Trott & Bligh (No 2) - [2023] FedCFamC1F 223

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Trott & Bligh (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1F 223

File number: BRC 2766 of 2015

Judgment of: BRASCH J

Date of judgment: 3 April 2023

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW - PARENTING – Where child not seen father since mid-2015 – Where father convicted of one count pursuant to ss 359E(1) and (3)(c) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) and one count pursuant to s 140 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) - Where father deported from Australia in mid-2021 – Where father sought change of residence from mother to him and international relocation of the child – Where, during trial, the father consented to orders the child remain living with the mother and she continue to have sole parental responsibility – Where father and his s 102NA lawyers part ways after the cross-examination of the mother and experts had concluded – Where issues in dispute ultimately very narrow

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - Where, by consent, any fresh Initiating Application is to come before the trial judge prior to service on the other party

Legislation:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Part VII, ss 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 60CC(2), 60CC(2)(a), 60CC(2)(b), 60CC(2A), 60CC(3), 61DA, 65D(1), 65DAB, 68B, 69ZX(3)(b), 102NA, 121

Migration Act (Cth) 1958 s 116(1)(e)(i)-(ii)

Criminal Code1899 (Qld) s 359F

Case cited:
Bielen & Kozma [2022] FedCFamC1A 221

Cotton & Cotton (1983) FLC 91-330

G & C [2006] FamCA 994

Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd and Penrith Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378

Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092; [2022] FedCFamC1A 97

Loddington & Derringford (No 2) [2008] FamCA 925

M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305

Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554; [2019] HCA 21

McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405; [2009] FamCAFC 92

Reynolds & Sherman (2015) FLC 93-659; [2015] FamCAFC 128

Tibb & Sheean (2018) 58 Fam LR 351; [2018] FamCAFC 142

Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 271

Date of last submissions: 13 February 2023

Date of hearing: 6, 8-10 February 2023

Place: Brisbane, Delivered in Sydney

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Ashcroft

Solicitor for the Applicant: Evans Brandon Family Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Collins (6, 8-9 February 2023)

Solicitor for the Respondent: Norris Law (6, 8-9 February 2023)

The Respondent: Litigant in person (9-10 February 2023)

Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms Lyons

Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Legal Aid Queensland
ORDERS

BRC 2766 of 2015

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MS TROTT

Applicant

AND:
MR BLIGH

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

order made by:

BRASCH J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 APRIL 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The child, B born 2011, spend no time with the father.
2.Pursuant to s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975, the father is, whether by himself or any servant or agent, hereby prohibited from:
(a)Contacting the mother save as may be provided in any subsequent parenting order of this Court;
(b)Contacting the child by any means save as may be provided in any subsequent parenting order of this Court;
(c)Approaching at or within 200 metres of the mother's residence or work place save as may be provided in any subsequent parenting order of this Court;
(d)Approaching at or within 200 metres of the child's school;
(e)Attending at or approaching within 100 metres of any venue or any extracurricular activity at or in which the child is involved or participates, is attending or involved in a function or participating activity; and
(f)This order is made for the personal protection of the mother and the child and has attached to it a power of arrest pursuant to s 68C of the Family Law Act 1975 so that if a police officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that the father has breached the injunction by:
(i)causing or threatening to cause bodily harm to a protected person; or
(ii)harassing, molesting or stalking that person;

the police officer may arrest that person without warrant.

3.The mother is permitted and authorised by this Order to unilaterally apply to seek the alteration of the registration of the name (Christian and Surname) of the child B born 2011 in the register of births in the State of Queensland to an alternate name, which may be chosen by her.
4.In the event the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages in the State of Queensland requires the father's signature to carry out an alteration of the registration of the name of the child B born 2011, then the Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia at Brisbane is hereby appointed pursuant to s 106A of the Family Law Act to execute all deeds and documents in the name of the father and to do all acts and things necessary to meet the requirements of the Registry to cause the alteration.
5.In the event the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages in the State of Queensland requires the name chosen by the mother to be explicitly stated in an Order of this court, the mother is hereby granted leave to apply to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia for an Order granting her permission to seek the alteration of the registration of the name of the child B born 2011 in the register of births in the State of Queensland to a specified name, and for that purpose, the Application, any supporting material, and any subsequent Order which state the said name shall not be required to be served on the father and shall not be published or made available on the Court's portal website and instead be sealed and marked "Not to be opened unless by Order of the Court".
6.Pursuant to s 121 of the Family Law Act, the mother have leave to provide a sealed copy of these orders and Reasons to her treating mental health practitioner.
7.The Court requests the Australian Federal Police forthwith remove the name of the child, B born 2011, from the Family Law Airport Watchlist in force at all points of arrival and departure by air or sea in the Commonwealth of Australia.
8.The parties have liberty to re-list the proceedings on matters of interpretation or implementation of these Orders, on the giving of seven (7) days’ notice to the other, by email to associate (via ...@...), copying the other party.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.On 8 February 2023 the following orders were made by consent:
1. That all previous parenting orders be and are hereby discharged.
2. That the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child [B], born […] 2011 (hereafter “the child”).

3. That the child live with the mother.
4. That pursuant to s 11(1)(b) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), the mother is permitted and authorised by this Order to unilaterally apply for and obtain an Australian travel document (or a renewal of such a document) for the child, and the child is permitted to have an Australian travel document, without requiring the father’s consent to such a document issuing from the Australian Passport Office.
5. That the mother be at liberty to remove the child from the Commonwealth of Australia to enable her to permanently relocate her residence or to enjoy an overseas holiday during such times as the child would otherwise be in her care in accordance with these orders.
6.That the mother be and remain at liberty to enroll the child [B] born […] 2011 in school or extra-circular activities with an alternate name, which may be chosen by her.

7. That the mother have leave to provide a sealed copy of these orders to:
(a) The child’s school; and
(b)The child’s treating medical practice/centre, specialist and any allied health practitioners.

8.        The father be at liberty to send a card and/or gift to the child once per year:
(a)       For the child’s birthday; and
(b)       For Christmas
for which purpose, the delivery address shall be care of the mother’s solicitors postal address.
9.That once per year, the mother shall cause an email to be sent to the father’s nominated emailing address, attaching a redacted copy of the child’s end of semester school reports, and for this purpose:
(a)Before doing so, the mother shall be at liberty to redact all identifying details which would reveal the school teacher, staff names, child’s name and any other information likely to reveal the place of enrollment, addresses or identities, including the identity used by the child; and
(b)The father is to provide his emailing address to the solicitors for the mother within seven (7) days of this order.

B.On 10 February 2023 the following Order was made by consent that:
1. In the event either the mother or the father files an Initiating Application seeking new parenting orders, it is requested the registry refer the Initiating Application and affidavit to my chambers prior to the sealing and service of the documents on the other party.

C.The previous orders are set out herein so the parties have one document, which references all orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Trott & Bligh has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BRASCH J:

B was born 2011 and is thus 11 years of age. He last saw his father in mid-2015 when the father took the child from his day care in contravention of court orders for supervised time and specific restraints that were in place at the time.
Backtracking a little from that event in mid-2015, the order of the Family Court of 9 April 2015 included:
The father is restrained from, and an injunction issue restraining the father from:
Attending at, and/or removing [B], or the child [C] born […] 2002 from any school or other organisation attended by that child unless expressly requested, in writing, by the mother to do so;
(Emphasis added)
(Order 13(a) of the orders made 9 April 2015)
The Family Court order also made provision for the child to spend regular supervised time with the father (Order 5 of the orders made 9 April 2015).
Shortly after the Family Court order, a Temporary Protection Order was made in a Magistrates Court of Queensland in early 2015 and it provided amongst other orders:
The respondent is prohibited from attending to or going to the school or other premises where a child of the aggrieved attends.
(Annexure “MT1” to the mother’s affidavit filed 16 December 2022, p.69)
After a session of supervised time between the child and father in mid-2015, the child’s supervised time with the father was suspended.
On 13, 14 and 15 July 2015, the father sent emails to the mother’s lawyer in the Family Court proceedings threatening “to intervene” to protect the child.
On 21 July 2015 and unbeknown to the mother, the father engaged a Private Investigator to find out whether and if so where the child was attending childcare (Exhibits 8 and 13). Page one says: “Surveillance Log prepared for: [Mr Bligh]”. Page two of the report clearly lists the mother as the subject of the surveillance. Nevertheless, it is the father’s evidence, which I accept, that he was really trying to find out if the child was back at kindy (Exhibit 13). However, the father accepted in cross-examination that by having the child subjected to surveillance, he was also having the mother subjected to surveillance.
The surveillance started on the mother’s street. At 7.00 am, 7.38 am, 7.50 am and 7.51 am the Report lists:
Investigator arrived in the vicinity of the given address. No activity is noted.
Subject's known vehicle is observed driving south along [U Street] and then east onto [V Street].
Subject's known vehicle is observed parked within the [AF Childcare Centre] Carpark located at [AB Street] QLD.
…
The front enterence [sic] to the Centre is controlled by a gate and then [sic] appears to be an intercom system to gain access with the complex.
[...]
Contact Client and provide an update.
(Exhibit 8, p.2-3)
Notwithstanding the order of this court and order of the Magistrates Court (extracted above), in mid-2015 the father attended the child’s childcare and removed the child. The father has long maintained the mother sent an email request to his brother requesting the father collect the child. The mother has long maintained her denial of this. A Single Expert, Mr AD (a computer forensics and data analytics expert), was engaged to determine whether such an email or communication was sent by the mother to the brother. As discussed later, the expert could not establish such an email was sent by the mother.
The mother was granted a Recovery Order by the Family Court on 30 July 2015, and B’s name was placed on the Airport Watch List. The Australian Federal Police found the father and child in a hotel room at the AE Hotel, J Town. The child was recovered to the mother.
The child has not seen the father since.
Consequently, on 6 August 2015, the Family Court made an order discharging the supervision orders and made a no-time order for the child and the father. The mother was granted sole parental responsibility for the child. The father was permitted to write to the child, via the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“the ICL”), once per week and to send the child a birthday gift. I have no evidence before me whether any such letters were sent.
A Final Protection Order was made for the benefit of the mother and the child in late 2015.
In or about late 2016 the father was charged with the following:
Count 1: That between [early] 2015 and [late] 2016 at [Suburb AG] and elsewhere in the State of Queensland he [committed an offence] pursuant to ss 359E(1), (3)(c) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).
Count 2: That on divers [sic] dates [in late] 2016 at [K Town] and elsewhere in the State of Queensland he [committed an offence] pursuant to s 140 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).
(District Court Reasons at [1])
After the father was charged with the above two counts he was remanded in custody and spent some years in custody awaiting trial. He mentioned W Correctional Centre at one point in the trial.
In 2016, the Minister of Home Affairs cancelled the father’s Visa relying on s 116(1)(e)(i) and (ii) of the Migration Act (Cth) 1958:
(e)the presence of its holders in Australia is or may be, or would or might be, a risk to:
(i) the health, safety or good order of the Australian community or a segment of the Australian community; or
(ii) the health or safety of an individual or individuals; or
The father’s migration appeals to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Federal Circuit Court (as it was then), and the Full Court of the Federal Court were unsuccessful.
At a time unknown, the father was also charged with two further counts of alleged criminality. The arraignment of the father in mid-2018 was as follows. He entered not guilty pleas to each charge:
[In mid] 2015 at [E Town] in the State of Queensland, you entered the premises of [AF Childcare Centre] [Suburb AC] with the intent to commit an indictable offence in the premises.
[In mid] 2015 at [E Town] in the State of Queensland, you forcibly took away [B], a child under 16 years, with intent to deprive [Ms Trott], the parent of [B], of the possession of [B].
(Exhibit 2, p.1)
For ease of reference, I will call these the child stealing charges.
Upon the father’s arraignment on these child stealing charges, the trial Judge of the District Court of Queensland ultimately directed the jury to deliver not guilty verdicts. The mother said in the Family Court proceedings that was because, at law, a parent cannot steal their own child. The father seemed to say mothers could steal their own child, which he said the mother had done here, but fathers could not. The father wanted me to accept a tender of the Supreme and District Courts of Queensland Benchbooks on the topic. I declined as it was irrelevant to the very narrow issues at hand, and in any event, Rackemann DCJ directed the jury to return not guilty verdicts for the following reasons:
I have concluded that there is no evidence upon which you could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either of the offences. That’s because, in relation to the offence in relation to stealing, there is a defence that, in the case of a child whose parents were not married to each other at the time of its conception and have not since married to each other, the defendant had a claim in good faith to be its father. And the Crown is not in a position to negative that defence.
Accordingly, as a matter of law, you could not find the defendant guilty of the child stealing charge. That being so, you also could not find beyond a reasonable doubt him guilty of the first count, that is, the entering of premises with intent to commit indictable offence, because that count relies on the second count.
(Exhibit 2, p.2)
That is not to say the father did not enter the premises and take the child. Rather, the acquittal only speaks to the culpability of a parent in relation to a biological child under the relevant section of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). Yet, the father’s attendance at the childcare centre was a particular of the separate stalking and contravention charges, of which he was subsequently convicted.
It seems that in early 2020, the father was granted Supreme Court bail. The father said that for a period between early 2020 and sometime in 2021 he was not detained. The ICL said that when the father was bailed, he was placed into Immigration Detention as his Visa had been cancelled. I do not know when the father was placed into Immigration Detention and cannot resolve that because: first, I have no reliable evidence to do so; second, the narrow nature of the disputes before me do not need resolution of this issue; and third, it is nevertheless common ground that the father was deported from Australia in 2021.
In late 2020, the father was convicted of two charges. The judge only trial went for 12 days. The mother was cross-examined. In her evidence before me she described the experience as:
I was extensively cross-examined by [Mr Bligh’s] defence counsel, whose name was [Mr AH] about [Mr Bligh’s] allegations against me, including that [Mr Bligh] maintained that I was an offender and that I was making the facts up to harm him and win the family law case.
I found the trial very arduous and I am concerned that it felt to me as if [Mr Bligh] enjoyed putting me through it all.
It was a long process over the course of days and I was exhausted by it.
I felt unwell and anxious for weeks after it.
(Mother’s affidavit filed 16 December 2022, paragraphs 440-441 and 445-446)
Count 1 originally had 27 particulars. Twelve of the 27 particulars were subsequently withdrawn by the prosecution. Her Honour found 12 of the remaining acts within Count 1 were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Her Honour was not satisfied three particulars were proven. “[B]” in the table below is the District Court’s reference to the child, who is also the subject of these proceeding before me. The mother is the complaint. The particulars of Count 1 that were made out are as follows and include references to the father’s admissions in that trial or her Honour’s findings:

