give effect to the orders above ... the Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia shall be and is hereby appointed to execute any deed or instrument in the name of the party, and do all acts and things necessary to give validity to the operation of the deed or instrument.
The only relevant order sought by the mother in her Response was for the child “to be formally registered on the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages as ‘[C Reynolds]’”.
The trial judge was not asked to consider whether any of the proposed orders would constitute a “parenting order”, although in her reasons she characterised part of the relief sought by the father as being “an injunction”. Given that the matter was not raised below, and given that we do not have the benefit of full argument, it is not proper to express a concluded view as to whether Order 2 was a “parenting order”. However, our tentative view is that an order dealing with a child’s name falls within the broad terms of s 64B(2)(i) and is therefore a “parenting order”.
If our tentative view is correct, her Honour was obliged to consider the matters in s 60CC, at least to the extent they were relevant. Her Honour did not do so, electing instead to apply authorities such as Chapman and Palmer (1978) FLC 90-510 and Beach and Stemmler (1979) FLC 90-692, which were decided prior to the 2006 amendments that introduced s 64(B)(2) in its present form.
But even if our tentative view is wrong, the child’s best interests were still a most important consideration, and some consideration of the relevant matters in s 60CC would therefore have been desirable. Had her Honour turned her mind to the s 60CC factors, we consider there was much material in the Family Report which may have been of assistance in considering, for example, the mother’s concern about the father “disengaging” from the child. Thus, matters relating to the father’s mental health, anger management issues and the existence of a family violence order were arguably worthy of consideration. Her Honour did not make any reference to the Family Report, even though both parties considered it was in evidence, as they referred to it in their submissions.
The father’s solicitor submitted that the s 60CC matters had effectively been taken into account by the parents consenting to orders for parental responsibility and for the father to spend time with the child. We are unable to accept this submission. Apart from anything else, the consent orders were made without the benefit of any judicial consideration of the s 60CC factors.
In the absence of full argument, our decision to allow the appeal has been made for the reasons earlier identified, rather than because of the merit we perceive in Ground 5.
Re-exercise or remittal
Both parties originally wanted us to re-exercise the trial judge’s discretion if the appeal was allowed. However, when we explained the options to the mother, she altered her position and asked us to remit the matter to allow her to adduce further evidence about circumstances relevant to the child’s name since the hearing and also to challenge the father’s evidence in cross-examination.
Although the father continued to ask that we re-exercise the discretion, his solicitor properly recognised that the more appropriate course would be to remit the matter if the appeal was allowed on procedural fairness grounds.
We have no alternative other than to remit, since the mother wishes to adduce further evidence which may well be controversial (for example, about the many times she says the father has missed visits with the child), but more importantly because the mother wishes to exercise her right to cross-examine.
In remitting the matter, we are mindful that the deficiencies we have identified in the conduct of the trial were likely to have been related to the fact that the matter was listed early in the morning, probably before a busy day in court, and with a time limit of just one hour. We are aware of the pressures of work in a busy trial court, and are therefore sympathetic to the effort her Honour made to resolve the matter expeditiously. Nevertheless, we consider that a dispute about the name by which a child will be known perhaps for his entire life is a matter of real importance. Accordingly, if possible, adequate time should be allocated on the rehearing to ensure the presiding judge is not placed under the same time pressures which the trial judge faced at the first hearing.
Costs
The mother did not apply for costs, but sought a certificate under the provisions of the Federal Proceedings Costs Act 1981 (Cth) to cover expenses incurred in prosecuting the appeal. The mother did not seek a certificate for the rehearing, in which she expects to be self-represented. The father sought a certificate for the appeal and the rehearing.
As we propose to make no order for costs, and as the appeal has been allowed on a question of law, we consider both parties should have a certificate for the appeal and the father should have a certificate for the rehearing.
I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (May, Thackray & Aldridge JJ) delivered on 30 June 2015.
Associate:
Date: 30 June 2015
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