No.

Date

Act by the Defendant

1

27-29 March 2015

Called the complaint and left abusive voicemail messages.

These included:

“I need to know my son is alive and well because you threatened him on multiple occasions, can you please let me speak to him. Thank you, you abusive cunt. Bye”

“Hello I want to know you haven’t killed [B] yet. Will it be OK if I spoke to him? You abusive bitch.”

“Hello I’m just ah wondering if you killed my son yet, or if he’s still alive. If it’s alright I would like to know that he’s still breathing. You abusive animal.”

(District Court Reasons at [56] and [219]).

The defendant admitted he left the messages (District Court Reasons at [141] and [143]). In evidence before this court, he also accepted he called the mother an “abusive cunt”, “abusive bitch” and “abusive animal”.

7

Mid-2015

Made a false complaint to police that the complainant had assaulted her son [B]. As a result, the complainant and her daughter had to speak to police.

The defendant admitted he made a complaint to police about the complainant assaulting [B] (District Court Reasons at [141] and [148]).

11 and 12

13, 14 and 21 July 2015

Emailed the complainant’s Family Court Lawyer and threatened to “intervene” to protect [B] after learning the [B] had not attended kindergarten.

The defendant admitted on 13, 14 and 21 July 2015, he emailed the complainant’s Family Court lawyers and made references to intervening to protect [B] (District Court Reasons at [141] and [152]). The defendant maintained the use of the word “intervene” was not threatening to remove [B] from the complainant (District Court Reasons at [154]).

14

Mid-2015

Attended [B’s] childcare centre.

This is when the father attended on the child’s day care facility and took the child. A Recovery Order subsequently issued.

The defendant admitted he attended [AF Childcare Centre, Suburb AC] where [B] was enrolled (District Court Reasons at [141] and [157]).

17

Early 2016

Called police and accused the complainant of permitting [the mother’s employer] to take photos of [B] in exchange for money.

The defendant admitted he made a complaint to police alleging the complainant had been paid money by [the mother’s employer] so that he could take photos of [B]. The defendant denied he fabricated the complaint (District Court Reasons at [141] and [160]).

20

Late 2016

Planted or arranged for another person/s to plant drugs in the complainant’s car.

The defendant accepted he hired a car of the same model as the car belonging to the complainant in mid-2016.The defendant drove the car and returned the car at 9:51 am two days later. It was suggested in the criminal trial that he had done so to familiarise himself with the kind of vehicle driven by the mother.

On the same day as the car return, the first round of allegations about the mother were made to Crime Stoppers that she sells drugs and hides them under her driver’s seat.

In late 2016, the police went to the complainant’s unit and informed her of the Crime Stoppers allegations made against her. The complainant invited the police into her unit and the police noted they did not notice any paraphernalia suggesting she sold drugs.

A month later, the complainant attended the [Suburb AJ] Police station and was played a number of the defendant’s 000 calls. The complainant was advised to go home and search her car “just for her peace of mind”.

The complainant searched her car and found drugs under her car seat. She rang the police immediately. (District Court Reasons at [278]-[280]).

The defendant denied planting or arranging for someone else to plant drugs in the complainant’s car. (District Court Reasons at [162]).

21

Late 2016

Made numerous electronic and telephone complaints to police and Crime Stoppers alleging the complainant is selling drugs and/or had possession of a gun.

The defendant denied making all but three electronic and telephone complaints to police and Crime Stoppers between mid to late 2016 (District Court Reasons at [165]).

22

Late 2016

Made seven phone calls to 000 claiming the complainant is selling drugs at various locations [in E Town].

The defendant admitted to making seven 000 calls during his interview with police in late 2016 and during his evidence (District Court Reasons at [141], [162] and [299]).

23

Late 2016

Made a phone call to PoliceLink claiming the complainant is selling drugs in [E Town].

The defendant initially denied calling PoliceLink, however, when the recording was played in court, the defendant changed his evidence and admitted it was in fact he who made the phone call (District Court Reasons at [141] and [309]-[310]).

25

8 September 2016

Followed the complainant in her car [in Suburb AJ] and various other locations [in E Town] throughout the day.

The defendant denied he followed the complainant and said he made the calls (referred to in act 22) from home and that he did not follow the complainant throughout the day (District Court Reasons at [318]).

26

9 September 2016

Went to the complainant’s work and approached her car.

The defendant denied he went to the complainant’s work and approaching her car. He said the complainant would not be able to recognise him as he had lost [a lot of weight] since she had last seen him (District Court Reasons at [330]).

Accordingly, upon the particulars above which were established beyond reasonable doubt, her Honour found the father guilty of Count 1. Not only do the particulars speak to the father’s criminality, but for these proceedings, they also speak to his lack of boundaries and the depths to which he would plummet to malign and impugn the mother. They also do not give me comfort that the father would follow directions of others, for example a supervisor, if he was told to do something with which he did not agree.
In short, the father’s conduct in these proven particulars constitute a reign of terror and menace on the part of the father towards the mother and others in her orbit. They also give a secure foundation to Dr N’s opinion (Single Expert psychiatrist) that the father desperately wants to see the child but engages in self-defeating conduct that has the opposite result (Transcript 9 February 2023, p.99 lines 8-17).
For Count 2, the prosecution case was that the defendant attempted to pervert the course of justice by asking his brother and a friend to contact others to falsely claim they were responsible for written and telephone communications the defendant made to police between mid-2016 and late 2016. The phone calls made by the father to his brother and a friend were made from prison. Those communications also formed a particular of the conviction against the defendant, being act 21 in the table above. The calls were recorded by prison authorities and the father knew he was being recorded, for example he said this to his brother in late 2016:
Make sure Make sure you keep working [Ms AL] because she’s the important one. Can’t tell you over the phone because obviously it’s recorded. She needs talking to every day from you, she’s needs legal advice from [Mr AK], between the 2 of you, you need to generate something that saves me. Without it I’m fucked….
(Emphasis added)
(District Court Reasons at [364])
Her Honour was satisfied the prosecution proved the elements of the offence on the criminal standard and thus found the father guilty of Count 2. It is not lost on the Court that the father used electronic communications to commit an offence, when one of disputes before me is whether the child ought have electronic communications with the father.
The father has appealed his conviction. He told me his “primary ground” is an evidentiary point about his Google search history being admitted into evidence in the criminal trial. The father is steadfast in his view that the appeal will be successful.
As for sentencing, the father was released on time served. The father had been in prison on remand for what the mother called “a lengthy period” awaiting trial (Mother’s affidavit filed 16 December 2022, paragraph 447). The father mentioned the number of years in cross‑examination. Restraining Orders were made to protect the mother and are in force until 2035.
The father was deported from Australia in 2021. He now resides in or around D Town, United Kingdom, although that took some time to ascertain:
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Well, where are you giving you evidence from?---
[THE FATHER]: The northern hemisphere.
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Are you not prepared to say where you’re giving your evidence from?---
[THE FATHER]: I – I don’t know what you mean. Well, how – how close do you want it? From the northern hemisphere. I – I don’t know what you mean. What – what point of relevance?
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: A location, sir?---
[THE FATHER]: Do you want country? Do you want hemisphere? Do you want [a] planet?
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.119 lines 22-29)
The child has remained living with the mother in Australia.
Events leading up to and during the trial
On 24 August 2022 the matter was set down for trial commencing 6 February 2023. On 17 January 2023 at a mention before me, the father made an oral application without notice to the other parties to adjourn the proceedings; he was represented by a s 102NA solicitor and barrister. This application to adjourn was on the basis that I ought await the outcome of the criminal law appeal. I dismissed that application for reasons given at the time.
On day one of trial, being 6 February 2023, the father’s second set of s 102NA lawyers made another application for an adjournment. For the reasons given at the time, I dismissed that application but gave the father’s counsel the two days for preparation he sought. I listed the trial to resume at 10.00 am, 8 February 2023.
The applicant mother seeks, in summary, a no contact order. She seeks a continuation of sole parental responsibility, various restraints and some specific issues orders and an order to change the child’s name. It is her case that she is terrified of the father and that he is an unacceptable risk to the child.
The respondent father had sought essentially the same orders as the mother, but in his favour. That is, not only that the child live with him, but the child be relocated to the United Kingdom where the father now resides. It was his case that the mother is a liar, manipulator of documents and fabricator of communications. He also asserted that the mother had hurt the child and threatened to kill him, including when the mother was pregnant with the child. Act 1 of Count 1 included references to the father’s voices message to the mother in early 2015, being the month of separation:
I need to know my son is alive and well because you threatened him on multiple occasions, can you please let me speak to him. Thank you, you abusive cunt. Bye
Hello I want to know you haven’t killed [B] yet. Will it be OK if I spoke to him? You abusive bitch.
Hello I’m just ah wondering if you killed my son yet, or if he’s still alive. If it’s alright I would like to know that he’s still breathing. You abusive animal.
(Emphasis added)
(District Court Reasons at [56] and [219])
At electronic-page 34 of his affidavit, he said:
The truth is in August 2014 I left her. She used threats to harm [B] to keep me living under the same roof.
(Father’s affidavit filed 14 July 2022, p.34)
In addition, in cross-examination the father said in 2014 “[the mother] violently shook [the child]” and “was rough with him a few times later on” (Transcript 9 February 2023, p.120 lines 19-20).
On the balance of probabilities, I understand the timing of the father’s allegations about the mother threatening to kill or harm the child, is that they arose prior to and/or around separation.
Yet, at electronic-page 64 of his affidavit the father said, “I cannot prove the mother has made threats to harm or Kill [B]”.
In any event, on 7 February 2023 the father filed a Further Amended Response wherein he changed his position to seek orders that the child live with the mother and he have weekly supervised video calls with the child. He agreed that the mother have sole parental responsibility but proposed she consult with him prior to making any final decisions with respect to the child’s education, health and religious and cultural upbringing. He maintained his case that the mother was a liar, manipulator of documents and fabricator of communications. He maintained the mother had threatened to kill the child and had hurt him.
The ICL sought orders reflective of the mother’s position, along with a s 121 order that the mother be able to give her health providers copies of Mr G’s two family reports, a vexatious litigant order against the father and that the Airport Watch List be lifted.
The Consent Orders
On 8 February 2023, when the trial resumed, I made consent orders (Exhibit 1) to the effect that the child live with the mother, she have sole parental responsibility and various specific issue orders.
The father signed the consent orders. Exhibit 1 bares his signature. He said this in cross-examination:
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: …You made some – you agreed to some consent orders a couple of days ago; that’s right, [Mr Bligh]?---
[THE FATHER]: That’s right, yes.
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Yes. Did you sign those orders?---
[THE FATHER]: I did, yes.
[Transcript 9 February 2023, p.119 lines 45-46 and p.120 line 1)
In cross-examination he confirmed he had “dropped” his case that the child relocate and live with him in the United Kingdom:
[ICL COUNSEL]: Is that what you think [B] is going to do? If you can keep these lines of communication open with him you will give him the opportunity to do that?---
[THE FATHER]: Well, what I wouldn’t do – that’s why I dropped the order asking the – your Honour to – to relocate him. I didn’t want him – to force him to do anything and that’s why I didn’t want to force him back to the UK. I would rather he did that of his volition if he chooses to do that. I – I don’t want to force [B] to do anything but I do want if he feels that he needs something different and to have that option...
(Emphasis added)
(Transcript 10 February 2023, p.220 lines 5-10)
The consent order significantly narrowed the issues in dispute.
The issues in dispute on the resumption of the trial
Having made the orders in Exhibit 1, the justiciable controversy before me was whether or not:
·The mother be required to advise and consult with the father when she proposes to make a major long term decision for the child;
·The child have no time with the father, or supervised weekly video calls;
·Communication restraints and Personal Protection Orders be made in favour of the mother and child;
·The father be restrained from applying for travel documents for the child;
·The mother is permitted to change B’s name with the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages;
·To make a s 121 order so the mother can give health providers Mr G’s two reports;
·To lift the Airport Watch List order; and
·To make a vexatious litigant order (but ultimately this was not pressed upon the making of consent orders on 10 February 2023).
On 9 February 2023, and after the applicant mother’s case closed, the father and his s 102NA lawyers parted ways. I do not know why. It does not matter. The father’s legal representatives had squarely, resolutely and clearly put the father’s case, even if it went well outside the narrow scope of the disputes before me. I gave his counsel considerable latitude to explore the father’s various concerns even though they had little, if anything, to do with the orders the father sought such as having weekly, supervised video calls with the child, or not.
The father thereafter acted for himself. At one point, he wanted to withdraw his consent from the orders, but they had already been made. He said he would appeal that. That is his prerogative. It seemed though that he thought that in giving his signed consent for the child to live with the mother, she have sole parental responsibility and other orders, that he was then precluded from telling me that the mother was a risk or an unacceptable risk to the child and that she was a liar, manipulator of documents and fabricator of communications.
Whilst I invited the father to concentrate on the issues in dispute a number of times, I assured him he submit whatever he wanted. And he did.
Thus, it remained the father’s case that the mother was a risk to the child (but perhaps, as he said, not an unacceptable one now given the child’s age) and was a liar, manipulator of documents and fabricator of communications.
On the last day of trial, the parties consented to the making of the following order:
In the event either the mother or the father files an Initiating Application seeking new parenting orders, it is requested the registry refer the Initiating Application and affidavit to my chambers prior to the sealing and service of the documents on the other party.
(Order 1 of the orders dated 10 February 2023)
The father said, and I accepted at the time of the making this order, that it would be more efficient for any application for fresh parenting orders to come before me given the long and protracted nature of this dispute:
[THE FATHER]: We could lose days in trying to get someone up to speed and – speed, you know. It just seems efficient.
(Transcript 10 February 2023, p.172 lines 46-47)
I made that order by consent. In those circumstances, the ICL did not press his application that the father to be declared a vexatious litigant.
I highlight that that order means that any further Initiating Application should come to my attention before it is sealed and served on the other party.
The ICL and mother’s counsel made oral submissions on the afternoon of the last day of evidence. The father said he was not expecting to make submissions that afternoon. With his consent, I made a direction that he file and serve written submissions by 4.00 pm AEST on Monday 13 February 2023.
The father filed his submissions; they were 71 pages long. Much of it largely constituted a critique of the mother’s affidavit and evidence and is very much focused on identifying all the mother’s seeming lies and crimes. Indeed, the opening paragraph of his written submissions highlighted the mother’s apparent criminality with respect to a child (C) who is not the subject of these proceedings:
The first lie I want to bring to the court’s attention is a lie regarding the abduction of [C] from the loving care of the father [a different father to the present] in breach of 363A of the Queensland Criminal Code.
(Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.1)
At page 70 of the written submissions the father said Dr N should give a new report and a new Family Report from a different Report writer, all at the mother’s expense. He also asked for this in his affidavit of July 2022, which is before me. In submissions, he asked for a further day of evidence and the parties be limited to 30 minutes of cross-examination.
It should not be forgotten that when the matter first came before me on 8 September 2022, I made orders giving the father liberty, through his s 102NA lawyer, to ask Legal Aid for funding to ask Dr N questions (Order 1). Separately however, Order 2 allowed the father to pose questions to Dr N, but on the basis he meet the cost of Dr N answering the questions. There is no evidence before me about any inquiries per Order 1. The father also did not take advantage of Order 2; he said he could not afford it, but he did not ask for a costs estimate from the doctor’s rooms. Nor it seems, did he pose questions and send a copy to the ICL so the ICL could request a costs estimate as provided for in Order 2.
In any event, the Court does not conduct applications for further evidence or to re-open a matter by submissions.
The father also made submissions such as (but not limited to):
•Overall, the Coming to Australia section [33-79] must be ruled Void by the court. It is clearly False and includes the advantage gained by the theft of [C] and access and monitoring of all of the respondent’s electronic communications.
•I’m also unsure how the court turns a blind eye to [Mr AM’s] intrinsic role in misdirecting the court to accept the fabricated evidence and façade.
•[Mr G’s] report is void. He admits he’s not a psychiatrist, he can only asses risk under normal circumstances. That does not include where he is fed false information by someone with severe psychological deviance, who clearly fabricated evidence he records as true, voiding the report himself.
•Further [Mr G’s] naiveness and relationship to the mother took a turn not based on the evidence.
•[Mr G] implied that the mothers account that [the mother’s former solicitor] withdrew due to the father is absolutely naïve
•The reason [the mother’s former solicitor] withdrew was that she came under pressure for a relationship with the Principle Register, where she asked the Principle Registrar for a favour and to permit a full custody order on the part of the mother though the evidence didn’t support it at that time.
•[The mother’s former solicitor] even admitted to [the former ICL] she had done such when [the former ICL] came on board.
•[The former ICL] did regret telling me that [the mother’s former solicitor] had got the initial orders as a favour, they were not based on law and [the former ICL] was looking to apply to the court to have supervised contact lifted, when she first came onboard
•Further, the mother's lawyer does not respect that the trial made it clear [B] and I were victims of crime. [B] had in fact been abducted by the use of fraud, and this very court had been leveraged to aid her in committing the crime.
•Respectfully, if the mother was arrested tomorrow, for say fabricating evidence or perjury, [B] would be back in his father's care in a whirlwind and would come out of it happy, healthy, supported and unharmed. Here we are talking about a quick video call
•21 fathers every week die in Australia, due to a sexist bias in courts regarding child access issues.
•This genocide is ultimately caused by the courts' belief a woman can do no wrong, allowing her to bare-faced lie to the court and fabricate evidence to gain possession and once they gain possession the court then rules that possession is 9/10ths the law. If any father still has fight left in him or a sense of justice, the court looks to take all contact away from him.
•It is a fact that the child has been stolen by the use of fraud in contradiction of 363A of the Queensland criminal code. It is a fact that so was his sister [C]. The applicant's lawyer, an officer of the court is aware of such and has supported the theft, including submitting documents that he knew were fabricated and accounts he knew were false.
•Further her lawyer asked a favour of the Principal Registrar because the evidence did not support the orders sort.
(As per original)

While it is patently clear that these issues, along with all others raised by the father, are of critical importance to him, the justiciable controversy before me is of narrow compass.
The father did make written submissions on each topic (see for example, from page 56), but not long thereafter returned to his themes about the mother’s failings. The father’s written submissions also reverted to his positon that the child live with him, he have sole parental responsibility and:
The mother has supervised contact with the child in any form, up to 4 hours per week with the father to organise, and facilitate, the mother is fund.
If the mother receives consent from an elected Psychiatrist, she may have to staying contact twice a year in the UK or Europe.
(Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.71)
However, I have already made Final Orders by consent that deal with whom the child lives and for the allocation of parental responsibility. In the alternative, the father sought the following orders:
The father has up to two hours per week, as his funds allow, supervised contact at the [AA Centre].
The paternal family are allowed to send gifts and cards to the [AA Centre], to be gifted to [B] not more than 7 days either side of Christmas and his Birthday,
The Mother is to cause [B’s] school to email a redacted copy of [B’s] school report to the father.
(Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.71)
I have already made an order by consent encompassing a version of the third of these proposed orders. I have also made an order by consent for the father to send a card and gift to the child for his birthday and for Christmas (Order 8 of the order made 8 February 2023).
However, the other parties had no notice of the newly proposed supervised time-with order or the sending of gifts by the paternal family, or that the school send reports to the father. Nor did they have the opportunity to cross-examination on these topics or make submissions about these belated proposals. The trial proceeded based on the father’s Further Amended Response filed 7 February 2023, which was then brought together in a single document setting out agreed orders and contentious orders, being Exhibit 1. To do procedural fairness to all, it is the father’s Further Amended Response and Exhibit 1 (which shows the agreements and differences between the parties) upon which I will concentrate, along with the mother’s Amended Initiating Application filed 17 January 2023. Those constituent documents define the justiciable controversy.
That said, even if notice had been given of the supervised, physical time-with order, I would not have made it because it lacks certainty both as to when such time would occur and whether the father is able to enter Australia. There is also no requirement that the father give any notice to the mother of his intention to spend time. I also have no evidence about the paternal family and their attitude to the child, much less any evidence directed at how this may affect the child. I would also not cast an onus on the school (a non-party) to email redacted copies of school reports to the father.
So the parties have one document, I will combine my orders from what is still in dispute with notations reciting the consent orders made 8 February 2023 and the consent order of 10 February 2023, with respect to any fresh applications coming before me.
Background
The father was born in 1981 and the mother in 1983. The parties do not agree on the date they commenced cohabitation. The mother contended the parties commenced cohabitation in late 2009 and the father contended the parties commenced cohabitation in late 2010. It is not necessary for me to resolve this for the purpose of the limited issues requiring determination.
The mother has a daughter from a previous relationship, C, born 2002. The parties have one child of the relationship being B, born 2011 (“B” or “the child”).
The mother moved to Australia with C and B in 2012. The father remained in the United Kingdom, but visited the mother and children in Australia. He obtained work with a company and worked on a two weeks on/two weeks off roster in AN Town, which satisfied his visa application. He relocated to Australia in 2013.
The parties separated in March 2015.
At the time of separation, the father was working away in AN Town, leaving the mother to care for the child, notwithstanding the father alleged the mother hurt the child and threatened to kill the child (District Court reasons at [52] and [56]).
The mother filed her Initiating Application on 31 March 2015 and the father filed his initial Response on 8 April 2015.
During the course of this litigation, the father brought a number of Applications in a Case (as they were then), including for the following relief:
Reciprocal care, visa rights, and 100% parental responsibility to be awarded to the Father until the 03/03/2017.
The mother to provide the court detail of each time she has been forcibly evicted from a property by police whilst in the care of a child, within 28 days of the orders becoming available.
The ICL, [name] must make a statement to the court about her use, reliance and history of use of antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs.
…
The child [B] is released (Custody given) to his Grandparents, [Mr AO] and [Ms AP] until contested issues are resolved or further instruction of the court.
The child [B] is released (Custody given) to his Auntie and uncle, [Mr L] and [Ms Q] until contested issues are resolved or further instruction of the court.
The child [B] is released (Custody given) to a mutual friend of both parents “[Ms R]”, until contested issues are resolved or further instruction of the court.
…
The case be moved before the [D Town] family court, so the parents backgrounds can be more accurately assessed.
The child [B] be placed into the custody of [Ms R] by the mother no later than 19:00 on the date of the hearing.
On serving a change of bail conditions, on the court and all parties, the father, [Mr Bligh] be awarded, full custody, visa rights, and parental responsibility of the child [B]
…
Following the mother handing over the custardy [sic] of the child [B], by 19:00 on the date of the hearing, the Mother must have no contact, directly or indirectly, with the child [B], unless approved in writing by the Father and witnessed by a Justice of the Peace
(Application in a case (as it was then), filed by the father on 7 March 2016 and cited, without demur, in the ICL’s submissions).
The application was dismissed on 15 March 2016 by the Acting Principal Registrar. The dismissal was affirmed by Hogan J on review on 24 May 2017.
I appreciate the father may have been unrepresented when drafting this Application in a Case and he may have a learning disorder; I make no criticism of him for these factors if correct. However, the relief he sought gives a good window into the father’s view of the mother and outrageous claims he is prepared to make against others he perceives are against him - in this case the former ICL and his allegations about her use, reliance and history of use of antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs.
In another Application in a Case filed 19 June 2019, the father objected to the parties having leave to inspect documents produced pursuant to a subpoena. In his affidavit he alleged, amongst other things, that the mother’s lawyer had leaked information about the case to the media. The application was dismissed. The father reviewed that and the review was dismissed. He then appealed to the Full Court and that was summarily dismissed.
Material
The mother relied upon:
·Amended Initiating Application filed 17 January 2023;
·Affidavit of Ms Trott filed 16 December 2022;
·Outline of Case Document filed 30 January 2023; and
·Written Submissions dated 10 February 2023.
The mother stated in her Outline of Case she also relied upon “evidence filed in the case of the Independent Children’s Lawyer and prior Orders of the Court.”
The father relied upon:
·Further Amended Response filed 7 February 2023;
·Affidavit of Mr Bligh filed 14 July 2022; and
·Written Submissions filed 13 February 2023.
The father was also provided with a copy of s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) by the Court.
The ICL relied upon:
·Affidavit of Dr N filed 13 May 2016;
·Affidavit of Mr G filed 28 July 2015;
·Affidavit of Mr G filed 26 August 2022;
·Affidavit of Mr AD filed 23 March 2016; and
·Outline of Case Document filed 6 January 2023 in which the ICL also relied upon the Reasons for Judgment in the District Court of Queensland proceedings.
Fourteen Exhibits came into evidence. Upon Court adjourning on 10 February 2022, the parties were sent a copy of the Exhibit list and the Exhibits to assist the father in preparation of his submissions.
The standard of proof in this case is the balance of probabilities. Section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provides:
(1)In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(2)Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a)       the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b)       the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(c)       the gravity of the matters alleged.
It is well settled that it is not necessary for a trial judge, in reaching a decision, to refer to every piece of evidence or argument presented during the trial. In Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [62], Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ said this:
…A judge's reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge's failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party's case.
In Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd and Penrith Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 at 385–386, Mahoney JA said this:
It is not the duty of the judge to decide every matter which is raised in argument.
…
Nor is it necessary for a judge who is exercising a discretionary judgment to detail each factor which he has found to be relevant or irrelevant, or to itemize, for example, in the assessment of damages for tort, each of the factual matters to which he has had regard … Nor is a judge required to make an explicit finding on each disputed piece of evidence. It will be sufficient, if the inference as to what is found is appropriately clear…
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Parenting proceedings – Legal principles.
Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) sets out the relevant statutory provisions applicable to proceedings in relation to children. Section 65D(1) of the Act provides that this court may make such parenting orders as it thinks proper, subject to ss 61DA (equal shared parental responsibility) and 65DAB (re parenting plans and thus irrelevant here). Section 60B of the Act sets out the objects and principles of Part VII as follows:
The objects are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:
•ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
•protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
•ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
•ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.
In Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554, their Honours Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, and Gordon JJ noted at [8] that the focus of the objects was on “ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child”.
Parental responsibility
The parties are agreed that the mother ought continue to have sole parental responsibility with respect to the child; I have already made that order by consent.
That means I am not mandated to follow s 61DA of the Act, which would otherwise require I consider equal time, and significant and substantial time. In short, my consideration of what orders for time and communication is “at large”, albeit conditioned by the relevant considerations in Part VII of the Act.
Best interests of the child
Section 60CA of the Act provides that “[i]n deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to the children, a court must regard the best interests of the children as the paramount consideration”.
The best interests of a child are to be determined by an examination of the considerations set out in s 60CC of the Act. In Tibb & Sheean (2018) 58 Fam LR 351 at [74]–[78], the Full Court made clear that while the Court must “consider” each of the primary and additional considerations in s 60CC, express discussion is not necessary. The relevant considerations are determined by the way in which the parties presented their cases.
The primary considerations set out in s 60CC(2) of the Act are as follows:
•the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and
•the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
In balancing these considerations, s 60CC(2A) of the Act requires the Court give greater weight to s 60CC(2)(b).
Section 60CC(2)(a): a meaningful relationship
In Loddington & Derringford (No 2) [2008] FamCA 925 (“Loddington”) Cronin J held at [169]:
There is no legislative definition of “meaningful relationship” but for there to be a meaningful relationship, it must be healthy, worthwhile and advantageous to the child.
In Loddington Cronin J further added at [173] that an assessment of the benefit to the child must be made according to “the peculiar facts of what the parents are offering”.
In Cotton & Cotton (1983) FLC 91-330 (“Cotton”), Nygh J noted that it was desirable for a child to maintain a meaningful relationship with both parents, however, his Honour stated at 78,252:
… that desirability only operates when there is a chance of a meaningful relationship, which is beneficial to the child. It is not, in other words, a question of contact for contact’s sake. If there is a situation where contact with a parent is, on balance, likely to cause more harm to the child than good, or even is not likely to confer any benefit, then little purpose is served by this Court making orders for such contact. That does not detract from the desirability of the child having a meaningful relationship, but the possibility of a meaningful relationship must first exist.
In McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405 (“McCall”) at 83,476, the Full Court said at [122]:
…No doubt in the majority of cases, there will be a positive benefit for the child having a significant relationship with both parents, but there will also be some cases where there will be no positive benefit to be derived by a child by a Court attempting to craft orders to foster a relationship with one parent, if this would not be in the child’s best interests.
In McCall at [117], the Full Court referred to the comments made by Bennett J in G & C [2006] FamCA 994, where it was said that “the enquiry was a ‘prospective’ one which requires a court to evaluate the extent to which a meaningful or significant relationship with both parents will be of advantage to a child”. In other words, the focus is upon whether the child having a meaningful relationship with a particular parent will be of advantage to the child in the future.
In this matter, the father’s Further Amended Response document sought he and the child communicate once a week for up to one hour and that communication be supervised. The mother sought no contact between the child and the father.
The child clearly has a meaningful relationship with the mother. Mr G said this in cross-examination:
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: …At paragraph 38, you said that:
[B] presented competently for this assessment. I think his relationship with his mother is good and his development is normal.
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Is that right?---
[MR G]: Yes.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.91 lines 33-39)
There is no probative evidence before me that the relationship is anything but that.
However, the child’s relationship with the father essentially ended, at least in an experiential way, in mid-2015. It is the mother’s proposal that that continue. The father seeks involvement in the child’s life and for some form of relationship with him, albeit from afar. I have already indicated I will not make the father’s belatedly sought time-with proposal as it lacks certainty and the other parties had no notice of it. I have also given reasons why I will not entertain orders about the paternal family sending gifts or the school sending redacted reports.
Understandably, the father (when represented) was at pains to point out that s 60CC(2)(a) referred to "the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents” but that is not the be all or end all. The second of the two primary considerations refers to "the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence...". Then any conflict in the two primary considerations is resolved by giving greater weight to protecting children from harm; s 60CC(2A).
With respect to the supervised communications sought by the father, a question that arises is whether such communications will be of benefit to the child, and whether that will be healthy, worthwhile and advantageous to him. I will consider this as relevant through these reasons and in particular, when I consider the father’s supervised communication proposal.
Section 60CC(2)(b): protection from harm
The second primary consideration in determining a child’s best interests, as set out in s 60CC(2)(b) of the Act, is the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
The Full Court in Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092 (“Isles”) summarised the authorities on unacceptable risk since M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 (“M v M”). The Full Court said that while conjecture about the future is based on historical facts and circumstances, it is only the relevant historical facts that need be proven on the balance of probabilities.
I have already set out the two counts and particulars upon which the father was found guilty on the criminal standard in the District Court of Queensland. Thus, those historical facts have been well made out.
It is not for me to look behind those reasons and findings; they have been made and the guilty verdicts stand until and unless the Queensland Court of Appeal quashes either or both. Section 69ZX(3)(b) of the Act allows me to adopt findings, decisions and judgments of any court. The reality is, it is not necessary for me to “adopt” the convictions – as a matter of fact, the father has been found guilty of two charges, the particulars of which constitute egregious acts against the mother, both directly and indirectly.
As I indicated at trial, if the father’s convictions are quashed, then the father would be at liberty to apply to this court submitting there has been a material change of circumstance. In saying that, I make no comment whatsoever whether such an application would be successful or not. I just indicate that would be an option for the father.

Those guilty verdicts and the underlying findings of fact are of considerable concern in these proceedings. They obviously indicate criminal conduct by the father against or directed at the mother, but also behaviour lacking in appropriate boundaries and behaviours which reveal the depths the father would go to impugn the mother - planting drugs in her car; making false reports to the police/authorities about the mother dealing drugs; emailing the mother’s Family Court lawyer and threatening to “intervene to protect [B]”; and, going to the mother’s work. Those behaviours also had an impact on the mother (about which I say more later).
I have set out the particulars of the two guilty verdicts above, which I have found to be a reign of terror upon the mother. I have already referred to the father engaging a Private Investigator to engage in surveillance of the child and thus the mother to find out where the child was attending kindy; this was after supervised time was suspended, but before the father attended upon and took the child from childcare. I expand upon the childcare issue and give a further example of the father’s conduct below.
Mid-2015 - the kindergarten
In mid-2015, the father attended and removed B from his kindergarten and took him. It is common ground that the father did that, but he argued the mother had requested him to do so by email to his brother. Indeed, in the criminal proceedings “The defendant made a formal admission to attending [B’s] kindergarten” (District Court Reasons at [157]).
The events of mid-2015 are relied upon by both parties (amongst other things) to demonstrate the other is an unacceptable risk to the child. The father says the mother deleted an email she sent to his brother requesting he collect the child – deleted both the email from her device but also the email received on the father’s brother’s device. The mother says the father attended the childcare premises and took the child. She denies requesting the father to do so.
It is useful to keep in mind the parameters of the dispute before me. The events of mid-2015 are plainly relevant to the mother’s unacceptable risk and no contact case. However, it is hard to see how it is relevant to the father’s case that the child have supervised video calls with him. For completeness, I will nevertheless consider the father’s case.
The purported email is found in the mother’s statement to police (Exhibit 10, p.5). It reads:
35. This submission by [Mr AK] [the father’s then solicitor] related to an SMS/Email that I had allegedly sent to [Mr Bligh’s] brother, [Mr L] [in mid] 2015 at 11.05pm BST (British Summer Time).
36. The above email refers to me authoring the following:
37. “Hi [Mr L],
Ok then, tell [Mr Bligh] that he can pick [B] up from kindy today.
Just ask him to drop him off there again tomorrow.
[Ms Trott]”
38. I did not author any such email or text message to [Mr Bligh’s] brother [Mr L], or indeed to anybody else regarding this matter. I did not give [Mr Bligh] any permission or authority either directly or indirectly to contact [B] or to remove [B] from his Kindy.
39.I am aware that my DV Court Lawyer has since made inquiries regarding the authenticity of the email that I am accused of sending to [Mr Bligh’s] brother. I have commission an expert Digital Forensic analyst to assess the authenticity of this email I am supposed to have sent to [Mr Bligh’s] brother in the UK.
The words “OK then” suggest the mother was replying or responding to something. But I have no evidence of what that might have been.
Of the apparent email, this is said in the District Court Judgment at [157]:
…He gave evidence that the complainant emailed his brother giving him permission to pick [B] up. Later, after discussions and an agreement with the prosecution, the defendant’s counsel asked the court to disregard the defendant’s evidence that he received any such email, and this answer was not part of the defence case. I have disregarded this evidence…
The father’s counsel could only have made this concession on instructions. Nevertheless, the father maintained in this court that the mother emailed his brother.
The father engaged in a lengthy cross-examination of the Single Expert Mr AD, which, at times, went well beyond Mr AD’s expertise. It was a long discussion about searches, devices, changing names, whether three year olds should be supervised on devices, device colours, last sync date, sign in dates, Google searches and Google pages visited. Doing the best I can, it seems that according to the father, the mother and father shared access to an email address and shared access to his text messages and she was sending messages impersonating the father from separation until on or about mid-2015 (Transcript 10 February 2023, p.211 line 20 to p.215 line 37) or thereabouts. However, the ability to share a device does not prove the mother actually sent or deleted the emails or texts the father alleges were fabricated or manipulated.
It was also the father’s case that because the mother could access his emails and texts, she could (a) delete her request to the father’s brother, and, separately, (b) send vile messages to herself, seemingly coming from the father’s devices and thus him. The mother denied doing any of this. It must also be that the mother could access the father’s brother’s device and delete the apparent request.
I accept this was all very important to the father and he has gone to great trouble to illustrate his points by conducting a lengthy cross-examination of Mr AD and by preparing a 53 page Power Point presentation (Exhibit 7). I appreciate he wants me to make findings against the mother that she is a liar, fabricator of documents and manipulator. However, I again refer to the narrow issues (i.e. the competing orders sought) which are actually in dispute before me. Separately, the father’s fervent focus on the need that I find the mother a manipulator, liar and fabricator of material gives me little comfort that the father would be able to contain himself from perceived wrongs or blights if having supervised video calls with the child. It also raises a concern for the Court that he would use supervised time with the child to prosecute his narrative about the mother with the child.
The father’s focus on the mother similarly highlights how fraught communication would be between the mother and father if they were to consult on major long term decision making as sought by the father.
The factual dispute between the parents about the alleged email request by the mother that the father collect the child could have been resolved by the father (and his brother, albeit, I accept, not a party) co-operating with Mr AD, the Single Expert, who was engaged to analyse electronic devices with respect to the alleged communication. The mother co-operated with the Expert but no such communication of a request was found. However, of the father (and his brother) this was said by the expert:
2.1I am unable to form an opinion as to the veracity or authenticity of the email in question for the following reasons:
2.1.1 I have not been provided with any credentials for any of the email accounts in the control of [Mr Bligh] or [Mr L], who I understand is the brother of [Mr Bligh]; and
2.1.2 I also have not been provided with the alternative electronic copy of the email in question
...
2.3 Further, I note that the order made by the Family Court of Australia on 27 October 2015 state at clause 1(f) "that the parties are to provide direct to you any login or password information, date or device, and comply with any other request made by you". I have not been provided with the information requested above and therefore, have not been able to form an opinion on the email in question.
2.4 I have however, been provided with the login credentials for the Gmail mailbox of [Ms Trott] ([…]). I have undertaken an analysis of [Ms Trott’s] Gmail mailbox and I note that no emails were identified with the following characteristics:
2.4.1 Having been sent to [Mr L] ([Mr Bligh's] brother) [in mid] 2015 at 11:05PM BST; or
2.4.2 Containing the subject "[B]" surrounding the key date.
2.5 I reiterate that no analysis was able to be conducted on [Mr L's] email mailbox ([…]) nor was there any analysis conducted on any electronic copy of the original email.
(Emphasis added)
(Annexure “I” to affidavit of Mr AD filed 23 March 2016, p.66)
It is very much the father’s case that the mother deleted the relevant email. However, the Expert opines:
2.9 Based on my forensic acquisition and analysis procedure, I note that neither of the iPhones appear to have been manipulated or tampered with in any way. That is, I did not identify any interruptions by any corrupt data files where a user may have previously attempted to modify data on those devices
2.10 A forensic analysis of the email log files extracted from each of the iPhones did not identify any dates reflecting the actual sent or received date of the email in question.
2.11 A visual inspection was conducted on the contents of the [Ms Trott's] iPhone 6 and no emails were identified "Sent" from the iPhone 6 referencing the key date.
(Annexure “I” to the affidavit of Mr AD filed 23 March 2016, p.67)
It was the father (and his brother) who did not co-operate with the Single Expert and produce what was requested by the Single Expert. I accept the father cannot control his brother. But that does not help the father evidence his case. The mother did co-operate. I infer the father (and his brother) did not, because the results would not have supported the father’s claims about the mother’s fabrication of emails and other communications.
Alternatively, the father could have called his brother as a witness in his case; but he did not. I do not accept the father’s reasoning that no one asked for him. The father is an experienced litigator. He has been in this court for many years, the District Court where many witnesses were called, in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Federal Circuit Court (as it was then) and the Full Court of the Federal Court. At an earlier mention, I asked the father whether he would have other witnesses in his case; he said no. Given how critical this email issue was to the father, the absence of his brother as a witness in the father’s case is telling. I infer that was because his presence would not have been helpful.
It is also the case that Mr AD’s evidence does not go as far as the father submits; for example, the father submitted that:
…[Mr AD] confirmed she did have my username and password, and she left her home at 2 am to call [Mr L] (exactly as [Mr L] previously said), she put her google on a VPN so law enforcement couldn’t get to it for at least 3 days...
(Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.52)
When asked about obtaining access to the father’s passwords Mr AD said:
[THE FATHER]: And [Mr AD], the next one is 43. That’s Keychain. Can you explain to us what Keychain is, please?---
[MR AD]: Your Honour, my understanding of Keychain is an encrypted service where Apple can store a user’s passwords so that they can easily access facilities or websites without needing to always enter the password. Apple will save your password for you.
[THE FATHER]: Okay. And if you’ve got the Apple ID, the Apple password, you can then access passwords to all the passwords in keychain, I presume?---
[MR AD]: Now, that I’m not absolutely sure of, your Honour. I know it’s very secure. I don’t know that you can access the passwords.
Further, there is no evidence before me that the mother has the skills to remotely access the father’s devices or his brother’s.
Finally, the idea that the mother would request the father to go to kindergarten, collect the child and keep him overnight does not sit comfortably with the Temporary Protection Order (made early 2015) that had been made for her benefit, nor the orders of this court for supervised time made 10 April 2015. Indeed, it is at odds with the orders sought by the mother and made by two courts for hers and the child’s protection.
For the reasons given above, I find the mother did not send the email request as alleged by the father. He has failed to persuade me otherwise.
Instead, the Temporary Protection Order and Family Court orders were clear. The father contravened the orders. I need only be satisfied he did not abide by the orders on the civil standard and I am. Even if I were wrong on the email request, it is incontrovertible that the father attended the child’s educational premises contrary to the Temporary Protection Order.
The consequences of the father’s action was that a Recovery Order issued and the father and child were found by the Australian Federal Police at the AE Hotel, J Town. The child was returned to the mother.
Inspecting the child for bruises
Exhibit 5 contains reports from the Contact Centre. I accept the supervision reports make it plain that the father is completely devoted to the child. It is also the case that the child enjoyed his time with his father in 2015. In cross-examination, the mother accepted that the child had safe and fun time, but “up to when he [the father] started checking the child for bruises”. The context of that is as follows, where despite the presence of a supervisor, this occurred on 10 June 2015:
[Mr Bligh] asked [B] why have you not been in kindy [B] did not answer he was too interested in talking about ninja turtles [Mr Bligh] then said did anyone hurt you and [B] said no they then went outside and played [Mr Bligh] then asked to take off [B’s] shirt so he could see if his shoulders were marked as he said that when [Ms Trott] shakes him it leaves marks for a few days on his shoulders, there were no marks then [Mr Bligh] took a call from what he said was [B’s] kindy they told him that [B] had been out of kindy for two weeks [Mr Bligh] asked if she had given them and notice that she was pulling him out before hand as he was concerned [Ms Trott] had harmed him they said they had to call him back once they had checked [Mr Bligh] became very upset once he had hung up the phone he cried it was sad to see.
Towards the end of the visit [Mr Bligh] was spending a lot of time on the phone i heard him on the phone asking advice on what would happen to him if he did not hand [B] over at the end of the visit [Mr Bligh] then was on the phone to the icl regarding some conditions he had put in place for him to hand [B] over while he was on the phone [B] was trying to get his attention he kept throwing bark from the garden on him to get his attention but [Mr Bligh] was very focused on his phone call….
(As per original)
(Exhibit 5, p.17)
On 11 June 2015, correspondence was sent from the ICL to the parties raising concern about the suitability of the AA Centre and indicating the ICL no longer agreed to the use of the service (Annexure “MT19” to the mother’s affidavit filed 16 December 2022, p.352-356).
Balancing the primary considerations
When balancing the two primary considerations, the mother and ICL submitted that the balance swings in favour of protection from harm. I infer the father would say the balance favours the meaningful relationship, but given he proposed his video calls be supervised there must be some recognition on his behalf for the need.
The ICL’s counsel submitted, on the particulars of the criminal charges alone, I would find the father an unacceptable risk to the child. I agree. Yet there are extra layers to the father’s conduct which, taken as a whole, support that finding. Thus, on the combination of the father’s criminal convictions and the particulars thereto, engaging surveillance on the child (and therefore the mother) (Exhibits 8 and 13), inspecting the child for bruises, and the father’s unbridled views about the mother, the balance squarely remains on protecting the child from harm. Those harms for the child are primarily emotional and psychological harms derived from a combination of: the father taking the child from child care contrary to orders, and therefore taking the child from the child’s residential parent; inspecting the child for bruises and being preoccupied with his lawyer when the child ought have been having beneficial time with the father; and, the relentless undermining of the child’s mother, which saw mother and child moving homes, and the child moving childcare facilities. All of those factors speak to the father’s lack of appropriate boundaries, inability to contain himself when pursuing a point, and his self-defeating conduct.
The father’s dogged pursuit of the mother had no regard, or any real and considered regard to the impact that may have upon her and thus her parenting of the child. Whilst the mother may have done a sterling job in shielding the child from the impacts on her and her views of the father (as is the evidence of Mr G), what I say here is directed at the father and his conduct. His conduct cannot be excused by saying the child is doing all right. That speaks more to the mother’s capacities and strengths in the very difficult circumstances created by the father, than to exonerating or ignoring the father’s conduct because the child is seemingly unaffected.
Nevertheless, I cannot stop there. I will consider the additional considerations below (Bielen & Kozma [2022] FedCFamC1A 221).
It is a separate question whether I can mitigate the unacceptable risk posed by the father to the child by the supervised video calls he seeks. As said, I also must ask if such time would be healthy and beneficial to the child. I will consider these questions when I turn to the relevant s 60CC(3) factors and the specific orders in dispute.
SECTION 60CC(3) - ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Court must have regard to each of the “additional considerations” under s 60CC(3) of the Act, separately, to consider how, together, they should give effect to either or both of the primary considerations in order to determine the child's best interests. I set these out in turn below.
(a) any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child's maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child's views;
Mr G said this:
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Now, did you ask [B] any questions as to whether he wanted to talk to his father, whether he wanted to – whether he was curious or anything of that nature?---
[MR G]: Yes.
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay. Now, [Mr G], your reasons for not disclosing it, what are they?---
[MR G]: I was worried about putting too much on the record because the father has a history of [criminal] behaviour and I didn’t want to escalate that risk.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.87 lines 9-14)
[MR G]: I asked him about his father, whether he wondered about his father and what had happened in the past. He said he didn’t know very much about all of that, but he knew there were some things. Sometimes, he is curious about his father, who he is, what he does, but he indicated that it didn’t really go much further than that. He said that he wouldn’t be prepared to meet him at this stage or have contact with him, and he didn’t really know how he might feel about that in the future. He was quite nervous talking about that part of things and that’s more or less where it was left with him. He didn’t have a bad image of his father in the sense that he was curious about him and it didn’t appear to me that he had received much in the way of negative commentary about his father in his absence. So I would say, in that sense, there has been some preservation of that concept for him, but he doesn’t really have a lot of information other than that.
(Emphasis added)
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.88 lines 11-22)
In the circumstances of this matter, I place considerable weight on the child’s views. I do so, because the child’s voice needs to be heard. On the evidence before me, he is not seeking to engage with his father. Whilst his views do not control the outcome, they are nevertheless important. There is no evidence before me that the child’s views are anything but genuine.

Suffice to say, I do not accept the father’s submission, “I am however able to control myself”. His conduct, affidavit, evidence in cross-examination and submissions paint the opposite picture.
Rather than focus on the video communication orders, the father’s insistence that the mother be subjected to a lengthy cross-examination and his submissions that I find she is a liar, manipulator and fabricator of documents again concerns me, and I find, that the father will struggle to contain himself or stay on point if talking to the child and thinking the mother has done something wrong or has blighted him in some way.
On the issue of a telecommunication devices it is also not lost on the Court that one of the father’s convictions involves the following:
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: And that the crime you were convicted for involved the use of a telephone system?---
[THE FATHER]: That’s correct.
(Transcript 10 February 2023, p.188 lines 39-40)
In other words, he had no hesitation in using a telecommunication system to commit a criminal offence. This again demonstrates the father’s lack of boundaries and lack of self-control by resorting to whatever means were available to him to advance his agenda against the mother. It was another act on his part which was self-defeating.
The father also submitted that the unacceptable risk that the mother poses will subside in six months if the child has a relationship with the father (Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.63). I have not found the mother is an unacceptable risk to the child; I have found the converse – the father is.
Both the mother and ICL submitted that I would find: the father is an unacceptable risk of harm; I could not be satisfied that he could contain himself; and, if the father said something inappropriate on a supervised video call the “Jeannie would be out of the bottle”, to use a phrase said by the mother’s counsel in submissions. I agree. Supervision would be reactive; that is, for example, ending a call after the father said something inappropriate.
I also have no evidence before me about how AA Centre would supervise the communication and the skills of the supervisor. Nor did I have any evidence before me AA Centre had been advised of this. To that end Mr G said:
[MR G]:…in terms of whoever might be supervising it it would need some consistency about who that person was over time. And someone with considerable, sort of, communication and interpersonal skills.
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: But given the father’s intractable narrative, [Mr G], there would be a risk that - - -?---
[MR G]: If it – if that were – if that was something that emerged in a conversation, I mean, I – I suppose, a supervisor would have to make a quick decision about how to – how to respond to manage that in a way that doesn’t upset the child at that point.
I do not even know if they are available to conduct such supervision.
It was also the mother’s case that if the father had the means to contact the child, that would also provide the means for the father to unlawfully stalk the mother, of which he has been convicted in the past. I accept that to be so.
The father has proven himself able to engage a Private Investigator to see if the child was going to kindy. He accepted in cross-examination that in doing so he was also having surveillance on the mother. If the child gave a little bit of information about his location or school, there would be nothing stopping the father from engaging a Private Investigator again, as he has done in the past. Indeed, the father also gave rather chilling evidence when he was asked that if he was videoing with the child, he might work out the child’s location and then get a Private Investigator to follow the child home. The father responded that he could easily engage an investigator:
… to be honest, if I rung up a private investigator and said to them, I want you to locate [Ms Trott] for me they would go locate [Ms Trott] for me so this is just like trying to make something up.
(Transcript 10 February 2023, p.217 lines 38-41)
Further, video calls would also place the child in an untenable situation if the father asked him what school he attended or where he lived, but the mother or supervisor told the child not to answer such questions. I find that the possibility of that burden is not one the child should carry or be exposed to a risk of that happening.
Mr G, the Family Report writer, was asked this:
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: [Mr G], there remains some outstanding issues between the parties and the one I wish to ask you about is an outstanding issue as to whether the father could communicate with the child by the telephone or a messenger service with supervised contact. That’s an order, in general terms, that the father is seeking. Can you comment on that? Do you think that is in the best interest of [B]?---
[MR G]: I don’t think it’s in the best interests of [B].
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: And why is that, [Mr G]?---
[MR G]: There’s a pattern of behaviour dating back to when I did my first report where the father has not complied with any real boundaries of supervision, taking matters into his own hands at points in time and caused some trauma to the family. Mainly, the mother and child during those occasions. His narrative about the mother’s position being lies and that he has been the victim of that, to broadly summarise it, is basically the same as it was seven years ago. And I don’t have any real surety that – that such a form of contact would be passing a benefit to [B] without considerable risk.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.80 lines 21-36)
He was then asked:
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: …The issue that I would like you to cast your mind to, please, is whether [B] should have supervised telephone time with his father and the level of risk, if any, that is created for [B] by having supervised telephone contact?---
[MR G]: I think I’ve answered the first part of your question just previously so I will just tend to the second part. It’s difficult to be very specific about the degree of risk but I can only go from what I know about the father and the contact that I had with [B]. I think that the father used his contact with [B] as a form of protection for [B] and that he has a vehement narrative about the mother and about the history that he finds difficult to contain. I think that supervision of him in that context would be difficult for anyone. There has been past supervision of the father with [B] and that has been problematic. I don’t see any change in his behaviour. In terms of the actual possible effect on [B], [B] knows very little about past events and he hasn’t really been apprised much by his mother about what has occurred except in the general sense. I think he’s at a particularly difficult age in terms of making the transition to adolescence. [B] may find it difficult to place into context – things might come – that might come out in that phone call and I’m sure he will have questions as well about why and what happened in the past and why he hasn’t seen his father for that long. I’m not sure what sort of conversation they could have in that context but I think that the risk though of it having a detrimental effect upon [B] would be fairly high.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.81 lines 11-30)
His evidence continued:
Well, I mean I think the father finds it very difficult to keep his comments to himself and his views. It may be possible that he can do that over a long period of time which, I assume, is what we’re talking about here but I think it’s unlikely. I think that the father has in the past posed a high degree of risk to [B] and I couldn’t say with any surety that that would be diminished in any new context.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.81 lines 37-43)
The questions about the impact of communications between the child and father continued:
…Further to that if [B] is having or spending some phone contact with his father, albeit, supervised, he would have a lot of processing to do about that. What it means? Why it’s occurring and what happened in the past? The father can present very persuasively. He has a strong personality. He doesn’t back down over anything at all or very much that I can think of and I think that could be troublesome and confusing for a boy of his age.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.83 lines 21-26)
The Report Writer was then asked about supervised video communications and the probability of the father expressing his views about the mother to the child give the father’s strongly held opinions about the mother. Mr G said:
… I can just say he has a lot of trouble keeping his opinions to himself. A lot of trouble.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.83 line 45)
Finally, the idea of preparing the child for communication was explored:
…In terms of [B] he would need to be prepared for that in the sense of providing him with the context as to what was going to be happening and how. He might need some counselling about that before it happened, if it was to happen, just to help him understand it. So those things could – could possibly support [B] somewhat. I think the mother’s – the mother’s support for the process would also be important. So by support I mean she may be against it but she – if she had the resilience to try to help [B] with it anyway that would be a supportive factor also.
…
…I’m not necessarily suggesting counselling. I mean this has been a long-term matter. I do think though that the father’s focus may not be necessarily upon what [B’s] needs are. He – he – I mean if he’s – if he’s casting the mother still in the same light, if he feels that he’s the victim in this process and that he still has to rescue [B] somehow I think it would be difficult to think that he has the maturity to engage in a process that would be good for [B]. But he may – like, he may have made some efforts along those lines. It may have come out through these proceedings but it’s – I think it’s a key issue in terms of whether this is something that would benefit [B]. Of course, it’s very important for children to know, understand and have some identity association with both parents. In this situation it’s a matter of whether the risks outweighs that and the father’s – the father’s internal attitude and behaviour are really the only markers that are going to indicate whether he’s capable of that from his position.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.85 lines 10-38)
As already extracted, the father confirmed in submissions he “will not change his beliefs” (Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.59). I accept Mr G’s opinions above, as they are based on factual foundations amply made out before me as per the findings I have made.
I find that if the child would need some form of counselling to prepare him for communications, and in circumstances where the child does not wish contact with his father and has not seen him since mid-2015, along with my findings that the father could not contain himself if he thought something with the child or mother was awry (from his perspective), then, in those premises, I would be making an order for communications for the sake of it. I see no benefit to the child in making such an order. It would no doubt be of great benefit to the father to communicate with the child, but it is the child’s best interests, which are paramount. Indeed, ordering video communications firmly falls into the category of case of which was spoken in Cotton:
It is not, in other words, a question of contact for contact’s sake. If there is a situation where contact with a parent is, on balance, likely to cause more harm to the child than good, or even is not likely to confer any benefit, then little purpose is served by this Court making orders for such contact. That does not detract from the desirability of the child having a meaningful relationship, but the possibility of a meaningful relationship must first exist.
I am also not prepared to make an order dependant on the father’s finances for the reasons already given – that is, expectations not being met.
I now turn to whether supervision would mitigate the unacceptable risk posed by the father. As found, I have no confidence that the father would be able to restrain himself or regulate his behaviour if communicating with the child or abide by directions from a supervisor. I have formed that view due to his criminal convictions (and more so, the particulars that were made out on the criminal standard of proof) which reveal words and actions of an anti-social nature directed at the mother and those within her realm. He has also proven himself unable to abide by Family Court and Magistrates Court orders when he took the child from childcare in contravention of the Temporary Protection Order and orders of this court. He considered it appropriate to inspect the child for bruises when on supervision. He has engaged a Private Investigator in the past and could do so again if the child gave him some hint to his whereabouts. Such is his disregard for law and order that he was found guilty of attempting to pervert the course of justice.
I am also not prepared to place the child in the invidious position of hiding identifying factors from the father, if the father asked him but the mother or supervisor told him not to answer.
The father’s very poor views of the mother remain palpable - they dripped from his 71 pages of submissions and rung true and clear when he was speaking for himself after his second s 102NA lawyers withdrew. I am not satisfied the father would be able to contain himself from sharing his views about the mother with the child.
For all the reasons expressed, I am not satisfied that supervised calls will mitigate the unacceptable risk which the father poses to the child. For example, if the father has “wound himself up” (to quote him) and calls the mother a horrible name over the video, the child has heard it and the supervisor will be dealing with a “Jeannie out of the bottle” (to quote the mother’s counsel).
I also conclude that if weekly calls occurred, even supervised, that would have an impact on the mother. I have previously set out the appalling things the father has called her. I have already set out the mother’s fear and anxieties about him, and actions she has taken to keep herself and the child shielded from the father. I am satisfied that video calls would cause the mother concern and a vigilance as to whether the father would be able to use clues as to their whereabouts to again engage a Personal Investigator to find their residence and/or the child’s school. There is no benefit to the child in having his parent in that state. In all that has happened in this matter, I do not need expert evidence to form the view that weekly video calls, even if supervised, will have a negative impact on the mother. It is a matter of common sense.
The child will be able to maintain some links to his father should the father send him letters and gifts as provided for in the final consent orders made on 8 February 2023.
Whether the mother be required to advise the father when she makes a major long term decision for the child
The father sought this order in his Further Amended Response filed 7 February 2023:
8. That in exercising sole parental responsibility:
(a) The Mother is to inform the Father of the decision he intends to make for the child via email;
(b) The Father is to respond within 7 days of receiving the communication and indicate his position and reasons for his position in relation to the decision the Mother intends to make;
(c) The Mother is to inform the Father of the final decision made within forty-eight (48) hours of the making of the decision.
In his written submissions, the father said:
The mother has shown that she gained custody of [B] dishonestly.
Both [B] and I are victims of crime. [B] was abducted. Our relationship was damaged by the fraud and deception of the mother.
It is merely disrespectful to punish the father for the mother's fraud.
This can have no negative consequence to [B], by contesting this the mother proves the point. It’s not about [B], it’s about punishing me for leaving her.
(Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.59)
Given the father does not believe a word the mother says, I do not know how he would then accept anything she said when consulting. I also do not know how he would accept any document she sent through because of his unwavering view she manipulates and fabricates material.
There is no communication between the parties.
Mr G was of the view that remain:
… just in terms of the communication, no. There’s really no capacity to communicate and, in fact, the best preservation here is that they don’t communicate
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.86 lines 25-27)
I agree. On the parties’ history as provided in these Reason, the mother’s experiences of the father and the father’s strident view she is a liar, manipulator of documents and fabricator of communications and on his submissions above, I cannot see how anything productive would be achieved by ordering this regime proposed by the father.
It is, frankly, a recipe for disaster.
Whether communication restraints and Personal Protection Orders be made in favour of the mother and child
Proposed Order 5 (Exhibit 1) would prohibit the father “by himself his servants and agents from communicating with the child or by placing any call or message to a mobile telephone service or device in the possession of the child”.
Proposed Order 6 is a raft of s 68B orders prohibiting the father or his servants or agents from contacting or approaching the mother or the child or from attending any location where the mother may reside or work, or the child’s school.
It seems to me that proposed Order 5 is encapsulated in proposed Order 6(b) which enjoins the father or his servants or agents from contacting the child “by any means” other than as court ordered. ‘By any means’ has the widest possible coverage, hence proposed Order 5 is redundant.
Exhibit 14 is a Restraining Order made in the District Court of Queensland, pursuant to s 359F of the Criminal Code (Qld):
1.[Mr Bligh] is prohibited from directly or indirectly, personally or otherwise, having, or attempted to have, any contact with [Ms Trott].
2. [Mr Bligh] is prohibited from communicating or attempting to communicate with, either directly or indirectly, [Ms Trott].
3.[Mr Bligh] is prohibited from following or surveilling, by any means, either directly or indirectly, [Ms Trott].
4. [Mr Bligh] is prohibited from harassing or intimidating, either directly or indirectly, [Ms Trott].
5.[Mr Bligh] is prohibited from threatening or attempting to threaten, in any manner, [Ms Trott].
6.[Mr Bligh] is prohibited from approaching, or attempting to approach, within 100 metres of [Ms Trott].
7.[Mr Bligh] is prohibited from approaching, entering or remaining at, within 100 metres of any place of employment of [Ms Trott].
8. [Mr Bligh] is prohibited from approaching, entering or remaining at, within 250 metres of any place of residence of [Ms Trott], and, in the case of an apartment complex, within 250 metres of any entrance of the complex.
9.[Mr Bligh] is prohibited from contacting, either directly or indirectly, the employers of [Ms Trott].
10.[Mr Bligh] is prohibited from taking photographs of, or in the general direction of, [Ms Trott].
It is in force until late 2035.
The Restraining Order is of benefit to the mother, but does not name the child. That is unsurprising because the guilty verdicts were in relation to the mother as complainant.
One would have thought a person in the father’s position would wish to give the other parent the comfort of agreeing to such orders as an indication that he would leave the child in peace. Or, put more frankly, as an assurance that he would not take the child contrary to orders again. But, the father did not:
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: You oppose orders 5 and 6 which are injunctions and they’re things about you contacting the child or the mother except outside of the orders. Do you remember those injunctive type clauses?---
[THE FATHER]: Yes, they’re just ridiculous, aren’t they?
(Transcript 10 February 2023, p.220 line 46 to p.221 line 3)

Given the criminal convictions and particulars therein, along with the father’s actions of attending upon and taking the child from kindergarten contrary to orders, and having surveillance placed on the child and thus the mother, I have no hesitation in making the Personal Protection Orders sought by the mother and ICL, which restrain the father for contacting or approaching the mother and child, and from attending on specific premises where they may be.
Whether the father be restrained from applying for travel documents for the child;
In court, the father thought there was no point in this proposed order:
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: You oppose an order that you are restrained from making an application for an Australian travel document or a travel document in another country for the child; is that correct?---
[THE FATHER]: Yes.
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: Why?---
[THE FATHER]: Because it’s a ridiculous order. Why would I – I’m in the UK. [Ms AQ] was in Australia what is the value of that order?
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: All right. You - - -
[HER HONOUR]: But you don’t apply for a UK one?---
[THE FATHER]: It would be like restraining me from - - -
[HER HONOUR]: What about that you don’t apply for a UK one?---
[THE FATHER]:What a UK travel document for [B]? Yes, no. That – that – that would be relevant but I can’t do that anyway. I can’t – I can’t just – you know. You’re on about something criminal or something. I can’t do that. You know I can’t apply for a travel document for [B].
[HER HONOUR]: Well, why are you opposing it then? If it’s not a problem why are you opposing it?---
[THE FATHER]: Because – because the injunction has no value, does it? Because if it’s a criminal act that’s like putting an injunction on me that I can’t murder anybody.
[HER HONOUR]: Well, no, I don’t follow that, sir:
The father is restrained from making an application for an Australian travel document or a travel document in any other country for the child.
It’s saying you can’t get a UK passport, for example, for [B]?---
[THE FATHER]: What are you – what are you – I’m not – if I’m in the UK I’m beyond the jurisdiction anyway so if – it’s pointless because, you know, the – the order doesn’t travel well here and it’s not something that I’m looking to do or would do. It is just like one of them – it’s like have a little niggle at him. Just pretend – pretend that he’s – you know what I mean? I’ve never done anything like that.
(Emphasis added)
(Transcript 10 February 2023, p.221 lines 40-47 and p.222 lines 1-23)
In submissions, the father wrote:
Again, this is not an order that in any way relates to [B] or his best interests. It is simply the mother's need to belittle and cause domestic violence.
[B] lives in a totally different country. I am the most honest, brutally honest person out there.
I lived in Brisbane for [,,,] years as a free man. I was unable to work, and all my time was my own. I went nowhere near the mother or [B] or tried to remove him from anywhere.
The mother has proven it was her who sent me to collect [B] from Kindy, and this is just a gloat that she got away with it.
It has no value, serves no purpose and is just an unlawful insult, the court tenders as an act of domestic violence by the mother.
(Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.59)
Despite what he submits, it troubles me that the father, at least twice, in cross-examination referred to being beyond the jurisdiction of this court when giving evidence. He seemed to suggest that he could do whatever he liked because he was “beyond the jurisdiction anyway”. The Court’s orders are made in personam – that is, against the mother and the father personally wherever they may be. The mother however intends to have the orders of this Court registered in the United Kingdom.
The father’s criminal conduct, lack of boundaries and demonstrated self-help but self-defeating actions lead me to conclude these order ought be made.
Whether the mother is permitted to change B’s name with the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriage
On 5 March 2018 an interim order was made allowing the mother to enrol the child in school and in extra-curricular activities with an alternate name of the mother’s choosing. I also made an order to that effect as a final order by consent on 8 February 2023.
The mother, supported by the ICL, sought further name orders to the effect that the mother be able to change the child’s name on the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages, without reference to or signature from the father.
It was submitted by the ICL that it stands to reason that the mother would have acted on the 2018 interim order and would have changed the child’s name for school and extra-curricular activities. The father agreed that that order be made as a final order. He did not however agree to the child’s name being changed on the Registry.
In cross-examination the father was asked about this:
[THE FATHER]:… if we start changing names and that and she’s how she is, so manipulative, he will have no way of finding his dad. That’s – that’s gone. He won’t be able to know who it was…
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.124 lines 39-41)
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: Why not?---
[THE FATHER]: Because a part of his identity is his name and I want him to develop well.
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: Right. An order was made in this court, wasn’t it, for the mother to be able to enrol [B] in a school and in any extracurricular activities in an alternate name which won’t be chosen by her. That’s Spink Rs order, your Honour, 5 March 2018.
HER HONOUR: Yes. I’ve got that one.
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: You’re aware of that, aren’t you, sir?---
[THE FATHER]: Yes. And I think she has the right to that with – with – with – with schools you can do that easily anyway. That’s - - -
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: Right. So if he has been known by a different name since, let’s assume, on or about – early 2018 if the mother changed – if the mother changed the records to reflect that what difference would that make to you?---
[THE FATHER]: What difference would it make?
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: Yes?---
[THE FATHER]: To me. It’s not about me, is it? It’s about [B].
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: Well, wouldn’t it be less confusing for him if the name he was known at school, I assume by his peers, teachers and the like, is reflected on his official documentation so he doesn’t get confused?---
[THE FATHER]: What do you mean get confused? He knows that that’s a name that he has got at the minute and hopefully he knows his real name.
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: Are you - - -?---
[THE FATHER]: He would be more confused if – he would be more confused when he grows up and he finds out that his dad’s name isn’t what he thought it was, you know. That – that – that will harm his development. He’s better off knowing that his dad’s name is this and his – his name is this.
(Transcript 10 February 2023, p.223 line 28 to p.224 line 16)
The father wrote in his submissions:
Not to keep beating the drum, but [B] and I are victims of crime.
It is established the mother gained custody of [C] and [B] by perjury, fraud and deception.
This order is not an order that anyone could consider in [B’s] best interests, it is an erosion of his roots and thus identity. It’s an insult to [B], and it’s an insult to me, simply for the purpose of allowing the mother to conduct domestic violence against [B] and I.
It must be noted that the arguments for these orders swiftly go pathetic. [Ms Trott] had sat in a known location for a week, making submissions that if I knew where she was and when I could have her followed home.
It shows the non-genuine concern for [B]. This is all just a show. An attack on [B’s] dad.
It was clear at no time more than when [Dr N] told the court if the mother had fabricated the evidence the court was already aware she had, that it would mean she was the severest of unacceptable risk to [B].
Rather than heed his warning or change tack, her honour shut [Dr N] down and the other parties prevented [sic] they did not hear it.
(Father’s written submissions filed 13 February 2023, p.59-60)
I have already extracted the transcript of the apparent shutting down of evidence above.
I accept that the last name Bligh is a link to the child’s “roots and thus identity”. However, I accept the ICL’s submission that it stands to reason the child was given an alternate name for education purposes since early 2018. That father consented to that as a final order.
Hence, I cannot see how having one name for the purposes of schooling and extra-curricular activities, but having a different name for other purposes would be helpful or beneficial to the child, let alone in his best interests. The best interests of the child is the paramount consideration in determining whether a name should be changed (Reynolds & Sherman (2015) FLC 93-659 at [54]-[55]). I do not consider it to be in the child’s best interests to have one name for school and extra-curricular activities and another for all other purposes. That would raise confusion and inconsistency for the child. It would also have him likely asking question why he was Bligh when he went, say, to the doctor, but another name for his most predominant engagement at his age, school.
I will make the order proposed by the mother and ICL but observe that in terms of the child knowing of his father, I made a final consent order that the father send a card and gift to the child on his birthday and at Christmas. The link or connection to his paternal identity remains open.
Whether to make a s 121 order so the mother can give health providers Mr G’s two reports
The mother was asked this and answered as follows:
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: Would it be helpful for you if her Honour made an order for her reasons for judgment and the orders that are made to be able to go to your treating mental-health practitioner to give them some background so you don’t have to relive this whole process – as less as you have to, anyway? Would that be helpful for you?---
[THE MOTHER]: Yes.
(Transcript 9 February 2023, p.110 lines 36-39)
The father did not make any submissions about this.
Even if he did and I missed it in his 71 pages (and assuming he opposed it), I will nevertheless make the order proposed by the mother and ICL. It will save the mother reliving her past experiences of the father and his conduct by having to tell her story – where relevant – to health providers.
Whether to lift the Airport Watch List order
The ICL’s counsel submitted:
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: … Whilst I was going back throughout the orders on 14th of – sorry, 1 December 2017 Carew J made an order which enabled the mother to leave the country. It appears from part A that there may be and – a current PACE – Australia Federal Police order for this child - - -
HER HONOUR: So - - -
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: - - - so that’s going to need to be lifted as well because otherwise one would foresee the mother having to keep applying if she would like to go overseas.
HER HONOUR: Yes. Sure.
[ICL’S COUNSEL]: And given she has got relatives overseas that would be appropriate.
I cannot see a submission from the father on this point.
Even if he did and I missed it in his 71 pages (and assuming he opposed it), I will make the orders to lift the Airport Watch List. By consent, the mother has sole parental responsibility. By consent, the following orders have also been made on a final basis:
4.That pursuant to s 11(1)(b) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), the mother is permitted and authorised by this Order to unilaterally apply for and obtain an Australian travel document (or a renewal of such a document) for the child, and the child is permitted to have an Australian travel document, without requiring the father’s consent to such a document issuing from the Australian Passport Office.
5.That the mother be at liberty to remove the child from the Commonwealth of Australia to enable her to permanently relocate her residence or to enjoy an overseas holiday during such times as the child would otherwise be in her care in accordance with these orders.
(Orders 4 and 5 of the orders made 8 February 2023)
When the parties are agreed that the mother can secure a passport for the child and leave the Commonwealth, it makes no sense whatsoever to keep the child’s name on the list.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and seventy-one (271) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Brasch.
Associate:
Dated: 3 April 2023

File number:	BRC 2766 of 2015
Judgment of:	BRASCH J
Date of judgment:	3 April 2023
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW - PARENTING – Where child not seen father since mid-2015 – Where father convicted of one count pursuant to ss 359E(1) and (3)(c) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) and one count pursuant to s 140 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) - Where father deported from Australia in mid-2021 – Where father sought change of residence from mother to him and international relocation of the child – Where, during trial, the father consented to orders the child remain living with the mother and she continue to have sole parental responsibility – Where father and his s 102NA lawyers part ways after the cross-examination of the mother and experts had concluded – Where issues in dispute ultimately very narrow FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - Where, by consent, any fresh Initiating Application is to come before the trial judge prior to service on the other party
Legislation:	Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Part VII, ss 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 60CC(2), 60CC(2)(a), 60CC(2)(b), 60CC(2A), 60CC(3), 61DA, 65D(1), 65DAB, 68B, 69ZX(3)(b), 102NA, 121 Migration Act (Cth) 1958 s 116(1)(e)(i)-(ii) Criminal Code1899 (Qld) s 359F
Case cited:	Bielen & Kozma [2022] FedCFamC1A 221 Cotton & Cotton (1983) FLC 91-330 G & C [2006] FamCA 994 Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd and Penrith Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092; [2022] FedCFamC1A 97 Loddington & Derringford (No 2) [2008] FamCA 925 M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68 Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554; [2019] HCA 21 McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405; [2009] FamCAFC 92 Reynolds & Sherman (2015) FLC 93-659; [2015] FamCAFC 128 Tibb & Sheean (2018) 58 Fam LR 351; [2018] FamCAFC 142 Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	271
Date of last submissions:	13 February 2023
Date of hearing:	6, 8-10 February 2023
Place:	Brisbane, Delivered in Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Ashcroft
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Evans Brandon Family Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr Collins (6, 8-9 February 2023)
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Norris Law (6, 8-9 February 2023)
The Respondent:	Litigant in person (9-10 February 2023)
Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Ms Lyons
Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Legal Aid Queensland

BRC 2766 of 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MS TROTT Applicant
AND:	MR BLIGH Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

order made by:	BRASCH J
DATE OF ORDER:	3 APRIL 2023

No.	Date	Act by the Defendant
1	27-29 March 2015	Called the complaint and left abusive voicemail messages. These included: “I need to know my son is alive and well because you threatened him on multiple occasions, can you please let me speak to him. Thank you, you abusive cunt. Bye” “Hello I want to know you haven’t killed [B] yet. Will it be OK if I spoke to him? You abusive bitch.” “Hello I’m just ah wondering if you killed my son yet, or if he’s still alive. If it’s alright I would like to know that he’s still breathing. You abusive animal.” (District Court Reasons at [56] and [219]). The defendant admitted he left the messages (District Court Reasons at [141] and [143]). In evidence before this court, he also accepted he called the mother an “abusive cunt”, “abusive bitch” and “abusive animal”.
7	Mid-2015	Made a false complaint to police that the complainant had assaulted her son [B]. As a result, the complainant and her daughter had to speak to police. The defendant admitted he made a complaint to police about the complainant assaulting [B] (District Court Reasons at [141] and [148]).
11 and 12	13, 14 and 21 July 2015	Emailed the complainant’s Family Court Lawyer and threatened to “intervene” to protect [B] after learning the [B] had not attended kindergarten. The defendant admitted on 13, 14 and 21 July 2015, he emailed the complainant’s Family Court lawyers and made references to intervening to protect [B] (District Court Reasons at [141] and [152]). The defendant maintained the use of the word “intervene” was not threatening to remove [B] from the complainant (District Court Reasons at [154]).
14	Mid-2015	Attended [B’s] childcare centre. This is when the father attended on the child’s day care facility and took the child. A Recovery Order subsequently issued. The defendant admitted he attended [AF Childcare Centre, Suburb AC] where [B] was enrolled (District Court Reasons at [141] and [157]).
17	Early 2016	Called police and accused the complainant of permitting [the mother’s employer] to take photos of [B] in exchange for money. The defendant admitted he made a complaint to police alleging the complainant had been paid money by [the mother’s employer] so that he could take photos of [B]. The defendant denied he fabricated the complaint (District Court Reasons at [141] and [160]).
20	Late 2016	Planted or arranged for another person/s to plant drugs in the complainant’s car. The defendant accepted he hired a car of the same model as the car belonging to the complainant in mid-2016.The defendant drove the car and returned the car at 9:51 am two days later. It was suggested in the criminal trial that he had done so to familiarise himself with the kind of vehicle driven by the mother. On the same day as the car return, the first round of allegations about the mother were made to Crime Stoppers that she sells drugs and hides them under her driver’s seat. In late 2016, the police went to the complainant’s unit and informed her of the Crime Stoppers allegations made against her. The complainant invited the police into her unit and the police noted they did not notice any paraphernalia suggesting she sold drugs. A month later, the complainant attended the [Suburb AJ] Police station and was played a number of the defendant’s 000 calls. The complainant was advised to go home and search her car “just for her peace of mind”. The complainant searched her car and found drugs under her car seat. She rang the police immediately. (District Court Reasons at [278]-[280]). The defendant denied planting or arranging for someone else to plant drugs in the complainant’s car. (District Court Reasons at [162]).
21	Late 2016	Made numerous electronic and telephone complaints to police and Crime Stoppers alleging the complainant is selling drugs and/or had possession of a gun. The defendant denied making all but three electronic and telephone complaints to police and Crime Stoppers between mid to late 2016 (District Court Reasons at [165]).
22	Late 2016	Made seven phone calls to 000 claiming the complainant is selling drugs at various locations [in E Town]. The defendant admitted to making seven 000 calls during his interview with police in late 2016 and during his evidence (District Court Reasons at [141], [162] and [299]).
23	Late 2016	Made a phone call to PoliceLink claiming the complainant is selling drugs in [E Town]. The defendant initially denied calling PoliceLink, however, when the recording was played in court, the defendant changed his evidence and admitted it was in fact he who made the phone call (District Court Reasons at [141] and [309]-[310]).
25	8 September 2016	Followed the complainant in her car [in Suburb AJ] and various other locations [in E Town] throughout the day. The defendant denied he followed the complainant and said he made the calls (referred to in act 22) from home and that he did not follow the complainant throughout the day (District Court Reasons at [318]).
26	9 September 2016	Went to the complainant’s work and approached her car. The defendant denied he went to the complainant’s work and approaching her car. He said the complainant would not be able to recognise him as he had lost [a lot of weight] since she had last seen him (District Court Reasons at [330]).